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ABSTRACT 
 
The destructive force of the far-right was tragically witnessed through the mass devastation 
brought about by World War II. The international community sought to prevent the repetition of 
such destruction through the establishment of institutions, such as the United Nations, and the 
adoption of documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Jurisprudence and conventions on a supranational level directly 
prohibit speech and expression of the far-right with, for example, Article 4 of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination prohibiting racist associations and 
racist expression. Nevertheless, we are living in a world where violent far-right entities, such as 
Golden Dawn of Greece, have received unprecedented electoral support, where xenophobic 
parties have done spectacularly well at the latest European Parliament elections, where the 
United Kingdom has voted to leave the European Union and where Donald Trump has been 
elected as the next president of the United States of America. As such, the far-right is no longer a 
phenomenon of the past. It is one of the present, rising at swift and worrying rates.  
 
In this light, the study analyses how supranational bodies, namely the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe and the European Union, require their members to tackle right-wing 
extremism either directly, or through the regulation of by-products of right-wing extremism, such 
as hate speech. The adherence to international obligations is examined through an assessment of 
two jurisdictions, namely, England and Wales and Greece. For purposes of this thesis, supra-
national obligations emanate from, inter alia, instruments such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination and the European Convention on Human Rights. It must be noted that, on 
an EU level, there is also a centralised mechanism in the form of Article 7 TEU which can, in 
theory, be used against Member States which embrace a far-right ideology or, potentially, 
tolerate the far-right. However, this tool has never been used. The dissertation considers the 
means and methods adopted by the jurisdictions under consideration to interpret and apply 
international and European obligations through their national legal systems along with a broader 
conceptualisation of their legal and judicial approaches to right-wing extremism.  
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The country analyses commence with an assessment of their adherence to international and 
European obligations, the thesis looks at the case-studies’ domestic frameworks in the realm of 
challenging far-right movements. For both countries, there is a legal analysis of how central 
rights and freedoms, such as non-discrimination, expression, assembly and association, are 
established by law. For England and Wales, it proceeds to look at the role of criminal law in 
relation to the far-right, assessing the public order ambit which is the one most habitually used to 
challenge the rhetoric and activities of the far-right. This is followed by an evaluation of recent 
anti-terror legislation which has come into play in relation to the regulation of violent elements 
of the far-right movement. After looking at criminal law and how it deals with ensuring public 
order and countering terror, the assessment of England and Wales looks at how national law 
treats political parties before registration and during their functioning. The purpose is to 
determine what tools and sub-tools are available and can be used for challenging far-right parties 
contesting elections. From the above-described analysis, it is concluded that the legal framework 
of England and Wales embraces the significance of the freedom of expression but readily allows 
for the limitation of speech if issues of public order, terrorism or anti-social behaviour arise. 
Assemblies are also readily prohibited if public order or anti-social behaviour issues arise. What 
is clear is that this case-study is not willing to proscribe associations if such associations do not 
amount to terrorist organisations.  
 
In relation to Greece, the dissertation assesses the principal legal instrument that tackles issues 
relevant to challenging the far-right, namely the criminal law framework and particularly the law 
on the punishment of racially discriminatory acts, and relevant provisions of the Greek Penal 
Codes such as those on racial aggravation and criminal and terrorist organisations. It also looks 
at the non-discrimination law which is relevant to this case-study given Golden Dawn’s 
provision of services to Greeks only. It became evident from the analysis that relevant legislation 
has seldom been relied upon to challenge the far-right in Greece, a reality which has led to a state 
of impunity for the criminal activities of Golden Dawn and an issue that has become a key 
concern for national and international human rights institutions and non-governmental 
organisations. Although some members of Golden Dawn were convicted for their criminal 
activities and the Court recognised their affiliation with Golden Dawn, before the murder of an 
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ethnic Greek, no steps were taken against the organisation. The chapter incorporates an analysis 
of the legal basis of the ongoing trial against Golden Dawn. Furthermore, the chapter also looks 
at how national law treats political parties before registration and during their functioning. This 
analysis demonstrated that political parties, even ones with dangerous and undemocratic 
intentions, can register and function without limitations with the only point of State intervention 
being when such entities cross into the threshold of a criminal organisation, as was the case of 
Golden Dawn.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 14 
1.1 Thesis of the Study 14 
1.2 Research Subject 
1.2.1 Extreme Right-Wing Parties, Groups and Movements: Examples and Illustrations 
1.2.2 ‘Triggering Factors’ Exploited by the Far-Right 
1.2.2 (i) Immigration and Islamophobia 
1.2.2 (ii) Ethnic Minorities and the LGBTI Community 
1.2.2 (iii) Finances and Political Dissatisfaction 
1.2.2 (iv) Concluding Comments on the Make-up of the Far-right in Europe 
1.2.3. The Extreme-Right: An Ideology against Human Rights 
14 
14 
19 
20 
28 
34 
36 
38 
1.3 Genesis of the Research Topic 40 
1.4 An Assessment of Two countries: England and Wales and Greece 41 
1.5 Originality of Research 43 
1.6 Methodology and Structure 45 
 
CHAPTER ONE: DEFINITIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
50 
1. The Extreme-Right and Related Terms 
1.1 The Extreme-Right: Semantics and Notions 
1.2 The Extreme-Right: Structural Framework  
1.3 The Extreme Right: Key Characteristics  
1.4 Nationalism  
1.5 Race and Racism 
1.6 Racial Discrimination 
1.6.1 Semantics and Notions 
1.6.2 Victims of Racial Discrimination 
1.6.3 Differential Treatment: Direct and Indirect Discrimination 
1.6.4 Intention to Discriminate  
1.7 Religion as a Ground for Discrimination 
1.8 Hate Speech  
1.9  Hate Crime 
50 
50 
55 
56 
58 
59 
63 
63 
65 
65 
67 
68 
69 
73 
Conclusion  74 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 75 
Introduction 75 
1. Restricting Rights and Freedoms 
1.1 A Legitimate Restriction of Rights - A General Framework  
1.2  Militant Democracy: Legitimately Restricting Rights for Purposes of Protecting Democracy  
1.2.1 Militant Democracy - A General Overview 
1.2.2 Militant Democracy: A Balancing Act? 
1.2.3 Applying the Doctrine of Militant Democracy  
1.2.4 Militant Democracy: Concluding Observations 
76 
76 
78 
78 
82 
84 
86 
2. Freedom of Expression: To Restrict or not to Restrict? 
2.1 Freedom of Expression: Thoughts from Classical Scholarship 
2.2 Restricting Expression: A Libertarian Approach  
2.3 Legitimately Legislating against Hate Speech 
2.4 A Theoretical Approach to Restricting Hate speech Legitimately: Critical Race Theory 
2.4.1 Speech Act Theory 
86 
86 
88 
94 
100 
100 
9 
 
2.4.2 Critical Race Theory  101 
3. Effects-Based Approach to Hate Speech Restriction   
3.1 Effects-Based Approach as a General Concept 
104 
104 
4. Freedom of Expression: A Legal Assessment of Theoretical Issues 109 
5. Freedom of Association  114 
Conclusion 115 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE UNITED NATIONS 117 
Introduction 117 
1. The Principle of Non-Discrimination in UN instruments 
1.1 Introduction: The Importance of International Non-Discrimination Law 
117 
117 
2. Freedom from Racial Discrimination 
2.1 General Overview of UN Instruments 
2.2 Monitoring ICERD Obligations: The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
2.3 Article 4 ICERD: General Overview 
2.4 General Prohibition of Incitement to Racial Discrimination 
2.5 State Obligations Arising from Article 4 
2.6 Conclusion: Prohibition of Discrimination and Racial Discrimination 
121 
121 
124 
125 
126 
128 
130 
3. Freedom of Expression 
3.1 Overview of Freedom of Expression in UN Instruments  
3.2 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: General Overview 
3.3 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Overview 
3.4 Monitoring ICCPR Obligations: The Human Rights Committee 
3.5 Restrictions to the Freedom of Expression under the ICCPR 
3.6 Limitation Grounds of Article 19 of the ICCPR 
3.7 Conclusion: Freedom of Expression  
130 
130 
132 
134 
135 
135 
137 
141 
4. Article 20 of the ICCPR 
4.1 Article 20 of the ICCPR: General Obligations on States Parties  
4.2 Article 20(2) of the ICCPR: Definitions and Notions 
4.3 Article 20: The Threshold Test 
4.4 Article 20(2): Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee 
4.5 Conclusion: Article 20(2) ICCPR 
141 
141 
144 
146 
147 
150 
5. Article 4(a): Regulating Hate Speech through the ICERD 
5.1 Article 4(a): Introductory Points  
5.2 Article 4(a): Political Parties and Racist Expression    
5.3 Article 4(a): Compatibility with the Freedoms of Expression and Association 
150 
150 
151 
151 
6. Sanctioning Bad Expression: Limitations and Regulations 153 
7. Conclusion: Regulating, Prohibiting and Sanctioning Radical Rhetoric 157 
8. Freedom of Assembly and Association 
8.1 Overview of Freedom of Association and Assembly in UN Instruments 
8.2 Freedom of Assembly and Association under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
8.3 Freedom of Assembly under the ICCPR  
8.4 Freedom of Association under the ICCPR: General Overview 
8.5 What is an Association under International Law?  
8.6 Limiting the Freedom of Association under the ICCPR 
8.7 Limiting the Freedom of Association and Assembly under Article 4(b) of the ICERD  
8.8: The Due Regard Clause of Article 4 ICERD  
158 
158 
159 
160 
162 
163 
164 
166 
169 
9. Another Route? Article 5 of the ICCPR: The Destruction of the Rights of Others 174 
10. Conclusion: Regulating, Prohibiting and Punishing Far-Right Association and Assembly  175 
11. Chapter Conclusion: Militant Democracy as a Central Tenet of International Human Rights Law 175 
10 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 176 
Introduction  176 
1. Council of Europe  177 
2. The Principle of Non-Discrimination in Council of Europe Instruments 
2.1 General Overview of Non-Discrimination in the ECHR 
2.2 Race as a Ground for Discrimination  
178 
179 
182 
3. Freedom of Expression 
3.1 General Overview of Article 10 of the ECHR 
3.2 What Kind of Speech?  
3.3 Hate Speech: Semantics and Notions 
3.4 Freedom of Expression: Reasonableness Review of Restrictions and Limitations 
3.4.1 Prescribed by Law 
3.4.2  Necessary in a Democratic Society 
3.4.3 Legitimate Aim 
3.4.4 Proportionality 
3.5 Violence as a Key Element to Prohibiting Expression  
3.6 Freedom of Expression – Concluding Comments  
182 
182 
185 
187 
192 
193 
194 
196 
198 
199 
201 
4. Freedom of Assembly and Association  
4.1 General Overview of Article 11 ECHR  
4.2 What Constitutes an Association? 
4.3 Legitimate Interferences to the Freedom of Association 
4.3.1 Is the Interference Prescribed by Law?  
4.3.2 Does the Interference Pursue a Legitimate Aim? 
4.3.3 Is the Interference Necessary in a Democratic Society?  
4.3.4 Is the Interference Proportionate to the Legitimate Aim Pursued? 
4.4 Violence as a Key Element in Limiting Association  
4.5 Limiting Association - Destruction of Democracy 
4.6 Dissolution of an Association – Establishing a Sufficiently Imminent Risk 
4.7 The Freedom of Racist Association and its Effects in the Workplace 
4.8 Freedom of Association: Conclusion  
4.9 Freedom of Assembly 
4.9.1 Freedom of Assembly – General Overview 
4.9.2 Legitimately Limiting Assembly 
4.9.3 Freedom of Assembly – Concluding Comments 
4.10 Freedoms of Association and Assembly – Concluding Comments 
201 
201 
202 
204 
206 
207 
208 
208 
209 
209 
212 
212 
213 
214 
214 
224 
218 
219 
5. Article 17 of the ECHR: Non-Destruction Clause 
5.1 Article 17 – Theoretical and Jurisprudential Overview 
5.2 Article 17 and Hate Speech  
5.3 Article 17 and Free Association and Assembly 
5.4 Article 17 – Concluding Comments  
219 
219 
221 
224 
226 
6. The Margin of Appreciation: Its Role in the Interpretation and Application of Article 10 and Article 11 of the 
ECHR  
227 
7.  The EctHR and Racist Crimes  231 
8. The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist 
and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems 
233 
Conclusion 239 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE EUROPEAN UNION 241 
Introduction  241 
11 
 
1. Rule of Law 
1.1 Rule of Law: General Overview 
1.2 Rule of Law Origins  
1.3 Rule of Law: Final Comments on the Rule of Law as a Doctrine 
1.4 Rule of Law: General Overview of the Rule of Law in EU Law 
1.4.1 Article 7 of the TEU: Safeguarding the Rule of Law in EU Member States?  
1.4.1 (i) Article 7: General Overview 
1.4.1 (ii) Article 7 – Foundations for the Combatting of Right-Wing Extremism 
1.4.1 (iii) Article 7 – Concluding Comments  
1.5 Threats to the Rule of Law Case-Study: Hungary  
1.5.1 The Deterioration of the Rule of Law: The case of Hungary 
1.5.2 Response of the European Union to the Hungarian Constitutional Crisis 
1.5.3 European Court of Justice: Its Role in the Hungarian Situation  
1.5.4 Hungary: Concluding Points 
1.6 A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law 
1.7 Council of the European Union – Annual Rule of Law Dialogue 
1.8 Rule of Law: Concluding Comments 
243 
244 
248 
248 
250 
250 
250 
254 
257 
259 
259 
261 
263 
265 
266 
268 
269 
2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  270 
3. 1996 Joint Action adopted by the Council Concerning Means to Combat Racism and Xenophobia 273 
4. Council Framework Decision 2009/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on Combatting Certain Forms and 
Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law  
275 
5. European Parliament Resolutions  280 
6. Other Measures 282 
7. European Union Framework – Concluding Comments  
 
284 
 
CHAPTER SIX: ENGLAND AND WALES  286 
Introduction  286 
1. Contextual and Definitional Framework 
1.1 Jurisdiction  
1.2 The EU Referendum: Legal, political and social ramifications  
1.3 The Face of the Far-Right in the United Kingdom: A General Overview    
1.3.1 Political Parties  
1.3.1 (i) The National Front  
1.3.1 (ii) The British National Party  
1.3.1 (iii) The United Kingdom Independence Party  
1.3.1 (iv) Britain First  
1.3.1 (v) Non-Party Groups: The English Defence League (and others) 
1.3.1 (vi) The Subculture Milieu - Combat 18  
1.3.1 (vii) Other Far-Right Groups and Movements  
1.3.2 The Far-Right in the United Kingdom: Concluding Comments 
1.4 Definitional Framework  
1.4.1 Racial and Religious groups 
1.4.2 Stirring up Racial and Religious Hatred – A Substitute for Hate Speech? 
1.4.3 Racial and Religious Aggravation 
1.4.4 Hate Crime 
1.4.5 Racial and Religious Discrimination or Harassment  
1.4.6 Terrorism  
1.4.7 Extremism  
288 
288 
291 
295 
301 
302 
303 
306 
309 
311 
314 
315 
315 
315 
316 
322 
324 
325 
326 
328 
329 
2. International Framework  330 
12 
 
2.1 International Framework – The United Nations 
2.1.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Kingdom 
2.1.2 International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the United Kingdom 
331 
331 
332 
3. European Framework 
3.1 The Council of Europe: The Human Rights Act 1998: Incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into 
Domestic Law  
3.2 The European Union: The Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions 
of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law 
335 
335 
 
338 
4. National Legal Framework  
4.1 Human Rights: Conceptual Backdrop  
4.1.1 Freedom of Expression 
4.1.2 Freedoms of Assembly and Association 
4.1.2(i) Freedom of Association: General Overview  
4.1.2(ii) Freedom of Association and Employment: Issues of Non-Discrimination  
4.1.2 (iii) Freedom of Assembly  
5. The Far-Right Movement and Criminal Law  
5.1 Maintaining Public Order as a Sphere through which to Challenge the Far-Right   
5.1.2 Acts Intending to Stir up Racial/Religious Hatred and Possession of Inflammatory Material 
5.1.3 Prohibiting Religious Hatred within the Public Order Framework: The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006  
5.2 Aggravation and Sentencing 
5.3 Jurisprudential Analysis 
5.3.1 Utilising the Public Order Act and/or the Crime and Disorder Act to Deal with the Activities of the Far-Right 
5.3.1 (i) Norwood v Director of Public Prosecutions 
5.3.1 (ii) Kendall v Director of Public Prosecutions  
5.4 Using Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 to Challenge Religious Hatred 
6. The Far-Right Movement and Anti-Terror Legislation 
7. Constitutional Law: Treatment of Political Parties by National Law 
7.1 Registration of Political Parties 
7.1 (i) Case 1: BNP’s Membership Policy Amounting to Unlawful Discrimination  
7.1 (ii) Case 2: Non-Adherence by the BNP to the Court Order? 
7.2 Post-Registration Phase 
7.2.1 The Electoral Process 
341 
341 
344 
344 
346 
347 
352 
355 
355 
356 
362 
368 
371 
371 
373 
375 
380 
383 
387 
387 
391 
393 
396 
396 
Conclusion 397 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: GREECE 
Introduction  
401 
401 
1. Contextual and Definitional Framework  
1.1 Overview of Greek Political and Legal System  
1.2 Dictatorship – Regime of the Colonels  
1.3 The Face of the Far-Right in Greece: General Overview    
1.3.1 Golden Dawn  
1.3.1 (i) Golden Dawn – Historical Development and Ideological Profile  
1.3.1 (ii) Golden Dawn and Violence 
1.3.1 (iii) Golden Dawn’s Electoral Development 
1.3.1 (iv) Reasons for Golden Dawn’s Rise 
1.3.1 (v) Golden Dawn’s Impunity: A Facilitating Factor of its Rise 
1.3.1 (vi) The Murder of Pavlos Fyssas – The Turning Point 
1.3.1 (vii) Golden Dawn’s Trial 
1.3.2 The Far-Right in Greece: Concluding Comments 
404 
404 
406 
407 
410 
410 
417 
420 
422 
425 
430 
432 
434 
13 
 
1.4 Definitional Framework 
1.4.1 Racial and Religious Groups  
1.4.2 Public Incitement of Violence and Hatred and Prohibition of Revisionism– A Substitute for Hate Speech? 
1.4.3 Racial and Religious Aggravation and Hate Crime: Two in one 
1.4.4  Discrimination and Harassment 
1.4.5 Public Order  
435 
435 
436 
438 
438 
439 
3. International and European Framework  440 
4. National Legal Framework 
4.1 Human Rights: Conceptual Backdrop  
4.1.1 Freedom of Expression 
4.1.2 Freedom of Association and Assembly 
4.1.2 (i) Freedom of Association 
4.1.2 (ii) Freedom of Assembly 
4.1.3 Non-Discrimination 
5. The Far-Right Movement and Criminal Law  
5.1 Law 927/1979 – Anti-Racist Legislation 
5.2 Aggravating, Sentencing and Hate Crimes 
5.3 Advances, Amendments and Alterations in the Sphere of Criminal Law 
5.4. Criminal Organisation – Prohibition of Establishment, Leadership and Participation  
5.5. Terrorist Organisations: Core Difference 
6. Constitutional Law: Treatment of Political Parties by National Law 
6.1.1 Registration of Political Parties 
6.1.2 The Post-Registration Phase  
6.1.3 Political Parties – Concluding Comments 
444 
444 
445 
447 
447 
452 
454 
457 
457 
466 
469 
471 
475 
476 
476 
479 
480 
Conclusion 480 
 
Conclusion 483 
Bibliography 494 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Thesis of the Study 
The destructive force of the far-right was tragically witnessed through the mass devastation 
brought about by World War II. The international community sought to prevent the repetition of 
such destruction through the establishment of institutions such as the United Nations and the 
adoption of documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Jurisprudence and conventions on a supranational level directly 
prohibit speech and expression of the far-right with, for example, Article 4 of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination prohibiting racist associations and 
racist expression. Nevertheless, in 2016, we are living in a world where violent far-right entities 
such as Golden Dawn of Greece have received unprecedented electoral support, where 
xenophobic parties have done spectacularly well at the latest European Parliament elections, 
where post-Brexit Britain has seen a worrying rise in hate crime. As such, the far-right is no 
longer a phenomenon of the past. It is one of the present, rising at swift and worrying rates. In 
this light, this study analyses how supranational bodies, namely the United Nations (UN), the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU), require their members to tackle right-
wing extremism. This will be examined through an assessment of two jurisdictions, namely, 
England and Wales and Greece. The dissertation will consider the means and methods adopted 
by the jurisdictions under consideration to interpret and apply these obligations through their 
national legal systems along with a broader conceptualisation of their legal and judicial 
approaches to right-wing extremism. Where relevant and available, assessment of policy will be 
effectuated, however, this analysis is complimentary to the core of the dissertation which is legal 
analysis. It must be noted from the onset that, in some parts of the dissertation, for example when 
referring to international and European obligations, reference will be made to the United 
Kingdom (the UK) rather than to England and Wales due to the fact that in such spheres, unlike 
in relation to the legal system, the UK is one entity. Further discussion on this aspect occurs in 
chapter six.   
 
1.2 Research Subject 
1.2.1 Extreme Right-Wing Parties, Groups and Movements: Examples and Illustrations 
15 
 
The rise of right-wing extremism is a pressing challenge currently faced by Europe not only 
within national parliaments and the European Parliament but also in the ambit of non-party 
groups and subculture movements. Greece’s far-right spectrum is dominated by The Popular 
Association - Golden Dawn (Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος-Χρυσή Αυγή) (Golden Dawn) which is a political 
party simultaneously acting as a violent movement. Golden Dawn’s national parliamentary 
election results saw a dramatic rise from approximately 20,000 votes
1
 to 440,000 votes
2
 during 
the period 2009 to 2012 with a small drop in the 2015 elections, when it received around 
380,000.
3
 Nevertheless, in 2015, the party moved from the fifth to third largest party.
4
 This 
development has been characterised as particularly alarming by the Fundamental Rights Agency 
(FRA)
5
 and, as such, Greece was one of the two countries
6
 considered in a 2013 thematic report 
on racism and intolerance.
7
 The leadership and some members of Golden Dawn are currently on 
trial for leading or participating in a criminal organisation. In the UK, although an equivalent of 
the violent Golden Dawn does not currently exist, the far-right movement is made up of several 
parties and groups as well as a subculture milieu. Political parties include the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), the British National Party (BNP) and Britain First. Non-party 
groups include the English Defence League (EDL)
8
 and there is also a subculture milieu made up 
of loosely structured groupings such as Combat 18. As will be demonstrated in the relevant 
analysis, UKIP, which adopts a predominantly Islamophobic and Eurosceptic rhetoric, has not 
                                                          
1
 Golden Dawn election results 2009: <http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2009/pages/index.html> [Accessed 1 
November 2015] 
2
 Golden Dawn election results 2012:- 
<http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012b/public/index.html#{"cls":"party","params":{"id":41}}> [Accessed 1 
November 2015]  
3
 Golden Dawn election results: <http://ekloges.ypes.gr/current/v/public/#{"cls":"party","params":{"id":41}}> 
[Accessed 1 November 2015] 
4
 Greece election results 2015: <http://ekloges.ypes.gr/current/v/public/#{"cls":"main","params":{}}> [Accessed 17 
April 2015] 
5
 The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) is one of the EU’s decentralised agencies. These 
agencies are set up to provide expert advice to the institutions of the EU and the Member States on a range of issues. 
FRA helps to ensure that the fundamental rights of people living in the EU are protected: 
<http://fra.europa.eu/en/about-fra> 
6
 The other country was Hungary 
7
 FRA Thematic Report: ‘Racism, Discrimination and Intolerance: Learning from Experiences in Greece and 
Hungary’ (2013)  
8
 There are regional branches of the Defence League, namely the Welsh Defence League, the Scottish Defence 
League and the Northern Ireland Defence League.  
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been able to gain a large number of seats in the national parliament, not because of its lack of 
support but because of the country’s ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system.9  
 
The far-right phenomenon is not restricted to the Greece and the UK as it has grown at a 
worrying rate in other European countries too.
10
 Whilst the far-right is regularly associated with 
countries marred by financial crisis, such as Greece, and whilst ‘East Central Europe continues to 
be the most dynamic breeding ground for right-wing extremism,’ 11  this movement is also 
developing in other frameworks, such as the liberal traditions of Scandinavia. For example, 
Sverigedemokraterna (The Sweden Democrats), a party founded in 1988, first entered the 
National Assembly in 2010 with 5.70% of the vote and by the 2014 elections it received 12.9% 
of the vote, making it the third largest party in the country.
12
 In general, the far-right attracts 
more than 10% of Western European votes on a national or European level
13
 and, in recent times, 
in countries such as Austria, Hungary, Sweden and the Netherlands, these parties have witnessed 
increasing success in elections.
14
 In the East, apart from some exceptions such as Estonia and 
Slovenia, such parties receive an average support of approximately 20%.
15
 On a European 
Parliament level, in 2014 the EU witnessed the victories of parties such as France’s Front 
National (National Front), UKIP and Denmark’s Dansk Folkeparti (The Danish People’s 
Party),
16
 with the parties gaining 24.86%
17
 26.77%
18
 and 26.60%
19
 of the vote respectively, 
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finding themselves at the top of the list for their countries.
20
 Violent far-right parties are also part 
of the European Parliament with Golden Dawn receiving 9.39% of the vote and Hungary’s 
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (hereinafter Jobbik) receiving 14.67% of the vote in 2014 in 
third and second place respectively.
21
 In relation to Jobbik, it must be noted that there exists a 
close proximity between this party and the ruling Fidesz.
22
  Moreover, even in countries where 
such parties have not been very successful in the electoral process, they have ‘nevertheless often 
contributed towards the mainstreaming of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim ideas and discourse, 
which help to create a broader climate conducive to radical right thinking.’23 
 
On a non-party level, examples include, as noted above, the English Defence League (EDL) 
which has been ‘at the forefront of violence around major Muslim centres and mosques,’24 with 
the UK Home Secretary banning their demonstrations on several occasions for purposes of 
public order.
25
 It is estimated that there have been approximately seven hundred criminal 
convictions directly linked to the EDL and its members.
26
 The EDL will be discussed further in 
chapter six. Other examples include Germany where, in 2011, authorities discovered a link 
between the violent far-right group Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist 
Underground) and the killing of ten persons, nine immigrants and one policewoman, over a 
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period of ten years as well as a bombing in Cologne.
27
 In 2007, members of Jobbik established a 
group entitled Magyar Gárda Egyesület (The Hungarian Guard Association), which has 
organised several public demonstrations throughout the country and in villages inhabited by 
large Roma populations.
28
 This association has been the subject of a European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) judgement. The case involved a 2007 paramilitary rally with two-hundred 
participants wearing military uniform as well as armbands reminiscent of Arrow Cross symbols
29
 
who were to march through a village of predominantly Roma inhabitants. The police were 
present and did not allow the march to pass through a street inhabited by Roma families. As a 
result of the rally, the Budapest Chief Prosecutor’s Office filed a court action for the dissolution 
of the Association. The action was based on the allegation that the Association had not 
conformed to the requirements of the freedom of peaceful assembly and that it carried out 
Romaphobic activities, generating fear amongst the Roma population of the village with 
speeches and the establishment of an intimidating environment through the wearing of uniforms, 
the marching formations used and the military style of the demonstration. After four hearings, 
the Budapest Regional Court disbanded the Association.  Following an appeal in 2009, the 
Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the judgement of the Regional Court. Later that year, the 
Supreme Court also upheld the Regional Court’s judgement30 and, as will be discussed in chapter 
four, in 2013 the ECtHR upheld the Supreme Court’s judgement. Tackling the activity of a social 
movement which falls within the general definitional realm of non-party groups has been 
deemed as more complicated than tackling a political party since a social movement is not bound 
by rules attached to the behaviour of entities active in the electoral process.
31
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Further, there is the subculture milieu which is an unstructured part of the far-right movement  In 
the UK, the Aryan Strike Force, Combat 18 and Blood and Honour, which are movements active 
on an international level, make up the entities of this milieu. In fact, two members of the Aryan 
Strike Force were arrested in 2010 and imprisoned for preparing violent racist activities, as 
further discussed in chapter six. The above tripartite structural approach to the types of entities 
which make up the far-right are not to be taken as completely reflective of the situation in each 
country. What will become apparent from the analysis on Greece is that the far-right framework 
is dominated by one entity, namely Golden Dawn which is a political party simultaneously 
acting as a subculture movement with a rigid rather than a loose structure.  
 
1.2.2 ‘Triggering Factors’ Exploited by the Far-Right  
The reasons and circumstances which right-wing extremist parties, groups and movements in 
Europe use and abuse for purposes of advancing their mandate include immigration and the 
presence of settled immigrants, particularly Muslims,
32
 and the interrelated concerns regarding 
so-called failed multiculturalism. Other reasons include the presence of minority groups, such as 
Roma and Jews and the stereotypes attached thereto, the dire financial situation which Europe 
finds itself in today
33
 and the increasing lack of trust in mainstream political parties due to the 
perceived failure of such parties to address issues such as the economic recession and social 
issues such as immigration.
34
 Within this ambit, the far-right movement finds itself in an ideal 
setting in which to flourish. Moreover, as noted by Michael Minkenberg, ‘the mobilization of the 
radical right or xenophobic movements often occurs in times of accelerated social and cultural 
change.’35  
 
When considering the reasons and situations which prompt the rise of the far-right in Europe, 
one must bear in mind that there does not exist an homogenous far-right on this continent in 
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terms of origins, drivers and manifestations. In fact, ‘although the extreme right in Europe 
displays a set of common features, in many respects its component movements diverge markedly 
from one another.’36 This is true in relation to the content of the movement’s activities and 
ideologies, as will be demonstrated below, as well as in relation to the structure of the movement 
with, for example, the extreme-right in the East often being less structured and organised than its 
Western counterpart.
37
 The diverging nature of the triggering factors which have led to the rise in 
the far-right according to country and/or region is also an issue to be taken into account. These 
differences will be discussed further below.   
 
1.2.2 (i) Immigration and Islamophobia 
Since World War II, Europe has become increasingly diverse in relation to ethnicities, 
nationalities and religions due to immigration.
38
 Immigration to Western Europe resulted 
predominately due to the influx of guest workers between 1945 and the 1970’s. Another key 
process which has resulted in immigration to Europe, more generally, has been that of asylum. In 
1992, the EU hosted a total of 670,000 asylum seekers with the number rising to 1.26 million in 
2015.
39
 In 2014, a total of 59,085
40
 and 126,055 persons
41
 requesting or enjoying international 
protection resided in Greece and the UK respectively. In addition, due to the free movement of 
persons from and within the EU, both countries receive persons from other European nations. In 
August 2015, 269,000 EU citizens were recorded as living in the UK.
42
 Britain’s labour migrants 
from former colonies in the Caribbean, India, Pakistan
43
 and Africa increased from around half a 
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million in the period between 1951 and 1962 to approximately one and a half million in 1970.
44
 
Even though this phenomenon decreased slightly in the 1970’s, as a result of economic recession 
and stricter immigration control, more than half a million immigrants arrived between 1969 and 
1978.
45
 In addition to this, the infrastructure for the facilitation of permanent immigration had 
been established and, thus, these persons continued to reside in the country, together with their 
families, as a result of the process of family reunion/reunification.
46
 Further, many descendants 
of the transatlantic slave trade reside in the UK.
47
 Today, approximately eight million persons of 
foreign descent live in the UK.
48
 Greece used to be only a sending country in the realm of 
immigration. However, after the 1990s and the fall of socialism but also due to the increase in 
the number of persons seeking work and international protection, Greece received approximately 
one million people from the Soviet Union, Southern Albania, Eastern Europe and from Asian 
and African countries  who today make up more than  10%  of the population.
49
  
 
Extreme right-wing movements ‘fiercely oppose immigration and rising ethnic and cultural 
diversity’50 promulgating discrimination against such groups while exploiting unemployment 
and other such woes to promote their mandate of prejudice and hostility towards this diversity. 
Minkenberg places this approach towards immigration and cultural diversity, more generally, 
within the framework of the myth that marks right-wing extremism which is none other than that 
of ‘a homogenous nation – a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism hostile to liberal, pluralistic 
democracy…’ 51  As noted, there are ‘immigrants and immigrants when it comes to the far 
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right.’52 The immigrants who become targets of the far-right are those who are perceived as 
posing some sort of threat to the country and culture.
53
 Furthermore, although post 9/11 a type of 
‘acceptable xenophobia-Islamophobia’ 54  was established, the focus has not always been on 
Muslims but on other groups, such as the historically persecuted Jews, as well as Southern 
European workers.
55
 Islamophobia is a central issue which the majority of extreme-right parties 
and groups feed off and unite upon. It has been argued that Islam has become the ‘cosmic enemy 
of all, an open threat…that replaces the imagined powerful Jew who used to subvert European 
societies.’56 There is no official data on how many Muslims live in Europe, but in 2013 it was 
estimated that they represent approximately 6% of the EU population.
57
 In the UK today, far-
right extremism is predominantly focused on immigration and is particularly driven by anti-
Islamic sentiments. The European Network against Racism
58
 (hereinafter ENAR) notes that 
Islamophobia and its effect on hateful discourse and hate crime are on the rise predominantly in 
the UK and France.
59
 As noted by Conservative Peer Sayeeda Warsi, in the UK, ‘Islamophobia 
has passed the dinner table test.’ The route has been paved to facilitate the embracement and 
promotion of anti-Islamic rhetoric which has much more credibility than rhetoric based on ideas 
of biological racism.
60
 The BNP tapped into the opportunities posed by terrorist events such as 
9/11 to cultivate anti-Islamic sentiment. Soon after that attack, the BNP handed out leaflets 
which held that ‘Islam stood for Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson and Molestation of 
Women.’61 In relation to hate crime, according to Metropolitan Police Statistics, in 2015 hate 
crimes against Muslims in London rose by 70%. There were a total of eight hundred and sixteen 
recorded Islamophobic crimes for the twelve months up until July 2015 in comparison to four 
hundred and ninety nine in the previous year.
62
 As noted by an anonymous Home Office adviser, 
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events such as atrocities committed by the Islamic State
63
 and the Rotherham abuse scandal
64
 
have fuelled such extremism.
65
 In relation to the Rotherham abuse scandal, Tell MAMA
66
 found 
that over a quarter of anti-Muslim hate crimes (fifty-eight hate crimes) that were recorded in the 
immediate aftermath of the scandal were held to be provoked by the scandal
67
 while online hate 
speech against Muslims, as led by the far-right group Britain First,
68
 also increased as a result of 
it.
69
 Further, the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby
70
 has had a significant effect on the rise of 
Islamophobic sentiments and activities in the UK. In a study conducted by Tell MAMA, this 
attack was referred to by Muslim participants of the study as an event which significantly 
increased Islamophobic hate and activity directed towards them both online and offline.
71
 In the 
UK, during the period 2014-2015, anti-Muslim activity included physical attacks against Muslim 
men and women, racist graffiti on Muslim properties, mosques and graves as well as firebombs 
thrown at mosques.
72
 In its 2015 annual report, the organisation found that the number of offline 
incidents of hate against Muslims rose by 200% in 2014, from 146 recorded incidents in 2014 to 
437 in 2015.
73
 Tell MAMA held that Muslim women are most vulnerable to Islamophobic 
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attacks and speech.
74
  Moreover, as noted by a government adviser in the UK:‘I have been 
working with people from the far-right for about twenty-seven years now, I can see increases in 
some of these groups and membership in some of these groups based on things that are 
happening nationally here and internationally.’ 75 As well as anti-Muslim crimes and online 
activity, Islamophobia marks the political discourse of parties and groups such as UKIP, Britain 
First and EDL. Goodwin argues that this movement is ‘united through a heavy preoccupation 
with immigration…and anxiety over the role of Islam and British Muslims in wider society.76 
Moreover, Islamophobia is a more generalised problem in the UK and the construction of a very 
different ‘other,’ that being Muslims, has ‘wide currency in the UK and … is certainly not 
confined to the far-right.’ 77 In Greece, although Islamophobia heavily marks the discourse and 
activity of the far-right, this occurs within the general framework of hate promulgated against 
immigrants. Notwithstanding that a general hostility to Islam can be directly correlated to the 
country’s historical relationship with Turkey, the arrival of a large number of migrants without 
an adequate migration and asylum policy has meant that the issue of immigration is more easily 
manipulated by the far-right than concerns over Islam. The European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)
78
 notes that there has been a significant increase in cases of 
incitement to hatred within the framework of far-right discourse with such hatred usually being 
directed towards immigrants but also Roma, Jews and Muslims.
79
 In Greece, there are 
immigrants who are Muslims and also an ethnic minority living in the North of Greece who are 
Muslims. Both these groups are targets of far-right rhetoric and activity. Golden Dawn has 
publicly expressed and promoted such hatred, using the national parliament as a platform on 
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which to do so.
80
 However, even beyond the framework of the far-right, Greek political 
discourse has been starkly marked by anti-immigrant rhetoric in recent years.
81
 At the same time, 
Roma are ‘subject to negative stereotyping in political discourse’82 whilst the GreekOrthodox 
Church has publicly expressed and promoted, amongst others, anti-Semitic beliefs.
83
 Religious 
intolerance is a theme that marks Greece as illustrated by several Strasbourg cases on the 
treatment of Jehovah’s witnesses,84 Muslims85 and Humanists.86  However, it is LAOS – The 
Popular Orthodox Rally (ΛΑΟΣ - Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός) (hereinafter LAOS), rather 
than Golden Dawn, which focuses more on the issue of religion. In relation to the Church, LAOS 
is directly affiliated with the preservation of the Orthodox religion as can be concluded by its 
name – The Popular Orthodox Rally. On the other hand, Golden Dawn was and continues to be a 
party obsessed with race rather than religion but, for purposes of increasing its electorate, has 
manipulated the subject of religion. As noted by Dimitris Psaras, although this party puts forth a 
Greek Orthodox profile, it essentially adopts ‘national socialist pagan beliefs.’87 The party’s 
supporters have been called to give the genuine pagan meaning to Christian festivities
88
 and, 
during Easter of 1996, issued a periodical about the ‘Greekness and the times of the celebration 
with the ancient ancestral celebrations.’89 The leader of the party has said that ‘we believe in the 
Idea of Religion, we believe in a Greek Christianity, absolutely identified with the culture and 
the history of our people…we see the day of the Resurrection not in the Jewish Easter but in the 
flower festival.’90 As noted by Psaras, Golden Dawn tried to align itself more closely with the 
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Greek Orthodox religion
91
 but through a racial lens, as illustrated in the examples given above.
92
 
As a result, the Greek Orthodox Church is essentially ‘split’ as to its opinions and positions in 
relation to Golden Dawn.
93
 Thus, although the far-right in Greece, in the form of Golden Dawn, 
promulgates racist rhetoric and also carries out racially violent crimes, other parties and the 
Greek Orthodox Church have also contributed to the cultivation of racist and/or religious 
discriminatory sentiments.
94
  
 
As well as greatly impacting the UK context and, to an extent, the Greek context, Islamophobia 
is also characteristic of activities and discourse occurring in other European countries. A new 
wave of terrorist attacks occurring over the past few years, such as the Brussels attacks which 
killed thirty two people and injured dozens more,
95
 the Paris attacks which killed one hundred 
and thirty and injured three hundred and sixty eight,
96
 the beheading of persons by the Islamic 
State which have been made public through videos, the attacks in Paris against the Charlie 
Hebdo offices and a Kosher supermarket,
97
 the shootings in Copenhagen
98
 and the terrorist attack 
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in Tunisia,
99
 has further fuelled the Islamophobia that taints Western society.  For example, 
following the coordinated Paris attacks, there were several incidents of the vandalising of 
properties such as mosques, kebab restaurants and halal butcher shops with Islamophobic 
messages
100
 and at least fifty anti-Muslim attacks against Muslims and mosques.
101
 Other 
reasons for the rise in Islamophobic sentiments have been events such as the Cologne sexual 
attacks, where it was reported that as many as one thousand women were assaulted at the 
Cologne train station on New Year’s Eve (2015-2016) by men of Arab or North African descent. 
Although asylum seekers in Germany had been targetted as the perpetrators, with hateful rhetoric 
against refugees subsequently arising, police found that three out of the fifty-eight suspects were, 
in fact, asylum seekers.
102
 As a response to the sex attacks, the Pegida Movement
103
 of Germany 
was, from October 2014 until February 2015, holding weekly anti-Muslim marches with 
approximately 25,000 participating in the Dresden march following the Charlie Hebdo attacks
104
 
whilst demonstrations also occurred following the Cologne attacks.
105
 In relation to Pegida, the 
2015 State of Hate Report noted that 2015 closed with the possibility of a branch of Pediga 
being established in the UK with certain activities, such as the movement’s demonstrations 
outside Downing Street in London, having already taken place.
106
 Minkenberg notes that ‘the 
fact that large portions of the public in Western European countries display Islamophobic 
attitudes…provides an opening for the radical right, enabling it to appear more mainstream in 
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comparison to blatantly extremist discourses like anti-Semitism.’107 This is not to say that the 
extreme right in Western and Southern Europe is not anti-Semitic, with parties such as Golden 
Dawn openly professing anti-Semitic ideologies, even in the national parliament.
108
  
 
1.2.2 (ii) Ethnic Minorities and the LGBTI Community  
According to context, anti-Semitism and Romaphobia may mark the rhetoric and/or activities of 
parts of the far-right movement. There are approximately ten to twelve million Roma
109
 in 
Europe, approximately six million of whom live in the EU.
110
 The Jewish Agency
111
 estimates 
that there are 1,426,900 Jews living in Europe.
112
 In Central and Eastern Europe, following 1989 
and 1990, ‘xenophobic sentiments began to reassert themselves…they were directed especially 
against the Sinti and Roma, but also against national minorities, Jews and homosexuals.’113 This 
has, in part, influenced today’s reality in these countries with targets such as Jews, Roma, 
LGBTI
114
 persons and national minorities constituting the ‘primary targets of virulent hate 
speech attacks.’ 115  In Central and Eastern Europe the far-right movement has ‘a vision of 
national renewal that is predicated upon purging
116
 ‘all alien influences.’117  For example, in 
Poland, victims of right-wing extremist violence are predominantly homosexuals or political 
opponents rather than members of ethnic minorities.
118
 In Romania, the far-right is particularly 
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intolerant towards Roma, ethnic Hungarians and sexual minorities
119
 while hate speech in 
Hungary is anti-Semitic, anti-Roma and homophobic.
120
 The anti-Roma nature of hate in 
Hungary can be reflected in the activities of the Hungarian Guard discussed in section 1.2.1. 
Such a movement can also be found in the Czech Republic and in particular the entity Národní 
Garda (National Guard). In relation to Hungary, improvements in the sphere of LGBTI rights 
can be seen with this country constituting ‘one of the most gay-friendly legislations in the whole 
CEE.’121 Whilst the far-right in Central Europe may habitually focus on ethnic and/or sexual 
minorities, the arrival of refugees in 2015 to countries of this area led to far-right rhetoric 
becoming increasingly affected by this occurrence.
122
 
 
Anti-Semitism, namely hatred against Jews,
123
 is ‘rooted in centuries of prejudice in Europe.’124 
In the UK, the Community Security Trust
125
 recorded that four hundred and seventy-three anti-
Semitic incidents, forty-four of which were violent assaults and two of which involved extreme 
violence, occurred across the UK in the first six months of 2015, a 53% increase on the first six 
months of 2014.
126
 In Greece, anti-Semitic rhetoric and literature are directly interlinked with 
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elected members of the Golden Dawn party.
127
 The latest figures in relation to anti-Semitic 
violence in Greece are from 2014 and show that there were four such incidents recorded.
128
 This 
does not mean that there were, in fact, only four anti-Semitic incidents since, as will be reflected 
in the country analysis, Greece has an ineffective reporting system whilst hate crimes are often 
underreported and, even in the event that the victim chooses to report a hate crime it may not be 
recorded as such by the authorities. In 2012, the FRA carried out a survey on Jewish people’s 
experiences and perception of discrimination, hate crime and anti-Semitism and noted that 35% 
of the respondents worry about being verbally insulted or harassed in a public place because they 
are Jewish and 33% worry about being physically attacked in the country where they live 
because they are Jewish. 75% of respondents considered anti-Semitism online to be a problem 
while 73% believed that anti-Semitism online has increased over the last five years.
129
  Further, 
the Jewish Agency recorded that in 2014 approximately seven thousand French Jews left France 
for Israel due to the increased anti-Semitism in France but also due to the economic situation of 
the country.
130
 In fact, from 2013-2014, the Jewish Agency recorded a 120% increase in the 
number of Jews moving from France to Israel.
131
 When looking at anti-Semitism, one must take 
into consideration the differences between anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli sentiments. The former, 
refers to the hatred against Jews and the latter refers to hatred against Israel due to their political 
and/or military activities in Palestine.  The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS 
Movement) is a global boycott movement that commenced in 2005 which seeks to put pressure 
on Israel in relation to the Palestinian issue. Some have described that this is essentially anti-
Semitic.
132
 For example, the Simon Wiesenthal Center
133
 issued a report in 2013 arguing that the 
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BDS Movement presents itself as a ‘pro-peace initiative but in reality is a thinly-veiled, anti-
Israel and anti-Semitic poison pill.’ 134  Other sources, such as Al Jazeera, said that BDS’ 
‘manifesto is a radical political position, but it is not anti-Semitic.’135 The BDS is active in the 
UK
136
 and in February 2016, the Conservative Party announced plans to put forth legislation for 
the criminalisation of anti-Israel boycotts by public bodies, town councils, libraries, universities 
and student unions. In a March 2016 discussion in the UK Parliament, a Conservative MP argued 
that ‘reports of anti-Semitic attacks being perpetrated in Europe can be directly linked with the 
hateful rhetoric espoused by many BDS campaigners.’137 There is no analogous representation of 
BDS in Greece with one reported protest of BDS supporters having taken place with 
approximately twenty demonstrators demanding that Greece change the colours of its flag so 
they do not resemble those of the Israeli flag.
138
 The author of this dissertation is not arguing that 
the BDS is, per se, an anti-Semitic movement. However, one must take into consideration that 
viewpoints on Israel and its practices, predominantly in relation to Palestine, may affect hate 
against Jews whilst negative sentiments towards Israel can be capitalised by haters for purposes 
of creating generalised hatred against Jews. The BDS is a platform in which there exists a real 
possibility of the blurring of the delineation between anti-Israeli sentiments and anti-Semitism. 
Moreover, haters within the far-right movement may exploit anti-Israeli sentiments arising of the 
current situation with Palestine for purposes of accentuating anti-Semitism.  
 
Further, a shift from anti-Semitism to Islamophobia can be discerned in relation to certain 
European far-right groups. For example, France’s National Front was habitually interrelated 
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with anti-Semitism, regularly demeaning the holocaust and portraying anti-Semitic views. 
Although Jean-Marie Le Pen attempted to rectify his party’s image, this was not possible. A shift 
from anti-Semitism to Islamophobia was partially accomplished by his daughter
139
 who argued 
that ‘there is no-anti-Semitism today in Europe’ 140  with the party attempting to become 
embedded in the Jewish community.
141
 The shift from anti-Semitism or, at least, an attempt 
thereto, which can be noted in the rhetoric and/or activities of several far-right parties of Western 
Europe can be discerned from other comments such as those of Andreas Mözler of Austria’s 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party). During a meeting of the far-right in Israel,
142
 
Mözler stated that ‘we do of course have a difficult relationship with Judaism, which is a 
hallmark of this camp [the nationalist camp]’143 but noted that ‘there was anti-Semitism in the 
nineteenth century. Today, however, we live in the twenty-first century. And we have long since 
overcome things like anti-clericalism and anti-Semitism.’ 144   
 
In relation to Romaphobia, a 2013 ENAR Shadow Report on Hate Crime in Europe found that, 
even though the Roma are particularly vulnerable to hate crime in countries where there is a 
large Roma population, they are the most vulnerable to such crime in Italy.
145
 Roma are often 
targetted with violence in Greece
146
 whilst Golden Dawn exploits anti-Roma sentiments for 
political purposes, organising, for example, violent anti-Roma marches.
147
 The latest statistics on 
Romaphobic violence in Greece are from 2009 when the FRA found that 54% of the Roma 
respondents in Greece had been victims of such crime.
148
 The FRA noted that this survey which 
looked at the situation of the Roma in several countries, including Greece but not the UK, 
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revealed that of all the groups surveyed by the FRA, ‘the Roma emerged as the group most 
vulnerable to discrimination and crime.’149 The UK is not immune to Romaphobic crime and 
discourse. In 2012, the UK government recognised the problem of violence against Roma 
communities in its action plan to combat hate crime.
150
 The plan underlined that under-reporting 
continues to constitute an obstacle in fighting hate crime committed against, inter alia, Gypsy, 
Traveller and Roma Communities.
151
 In its 2014 follow-up report, the government stated that 
under-reporting amongst these communities was still a problem.
152
 Anti-Roma political 
discourse was particularly influential on far-right discourse in the UK during 2013 and the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU,
153
 with the emphasis repositioning itself on anti-
Muslim and anti-immigrant rhetoric after that and even more so following the rise of the Islamic 
State and terrorist attacks committed by its members.  
 
In a nutshell, the focus of far-right movements is very much dependent on the historical but also 
socio-economic context of a particular country at a particular time. The far-right targets those 
who pose more of a problem in the construction of an ‘ideal’ society, whether these people are 
the migrants in Greece or the Muslims in Britain, whilst they are also affected by external factors 
including historically established forms of racism, such as Romaphobia in Hungary as well as the 
position and impacts of other institutions, such as the Church (particularly the Orthodox or 
Catholic Church) in the realm of, for example, anti-Semitism and homophobia.
154
 Moreover, the 
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focus of the far-right is fluid and adaptable to change, as reflected in recent events such as 
regards the arrival of refugees in or near Central Europe.  
 
1.2.2 (iii) Finances and Political Dissatisfaction  
In 2014, an ECRI report noted the interrelation between the economic crisis, scapegoating of 
groups such as migrants and a rise in hateful parties. More particularly, it held that ‘a worrying 
consequence [of the recessions] has been the rise of nationalist populist parties rooted in 
profound hostility to ethnic, religious and cultural diversity.’ 155A 2002 European Social Survey 
concluded that support for the far-right ‘was typically stronger among people who believed that 
immigrants are an economic threat, by taking away jobs or depressing wages, that the nation’s 
culture was undermined by foreigners, or that there should be restrictive policies toward 
refugees.’ 156  In countries such as Greece, although the preoccupation and concern over 
immigration is an issue in itself, far-right support is also strongly interlinked with the financial 
crisis hitting the country in 2009
157
 As noted by the FRA, racist violence, discrimination, 
intolerance and extremism, which have been evident in Greece over the past few years, can be 
related to the socio-political effects of the financial crisis. This sets out ‘fertile ground for the rise 
of political extremism’ in the form of the far-right Golden Dawn. 158  The interrelationship 
between financial crises and the rise of far-right extremism is not a new phenomenon. More 
particularly, the dire financial situation of the period between World War I and World War II are 
‘widely cited as a factor in the rise of fascist parties,’159 since ‘economic stagnation proved 
beneficial to far-right parties.’160 This was particularly the case for depressed Germany which, in 
pre-1929, saw the National Socialist Party receiving only 2.63% of the vote which rose to 
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18.25% by 1930 and 37.27% in 1932 placing this party in first place.
161
 A relevant study of the 
political and economic situation of the 1930s showed the existence of a relationship between 
political extremism and economic crises but found that a year or two of a crisis did not result in a 
large rise of extremist support, noting that other factors played a role. These included national 
occurrences, such as whether or not a country had lost the First World War, whether far-right 
parties already existed or whether they were a new phenomenon, the very structure of the 
electoral process of a country and its impact on the potential success of a far-right party as well 
as the length of a country’s experience with democracy. Further, during that time, the economic 
depression did not result in the rise of the far-right in all countries with communist parties rising 
in countries such as Bulgaria, Greece and France.
162
 Today, the global financial crisis ‘proved to 
be a turning point that boosted political extremism in Europe.’163 In fact, it was argued that it is 
no coincidence that, since 2008, far-right parties are experiencing an increased electoral success 
on a national and European level.
164
 However, once again it is not all black and white. For 
example, whilst the far-right has drastically risen in crisis-stricken Greece, one cannot see an 
equivalent reaction in other countries deeply affected by the crisis such as Spain. Further, if a 
long-term economic crisis in itself was indispensable to the success of the far-right then one 
would not be witnessing its great rise in more prosperous areas such as Sweden. Thus, care must 
be taken when placing the far-right’s success with the aforementioned crisis given that the far-
right and interrelated phenomena are ‘undoubtedly fuelled by the severe impact of the economic 
crisis but are not necessarily caused by it.’165 
 
As well as feeding off cultural and financial fears related to a multicultural and multi-religious 
Europe, the far-right exploits society’s disappointment with the way mainstream parties deal 
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with social issues such as immigration.’166 Based on this, far-right parties describe mainstream 
parties as corrupt and incompetent
167
 whilst simultaneously portraying themselves as ‘outsiders 
in the party system, as underdog parties that represent the true voice of a silent minority and as 
the only organizations willing to address sensitive issues such as immigration.’168 This reality 
played a significant role in, for example, Greece, where there was a gradual degradation of the 
public’s trust in mainstream political parties, a point which was used and abused by the far-right 
to usurp mainstream voters and rise.
169
 In Greece, a decline in trust towards the government and 
political parties was demonstrated for the years 2003-2010. In 2003, 28% of the people had 
much or some trust in political parties but by 2010 this fell to 5%. In relation to the government, 
55% of people had much or some trust in the government and by 2010 this had fallen to 21%.
170
 
This declining trust in the government goes hand-in-hand with the rise of the far-right in that 
country which, just as far-right parties in the 1930s did, ‘promise to overthrow the established 
political system.’171 In 2005, an official survey took place in the UK, to extrapolate on why there 
was a low turnout at the 2001 general election. This found a ‘well-ingrained popular view across 
the country that our political institutions and their politicians are failing, untrustworthy and 
disconnected from the great mass of the British people.’172 
 
1.2.2 (iv) Concluding Comments on the Make-up of the Far-right in Europe 
In sum, the far-right in Europe differs according to State, structure and nature, with key divides 
being discerned between the different regions, but also amongst parties within particular regions. 
For example, as noted by Marine Le Pen, ‘different opinions exist even in marriages’173 with the 
Western far-right witnessing conflicting ideologies. For example, Dutch Geert Wilder’s Partij 
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voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) is ‘strongly pro-gay, while NF (National Front) is against 
gay marriage’ 174  Further, the mandate of the far-right is developed according to the socio-
economic context of a particular area with its rise often being correlated with economic 
depression as well as rising worries on the impact of multiculturalism and immigration on the 
cultural and/or religious and/or social make-up of a society. The disharmony that marks the far-
right movement in Europe, particularly vis-à-vis political parties, is well reflected in the trouble 
such parties have had in developing a coherent coalition on a European Parliament level. In 1984, 
the first far- right group was created on a European Parliament level but broke down by 1989 due 
to internal disagreements.
175
 In 1989, the Technical Group of the European Parliament
176
 was 
established but only lasted until 1994. It was noted that the use of the term ‘technical’ in its title 
reflects that ‘it was less about ideological agreement than about technical cooperation.’177 In 
1994, this group did not have enough members and, thus, broke apart and by 1999 even more 
seats were lost by the far-right and consequently the movement was weakening. In 2004, and 
with the rise of the far-right, the group Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty was formed and lasted 
until 2007. This was made up of members of France’s Front National (National Front), the 
Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) party of Belgium and far-right parties from the newly acceded 
Romania and Bulgaria. However, there were ideological controversies within the functioning of 
the short life span of this group and, as a result, it ‘failed to act as a coherent political faction.’178 
Its dissolution came in 2007 after Italian MEP Alessandra Mussolini of Lega Nord (Northern 
League) referred to Romanians as ‘habitual lawbreakers.’179 The Romanian members found this 
comment insulting and, in protest, left the group which resulted in its disqualification as an 
official parliamentary group due to lack of membership. During that period, members of parties, 
such as Northern League of Italy and UKIP, were part of the eurosceptic group 
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Independence/Democracy.
180
 This group collapsed after the 2009 elections since it lost many 
MEPs but was succeeded by Europe of Freedom and Democracy for the period between 2009- 
2014. It is this group which provided the framework for the creation of today’s Europe of 
Freedom and Direct Democracy which, up until 2015, was home to parties such as the National 
Front and Northern League.
181
 When establishing this coalition, Marine Le Pen ruled out 
cooperation with Golden Dawn, Jobbik and Ataka
182
 due to her belief that they were just too 
racist.
183
 Instead, parties such as the National Front, the Northern League and UKIP formed a 
coalition, leaving representatives of the ousted parties to remain as non-attached members of the 
European Parliament.
184
 In June 2015, the Europe of Nations and Freedom group was 
established which houses MEPs from the National Front, Northern League, Flemish Interest, 
Party for Freedom and Austria’s Freedom Party. UKIP remained part of the Europe of Freedom 
and Direct Democracy.    
 
Therefore, the historical functioning of the far-right at a European parliament level reflects that 
the non-uniform nature of the far-right as a political movement directly and significantly 
hampers its development into a strong political force on a regional level that is equivalent to 
mainstream groups.  
 
1.2.3. The Extreme-Right: An Ideology against Human Rights 
The extreme-right movement promotes ideas and beliefs which are against the spirit and values 
of a functional human rights culture as these have been promulgated by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter the UDHR) and the documents subsequent to it. In 
essence, far-right entities ‘reject the principle of human equality and hence are hostile towards 
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immigrants, minority groups and rising ethnic and cultural diversity.
185
 By endorsing and 
carrying out Islamophobic, Romaphobic, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant and/or homophobic and 
transphobic rhetoric and activities, the movement itself becomes an issue that is to be looked at 
and addressed through a human rights lens in a two-fold manner. On the one hand, the movement 
violates human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as non-discrimination, and rejects 
principles such as equality and human dignity. On the other hand, the movement exploits rights 
and freedoms emanating from this framework, such as the freedoms of expression, association 
and assembly, so as to pursue and achieve their discriminatory and, at times, violent goals. 
Particularly due to the dire effects of fascism and extremism on mid-twentieth Century Europe, 
through its post-WWII initiatives, the international community recognised the consequences of 
far-right rhetoric and activity and sought to eliminate the possibility of the movement’s 
resurgence. This was pursued through the direct recognition of non-discrimination as a principle 
of law and on the limitation of the aforementioned rights in the event of discriminatory and/or 
violent activities and expressions. As such, there exist several international and European laws, 
principles and policies designed to counter this phenomenon, with leading documents including, 
inter alia, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
(ICERD) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The framework has not 
remained static on any of these levels, with the UN Monitoring Bodies, such as the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), issuing General Recommendations, such 
as No. 15, on Measures to Eradicate Incitement to or Acts of Discrimination and incorporating 
recommendations to States in relation to their handling of right-wing extremism within 
Concluding Observations. On a CoE level, the developments are manifested in, inter alia, 
Strasbourg case-law which prohibits hate speech and hateful association
186
 as well as the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a 
racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. In fact, one of the 
commitments made by the Heads of State of CoE countries in the Vienna Declaration
187
 was ‘to 
combat all ideologies, policies and practices constituting an incitement to racial hatred, violence 
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and discrimination as well as any action or language likely to strengthen fears and tensions 
between groups from different racial, ethnic, national, religious or social backgrounds.’ The 
authors of the Declaration were ‘convinced that these manifestations of intolerance threaten 
democratic societies and their fundamental values.’ Also, in 2014, a General Rapporteur against 
Racism and Intolerance was appointed on a CoE level. The role of the rapporteur is to deal with 
issues such as racist violence and hate speech.  On an EU level, the development of initiatives to 
challenge the far-right have been limited in scope and applicability. The most central tool to 
challenge the far-right in EU Member States is the combined Article 2 and Article 7 mechanism 
of the Treaty on the European Union which seeks to tackle breaches of the rule of law, human 
rights and democracy which may arise, amongst others, from the rhetoric and/or activities of 
movements such as the far-right. However, upon investigating this tool further, as will be done in 
chapter five, one can discern that, to-date; it is marred by too much reliance on political will and, 
thus, remains dormant for the moment. On this level, there is also the Framework Decision on 
Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal 
Law which can be used to tackle rhetoric and acts of the far-right. At the foundation of relevant 
legal provisions of international conventions and jurisprudence and, as a result, at the foundation 
of the analysis of this dissertation; lies the doctrine of militant democracy further discussed in 
chapter two. 
 
Regardless of the existence of tools and the existence of State obligations arising from their 
status as States Parties to international and European documents and/or their membership of the 
EU, and, even though there have been several official acknowledgements that the far-right must 
be challenged, this movement is rising in Europe, propagating discriminatory ideology and, at 
times, carrying out violent activities, with the current socio-economic climate serving as an ideal 
setting in which the far-right can develop.   
 
1.3 Genesis of the Research Topic 
In light of the above, this topic has been chosen firstly because it is timely and significant with 
extreme right-wing parties, non-party groups and subculture movements across Europe 
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becoming increasingly established.
188
 Secondly, extreme right-wing movements reject principles 
pertaining to human equality and advocate discriminatory practices and stances against minority 
groups whilst simultaneously promoting an attitude that is ‘ambiguous, if not hostile, towards 
liberal representative democracy.’189 As a result, and taking into account ‘the inherent dignity 
and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,’190 such movements are 
to be considered a threat to democracy and the rule of law. This characteristic demonstrates the 
severity of the problem and the significance of looking through a human rights lens when 
examining the issue. Based on the above reasons which led to the genesis of the project and 
emanating from the premise that legal responses are a significant means of mitigating the 
potential damage brought about by such movements, this study shall consider the role of the law 
in the realm of right-wing extremism through a comparative analysis of England and Wales and 
Greece, carried out in the ambit of the precepts and precedents established by international and 
European documents and jurisprudence respectively.  
 
1.4 An Assessment of Two Countries: England and Wales and Greece 
This thesis will assess the way the laws of England and Wales and Greece seek to challenge 
right-wing extremism. The two jurisdictions were chosen for three central reasons. Firstly, it was 
necessary to choose countries which are Member States/States Parties of the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe and the European Union so as to be able to look at principles and tools 
emanating from these frameworks. The supranational analysis is now ready and transferable to 
other countries which are members of the above institutions. Secondly, the contextual realities of 
the far-right in the two case-studies are particularly interesting when researching this 
phenomenon. On the one hand, the far-right in Greece is manifested in a particularly violent 
form, rendering imperative the need for research on supranational and national tools that 
may/should be used to challenge the far-right as well as for an evaluation of good practices from 
other countries. Such analysis is not currently available. Also, given that most of the legal 
research on Greece is available only in Greek, it was considered important to broaden this scope 
through research on challenging the far-right in Greece, in English. In relation to England and 
                                                          
188
 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, ‘Briefing Paper - The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements 
in Europe’ (2012) 
189
 Chatham House Report ‘Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe’ (2011) 4 
190
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble 
42 
 
Wales, although there is no equivalent of the systematically violent far-right in the UK more 
generally, this country did see a rise in parties such as UKIP, an increase in far-right violence 
and an increase in the far-right rhetoric in the framework of the EU referendum. More 
particularly, the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced his plan for an EU 
referendum at the start of 2013 during which the outline for this dissertation was being prepared. 
The author considered the run-up to the referendum and the outcomes of it, especially in the 
event of a leave vote, to constitute potentially fertile grounds upon which the far-right could 
flourish. This did occur, with both sides of the campaign embracing hateful rhetoric and, 
ultimately, with the UK’s vote to leave the EU pushing dormant hateful sentiments out into the 
open leading to an increase in far-right speech and crime. Moreοver, what became apparent, both 
during the campaign phase and post-referendum, was that the UK is, in fact, a vulnerable society 
in terms of right-wing propaganda. As such, it was deemed imperative to provide an analysis of 
legal tools to challenge this phenomenon. Thirdly, the two case-studies move along broadly 
similar legislative lines to challenge the far-right, using doctrines such as public order, anti-terror 
activity and non-discrimination as frameworks through which to function, albeit with certain 
significant differences which will be discussed below.  The analysis of these differences but also 
the approach taken by the State in upholding the relevant legislation is what renders the 
combination of the two case-studies particularly interesting.  Given that two separate legal 
cultures and contextual realities will be looked at, a few words will be said regarding the 
difference between the two jurisdictions. The first point to note is that England and Wales has a 
common law system and Greece has a civil law system. This leads to several differences. Firstly, 
the courts in England and Wales are bound by the stare decisis doctrine
191
 whereas Greek courts 
are not.
192
 Secondly, in civil law jurisdictions, the central source of law is legislation in the form 
of codes and statutes whereas in common law jurisdictions, although legislation exists, this is of 
secondary importance to case-law.
193
 In addition, the two differ in the fact that the UK does not 
have a written constitution. Furthermore, the make-up of the far-right in Greece and the UK is 
considerably different. Firstly, the focus of the Greek far-right is Golden Dawn, whereas an 
analysis of the UK incorporates more than one group including, amongst others, the BNP, the 
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EDL and Britain First. It must be noted that these groups are active in other parts of the United 
Kingdom and not just England and Wales, thus reference to the UK is made when providing an 
overview of the constitution of the far-right. At the same time, the UK has the UKIP, a washed 
down version of the far-right which nevertheless endorses Islamophobia, rejects multiculturalism 
and promotes Euroscepticism, an equivalent of which cannot yet be found in Greece. The UK 
also has a subculture milieu in the form of Combat 18, Aryan Strike Force and Blood and 
Honour. It must be stated from the outset that Greece is marked by a more violent far-right scene 
through the activities of Golden Dawn. This is not to say that the far-right in the UK is not 
violent and, in fact, in 2015 it began becoming more violent. Also, predominantly in England, 
hate crime has seen a rise following the country’s decision to leave the EU. Further on this issue 
will be discussed in the country’s analysis. Either way, the violence associated with Golden 
Dawn has been more severe, more systematic and has been occurring for several years on a 
larger scale than in the UK. As noted by the FRA, the large number of hate crimes committed by 
Golden Dawn has been repeatedly reported by national and international organisations as well as 
civil society.
194
 As well as murders, Golden Dawn members have been accused of torture and 
violence committed predominantly against immigrants
195
 Furthermore, although right-wing 
extremism is present in both Greece and the UK, as will be demonstrated in the relevant chapters, 
the reasons for the existence of these phenomena are marked by some variations with 
immigration, Islam and multiculturalism being central to both scenes but with Greece’s 
experience being aggressively affected by the current financial climate and the current migration 
crisis. Moreover, the historical backdrops and development of the far-right scene in the two 
countries differ, as extrapolated in the chapters on the UK and Greece respectively.  
 
1.5 Originality of Research   
The phenomenon of right-wing extremism has been looked at within several academic spheres 
including political science and law. In relation to the former, academic discussion has considered, 
inter alia, the general trends and developments of the extreme-right generally or within particular 
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contexts,
196
 the nature of the far-right as a political and/or non-political structure, with such 
books focusing on particular areas or regions,
197
 the socio-economic and interpersonal reasons 
which led citizens to opt to be part of the far-right electorate
198
 and the advantages and 
disadvantages of proscribing right-wing extremist groups.
199
 Legal research, to- date, has 
considered elements of the far-right such as hate speech and activity, more generally,
200
 with no 
study, to date, focusing on far-right speech and activity as is manifested solely within the 
framework of political parties, non-party groups and subculture movements. Thus, the first 
reason for which this study is a new contribution to the general academic framework is that it 
focuses solely on rhetoric expressed and activities conducted in the sphere of the far-right 
movement. Secondly, as reflected in the literature review, hate speech has been dealt with more 
substantially than hateful associations, with minimal reference given to assemblies. Thus, this 
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study seeks to contribute to existing academic research by addressing the imbalance described 
above and ensure that all the rights which may be used and abused by right-wing extremists in 
order to promote their mandate and conduct their activities are dealt with in a comprehensive 
manner. The third reason for the study’s originality is that, to achieve the above, it constructs the 
adopted analysis partly through a militant democracy lens. This doctrine has been considered in 
several arenas as a concept more generally,
201
 in the sphere of the European Convention on 
Human Rights
202
 in relation to particular freedoms, such as that of association,
203
 and as a tool 
for challenging the far-right movement through the spectrum of political science.
204
 However, 
this doctrine has not yet been applied within a legal assessment of challenging the far-right as a 
single entity. Finally, this is the first study looking into the national legislation and case-law of 
England and Wales and Greece as single entities and/or in conjunction with each other, through 
the more general sphere of their obligations under international and European law in the realm of 
the far-right movement. In brief, by solely dealing with the organised, semi-organised or loosely 
organised manifestation of the far-right, approaching the study in the ambit of restricting human 
rights and freedoms and by offering the first insight into these two jurisdictions in the way 
described above, this dissertation aspires to be a new academic contribution to the task of 
challenging right-wing extremism.  
 
1.6 Methodology and Structure 
The methodology adopted throughout the thesis is a desk-bound assessment of primary and 
secondary sources of law as well as advisory sources. In terms of primary law, it will look at 
legislation and, in the example of Greece, the Criminal Code and Constitution. It will assess 
case-law of domestic courts, placing a focus on the highest domestic court judgement in the 
event that there was an appeal process. However, if the decisions of lower courts are relevant to 
the overall analysis, these will be discussed. Books and academic articles, as secondary sources 
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of law, will also be considered for the development of critical discussion. Finally, where 
applicable, the thesis will look at advisory sources including reports from organisations, such as 
the FRA, ECRI and ENAR. These will all be assessed in the framework of hard and soft 
international and European law.  
 
Chapter one will provide a definitional framework of key terms and notions that will be 
employed in this dissertation. Chapter two will set out the theoretical framework, considering the 
approaches adopted predominantly by philosophers and legal theorists on the question of if, how 
and when freedoms, such as expression and association, can be restricted for purposes of 
preventing harm and providing a review of the existing literature which lays out the ideas and 
thoughts relevant to the theoretical conceptualisation of restricting the far-right and/or its 
vehicles.. Chapter three will set out the international legal framework that is to be applied for the 
regulation of right-wing extremism. It will consider the relevant UN Conventions and, 
particularly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ICERD as 
well as jurisprudence, General Comments and General Recommendations of the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) and the CERD and reports of relevant UN Special Rapporteurs. It will also set  
out the development, efficacy and potential loopholes that exist on this level. By assessing 
existing academic opinions, this chapter will also pinpoint State obligations, legal benchmarks, 
good practices and central principles emanating from this framework so that the extent to which 
these have been incorporated and applied by the jurisdictions under consideration can be looked 
at later on. The key research questions that are to be responded to in this chapter are: 
 
1. How does international law (directly or indirectly) challenge right-wing extremism? 
What are the aims, objectives, scope and possible shortcomings of international law in this 
sphere? 
2. What State obligations arise from international law in the sphere of regulating right-
wing extremism? 
 
Chapter four will look at the Council of Europe, providing an analysis of State obligations in the 
realm of relevant treaties, conventions and protocols. More particularly, the chapter will look at 
the ECHR and how this has been interpreted and upheld by the ECtHR and, previously, the 
47 
 
European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter EComHR) in jurisprudence relevant to far-
right rhetoric and activity. An overview will also be made of the Additional Protocol to the 
Cybercrime Convention, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic 
Nature Committed through Computer Systems. The key research questions that are to be 
responded to in this chapter are: 
 
1. How is freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of association and freedom of 
assembly provided for by the European Convention on Human Rights? 
2. How does the ECtHR approach right-wing extremism? Where available and relevant, 
how did the EComHR approach right-wing extremism? 
3. What obligations arise from a country’s status as Contracting Party to the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the sphere of challenging right-wing extremism? 
4. What obligations arise from the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention on 
Racism and Xenophobia? How does this document contribute to challenging the far-right 
in Contracting Parties? 
 
Chapter five will look at the EU and the frameworks through which right-wing extremism can 
and/or should be challenged by Member States. Particularly, it will look at primary law, such as 
Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union, and secondary law, such as the Council 
Framework Decision on Combatting Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia 
by Means of Criminal Law.
205
 The questions that will be tackled are: 
 
1. How does EU Law challenge (directly or indirectly) right-wing extremism?  
2. What are the aims, objectives, scope and possible shortcomings of EU law in this 
sphere? 
3. What State obligations arise from a country’s status as Member State of the EU in 
the sphere of regulating right-wing extremism? 
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As with the discussion on the United Nations, as well as identifying potential weaknesses which 
exist on an EU and CoE level, the respective chapters will also serve as a backdrop against which 
the obligations of the UK (and thus England and Wales) and Greece arising from these 
institutions shall be assessed later. 
 
Chapters six and seven will consist of an appraisal of England and Wales and Greece 
respectively, examining how the extreme right-wing movement is dealt with by these 
jurisdictions. Firstly, a contextual setting will be established, adopting Minkenberg’s three 
entities of political parties, non-party movements and the subculture milieu,
206
 taking care to 
distinguish between violent, non-violent and quasi-violent mandates,
207
 as this will facilitate the 
establishment of a broad spectrum of entities taking into account central variations. This will, 
accordingly, allow for a determination of the possible differentiations in laws and legal measures 
implemented according to a group’s positioning within Minkenberg’s structure and/or according 
to the nature of its activities. Minkenberg’s structure in itself will assist in demonstrating the 
complexities that arose from tackling Golden Dawn, as a registered political party 
simultaneously acting within a subculture realm. In order to construct the contextual setting, 
academic sources will be looked at in addition to, where available, primary sources such as the 
groups’ websites, social networking sites and Statutes. After establishing the contextual settings, 
there will be an overview of how the freedoms of expression, association, assembly and the right 
to non-discrimination are provided for by national law, as it is through the restriction of these 
rights that far-right phenomena are habitually tackled by international and European law. 
Following this analysis, the jurisdictions’ legislation, policies and case-law shall be assessed in 
order to ascertain the efficacy and efficiency of the national laws and jurisprudence in the sphere 
of regulating extreme right-wing movements. More particularly, the chapters will look at the 
national laws that exist which can be used to challenge extreme right-wing movements and the 
potential loopholes or good practices that exist, therein, the intended and unintended effects of 
the national laws considered in the sphere of right-wing extremism and whether national laws 
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make any distinctions as to the categories of right-wing groupings. Moreover, it will assess if and, 
if so, how the jurisdictions have incorporated international and European law in their legislation 
and if and, if so, how they have followed the jurisprudence of Strasbourg, the HRC and the 
CERD. In order to determine the States’ adherence to international obligations, potential 
reservations and/or interpretative declarations imposed on provisions of international 
conventions shall be assessed in addition to Concluding Observations made by the HRC and the 
CERD on the respective jurisdictions. The key research questions to be tackled in these chapters 
and applicable to both jurisdictions are: 
 
1. What is the contextual framework of the far-right? 
2. Are the freedoms of expression, assembly and association and the right to non-
discrimination protected by the national legal orders of the two jurisdictions? If so, how? 
3. Do national laws exist to challenge extreme right-wing movements? If so, what are the 
aims, objectives, scope and possible shortcomings of these national laws? 
4. Do national laws incorporate relevant international and European laws and principles? 
If so, how has this been achieved? 
5. Does national case-law exist that has dealt with extreme right-wing movements? If so, 
what approach is taken by the Courts under consideration? Is there a pattern in the 
treatment of far-right cases by the Courts? Do the Courts follow approaches adopted by 
UN Monitoring Bodies and/or Strasbourg? If so, how? If no, why?  
 
After setting out the legal regulation of right-wing extremism in England and Wales and Greece, 
there will be a final conclusion of the dissertation’s central findings, predominantly through a 
comparative analysis of the two jurisdictions.   
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CHAPTER ONE: DEFINITIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide a definitional and conceptual framework of the key terms and notions 
used and referred to in this dissertation so as to facilitate the critical analysis of challenging right-
wing extremism. It will look at terms habitually used to describe the phenomenon under 
consideration and consider Minkenberg’s three entities which exist within the far-right, namely 
political parties, non-party movements and the subculture milieu,
208
 ascertaining their 
characteristics. This structure will subsequently be adopted when appraising the legal and 
contextual frameworks of England and Wales and Greece in order to ensure that all the forms 
through which the far-right is manifested are included in the discussion and determine the 
differences, if any, between the legal regulations of the different entities. Furthermore, the 
chapter will offer definitions and explanations of racism, racial discrimination, hate speech and 
hate crime as consequences of the far-right. Emanating from the premise that the far-right poses 
a threat to liberal democracies, the chapter’s analysis will elucidate the definitional boundaries 
between acceptable and unacceptable parties and groups and their declarations and actions. 
 
1. The Extreme-Right and Related Terms  
1.1 The Extreme-Right – Semantics and Notions  
Extreme-right movements are not easily defined, with no consensus as to their definition and 
with the lines between different terms that exist within this realm remaining blurred. In fact, the 
terms ‘populist, neo-nationalist, far right, radical right and extreme right are often used 
interchangeably.’209 According to Cass Mudde, even though ‘the term right-wing extremism is 
today quite current in the social and political jargon, there is no unequivocal definition.’210 
‘Fascism’ which is a ‘heavily contested term’211 has also been used on occasions to describe such 
movements. This term can be traced back to Mussolini’s Italy (1922-1943) where ‘prototypal 
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Italian fascism’212 emanated from and could subsequently be found in countries such as France, 
Great Britain and the Netherlands.
213
  European fascism is directly interrelated with the period 
between the end of the first World War and the end of the second’214 and, notwithstanding that 
some pre-World War I traces of fascism existed, it was that war and its consequences which 
‘truly forged fascism out of the primitive pre-war ore.’215 Fascism has been defined as a term 
which includes phenomena such as ‘hypernationalism, antiparliamentarism, antiliberalism, 
populism…’ 216  and also as one which is, ‘...a typical manifestation of 20th century 
totalitarianism; resistance to 'modernization…’217 As such, and as noted in the Evrigenis Report, 
which was formulated by an expert committee on an EU level for purposes of examining the rise 
of fascism and racism in Europe in the 1980s, ‘there was widespread insistence that the 
phenomena under consideration must be placed in a historical perspective, some experts even 
maintaining that the term fascism should be confined to the movements active in inter-war 
Europe under that name.’218 Minkenberg also adopts this viewpoint by noting that the term 
fascism ‘refers to specific historical phenomena.’ 219  Interlinked with the term ‘fascism’ is 
‘Nazism’ and variations such as Neo-Nazi. In relation to Nazism, some of the experts who 
composed the Evrigenis Report placed fascism and Nazism under one umbrella, arguing that 
‘nazism is part of a continuous ideological development in Europe.’220 whereas others noted the 
difference between Nazism and Fascism by making reference to, inter alia, ‘the anti-Semitic 
aspect of nazism as distinguishing the two.’ 221  Importantly, ‘while fascist or neo-fascist 
movements or parties should indeed be considered right-wing extremist, not all right-wing 
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extremist movements or parties may be considered fascist or neo-fascist.’222 More generally, the 
terms Fascism, Nazism, Neo-Fascism and Neo-Nazism were the terms employed by political and 
academic commentators until the 1960s with the term right-wing extremism coming into play in 
the 1970s.
223
 In relation to the term right-wing extremism, it must be noted that this is favoured 
predominantly in Europe whereas the term ‘radical right’ is more often used in the United States 
of America.
224
  
 
Either way, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to assess the constituents of the different 
definitions used to describe the far-right movement. Instead, it is sufficient to note that the 
definitional framework adopted for purposes of this study’s analysis of the ways in which this 
movement is challenged, in the jurisdictions under consideration and on a supranational level, 
does not adopt an exclusionary approach towards any of the aforementioned definitions when 
appraising academic, legal and, where relevant and available, policy text given that they are, in 
many cases, employed interchangeably therein. However, when referring to the movement under 
consideration, the terms far-right, extreme-right, radical-right and right-wing extremism will be 
employed due to their more neutral, broader and all-encompassing nature. Furthermore, viewing 
the above broad terms on an equal footing is also justified by focusing on the elements which are 
common to all parties and groups within this movement. For example, ‘the centrality of the 
immigration issue for this party family in Europe is undisputed,’225 a statement that can be 
extended to other entities such as non-party movements. More particularly, the very opposite 
‘others’ scapegoated through the movement’s rhetoric and activities are immigrants, with a 
particular emphasis being placed on Muslims.
226
 This is particularly true of far-right entities 
which exist in countries with a high Muslim population. In fact, this characteristic is facilitated 
by the ‘increasingly critical rhetoric and policy surrounding migration and Islam in Europe.’227 
Notwithstanding the accuracy of such statements for the reality of a large number of European 
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countries, they must be considered with care given that the contextual reality of this movement in 
central and eastern Europe is different resulting in the parties and groups of these areas focusing 
on ‘mobilizing public hostility towards the Jews [and] the Roma’228 with their Northern and 
Western counterparts, for example, placing more emphasis on anti-Islam rhetoric. Once again, 
these characteristics are not clear-cut since these features are not mutually exclusive but merely 
mark the bulk of the parties’ activities. In simple terms, this is not to say that a right-wing 
extremist party in the South of Europe does not promote anti-Semitic sentiments and practices, 
as will be reflected by the analysis of Greece. Also, this is not to say that many of these parties 
limit themselves to the type of rhetoric mentioned above with new objectives arising as times 
and contexts change, a suitable example being the increasingly discriminatory rhetoric adopted 
by these parties against EU immigrants in countries such as the United Kingdom.
229
 Thus, the 
argument made in the framework of right-wing political parties insofar as ‘they appear similar 
but in some respects they also seem the same but different’230 hits the nail on the head in relation 
to the movement more generally. In light of the above, it is safer to argue that ‘ethnic 
exclusionism and/or expulsionism are now the sine qua non of most extreme right 
movements.’231  
 
So, on one level, this movement is characterised by an anti-minority rhetoric and/or practice, a 
characteristic which encompasses all the relevant counterparts such as anti-immigrant, anti-
Muslim, anti-Roma and anti-Semitic. In addition to this, the movement is explicitly defined as 
such, or implicitly linked with the notion of extremism. This positive correlation assumes that the 
rhetoric and activities such parties or groups promote or adopt are incongruous with the general 
framework in which they find themselves. In Western democracies, it is the principles which 
make up a liberal democracy that are the driving force of politics and, by extension, other 
groupings. As a result, any potential for the existence of extremism should be measured against 
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the aforementioned principles.
232
 In this light, and as noted by Minkenberg, right-wing 
radicalism, which is his preferred term, is a ‘political ideology or tendency based on ultra-
nationalist
233
 ideas which tends to be directed against liberal democracy – although not 
necessarily directly or explicitly so.’234 It is noteworthy to refer to the possibility of an implicit 
breach of the principles of a liberal democracy referred to by Minkenberg, which is a reality 
since, for example, right-wing extremist political parties, duly registered as such, are acting 
within the framework of a democratically elected system of government but, through this avenue, 
are promoting and adopting anti-democratic approaches and practices. This poses the interesting 
perplexity of a liberal democratic system which permits a far-right entity to exist within its 
spectrum notwithstanding that the latter’s aims and objectives are in direct contravention to the 
former’s founding principles. The dichotomy between the freedoms of expression, association 
and assembly, which are central to a liberal democracy, on the one hand, and the right to non-
discrimination as well as general principles such as preserving human dignity, on the other, will 
lie at the heart of the theoretical framework underpinning this dissertation’s analysis.  
 
The aforementioned focus on the hostility expressed towards minority groups does not mean that 
groups within this framework do not adopt discriminatory approaches towards other vulnerable 
groups such as LGBTI, women and disabled persons.
235
 However, the dissertation will focus 
solely on the hostility towards particular ethnic groups such as immigrants or ethnic minorities, 
since this is the common denominator in all European groupings.
236
 It also constitutes one of the 
key academic, legal and policy concerns in an increasingly multicultural Europe, especially in 
States hit by financial crises which slowly manifest themselves into social crises of intolerance, 
scapegoating and racism.  
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In light of the above, when looking at the jurisdictions under consideration, the dissertation will 
look at all groups, parties, subcultures and other forms of organised or semi-organised entities 
which seek to promote ethnic exclusionism or expulsionism in an extremist manner. In adopting 
the two-fold formula of ethnic exclusionism and expulsionism on the one hand and extremism on 
the other, the assessment of the two jurisdictions which will take place against the backdrop of 
UN, CoE and EU principles, documents and, where available, jurisprudence, will ascertain how 
the two jurisdictions have interpreted these terms and subsequently defined, categorised and 
treated the related political parties as well as other groups and entities.  
 
1.2 The Extreme-Right: Structural Framework 
Right-wing extremism is an ideology promoted by individuals and groups. For purposes of this 
dissertation, right-wing extremist rhetoric and/or activity as uttered and/or carried out by political 
parties, non-party groups and the subculture milieu will be assessed, looking at the far-right 
within the sphere of an organised or semi-organised movement, rather than at right-wing 
extremist individuals with no affiliation to a particular entity or movement. This is because the 
dissertation’s objective is to conceptualise and analyse how England and Wales and Greece 
tackle the far-right as a movement, rather than the actions of lone wolves. As noted, Minkenberg 
divided the organised groupings of this movement into three different forms, those of a political 
party, a non-party group and a subculture environment. The first status enjoyed by such groups is 
that of a registered political party functioning within a democratic regime, seeking support 
through elections and seeking to influence policy and practice through actual or pursued 
representation in the executive and/or legislature. Second are the non-party groups which are not 
rigidly structured and are ‘not geared towards elections or public offices but nonetheless aim to 
mobilize the public in general.’237 Third are the ‘small groups in the sense of a subculture 
environment’238  which operate independently from the other entities and are more prone to 
                                                          
237
 Michael Minkenberg, ‘The Radical Right in Europe Today: Trends and Patterns in East and West’ in Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung Forum Berlin: Nora Langenbacher  & Britta Schellenberg, ‘Is Europe on the Right Path? Right-Wing 
Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Europe’ (2011) 41 
238
 Michael Minkenberg, ‘The Radical Right in Europe Today: Trends and Patterns in East and West’ in Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung Forum Berlin: Nora Langenbacher  & Britta Schellenberg, ‘Is Europe on the Right Path? Right-Wing 
Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Europe’ (2011) 41 
56 
 
violence than other groups.
239
 Minkenberg’s structure will be adopted when assessing the 
contextual frameworks as it facilitates the establishment of a spectrum of entities with, for 
example, varying levels of organisation and/or violent manifestations. This tripartite structure 
reflects the inherent weakness in a legal system which only tackles the impact of, for example, 
political parties and disregards the other entities making up this group. As noted, ‘exclusion 
constrains radical right parties but cannot prevent the movement sector from developing 
comparatively strongly.’240 As such, the advantage of adopting Minkenberg’s structure in this 
dissertation is that it will ensure that the appraisal of the law is carried out bearing in mind the 
different forms which this movement takes. This subsequently allows for an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the law when confronted with the right-wing extremist movement in its entirety.  
What becomes particularly significant in the analysis of Greece is that the far-right in this 
country deviates from Minkenberg’s structure given that Golden Dawn is a political party with 
characteristics of a violent subculture movement with a rigid rather than a loose structure. In fact, 
as will be discussed in chapter seven it is precisely the status of Golden Dawn as a political party 
that constituted one of the central reasons the State repeatedly cited as the reason for not 
interfering with its rhetoric and actions.  
 
1.3 Extreme-Right Entities: Key Characteristics 
Right-wing extremist political parties are witnessing escalating success in the United Kingdom 
and Greece as well as in other European countries on a local and/or national and/or regional scale. 
On a regional scale, this was reflected by the 2014 European Parliament elections which saw the 
representation of the far-right flourish. Far-right parties are ‘ambivalent if not hostile towards 
liberal representative democracy.’241 There are different types of political parties that make up 
the far-right scene, as will be illustrated in the contextual frameworks of England and Wales and 
Greece, and as was reflected in the analysis of the embedded conflicts which have marked any 
effort to form a coalition of the far-right in the European Parliament. The simplest examples that 
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demonstrate a differentiation of the types of political parties are those ‘that remain wedded to 
interwar fascism and those that eschew this tradition.’ 242  Notwithstanding the differences 
between far-right political parties in terms of vision, mission and structure, they, nevertheless, 
share the common feature of presenting minority groups, such as immigrants and/or Muslims, in 
the States under consideration, as posing a socio-cultural threat to the nation. In addition to such 
parties’ habitual electorate, a large section of society could be wooed by this mandate as is 
reflected by ‘public attitudes on immigration, growing public hostility towards, for example, 
settled Muslim communities and public dissatisfaction with mainstream parties and their 
performance on immigration-related issues.’243  The dire consequence of such parties is that they 
‘can weaken social cohesion, undermining the social fabric of democracy.’244 The impact of such 
parties goes beyond these frameworks given that ‘their ideas have become increasingly 
intertwined with mainstream politics.’245 Moreover, by contributing to the mainstreaming of their 
rhetoric, they ‘help to create a broader climate conducive to radical right thinking.’246 In light of 
the above, the dissertation adopts the view that the discriminatory mandates of such parties are 
considered to constitute a threat to the very foundation of democracy and the rule of law. As 
noted by Elizabeth Carter, right-wing extremist entities ‘reject the principle of fundamental 
human equality.’247 As such, it can be concluded that such parties are considered right-wing 
extremists as ‘they unquestionably occupy the right-most position of the political spectrum’248 
and embrace ‘exclusionary representations of the nation, combined with authoritarian political 
perspectives.’ 249  Some parties may directly dismiss the functioning of a representative 
democracy but, even if they guise themselves behind a shield of alleged legitimacy and do not, 
per se, doubt or condemn the functioning of a liberal democracy, they are nevertheless quick to 
                                                          
242
 A Chatham House Report: Matthew Goodwin, Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist 
Extremism in Europe’ (2011) 12 
243
 A Chatham House Report: Matthew Goodwin, ‘Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist 
Extremism in Europe’ (2011) 11 
244
 Institute for Strategic Dialogue: Matthew Goodwin & Vidhya Ramalingam, ‘Briefing Paper - The New Radical 
Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe’ (2012)  12 
245
 Institute for Strategic Dialogue: Matthew Goodwin & Vidhya Ramalingam, ‘Briefing Paper - The New Radical 
Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe’ (2012)  9 
246
 Institute for Strategic Dialogue: Matthew Goodwin & Vidhya Ramalingam, ‘Briefing Paper - The New Radical 
Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe’ (2012)  3 
247
 Elizabeth Carter, ‘The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?’ (eds. Manchester University Press 
2005) 17 
248
 Piero Ignazi, ‘Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe’ (eds. OUP 2003) 2  
249
 Paul Hainsworth, ‘The Politics of the Extreme Right: Form the Margins to the Mainstream’ (eds. Pitner 2000) 7 
58 
 
espouse extremist discourses and exclusionary approaches to issues such as immigration, thereby 
diverging from the key constituents of a democratic system.
250
  
 
The element of violence is also a key consideration when looking at the extreme right. Although 
today such parties are mainly of a non-violent nature with most seeking to ‘disassociate 
themselves from historical or perceived ties to their…violent counterparts’,251 there are situations 
where violence continues to mark their activities as will be reflected in the analysis of Greece. 
Given that violence, including the incitement to violence, is a potential or a reality of this 
movement, whether and, if so, the extent to which far-right violence and or the prevention and/or 
punishment of such violence is incorporated into the jurisdictions’ legal (and where available, 
policy) frameworks will be considered.  
 
Hence, right-wing extremist organisations come in different shapes and sizes, boasting a variety 
of means and methods adopted for purposes of achieving their objectives. Notwithstanding some 
variations in their mandates, the key elements which tie these entities together include their 
ethnically exclusionary and/or expulsionary rhetoric and activities conducted through an 
extremist framework, targetting a variety of groups due to their ethnicity and/or nationality 
and/or religion and/or sexual orientation.   
 
1.4 Nationalism  
Nationalism is an important doctrine in the sphere of far-right movements and can be defined as 
‘an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on 
behalf of a population.’252 It is closely related to concepts such as ‘national sentiment, collective 
sentiments for the strength and welfare of the nation and national identity.’253 Ultra-nationalism 
can be defined as ‘a great or excessive devotion to or advocacy of national interests and rights 
especially as opposed to international interests.’254 So, whilst nationalism can be affiliated with 
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issues such as a sense of national belonging, ultra-nationalism encompasses sentiments and 
subsequent behaviour that incorporate a certain form of excessiveness. This is not to say that 
only ultra-nationalist ideas fall within the ambit of the far-right since nationalism and a thwarted 
and exclusionary understanding of the nation are also applicable to the far-right. For the far-right, 
the nation is ‘idealised and popularised as a homogenous identity.’255 Minkenberg argues that 
‘the nationalistic myth is characterised by the effort to construct an idea of a nation and national 
belonging by radicalizing ethnic, religious, cultural and political criteria of exclusion…’256 One 
of the reasons that far-right groups are considered to be extremist is their promotion of an 
‘exclusionist or exclusivist view of the nation.’257 As such, for this movement, an issue such as 
immigration is an outside influence which constitutes a threat to the far-right conception of the 
nation and national identity. To summon support for anti-immigrant stances and approaches, far-
right groups present immigrants as a threat to the continued existence of the national group. This 
is also extended to other perceived threats such as ethnic minorities.
258
 Further, far-right entities 
active in Member States of the EU habitually consider their countries’ membership of the EU as 
a threat to their conception of a nation, national identity and state sovereignty.
259
 This was 
clearly manifested in the campaigning for the leave vote in the UK’s EU referendum. Although, 
currently, the first issue that comes to mind when looking at the perception of the nation in the 
eyes of right-wing extremists is immigration, it is also interlinked with other policies and 
ideologies adopted by them, such as their perception of the role of women in society. For 
example, in Golden Dawn’s overview of its positions and policies, it argues for the financial 
support of motherhood, the further enhancement of support of families with three or more 
children and, interrelated to the issue of motherhood, the prohibition of abortion.
260
 Thus, the 
party believes that by increasing the birth rate of Greek children, this subsequently enhances the 
strength of the Greek nation. This approach to motherhood and abortion was also adopted by the 
French National Front with Martin Durham arguing that its ‘anti-abortion stance was part of its 
pro-natalist order to ward off being overtaken by non-French birth rates.’261 
                                                          
255
 Paul Hainsworth, ‘The Extreme Right in Western Europe’ (eds. Routledge 2008) 77 
256
 Paul Hainsworth, ‘The Extreme Right in Western Europe’ (eds. Routledge 2008) 77 
257
 Paul Hainsworth, ‘The Extreme Right in Western Europe’ (eds. Routledge 2008) 22 
258
 Matthew  Goodwin, New British Fascism – Rise of the British National Party’ (eds. Routledge 2011) 7 
259
  Paul Hainsworth, ‘The Extreme Right in Western Europe’ (eds. Routledge 2008) 82 
260
 Golden Dawn’s Positions: <http://www.xryshaygh.com/kinima/thesis? [Accessed 10 November 2015]  
261
 Martin Durham, ‘Women and Fascism’ (eds. Routledge 1998) 86-90  
60 
 
 
1.5 Race and Racism  
In order to consider the term racism, one must first clarify what is meant by race. For this 
purpose, it is sufficient to say that the notion of race is ‘based on assumptions of some sort of 
common ancestry and even on a degree of physiognomic homogeneity.’262 Along with ‘gender, 
class and religion, race has been identified as an essentially contested concept.’263 Although 
different races do not scientifically exist, ‘race discourses remain central to modern society.’264 
In the 17
th
 century, scientific theories on race came about which sought to divide humans into 
separate races as a result of the alleged differences in physical traits. Such theories were 
interlinked to particular intellectual abilities promoting the position that some races were, in fact, 
superior to others.
265
 This, in turn, provided ‘a veneer of legitimacy for imperialism and the slave 
trade. It also provided an ideological underpinning for the emergence of race laws in the 1930s 
and the subsequent Holocaust.’266 During imperial times, it was widely considered that European 
States were succeeding in their efforts to conquer and rule due to the ‘qualities inherent in the 
white race or races.’267 Such theories resulted in what is referred to as scientific or biological 
racism.
268
 Rebuttal of this theory commenced in the 1920s with UNESCO accelerating the 
process following WWII.
269
 In a formal statement, UNESCO held that ‘for all practical social 
purposes race is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth.’270 However, UNESCO 
re-drafted this statement following complaints brought forth by certain scholars in the field of 
race and ‘focused on genetics and weakened many of the more forceful assertions of the first.’271 
In time, the international community began to underline the fallacy of this theory with the 
Preamble of the ICERD noting that ‘any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is 
                                                          
262
 Hatred against the Jews and Judaism: John Hartwell Moore, ‘Encyclopaedia of Race and Racism’  (eds. Thomson 
Gale 2008), Volume 3, 329 
263
  Mattias Möschel, ‘Race in Mainland European Legal Analysis: Towards a European Critical Race Theory’ 
(2011) 34 Ethnic and Racial Studies 10, 1650 
264
 Sasha Williams & Ian Law, ‘Legitimising Racism: An Exploration of the Challenges Posed by the Use of 
Indigeneity Discourses by The Far-Right.’ (2012) 17 Sociological Research Online 2, 2 
265
 Charles Hirschman, ‘The Origins and Demise of The Concept of Race’  (2004) 30 Population and Development 
Review 385, 393 
266
 Mark Bell, ‘Race, Ethnicity and Racism in Europe’(2009) Oxford Scholarship Online, 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com> [ Accessed 20 August 2014], 8 
267
 Harry Goulbourne, ‘Race Relations in Britain since 1945’ (eds. Macmillan 1998), 58 
268
 John Hartwell Moore, ‘Encyclopaedia of Race and Racism’  (eds. Thomson Gale 2008), Volume 3, 1  
269
 David Kretzmer, ‘Freedom of Speech and Racism’ (1987) 8 Cardozo Law Review 445, 452 
270
 UNESCO 1950 Statement on Race, para. 14: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001229/122962eo.pdf>  
271
 John Hartwell Moore, ‘Encyclopaedia of Race and Racism’  (eds. Thomson Gale 2008), Volume 3, 11 
61 
 
scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous…’ The 1978 
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice held that ‘all human beings belong to a single species 
and are descended from a common stock’ and that ‘differences between the achievements of the 
different peoples … can in no case serve as a pretext for any rank-ordered classification of 
nations or peoples.’ As a result of what was known as scientific or biological racism, the earliest 
definition of racism offered by UNESCO states that racism ‘consists of antisocial beliefs and acts 
which are based on the fallacy that discriminatory intergroup relations are justifiable on 
biological grounds' 
272
 The rebuttal of the theory, which served as a pretext for racism, did not 
mean that racism ceased to exist but merely that it found different sources and foundations on 
which to develop. As argued by Floya Anthias, a new form of racism has now emerged which 
has shifted away from ‘explicit biological notions to culturalist or nationalist ones.’273 As a result, 
the extreme-right movements in Europe have mostly, but not entirely,
274
 moved away from the 
previous race theories with their discourse becoming ‘couched in terms of opposition to 
immigrants and immigration,’275 but also to ethnic groups such as the Roma. As a result, when 
seeking to determine the meaning of racism, one must take into account the contextual and 
conceptual variations according to acceptable rhetoric, at the material time, which may influence 
its causes and consequences.  
 
Racism is a difficult term to define due to the complexities in drawing boundaries between 
racism, nationalism and ethnocentrism with the latter two not necessarily constituting 
problematic phenomena.
276
 However, a 2005 European Parliament Resolution noted the need for 
‘sound and clear definitions on racism and xenophobia, as means of effectively combatting these 
phenomena.’ 277  ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No.7 has been one of the few 
documents, aside from academic papers and dictionaries, offering a definition of racism. It holds 
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that racism is ‘the belief that a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or 
national or ethnic origin justifies contempt for a person or a group of persons, or the notion of 
superiority of a person or a group of persons.’ 278  This definition refers to contempt and 
superiority and not to hatred, thereby, allowing for a broad spectrum of beliefs that can be 
incorporated therein, as there is no need to demonstrate the intensity of hate. An academic 
definition put forth for racism is that it consists of ‘negative attitudes directed in blanket fashion 
towards people belonging to groups defined by reference to colour, race or ethnic or national 
origins.’279 It also provides that ‘hatred of such groups is...a form of racial prejudice’280 rather 
than incorporating the notion of hatred within the definition of racism.  
 
Thus, the common denominator of the majority of such definitions is that they refer to racism as 
a belief system rather than an action or omission resulting in the abstract nature and the potential 
intricacies in defining and legislating on it. This could perhaps demonstrate why it is more 
efficient to define actual conduct in the form of racial discrimination, for example, rather than 
abstract notions of beliefs and ideas. In this light, it has been argued that ‘Recommendation 7 
introduces a concept that is difficult for any legal system to prosecute.’281 Further, as noted by 
Erica Howard, by legislating on one’s beliefs, this would result in the violation of the freedom of 
thought
282
 which is generally granted an absolute status. These arguments are based only on the 
premise that racism does, in fact, merely incorporate a system of beliefs and ideas rather than any 
practices or activities. As noted by Mark Bell, the lack of a concrete definitional framework in 
legal instruments could be due to the ‘assumption that racism refers merely to a state of mind, as 
opposed to specific acts which could be subject to legal regulation.’283 This assumption was not, 
however, adopted by UNESCO which, in defining racism, has gone beyond the mere system of 
beliefs and has underlined that racism includes ‘racist ideologies, prejudiced attitudes, 
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discriminatory behaviour, structural arrangements and institutionalised practices resulting in 
racial inequality as well as the fallacious notion that discriminatory relations between groups are 
morally and scientifically justifiable…’ 284  The distinction of this term in comparison to its 
aforementioned counterparts is that it does not remain within the sphere of ideologies and belief 
systems but incorporates activities which have the potential of being legislated against. 
Nevertheless, in most legal instruments, such as the ICERD, drafters have avoided defining 
racism, probably because of the assumption that it merely contains beliefs, and have 
circumvented this problem by focusing, defining and legislating on racial discrimination as 
discussed below.  Despite the lacking definitional framework for the reasons mentioned, racism 
is sui generis
285
 as it is ‘universally condemned.’286  
 
1.6 Racial Discrimination  
1.6.1 Semantics and Notions 
Legal documents have been more open in providing definitions for racial discrimination rather 
than for racism. Article 1(1) of the ICERD states that racial discrimination means ‘any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or 
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.’ Although the word ‘race’ is 
used in the definition of Article 1(1), the international community has acknowledged that race ‘is 
not a biological fact, but a social construction.’287 In addition, the use of this term in Article 1(1) 
must be read in light of the ICERD’s Preamble which stipulates, amongst other things, that ‘any 
doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, 
socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial discrimination, in theory 
or in practice, anywhere.’ Another document which provides a definition of racial discrimination 
is the ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No.7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism 
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and Racial Discrimination, which holds that direct racial discrimination is ‘any differential 
treatment based on a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or 
ethnic origin, which has no objective and reasonable justification’ adding language and religion 
to the previous list. As well as including the two additional grounds, it extrapolates on the 
conditions for justifying such treatment which the Policy Recommendation holds must be 
objective and reasonable and must seek to pursue a legitimate aim and be proportional. The 
Policy Recommendation adds nuance to racial discrimination in a theoretical sense. However, on 
a practical level, it could be argued that terms, such as objective and reasonable, are open-ended 
and could have a plethora of interpretations which are unavailable in the case of a policy 
recommendation document.  
 
The definition of racial discrimination, as provided for by the ICERD, entails separate yet 
interrelated practices, namely any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which may 
result in hindering the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms within a variety of 
sectors of public life. As noted by General Recommendation No. 32 of the CERD, ‘the reference 
to public life does not limit the scope of the non-discrimination principle to acts of the public 
administration but should be read in light of provisions in the Convention mandating measures 
by States parties to address racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization.’288 Thus, 
States have the obligation to protect persons from discrimination promoted by right-wing 
extremist groups and their representatives which are political or other associations operating 
within or outside the public domain.  As such, even though racism and racial discrimination are 
often used interchangeably, especially in every-day speech, the fact remains that within legal 
documents, correctly or not, a silent distinction is recognised. This has resulted in more 
definitions arising as to racial discrimination. Based on the premise that racism constitutes a 
belief system and racial discrimination refers to the surmounting practices and omissions, it has 
been argued that ‘it is easier to give a definition of unlawful conduct than it is to give a definition 
of unlawful beliefs.’289 
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1.6.2 Victims of Racial Discrimination 
In order to comprehend fully the meaning of racial discrimination, as conceptualised in the 
ICERD, it is necessary to consider who may be a potential victim of the discrimination covered 
therein. In General Recommendation 35, the CERD refers to groups of people who may fall 
within the ambit of Article 1, namely ‘indigenous people, descent based groups, and immigrants 
or non-citizens, including migrant domestic workers, refugees and asylum seekers, as well as 
speech directed against women members of these and other vulnerable groups.’290 Right-wing 
extremism marking Europe today attacks the majority of groups referred to in this explanation, 
with the term ‘other vulnerable groups’ holding the potential of incorporating other groups which 
could possibly be targetted, as long as such targetting falls within the scope of racial 
discrimination. The CERD has insisted that, in appraising discrimination, ‘the specific 
characteristics of ethnic, cultural and religious groups be taken into consideration.’291  However, 
it must be noted that, as the CERD made clear in Kamal Quereshi v Denmark, discrimination 
must be particularly directed to the victim or groups of victims, as outlined above, given that 
generalised targetting does not fall within the ambit of the ICERD.
292
 
 
1.6.3  Differential Treatment: Direct and Indirect Discrimination  
It must be noted that not all differential treatment falls within the ambit of discrimination as 
defined by the ICERD. More particularly, Article 1 of the Convention removes liability for 
differential treatment between citizens and non-citizens, denotes that regulations related to 
citizenship, nationality or naturalisation are not to be considered discrimination as long as there 
is no discrimination against a particular nationality and protects measures that seek to ensure 
positive discrimination. It could be argued that part two is rather open-ended and potentially 
dangerous as it allows for preferential treatment in all areas without distinction in relation to all 
immigrants without citizenship, laying down no safety nets. This differentiation could pose an 
obstacle in combatting the far-right given that this movement often links the provision of 
services and the enjoyment of rights to a particular ethnic group. This potential danger was 
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partially rectified by CERD’s General Recommendation No.14 which observed that differential 
treatment will constitute discrimination ‘if the criteria for such differentiation, urged in the light 
of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to the legitimate aim, 
and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.’ 293 General Recommendation No. 30 of 
the CERD observed that differential treatment will ‘constitute discrimination if the criteria for 
such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not 
applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.’294 
Therefore, discrimination which aims to fulfill legitimate aims within the boundaries of the 
Convention principles and grounds, and which do so in a proportionate manner, is accepted. As 
an extension to this, Article 1(4) provides for positive discrimination in the form of special 
measures for ‘securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or 
individuals…as may be necessary in order to ensure…equal enjoyment or exercise of human 
rights.’ The aforementioned definition, as incorporated in the ECRI’s General Policy 
Recommendation 7, also defines indirect discrimination as cases involving an ‘apparently neutral 
factor which cannot be easily complied with by persons belonging to a particular group 
designated by a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic 
origin.’ The same conditions in relation to the objective and reasonable justification, as 
incorporated in the direct discrimination definition, are found in relation to indirect 
discrimination as well.  It must be noted that the definitions in ECRI’s recommendation are very 
similar to those offered by the EU Council Directive Implementing the Principle of Equal 
Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin which deals particularly with 
the employment setting and the provision of goods and services. The ICERD definition may not 
contain the term indirect discrimination but, refers to practices which have ‘the purposes or 
effect’ of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field of public life.’ The reference to the word ‘purpose’ implies that the practices referred to in 
this article aim at pursing the given result while the use of the word ‘effect’ means that the 
purpose may be seemingly legitimate whilst the result constitutes discrimination. Thus, although 
indirect discrimination is not explicitly provided for by this Convention, neither is it rejected, 
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constituting a plausible outcome on the grounds set out in the article. As a result, the definition 
allows for a broad range of acts to come within the scope of the ICERD so long as their 
consequence pertains to racial discrimination.  
 
1.6.4 Intention to Discriminate  
In relation to intention, the CERD has noted that ‘the mere act of dissemination is penalised, 
despite lack of intention to commit an offence and irrespective of the consequences of the 
dissemination.’295 As such, by removing the necessity of an intention, the CERD envisages 
discrimination in a broad manner. A 2001 Joint Statement between the Special Rapporteur on the 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression and the OSCE (Organisation of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe) and OAS (Organisation of American States) Representatives on Racism and the Media 
took an opposite view to the CERD and noted that ‘no one should be penalised for the 
dissemination of hate speech unless it has been shown that they did so with the intention of 
inciting discrimination, hostility or violence.’296 In relation to the necessity of intention, Patrick 
Thornberry has argued that CERD’s stance entails a ‘total absence of culpability elements 
beyond the act of dissemination’ and that this approach ‘would do violence to basic principles of 
criminal liability in many if not most jurisdictions.’297 This renders the CERD’s interpretation of 
intention rather problematic subsequently limiting the adoption of this stance by States Parties.  
 
In sum, minus any forms of positive discrimination, as long as the propaganda of an organisation 
in question results in racial discrimination and, regardless whether this is concealed in seemingly 
legitimate terms, and regardless of any intention on the part of the perpetrator, actions, omissions 
or utterances falling within the definitional framework of Article 1 of the ICERD are forbidden. 
The ECRI and the EU Council Directive place explicit emphasis on the culpability of measures 
which are indirectly discriminative, thereby, allowing for a broad range of offences. However, 
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the issue of intention has been dealt with differently by other bodies of the UN and other 
institutions more generally, with intent being required as a pre-requisite for finding racial 
discrimination.  
 
1.7 Religion as a Ground for Discrimination  
Unlike the ECRI’s aforementioned recommendation, the definitional framework, as provided for 
by Article 1 of the ICERD, does not refer to religion as a ground for discrimination. Likewise 
CERD’s General Recommendation No. 35 does not explicitly refer to religious groups as 
potential victims of practices referred to in Article 1. In General Recommendation No. 35, the 
Committee reaffirmed what had once been stated by the Human Rights Committee, namely, that 
‘criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine or tenets of faith should not 
be prohibited or punished.’ 298  Nevertheless, the CERD has recognised the existence of 
‘manifestations of hatred against ethno-religious groups’299 thereby preserving the ‘principle of 
intersectionality.’ 300 This principle has been defined in the framework of gender discrimination 
as ‘multiple…discrimination…compound discrimination, interlinking forms of discrimination, 
multiple burdens of double or triple discrimination.’301 In the CERD’s General Recommendation 
No. 32 on Special Measures, the Committee underlined that the existing grounds of 
discrimination under the Convention, as referred to above, are ‘extended in practice by the notion 
of intersectionality whereby the Committee addresses situations of double or multiple 
discrimination—such as discrimination on grounds of gender or religion—when discrimination 
on such a ground appears to exist in combination with a ground or grounds listed in Article 1 of 
the Convention.'
302
 Three Special Rapporteurs have highlighted the significance of this principle 
in the sphere of religion, underlining the difference between racial rhetoric and religious 
defamation and holding that extending the affirmations of the Preamble of the ICERD to religion 
                                                          
298
 CERD General Recommendation 35: Combatting Racist Hate Speech (2003) CERD/C/GC/35, para.6, HRC 
General Comment 34: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (2011) CCPR/C/GC/34,  para.48 
299
 CERD General Recommendation 35: ‘Combatting Racist Hate Speech’ CERD/C/GC/35 (2013) para.6, HRC 
General Comment  34: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (2011) CCPR/C/GC/34, para.6 
300
 CERD General Recommendation 35: ‘Combatting Racist Hate Speech’ CERD/C/GC/35 (2013) para.6, HRC 
General Comment  34: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (2011) CCPR/C/GC/34, para.6 
301
 UN Expert Group Report: Gender and Racial Discrimination 
(2000):<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/genrac/report.htm>  [Accessed 9 May 2014] 1 
302
 CERD General Recommendation 32: The Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2009) CERD/C/GC/32, para.7 
69 
 
would be a tricky task.
303
 More particularly, they held that ‘freedom of religion or belief also 
covers the rights to search for meaning by comparing different religions or belief systems, to 
exchange personal views on questions of religion or belief, and to exercise public criticism in 
such matters. For this reason, the criteria for defining religious hatred may differ from those 
defining racial hatred. The difficult question of what precisely constitutes religious hatred, at any 
rate, cannot be answered by simply applying definitions found in the area of racial hatred.’304 
 
Intersectionality was referred to in two CERD cases, namely P.S.N. v Denmark and A.W.R.A.P. v 
Denmark, which were declared inadmissible given that the respective claims were, according to 
the CERD, based on religious discrimination only and, as noted, ‘Islam is not a religion practiced 
solely by a particular group.’305 The CERD summed up its position in relation to this issue by 
holding that ‘religious questions are of relevance to the Committee when they are linked with 
issues of ethnicity and racial discrimination.’306 Thus, in light of the principle of intersectionality, 
Islamophobic and/or other religiously-themed hate speech and activities, promulgated by right-
wing extremist movements, can be condemned and prohibited under the ICERD only if 
interlinked with one of the grounds expressly stipulated in Article 1, these being race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin. 
 
1.8 Hate Speech 
Hate speech constitutes yet another by-product of right-wing extremism which does not enjoy a 
universally accepted formulation,
307
 with most States and institutions adopting their own 
                                                          
303
 OHCHR Expert Workshops on the prohibition of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred, Expert 
workshop on Europe (2011) Joint submission by Mr. Heiner Bielefeldt, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 
or Belief; Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression; Mr. Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,  
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Vienna/CRP3Joint_SRSubmission_for_Vienna.pdf > 
[Accessed 6 May 2014] 
304
 OHCHR Expert Workshops on the prohibition of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred, Expert 
workshop on Europe (2011) Joint submission by Mr. Heiner Bielefeldt, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 
or Belief; Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression; Mr. Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,  
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Vienna/CRP3Joint_SRSubmission_for_Vienna.pdf > 
[Accessed 6 May 2014] 
305
 P.S.N v Denmark (2007) Communication No. 36/2006, CERD/C/71/D/36/2006, para.6.3 
306
 CERD Concluding Observations 2002 – 2006: Georgia, A/60/18, para. 246 
307
 European Court of Human Rights, Fact Sheet on Hate Speech, 2013, 1 
70 
 
understanding of what hate speech entails,
308
 notwithstanding that the term is often incorporated 
in legal, policy and academic documents.
309
 Determining what constitutes hate speech in the 
absence of such a formulation becomes even more difficult when considering that hate speech 
may be ‘concealed in statements which at a first glance may seem to be rational or normal’310 
and does not necessarily manifest itself through the expression of hatred or of emotions.
311
 As 
noted by the CERD, promoters of hate speech ‘hijack the principles and mechanisms of 
democracy to legitimise racist and xenophobic platforms and hate speech.’312 One of the few 
documents, albeit non-binding, which has sought to elucidate the meaning of hate speech, is the 
Recommendation of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on hate speech.
313
 It provides 
that this term is to be ‘understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, 
promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on 
intolerance, including intolerant expression by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, 
discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.’ 
Interestingly, the Recommendation incorporates the justification of hatred as well as its 
spreading, incitement and promotion, allowing for a broad spectrum of intentions to fall within 
its definition. Hate speech has also been mentioned, but not defined, by the ECtHR. For example, 
it has referred to ‘all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on 
intolerance including religious intolerance.
314
In Vejedland v Sweden, in the framework of 
homophobic speech, the Court held that it is not necessary for the speech ‘to directly recommend 
individuals to commit hateful acts’315 since attacks on persons can be committed by ‘insulting, 
holding up to ridicule or slandering specific groups of the population’316 and that speech used in 
an irresponsible manner may not be worthy of protection.’317 Through this case, the Court drew 
                                                          
308
 CoE Committee of Experts for the Development of Human Rights Report (2007) Chapter IV, 123, para.4 
309
 Tarlach McGonagle, ‘The Council of Europe against online hate speech: Conundrums and Challenges’ Expert 
Paper, Institute for Information Law, Faculty of Law, 
<http://hub.coe.int/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=62fab806-724e-435a-b7a5-153ce2b57c18&groupId=10227> 
[Accessed 15 August 2014] 3 
310
 Anne Weber, ‘Manual on Hate Speech’ (1997) Council of Europe Publishing, 5 
311
 Anne Weber, ‘Manual on Hate Speech’ (1997) Council of Europe Publishing, 5 
312
 CERD 81
st
 Session CERD/C/SR.2196  
313
 Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers Recommendation 97 (20) on Hate Speech  
314
 Gűndűz v Turkey, App. no 35071/97 (ECHR, 4 December 2003) para. 40, Erbakan v Turkey, App. no 59405/00, 
(6 July 2006), para. 56 
315
 Vejdeland and Others v Sweden, App. no 1813/07 (ECHR 09 February 2012) para.54 
316
 Vejdeland and Others v Sweden, App. no 1813/07 (ECHR 09 February 2012) para.54 
317
 Vejdeland and Others v Sweden, App. no 1813/07 (ECHR 09 February 2012) para.55 
71 
 
the correlation between hate speech and the negative effects it can have on its victims, 
demonstrating that it is not merely an abstract notion but one with potential to cause harm. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the fact that the Court has not yet offered a definition of 
hate speech is ‘unsatisfactory from the point of judicial interpretation, doctrinal development and 
general predictability and foreseeability.’ 318  In addition, the FRA has offered two separate 
formulations of hate speech with the first being that it ‘refers to the incitement and 
encouragement of hatred, discrimination or hostility towards an individual that is motivated by 
prejudice against that person because of a particular characteristic.’319 In its 2009 Report, the 
FRA held that the term hate speech, as used in the particular section ‘includes a broader 
spectrum of verbal acts including disrespectful public discourse.’320 The particularly problematic 
part of this definition is the broad reference to disrespectful public discourse especially since 
institutions, such as the ECtHR, extend the freedom of expression to ideas that ‘shock, offend or 
disturb.’321 In the framework of academic commentary, a plethora of definitions has been put 
forth to describe hate speech. In exploring different formulations of hate speech, Belavusau notes 
that hate speech is ‘deeply rooted in the ideologies of racism, sexism, religious intolerance, 
xenophobia, and homophobia.’ In addition, he argues that pinpointing the grounds from which 
hate speech may arise is also a tricky task and poses the questions of where limits are to be 
drawn. 
322
According to Maria Matsuda, hate speech contains three central elements, namely that 
the message is ‘of racial inferiority, the message is directed against historically oppressed groups 
and the message is persecutory, hateful and degrading.’323 Tarlach McGonagle offers a broad 
interpretation of hate speech that ‘virtually all racist and related declensions of noxious, identity-
assailing expression could be brought within the wide embrace of the term.’ 324 Alexander Tsesis 
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has described it as a ‘societal virus’325 while Rodney Smolla refers to the lack of contribution 
made by hate speech to the development of society since it ‘cannot contribute to a societal 
dialogue and therefore can be ethically curtailed.’ 326 Scholars, such as Kent Greenawalt, have 
argued about the damaging consequences of such speech, arguing that ‘epithets and slurs that 
reflect stereotypes about race, ethnic group, religion and gender may reinforce prejudices and 
feelings of inferiority in seriously harmful ways.’327 In discussing bans on racist speech, Robert 
Post examines several arguments that have been put forth as justifications for such bans 
including, the ‘intrinsic harm of racist speech’328 insofar as there is an ‘elemental wrongness’329 
to such expression, the infliction of harm to particular groups or individuals as well as to the 
marketplace of ideas. 
330
  
 
From the above approaches to hate speech and the variations, therein, although some common 
elements can be discerned, it could be argued that ‘hate speech seems to be whatever people 
choose it to mean.’331 For the purpose of this thesis, and emanating from the reality that there is 
no one universal conceptualisation of hate speech, it will generally be assumed that hate speech 
‘singles out minorities for abuse and harassment’332 and, as a result, the legal regulation for any 
such speech will be assessed. Further, based on the premise that the actual understanding of hate 
speech is a significant constituent of its effective legal regulation, investigation will be made as 
to whether and how the case-studies under consideration have defined hate speech.  
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1.9  Hate Crime 
Hate crime, for purposes of this dissertation, shall include racially aggravated crimes directed at 
a person or persons on grounds of the victim’s participation in an ethnic, national and/or 
religious group. However, it must be noted that hate crime can extend to other persons such as 
LGBTI persons victimised due to their sexual orientation and/or identity. ‘Violence against 
ethnic minorities is nothing new in Europe. Countries across the continent have long been sites 
of racist vandalism, assaults and even murders.’333 As noted, hate crime is differentiated from 
other forms of criminality, both because of the motivations of the offender and its effects on an 
individual, community and societal level. Through the committal of such crimes, the victim is 
targetted due to his or her identity which, in turn, terrorises himself or herself but also other 
members of the group which he or she belongs to. 
334
 To this end, the OSCE recognises that a 
hate crime is also a message crime and a symbolic crime.
335
 Previously, such crimes were 
habitually given ‘no more concern than other serious crimes’ 336 with this situation altering in the 
last twenty years as a result of ‘mounting public and political attention to racist violence.’337 This, 
in part, emanates from the realisation that this type of violence is ‘particularly reprehensible’338 
since it ‘can inflict damage above and beyond the physical injury caused by a garden-variety 
assault’ 339 
 
When assessing the legal frameworks of the two jurisdictions under consideration in this study, 
hate crimes, as defined in national legislation, shall be considered and evaluated against the more 
general backdrop of international and European laws and principles pertaining to racism and 
racial discrimination always incorporating the issue of religious discrimination in its analysis but 
absent any supranational definition of hate crime.  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the right-wing movement and particularly its consequences, such as hate speech 
and racism, are abstract notions which are often poorly defined or their definition purposefully 
omitted in supranational legal documents, meaning that there exist no definitional benchmarks 
against which national initiatives, laws and policies in this ambit can be assessed. Nevertheless, 
this chapter has underlined the key ingredients that will be considered when determining which 
entities will be considered and how their practices, activities and rhetoric are subsequently 
regulated by the legal system of the jurisdictions under consideration. Also, as a first step in the 
evaluations of England and Wales and Greece, the study will examine how the systems of the 
two jurisdictions under consideration in this dissertation have tackled the definitional 
frameworks of the relevant themes.   
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction  
In the framework of a militant democracy which recognises the destructive effects of abusers of 
rights and freedoms, challenging the far-right can be attempted by restricting the freedoms of 
expression and/or association and/or assembly when it comes to rhetoric and/or activities of 
extreme right-wing groups for the overarching purpose of adhering to the principle of non-
discrimination within the wider context of human rights protection and promotion. On one level, 
this position can be justified by relying on the limitation grounds of certain articles, such as 
Articles 10
340
 and 11
341
 of the ECHR or by other provisions, such as Article 4 of the ICERD, 
which, inter alia, restrict racist propaganda and organisations. However, with a view to ensuring 
a well-rounded understanding of the issue of legitimate restrictions of certain rights, a concept 
which lies at the heart of this dissertation, it is imperative to conduct an appraisal of positions 
and arguments put forth in the realm of philosophy and legal theory. Moreover, a perusal of legal 
literature
342
 which looks at themes and issues developed in the dissertation is necessary for 
purposes of comprehending how principles and doctrines developed in philosophical and 
theoretical thought have been interpreted by academics in the sphere of far-right expression and 
activity. Also, this chapter’s analysis will provide insight into the current positions and 
arguments put forth in relation to the far-right, revealing possible gaps in the current academic 
debate and clarifying the contribution of this dissertation and its position within the broader 
academic context. It must be noted that, in the scholarship to date, there is more emphasis placed 
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on the issue of free expression when compared with association and assembly. However, this is 
not a serious shortcoming since responses to key questions in relation to association and 
assembly can be found when looking at the general conceptualisation of the restriction of rights 
whilst, at the same time, the analysis found in the framework of expression can be extended to 
association and assembly which are directly interrelated to expression.
343
 Associations and 
assemblies constitute central vehicles for expression since an association is an organised 
collective through which persons seek, inter alia, to express their opinions whilst an assembly is 
another mechanism through which ideas and opinions are put forth. In light of the above, this 
chapter will commence by considering the general theoretical framework which demonstrates if 
and, if so, when the restriction of human rights and freedoms can be considered legitimate. It will 
continue to assess militant democracy as a doctrine justifying the restriction of rights and 
freedoms for the protection of democracy itself.  The freedom of expression will then be 
appraised through an analysis of the libertarian approach to this freedom both in the realms of 
classical and contemporary scholars. There will be reference to hate speech throughout the 
analysis of the theories. It will proceed to look at Critical Race Theory (CRT) and also consider 
free speech restriction through the application of an effects-based approach. Following that, the 
chapter will examine how legal commentary has interpreted and applied the theoretical notions 
and principles developed in discussions on the restrictions of rights. There will then be an 
overview of the literature that exists on free association in the realm of the far-right. No section 
on the freedom of far-right assembly is incorporated in this chapter given the lack of relevant 
literature As will be reflected in the analysis of relevant literature, the key theoretical dilemma 
faced by scholars when considering whether hate should be restricted is how to balance the 
freedom to practise certain rights, such as expression, and the right to be free from the effects of 
this expression. The theme of harm on an individual and/or group and/or societal level shall be 
central to this chapter.   
 
1. Restricting Rights and Freedoms 
1.1 A Legitimate Restriction of Rights - A General Framework  
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In relation to ancient times, Plato’s ‘Republic’ argued that when there are no barriers to freedom, 
the consequences are that it loses its meaning and results in moral superficiality and anarchy.
344
 
Plato also noted that the worst evil is too much freedom while regulated freedom is the best 
possession.
345
 In Roman times, Cato
346
 held that the State could only interfere in order to ‘protect 
men from the injuries of one another.’347 Later, John Locke, a believer in the inherent liberty and 
freedom of persons, argued that, for purposes of ensuring a cohesive and secure society, persons 
should give up a part of their freedom for purposes of its regulation and the promotion of 
common well-being.
348
 He observed that ‘all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights 
and from doing hurt to one another…’349 thereby recognising the potential for interference in the 
exercise of rights insofar as the rights of others are damaged and, as such, sowing the seeds for 
the harm principle which was further developed by John Stuart Mill. Mill put forth the necessity 
to regulate rights and freedoms in some particular circumstances. He was careful firstly to 
separate the role of the State in personal affairs affecting only the individual carrying out an 
activity, holding that the State ‘must not interfere in the areas which are self-regarding, that is 
which concern the individual him/herself. Every human being is the sole custodian over his/her 
body and mind: one’s freedom must not be compromised, and one should be encouraged to 
express his/her personal desires.’350 Through this statement, Mill recognised that the State must 
not involve itself in any conduct which affects the conductor only (self-regarding) and implicitly 
setting the foundations for his subsequent arguments that, when such conduct affects others, the 
State has the right to interfere (in certain situations).  His particular reference to expression, 
when talking generally of the non-interference of the State, demonstrates the significance which 
Mill attached to this freedom. However, he developed a framework through which rights may 
indeed be regulated, which is what has come to be known as the harm principle. He held that ‘the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
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community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’ 351 He underlined that ‘as soon as any 
part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction 
over it and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering 
with it, becomes open to discussion.’352  So, Mill extrapolated on what was previously left 
implied, namely the State’s power to interfere in conduct which affects others. However, this 
power is not automatically granted but, instead, the issue of interference simply becomes open to 
discussion through an appraisal of a balancing test of competing rights. The severity of 
interfering with the liberty of a citizen by curtailing his or her rights is, therefore, highlighted.  
This severity of interference is also denoted by the fact that Mill recognised that the 
consequences may be hurtful to another but that does not amount to a violation of rights and, as 
such, cannot be prohibited.
353
 Thus, classical theorists, such as Locke and Mill, recognised that 
rights and conduct can be limited within the general framework of protecting the rights and 
interests of others, preventing harm coming upon them through the actions of another, according 
to the severity of the harm, with a strict threshold being attached thereto. Joel Feinberg sought to 
extrapolate on the meaning of harm by holding that this results in a negative effect on a person’s 
interests and that it violates a person’s rights.354 In fact, Feinberg went a step further, noting that, 
following an adequate balancing test of the rights and interests involved, rights may be restricted 
if they result in an offence to others, but that, in such cases, the proportionality principle should 
be applied and means other than criminal law should be considered.
355
 Feinberg defined offence 
as something which does not result in the violation of a person’s rights or interests but 
nevertheless has negative consequences on that person.
356
   
 
1.2: Militant Democracy: Legitimately Restricting Rights for Purposes of Protecting Democracy  
1.2.1 Militant Democracy - A General Overview 
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This section shall consider the doctrine of militant democracy as one through which human 
rights and freedoms can be legitimately restricted for purposes of maintaining democracy. As 
Joseph Goebbels infamously observed ‘it will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy 
that it provides its own deadly enemies with the means with which it can be destroyed.’357 
Militant democracy essentially seeks to prevent such “jokes.” This concept was initially 
developed on an academic level by Karl Loewenstein in a 1937 two-part article which underlined 
the need democracy has to protect itself from anti-democratic threats. When he wrote the article, 
Loewenstein had just emigrated to the United States after recognising that ‘his Jewish ancestry 
and liberal mind set would not…be in his favour’ 358  in the Nazi regime. Moreover, 
Loewenstein’s two-part article was developed during a time when the Nazi party had risen to 
power through the use and, ultimately, the abuse of the democratic institutions of the Weimar 
Republic, thereby rendering fascism a central tenet of the development of the author’s ideas. In 
addition to the last point, when placing Loewenstein’s writings in context, it must be taken into 
account that they were published before the onset of World War II, before the Holocaust and 
before the defeat of Nazi Germany.
359
 Loewenstein’s arguments were, thus, not a reaction to the 
atrocities of the time but almost a precognitive solution to them. In his writings, he noted that 
‘democracy and democratic tolerance have been used for their own destruction’360 and sought to 
replace the opposing notion of democratic fundamentalism with a militant democracy since, 
‘until very recently, democratic fundamentalism and legalistic blindness were unwilling to 
realise that the mechanism of democracy is the Trojan horse by which the enemy enters the 
city.’ 361  Loewenstein held that ‘constitutions…have to be stiffened and hardened when 
confronted by movements intent upon their destruction’ 362 and that ‘every possible effort must 
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be made to rescue [democracy], even at risk and cost of violating fundamental principles.’363 
Based on Loewenstein’s initial explanatory and definitional framework, Macklem eloquently 
defined militant democracy as ‘a form of constitutional democracy authorised to protect civil and 
political freedom by pre-emptively restricting the exercise of such freedoms.’ 364   Militant 
democracy (wehrhafte Demokratie or streitbare Demokratie) was embedded as a doctrine in 
post-war Germany to prevent the repetition of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime and, 
as a result, is particularly associated with it. More particularly, the German Basic Law was the 
first European Constitution to recognise the need and incorporate the principle of militant 
democracy with most post World War II constitutions following its lead.
365
 Within a more 
general framework, militant democracy today is generally seen as the fight against extreme 
movements, with particular emphasis on political parties pursuing anti-democratic aims. 
366
 
Particularly in relation to right-wing extremism, Macklem holds that ‘neo-nazi 
movements…may have also provoked States to assume militant stances towards threats to 
democratic institutions.’367 This statement shall be considered more closely when evaluating the 
nature of the legal and judicial stances towards such groups in the jurisdictions under 
consideration in this thesis. On a Council of Europe level, militant democracy can be found in 
the form of Article 17 of the ECHR, the prohibition of the abuse of rights clause which is 
discussed further down. However, notwithstanding academic, legal and judicial developments in 
this realm, militant democracy remains ‘an issue of extensive debate’368 with a central issue 
being the extent to which democracies can limit personal rights and freedoms through preventive 
measures. 
369
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A large number of States have endorsed militant democracy in one form or another with 
countries such as Germany embracing the doctrine in a strict sense. The case-studies examined in 
this thesis could, on one level, be considered to have varying approaches to the principle of 
militant democracy due to their different experiences with authoritarian regimes. More 
particularly, it could have been expected that Greece is more sensitive than the UK in relation to 
the doctrine under consideration due to its experience with the military junta during the period 
1967-1974. Further, the actual marks of militant democracy in the form of restrictions and 
limitations to human rights and freedoms are easier to distinguish in the case of Greece through a 
simple perusal of its Constitution, something that cannot be carried out with the UK due to the 
absence of such a Constitution. However, although not embedded as a constitutional doctrine of 
the UK and, even though ‘few British lawyers are acquainted with the term militant 
democracy,’370 militant democracy can be seen in several laws and regulations and has arisen 
more particularly due to the country’s perceived threats arising from Irish republicanism and 
loyalism and Islamic extremism. A classic example was Thatcher’s 1988-1994 decision to 
restrict the broadcasting rights of Sinn Féin and other Irish Republican and Loyalist groups as 
her government considered these parties to pose a risk to the democratic values of the nation.
371
 
In addition, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if 
she believes it is involved in terrorism and that the ban constitutes a proportional measure. Some 
such proscribed organisations include the Greek 17 November Revolutionary Organisation 
(Επαναστατική Οργάνωση 17 Νοέμβρη), the Kurdish Workers’ Party (the PKK) as well as, 
amongst others, an array of Islamic and Irish groups.
372
 There are several examples of militant 
democracy in the Greek constitution. For example, Article 14(3) on the freedom of the press 
holds that newspapers or other publications may be seized in the event that the material aims at 
inter alia, the violent overthrow of the regime or is directed against the territorial integrity of the 
State.  Further, Article 25 (3) holds that the abusive exercise of rights is prohibited.  
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1.2.2 Militant Democracy: A Balancing Act? 
When seeking to comprehend militant democracy, one notes the almost oxymoronic nature of the 
notion of militant democracy since, as Loewenstein held, democracy ‘stands for fundamental 
rights, for fair play for all opinions, for free speech, assembly, press. How could it address itself 
to curtailing these without the vary basis of its existence?’373 Some authors, such as Patrick 
Macklem, have noted that ‘the legality of militant democracy…is far from clear’374 with others, 
such as Hans Kelsen, taking a stricter approach, namely, that when a democracy attempts to 
safeguard itself from anti-democratic entities, it is no longer a democracy.
375
 Loewenstein 
justifies the militancy of a functioning democracy by noting that it has a duty to rescue itself 
from the ‘opportunistic platitudes of fascism….even at the risk and cost of violating fundamental 
principles…’376 Paul Cliteur pinpointed that Loewenstein had indirectly recognised three distinct 
yet interrelated vulnerabilities of the democratic system, which subsequently constitute a sound 
backdrop against which the militancy of a democracy can be justified. These include the access 
democracy grants hostile entities to its institutions. More particularly, such entities are entitled to 
rights and freedoms ‘thereby allowing them to actually discredit and vilify her,’ 377  making 
particular reference to rights such as free speech and assembly. In this realm, it is further noted 
that democracy allows anti-democratic parties ‘to access after the election the very institutions 
they have preached to destroy.’ 378 However, notwithstanding the conjectural justifications for 
seeking to limit democracy in a general sense, problems do arise with the technicalities of doing 
so. There are intricacies related to the point at which such limitations commence and the extent 
to which they continue. Macklem argues that this doctrine and its legality will remain vague and 
open to abuse unless legal standards pertaining to definitions of entities and/or actions which 
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should fall within the restrictive actions of a militant democracy are formulated and upheld. 
379
 In 
addition, as poignantly posed by Cliteur, should militant democracy protect itself ‘only against 
hostile but violent parties, or also against hostile but non-violent parties?’380 Central to this 
question is the consideration of  non-violent yet hostile parties, not simply due to the legal issues 
that may arise when balancing key rights, but also due to the fact that, as argued by Loewenstein, 
‘no government can rely only on force or violence, the cohesive strength of the dictatorial and 
authoritarian state is rooted in emotionalism.’ 381  Although this statement was made when 
referring to Loewenstein’s reality at the time, that being Nazi Germany, it can still be applicable 
in today’s right-wing extremist context, particularly in relation to political parties which also 
adopt political emotionalism as a central weapon. This reference is made with due regard to the 
fact that, as will be demonstrated particularly in the case of Greece, violence is present.  As 
highlighted early on by Loewenstein, openly violent acts can easily be restricted with the 
intricacies lying in combatting subtler techniques related to the freedom of expression.
382
 
However, the latter part of his statement is offered without any theoretical explanation of how 
precisely to restrict subtler techniques and without any reference to parties which may not be 
openly violent but pursue discriminatory aims, to say the least. It is George Van den Bergh, who 
sought to extrapolate on the not so obvious justification of curtailing the right of non-violent yet 
undemocratic parties to associate. To this end, he refers to the ‘self-correcting nature of 
democracy’383 which treats all ideas equally, except those which seek to destroy it.384 Based on 
this premise, democracy may limit all groups which promote such ideas.  
 
On a practical level, the ECtHR has, on occasion, sought to extrapolate on limiting certain rights 
for the preservation of democracy and, in doing so, has put forth its own justifications for a 
militant model of democracy. It is accepted that one of the issues at stake when deliberating on 
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expression is the possible conflict between the freedom of expression in the realm of problematic 
speech and the values of equality and non-discrimination. As early back as Klass v Germany, the 
Court underlined that ‘some compromise between the requirements for defending democratic 
society and individual rights is inherent in the system of the Convention.’ 385  In United 
Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey, the problem which arises is how to strike an 
equitable balance between defending democracy whilst simultaneously protecting individual 
rights and freedoms. The resulting balancing test emanates from the premise that one must grant 
due consideration to ‘the democratic importance of freedom of speech on the one hand and the 
harmful consequences of hate propaganda on the other hand.’386 In Thoma v Luxembourg, the 
Court held that restrictions on rights guaranteed by the Convention must be narrowly construed 
and enforced in the interest of public and social life in its entirety as well as in the interest of 
individuals making up that society.
387
 In Ždanoka v Latvia, the Court held that ‘in order to 
guarantee the stability and effectiveness of a democratic system, the State may be required to 
take specific measures to protect itself.’388  
 
1.2.3 Applying the Doctrine of Militant Democracy  
As noted above, on a Council of Europe level, Article 17 of the ECHR echoes militant 
democracy. More particularly, Article 17 provides that: 
 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of 
the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the Convention. 
 
Interestingly, even though the Court has relied on the precepts of militant democracy legitimately 
to curtail radical expression and groups, as is reflected for example in the case of Refah Partisi,  
discussed below, and notwithstanding the existence of Article 17, in the large majority of 
instances the Court has relied on limitation grounds of relevant articles other than Article 17. 
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This is probably because of the high threshold that needs to be met when applying this article. 
For example, as early back as De Becker v Belgium, the Court noted that Article 17 ‘applies only 
to persons who threaten the democratic system of the contracting parties and then to an extent 
strictly proportionate to the seriousness and duration of such threat.’ 389  In relation to the 
application of the doctrine by the ECtHR, it has been noted that ‘almost since its inception, the 
European Court of Human Rights has been required to consider the question of the rights of anti-
democratic actors within the liberal democracies.’390 However, it was following its judgement in 
Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v Turkey, discussed in detail in chapter four, and the ‘pressing 
social need’ test formulated, therein, that the Court offered a ‘clear re-endorsement of militant 
democracy.’391 In this case, the Court allowed the State to restrict the right of association of a 
political party which was considered to be a threat to democracy, which, due to its status as such 
habitually enjoys a high threshold of protection from interference. The significant characteristic 
of the Court’s approach in this case was the preventive nature of the restriction, that being the 
permissibility of the party ban before it came to power and destructed democracy. The Court 
held that ‘a state cannot be required to wait, before intervening, until a political party has seized 
power and begun to take concrete steps to implement a policy incompatible with the standards of 
the Convention and democracy.’ 392 Macklem argues that the ‘traditional democratic approach to 
such an agenda is to determine its constitutionality when it begins to conflict with the rights of 
others.’ 393 The Court, however, militantly protected the Turkish State from such a party in a 
preventive manner, notwithstanding the absence of substantial violence, with the judgement, 
thus, embodying militant democracy rather than, for example, democratic fundamentalism as 
referred to by Loewenstein. When appraising the application of militant democracy, care must be 
taken to look at the inherent weaknesses that lie within this concept. Firstly, notwithstanding 
some theoretical justification for interfering with human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
name of preserving democracy, and, even though the ECtHR has had the opportunity to 
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deliberate and extrapolate on the rights of the State when confronted with potential risks to 
democracy, some commentators contend that militant democracy continues to be a poorly 
defined doctrine, ‘leaving fundamental freedoms exposed to the risk of abusive state action.’394 
Further, it has even been held that ‘a militant democracy can easily become an illiberal 
democracy, more concerned with its own stability than with political developments.’ 395 
Secondly, States which choose this formula as a tool to combat extremism must not rely on this 
solely, since one must not ‘overestimate the ultimate efficiency of legislative provisions against 
fascist emotional technique’396 Thus, care must been taken not to treat this doctrine in an illiberal 
manner.  
 
1.2.4 Militant Democracy: Concluding Observations 
The analysis of the rights and freedoms in this dissertation shall be made, in part, through a 
militant democracy lens. This position emanates from the premise that militant democracy is 
central to the State regulation of extremism given the overarching objective of protecting 
democracy as well as individual and group rights.  Moreover, by ascertaining how the different 
institutions looked at in this dissertation approach the issue of balancing conflicting rights and 
how the State protects itself from right-wing extremism on a legislative and judicial level, the 
thesis is essentially appraising the militancy of the institutions under consideration, without 
necessarily making direct reference to the term. However, this is not the only lens through which 
the analysis of this dissertation will be effectuated with other theories, such as CRT, being 
considered, as will be discussed in this chapter.  
 
2. Freedom of Expression: To Restrict or not to Restrict? 
2.1 Freedom of Expression: Thoughts from Classical Scholarship 
As noted above, more emphasis has been placed by scholars on the issue of limiting expression 
and, so, the next section will consider some of these arguments which could be used when 
considering the restriction of expression and, by extension, association and assembly. Free 
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expression was a concept considered by Ancient Greek thinkers. Aristotle’s Rhetoric supports 
free expression and particularly ‘robust public discourse as a means to promote citizen awareness 
and vigilance’397 In Gorgias, Plato is contrary to public discourse as there is the potential to 
‘manipulate and misguide people who lack facility in critical reason.’398 In Ancient Greece, there 
was the concept of parrhesia (παρρησία) which, as noted by Uladzislau Belavusau is very 
difficult to translate with the closest meaning being ‘the frankness in speaking the truth’ with 
Michel Foucault being one of the authors translating this into English as free speech.
399
 In 
addition to the concept of parrhesia, there was also isigoria (ισηγορία) which ‘describes the equal 
right of speech in a democacy.’400 Thus, parrhesia refers to the freedom to express oneself in a 
democratic society whereas isigoria incorporates the significance of equal status amongst all 
citizens in the realm of expression. In Ancient Rome, Cato, a Statesman, argued that free speech 
was ‘the great bulwark of liberty’401 which protected persons against an arbitrary State and was, 
thus, an ‘essential element of natural liberty.’402 In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke noted 
that there are certain rights which are inalienable and can only be restricted if the rights of others 
are affected and these include, religious freedom and the freedom of thought,
403
 demonstrating 
the great significance he placed on the freedom to think. Thomas Hobbes noted that, in relation 
to speech, there may be an issue of limitation as it is ‘but an abuse of Speech to grieve him404 
with the tongue.’405  
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2.2 Restricting Expression: A Libertarian Approach  
Several commentators have noted that freedom of expression holds a particularly sacred place in 
society. This protected status has subsequently given rise to a lengthy discussion on the nature of 
free speech, whether it should or could be legitimately curtailed or whether it should or could be 
absolute. Classical libertarian models of free speech have been formulated by theorists such as 
Milton who, in Areopagitica,
406
 considered conflicting arguments and ideas to lie within a 
battlefield, with the truth always revealing itself in the end. The need to restrict expression was, 
thus, limited given that the truth would, in one way or another, become known. However, his 
understanding of this freedom was very much based on his own faith in God since ‘the truth407 
he speaks of is divine, and its triumph is assured by God’s own omnipotence.’408 As noted by 
Stanley Fish, the religious foundations from which this argument emanates render it subjectively 
reasonable given that the truth is considered to be a divine creation. However, if one were to 
remove the theological character of this argument, the model would plummet.
409
  
 
Mill, who developed one of the original libertarian models of free speech which has survived in 
time and place, held that ‘there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a 
matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered.’410 He put the 
importance of the freedom of expression down to four key points. Firstly, he held that expression 
may be true and so should not be curtailed, given that those who are seeking to do so have no 
right to interference as they are not infallible and so cannot be sure that something is in fact 
untrue.
411
 Secondly, he argued that the opinion uttered may contain elements of the truth and so 
is necessary to ‘supply the remainder of the truth.’412 Thirdly, he noted that an opinion must be 
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contested before being accepted as the truth otherwise it will ‘be held in the manner of a 
prejudice.’ 413  Lastly, without freedom of expression truth will become dogma thereby 
‘preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction.’414 Mill embraced a strict test when it 
comes to the question of the limitation of rights and, so, it can be deduced that the threshold he 
placed for prohibition of expression is high. For example, in relation to expression, for Mill, 
‘mere offensiveness does not constitute harm’415 and, as such, he sought to establish some kind 
of threshold for unprotected speech which is attached to a certain degree of damage resulting 
from such speech. In relation to expression, he enhanced the stringency that is to be enforced 
when considering limitation by putting forth other terms and conditions that need to be met if it 
is to be restricted. He noted that, even if the manner in which speech is communicated is not 
temperate, aggravated and objectionable, the law cannot restrict it.
416
 Thus, on the one hand, Mill 
did not require the tone or the manner of speech to be particularly peaceful, polite or acceptable 
but, on the other hand, he deemed the setting in which speech is expressed and disseminated to 
be significant as it has the potential to influence the effects of such speech. More particularly, he 
argued that ‘even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are 
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous 
act.’417 This description partly rings the bell of terms used today in the realm of hate speech 
including dissemination of hatred or violence, which constitute mischievous acts. It is clear that 
Mill placed a great emphasis on the importance of free expression as a centrifugal element to the 
development of a society which requires persons to ‘be capable of being improved through free 
and equal discussion.’418 However, he noted that the liberty principle attached to the ever so 
important freedom of expression does not apply to children, madmen and barbarians as they are 
not in a position to be improved by free and equal discussion.
419
 Therefore, Milton and Mill 
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envisioned a society where unrestricted debate and discussion of a variety of conflicting ideas 
was central to a flourishing democracy in which truth is revealed and effective responses to 
issues are determined as a result of the permitted debate.
420
 Their thoughts constitute the 
conceptual foundations for the ‘marketplace of ideas’ principle first formulated as such in 
Abrahams v United States which dealt with anti-war activists.
421
 In his dissenting opinion, 
Justice Homes held that ‘the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.’422 When considering the writings of scholars such as Milton and Mill, 
one must always bear in mind the systematic and long-term repression that speech underwent, 
with the particular temporal setting constituting the backdrop of their writings. This may have 
partly demonstrated the great emphasis they placed on the importance of free expression.  
 
More recent commentaries adopting the libertarian approach include that of Zechariah Chaffee 
who held that, by allowing free expression, a society can discover the truth and so can proceed in 
the best possible way to serve its best possible interests and, also, serve the needs of the 
individual to express themselves on issues that are relevant to their quality of life.
423
 Further, 
Alexander Meiklejohn argued that ‘absolute freedom of speech is an inevitable corollary of self-
rule’424 since citizens living in a democracy have the right to take decisions regarding their 
government which, hence, has no power to restrict the vehicle through which this is attained, 
namely expression. This position is partly shared by Lee Bollinger who, although underlining 
that hate speech does not contribute anything valuable to society nevertheless concluded that 
hate speech should be permitted.
425
 He bases this premise on the fact that the ability of a society 
to tolerate even the most unpleasant of viewpoints allows persons to develop a sense of toleration 
                                                          
420
 John Milton, ‘Aeropagitica’ (London 1644) in ‘Two Complete Prose Works of John Milton’ (eds. E. Sirluck 
1959)  486 
421
 Abraham v United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919): The Court upheld the conviction of five anti-
war protestors, who had been charged with Sedition for distributing anti-war pamphlets.  
422
 Abraham v United States at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
423
 Zechariah Chaffee, ‘Free Speech in the United States’ (eds. Atheneum 1969) original published in 1941, 33  
424
 Alexander Meiklejohn, ‘Free Speech and its Relationship to Self-Government’ (eds. Harper 1948) 27 
425 Lee Bollinger, ‘The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America’ (eds. Oxford 
University Press 1986) 77-79.  The principle of permitting expression, even if it ‘shocks, offends or disturbs’ was 
incorporated by the ECtHR in the case of Handyside v UK (1976) discussed in chapter four. This idea is also 
incorporated and extended in the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court which has permitted, inter alia, the 
burning of a cross in the front garden of an African American family, R.A.V. v City of Saint Paul 505 U.S. 377 
(1992), radical speech by white supremacists (Klu Klux Klan) and Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
91 
 
for something that they would like to prohibit.
426
  Thus, libertarian positions of expression 
comprehend expression in almost absolute terms and underline its significance on an individual 
and societal level. Such an approach could be said to extend not only to the expression itself but 
also association and assembly, given that they are some of the central vehicles through which 
ideas are expressed and disseminated.  
 
It must be noted that the right to freedom of thought is one that has habitually been regarded as 
absolute, with little need appearing to discuss any forms of restrictions thereto. Mill refers to the 
‘absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, 
moral or theological.’427 Mill noted that, although freedom of thought and freedom of expression 
are interlinked, they also have certain distinctions, including in that expression affects other 
persons. Nevertheless he recognised that it is ‘almost of as much importance as the liberty of 
thought itself.’428 Mill’s position in relation to freedom of thought, namely that it is linked to 
expression, but, unlike expression, is absolute, can also be seen in international conventions. For 
example, Article 19 of the ICCPR holds that everyone shall have the right to hold opinions 
without interference. Part 2 of this article provides for expression as a separate right which may 
be restricted on the grounds provided for in part 3. These grounds cannot be used for purposes of 
restricting the freedom of opinion. However, interestingly and rather surprisingly, Article 10 of 
the ECHR provides for freedom of expression and incorporates the freedom of opinion as part of 
this right. As a result, on one level, this could appear to mean that the possibility for restriction 
also extends to the freedom of opinion although no Strasbourg case-law has demonstrated this 
point and it would be rather bizarre for the Court’s position to be that the freedom of opinion is 
not absolute. This takes no account of the philosophical and legal principles discussed in this 
chapter that essentially legitimise restriction (if at all) insofar as the exercise of a particular right 
affects the rights of others and/or general issues such as public order.  
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Moving more specifically to the potential realms of hate speech, there are commentators who 
argue for the non-prohibition of hate speech due to the inherent significance of freedom of 
expression. For example, Feinberg placed more emphasis on the individual level, arguing that 
‘no amount of offensiveness in an expressed opinion can counterbalance the vital social value of 
allowing unfettered personal expression.’429  However, there are also arguments in favour of 
non-prohibition of hate speech which are put forth for reasons other than the sanctity of free 
speech. Ronald Dworkin’s argument focused on a permissibility of hate speech which he 
considered to be ‘the price we pay for enforcing the laws that the haters and defamers oppose.’430 
Dworkin placed his arguments in the more general framework of ensuring democracy. However, 
as noted by Heinze, he does not recognise the differences between democracies in, for example, 
post-colonial countries compared to their Anglo-Saxon counterpart.
431
 He holds that the State 
must not forbid hate speech as this may ‘spoil the only democratic justification we have for 
insisting that everyone obey laws.’432 Thus, Dworkin adopted an interesting outlook on hate 
speech and the limitation of free speech which does not emanate from the importance of free 
speech per se. Instead he argued against State arbitrariness and for the maintenance of the 
legitimacy of a political and legal process, which he believed would be undermined if a person or 
persons were prohibited from uttering an opinion before a decision is taken.
433
 Dworkin 
contested that, although hate speech should be permitted for purposes of legitimising other anti-
discrimination legislation and processes, as discussed above, arguments in the realm of limiting 
speech for purposes of preventing injury to others should be permitted.
434
  In other cases, where 
the aim of restriction is to satisfy the interests of policy, Dworkin noted that we should be ‘with 
our thumbs on the free speech side of the scales’435 demonstrating the high threshold that should 
be met for limiting free speech insofar as only injury to others can justify it. Further, Dworkin 
argued that, as a result of the importance of the general legitimacy of a State, even debates on 
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controversial issues such as racial intelligence should be allowed. Waldron holds this position to 
be wrong, as it places too much emphasis on free speech and argues that this results in society 
‘bear[ing] the costs of what amounts to attacks on the dignity of minority groups.’436 At this 
point, the central question is whether one should adopt Mill’s aforementioned argument that, 
even an immoral opinion should be permitted in the name of free speech, or, whether such a 
controversial debate is to be considered to step into the grounds of harm? It is this question 
which lies at the heart of the debate on hate speech restriction.  
 
Therefore, the libertarian model allows for rights to be restricted insofar as it is demonstrable that 
there is a serious and imminent risk of serious harm to others. Within this framework, freedom of 
expression has been repeatedly understood to hold a particularly significant position within the 
human rights framework. As such, to limit this right would entail a particularly high threshold of 
severity and imminence with theorists noting, for example, that mere offensiveness does not 
meet the threshold. It could be discerned that such a threshold could also be attached to the 
vehicles of expression, namely association and assembly.  So, essentially, libertarians interpret 
free expression in a very strict manner and, as such, require a high severity of harm if expression 
is to be restricted.  Some scholars have condemned this position with, for example, Fish arguing 
that the dangers associated with such speech are far more serious and extensive than classical 
and contemporary libertarians believe.
437
  Furthermore, hate speech finds support as free speech 
for other reasons apart from the particular importance of free expression. For example, James 
Weinstein argues that the most suitable response to hate speech is not a ban but a lively counter-
argument put forth by the State or citizens so as to enable society to realise the damage of such 
speech, urging the State to put time and resources in to such activities.  Thus, Weinstein adopts a 
libertarian approach as a strategy to fight speech rather than as a result of his particular emphasis 
on free speech.
438
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It must be noted that, as underlined by Heinze, opponents of hate speech bans come from 
different schools of thought and include communitarian writers which challenge such bans on the 
grounds that they manifest ‘modernity’s exaggerated focus on individual legal entitlements,’439 
and civic republican theorists who ‘seek to limit the capacity of rights regimes to trump, hence to 
foreclose, collective deliberation’440 Either way, as noted by Frederick Schauer, ‘free speech is a 
good card to hold’441 but ‘it does not mean that free speech is the ace of trumps,’442 the point of 
contention being at what point to accept that a particular harm of a particular speech may 
constitute sufficient grounds for limitation. 
 
2.3 Legitimately Legislating against Hate Speech:   
Some commentators have sought to tackle the question of whether hate speech should be banned 
by considering how to strike a balance between combatting hate, such as racial hate on the one 
hand, and preserving democratic freedoms such as that of expression on the other. This concept 
has been dealt with by several authors who have approached it, through a mélange of legal, 
normative and contextual avenues alone or in conjunction with each other. David Kretzmer’s 
article entitled ‘Freedom of Speech and Racism’443 is an earlier piece of work but continues to be 
relevant to the current reality, often being cited in literature. It looks at freedom of speech and 
racism and considers the boundaries of freedom of expression when dealing with racist speech, 
placing more emphasis on normative appraisals of free speech theories such as Mill’s truth 
argument and individualist arguments and the way in which such theories, where applicable, 
have received judicial support. The central research question put forth is whether there is a case 
for limiting the right of racist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, from disseminating their 
ideologies. After establishing a definitional framework of the key terms of racist speech and 
freedom of speech, the paper appraises theoretical arguments for and against the restriction of 
racist speech and the question of legislating against hate speech, its intricacies and desirability in 
light of the difficulties, with the author concluding that the desirability for legislation ultimately 
depends on social factors. Although the paper commences with a direct reference to racist groups, 
no examination of the freedom of association or assembly is conducted. Elizabeth F. Defeis’ 
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‘Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response to Hate Speech’444 examines the 
USA’s approach to hate speech, underlining the difference in the approach it takes in comparison 
to most other countries and noting that its approach is very different to that incorporated in 
international law. It argues that the ‘First Amendment absolutist approach has failed to 
accommodate equality and non-discrimination rights’ 445  It then looks at the international 
conventions relevant to this discussion and examines regional documents such as the ECHR. 
Thus, this article produces an overview of the international and European frameworks, making 
reference to other regions such as Africa but, most importantly, the author’s argument for a 
change in the USA’s approach to hate speech is predominantly based on the breach of equality 
and non-discrimination that arises from the aforementioned absolutist approach, making this a 
significant contribution to the interrelation and interdependence of restricting hate speech and 
promoting these values as a valid justification for legitimately legislating against hate. In 
Stephanie Farrior’s ‘Molding the Matrix,’446 the author offers an extensive assessment of the 
international framework governing hate speech, exploring the history of the prohibition of hate 
speech in this sphere by looking at the travaux préparatoires of the documents and assesses the 
theories that underlie these developments. It also makes a comparison of the justifications put 
forth by international law for the limitation of hate speech with those of critical race theory, 
noting, for example, the importance both place on the potential injury of hate speech on its 
targets. Through its analysis of the legal and normative frameworks it concludes that hate speech 
can be restricted for purposes of protecting the principles of equality and non-discrimination, 
finding that the abuse of right theory is one of the most convincing justifications for limiting hate 
speech. Tarlach McGonagle’s article ‘Wrestling Racial Equality from Tolerance of Hate Looks 
at the Restrictions to Hate Speech from the Ambit of Prompting the Right to Equality’447 studies 
the notion of tolerance in a normative sphere and the socio-political reality behind the increasing 
anti-racist mandate of the international community, thereby, setting a well-rounded and original 
normative and contextual setting for the subsequent analysis. It then continues with the standard 
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UN and Council of Europe instruments and case-law, considers negationism, the effectiveness of 
hate speech laws and the contextual reality of Ireland. This formula is implemented in order to 
justify its central position that the ‘objective of promoting equality and non-discrimination must 
not be allowed to subordinate or even subdue the right to freedom of expression.’448 The author 
suggests the need to balance all the rights and interests at stake. Two earlier pieces of writing 
also focus on the issues of equality and non-discrimination within the sphere under consideration. 
‘Extreme Speech and Democracy’449 includes a collection of essays on a wide variety of issues 
related to its title including, inter alia, the international and European frameworks governing 
hate speech and the issue of legislating against Holocaust denial. It incorporates examples from 
Europe and the USA to illustrate the points put forth whilst simultaneously including a section 
which outlines the problems of implementing comparative analyses between States’ and regions’ 
approach to hate speech. At the core of the discussions is the difficulty of balancing between the 
different rights and freedoms at stake, an issue which is further developed through a 
philosophical approach too. This book generally adopts an interdisciplinary approach rather than 
a purely legal one. In Eva Brems’ article on ‘State Regulation of Xenophobia Versus Individual 
Freedoms,’450 the central research question is whether States can and should impose restrictive 
legal measures against anti-democratic rhetoric, organisations and individuals. She frames this 
question as a ‘democratic dilemma’451 with the central question being ‘is the remedy then not as 
dangerous as the illness?’452 The author responds to the question through a legal appreciation of 
the issues. She establishes the legal framework by providing an overview of the UN, EU and 
Council of Europe frameworks that backdrop anti-democratic rhetoric and activities, 
promulgated by groups and individuals, and offers a comparative analysis of the situation in the 
USA and Germany, offering an historical explanation as to the variation in stances. She then 
moves on to tackling the problem question against the aforementioned normative background, 
offering a two-fold justification for the legitimate restriction of anti-democratic groups and 
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expression in the form of ‘weighing different kinds of harm’453 and ‘defending democracy.’454 In 
relation to the first, restricting a person or group of persons’ freedom of expression or association 
is legitimate due to the harmful effects such speech has on individuals and groups. Although the 
author does not explicitly extend this position to association, it can be implicitly discerned from 
the composition of this section. In relation to the second justification, the author focuses 
particularly on Article 17 of the ECHR as the embodiment of militant democracy and notes that 
far-right ideology threatens the very foundation of the ECRH. Erik Bleich’s ‘The Freedom to be 
Racist? How the USA and Europe Struggle to Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism’ 455 
explores national laws and policies of countries such as the USA, Germany, the UK and France 
in the spheres of racist expression, association and racism. It recognises the differences in 
approach taken by European countries, on the one hand and the USA on the other, but concludes 
that, regardless of such variations, none of the countries has breached democratic principles. The 
overarching objective is to examine how the countries under consideration strike a balance 
between the different rights and values at stake. Interestingly, Tim Bakken’s article on ‘Liberty 
and Equality through Freedom of Expression: The Human Rights Questions behind Hate Crime 
Law’456 takes an opposite stance to that of the majority of relevant literature. More particularly, it 
looks at how enhancing the freedom of expression maximises liberty and equality, focusing on 
the justification put forth for the enactment of laws against hate crime and concluding that these 
laws ‘actually diminish liberty and equality’457 The author further argues that such laws do, in 
fact, promote inequality as they allow for greater punishments due to the victims’ race, religion, 
sex or national origin. The author seeks to justify his positions by looking at theories of free 
expression, some case-law, statistics and figures from the USA with a brief reference to relevant 
international law. It must be noted that the comparison between American and European 
approaches to hate speech is of particular interest and relevance to the issue of hate speech given 
the profoundly different approaches taken by the two on the issue, with an almost absolutist 
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position to free speech being adopted by the former. Several articles have been written by 
authors such as Roger Kiska
458
, Claudia E. Haupt,
459
 Winfried Brugger
460
 and Sionaidh Douglas-
Scott
461
 on freedom of expression through a comparative assessment of US-European approaches 
to this freedom, with European meaning either an analysis of ECtHR case-law or an analysis of 
instruments available in single States, usually Germany. All the authors mentioned provide 
normative overviews of international and/or European law and, due to the distinctions between 
the approaches being compared, serve to reflect the pros and cons of each. This could arguably 
be the case due to the stark variation between the approaches adopted in the two areas and/or 
States. Thus, these articles contribute to the buildup of literature on free speech and to the 
variations between positions adopted in the USA, on the one hand, and in Europe and/or 
European countries on the other. Thus, the above literature seeks to find ways to strike a balance 
between the values and rights at stake in cases of promoting hate through freedoms and/or to 
justify or reject such a balancing exercise. Principles ranging from the preservation of the 
principle of non-discrimination to the Mill’s truth argument against the backdrop of international 
and national frameworks have been assessed by authors in pursuing their objectives. One 
important observation that can be made from the above is that, although the authors recognise the 
potential of organised groups, such as political parties, to promote hate, focus is placed on the 
freedom of expression with no concrete mention of association or assembly in the sphere of 
legitimately restricting hate.  
 
Some commentators have directly tackled the question of whether bans on hate speech should be 
permitted constituting a significant question particularly for American Scholars who stand before 
a legal culture where free expression is very important. As such, several authors have considered 
the basic question of whether or not hate speech bans are legitimate. For example, the issue of 
hate speech bans has been considered within a critical race theory framework and predominantly 
in the book ‘Words that Wound’ which rejects, amongst others, the libertarian model adopted for 
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hate speech given that critical race theorists consider this to ignore the inherent imbalances that 
mark American society. The authors put forth examples to demonstrate such inherent imbalances 
and the history of racism in America as reasons to argue against libertarian models of free speech. 
For example, they argue that it is the deeply embedded racism that marks American society 
which has led to phenomena, such as defamation, to fall outside the framework of free speech 
guarantees whilst racist speech is considered protected speech.
462
 In  Robert Post’s Ninety’s 
article ‘Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment,’463  the author argues that, for 
purposes of ensuring a harmonious existence between the freedom of expression and the 
limitation of racist speech, focus must be placed on the harm caused by such speech. Closely 
interrelated to this justification are the ideas put forth by Jeremy Waldron. More particularly, in 
his 2014 book ‘The Harm in Hate Speech,’464 Waldron justifies limiting hate speech on grounds 
of preserving human dignity and protecting members of minority groups, often targetted by such 
speech. The arguments in this book can be considered as an extension of his article ‘Dignity and 
Defamation: The Visibility of Hate’465 in which the author argues that hate speech should be 
restricted for purposes of ensuring human dignity. Alexander Tsesis recognises a larger-scale 
consequence of hate speech as a justification for hate speech bans. More particularly, in his book 
‘Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements,’466 he 
argues that hate speech sends destructive messages which are linked to the systematic 
marginalisation of minority groups which, in turn, become part of mainstream dialogue with 
destructive results, such as slavery. On the other hand, some authors find no justification for the 
banning of hate speech. For example, Eric Heinze in ‘Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech’ 
has argued that there exist no justifications for restricting hate speech and that such measures are 
‘inherently discriminatory and should be abolished.’467 Ronald Dworkin also adopts an anti-hate 
speech ban in his forward to Hare and Weinstein’s book ‘Extreme Speech and Democracy,’ by 
arguing that such bans would be destructive for society since they may ‘spoil the only 
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democratic justification we have for insisting that everyone obey laws.’ 468  Interestingly, in 
Heinze’s recent book ‘Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship,’ the author provides a critical 
overview of the different positions and theories that exist in relation to hate speech regulation 
and concludes that public expression can only be restricted in cases where expression may create 
issues of national security. 
469
 
 
2.4 A Theoretical Approach to Restricting Hate speech Legitimately: Critical Race Theory 
Taking into account that at the heart of this dissertation lies the concept of hate and 
discrimination against minority groups, Critical Race Theory (CRT) will be assessed as a lens 
through which free speech can be restricted insofar as such speech constitutes hate speech and, 
by extension hateful association and assembly. Before proceeding with an analysis of CRT, the 
Speech Act Theory will be briefly assessed for purposes of extrapolating on speech as an act. 
 
2.4.1 Speech Act Theory 
The Speech Act Theory sets out a structure for purposes of elucidating the meaning of 
expression and, subsequently, its hierarchy of effects. The Speech Act Theory was put forth by 
John L. Austin in ‘How to Do Things with Words’ which essentially ‘presented a new picture of 
analysing meaning.’470 The theory was further developed by John R. Searle in ‘Speech Acts.’  At 
the core of Austin’s writings is the concept of meaning which is illustrated by reference to the 
concept of acts. Essentially, in speaking, the speaker ‘with an associated intention performs a 
linguistic act to the hearer.’471 The theory sets out three speaking-acts; a locutionary act as one of 
purely saying something, an illocutionary act as an act performing a function such as a request 
and a perlocutionary act which has an effect on the actions, thoughts or feelings of the 
receiver.
472
 Austin presented a locutionary act as one with a certain meaning, illocutionary as one 
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with a certain force and perlocutionary as one which is to achieve a certain effect.
473
 Thereby, the 
differentiation between the three is significant for the conceptualisation of speech under 
consideration and its possible effects. However, as argued by Judith Butler, a speech situation is 
‘not a simple sort of context, one that might be defined easily by spatial and temporal 
boundaries.’ 474 As underlined by Belavusau, libertarian free speech supporters endorse the 
locutionary nature of a hateful form of expression,
475
 thereby considering it as purely an act of 
saying something, with no ramifications whereas others who do not adhere to a libertarian 
approach will ‘articulate the intimidation and even subordination potential of such expression to 
amount to a performative act.’476 The recognition, by this theory, of the capacity of speech to 
have an actual effect on its listener if the particular speech fell within the realm of a 
perlocutionary act ‘stimulated criticism of the US Supreme Court’s laissez-faire attitude towards 
hate speech’477  by critical race theorists. Heinze notes that Critical Race Theorists describe 
hateful expression as ‘a weapon delivering a blow as harsh as a physical assault’478 thereby 
reflecting the actual consequences these theorists attach to expression which is hateful. As such, 
CRT is discussed below.  
 
2.4.2 Critical Race Theory  
CRT came about in the mid-1980s
479
 after a realisation by scholars, activists and lawyers that 
‘new theories and strategies were needed to combat the subtler forms of racism that were gaining 
ground.’480  Racist incidents on campuses of universities in the United States prompted the 
writings of critical race theorists such as Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, Richard Delegado 
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and Jean Stefancic ‘who wrote the phrase hate speech into the legal lexicon.’481 CRT considers a 
variety of issues looked at through, for example, the civil rights lens, but, instead, ‘places them in 
a broader perspective that includes economics, history, context, group and self-interest, and even 
feelings and the unconscious…[and…questions the very foundations of the liberal order, 
including equality theory, legal reasoning, enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of 
constitutional law.’482 For these theorists, racism ‘lies at the very heart of American  and Western 
culture.’483 The overarching aim of CRT is to ‘eliminat[e] racial oppression’484  and achieve 
‘fundamental social transformation.’485 It can be used to look at a variety of issues from law, to 
education, to political science and more. 
486
 In relation to hate speech, critical race theorists 
argued that the libertarian model adopted for free speech and, thus, for hate speech did ‘not 
acknowledge the imbalance of power that exists within American society.’487 Thus, according to 
this theory, there is an inequality of arms as a result of an inherent prejudice held and manifested 
against the groups and, as such, these groups which live on the margins of society cannot 
possibly be deemed to be able to participate equally in a dialogue with haters. As noted, ‘in a 
rigged game…the argument that good speech ultimately drives out bad speech rests on a false 
premise unless those of us who fight racism are vigilant and unequivocal in that fight,’ therefore 
demonstrating that the groups themselves who are targets of such speech cannot participate 
without the assistance of others who may work in the field of anti-racism but are not 
marginalised themselves. According to Matsuda, hate speech is defined as such if the message 
incorporates the idea of racial inferiority, is directed to a traditionally marginalised group and is 
hateful, degrading and menacing.
488
 In this way, Matsuda attempts to encapsulate only the 
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speech which is truly hateful and menacing and to leave out generally controversial speech. 
489
 
Given the emphasis placed on the unequal position certain groups find themselves in due to the 
prejudice and marginalisation which they have historically experienced, Matsuda argues that, in 
the event that hate speech is directed towards society’s dominant group, then the libertarian 
model of free speech should be applied.
490
 On one hand, this position could be justified by the 
fact that the majority group is not hampered by inequalities, prejudices and discrimination and 
there is no issue of inequality of arms and, as such, they can reasonably partake in an effective 
response with the hate speech in question not causing damage to this group’s societal position 
which, either way, is diachronically in power.  On the other, it could be hard to accept given 
embedded principles of law such as the general non-discriminatory application of the law. 
Moreover, such a position could cause concerns as to ‘where such precedents might lead.’491 
CRT is, as might be expected, not without criticism with one of the arguments put forth against it 
being its ‘single mindedly critical character,’ 492  discussing, analysing and blaming without 
offering any solution to the issues it raises. As noted by Mark Tushnet, in relation to CRT, 
‘critique is all there is.’493 Other critics of CRT and the way in which this school perceives the 
effects of hate speech include Judith Butler who has noted that the interrelationship between hate 
speech and the alleged resulting harm does not always exist.
494
 Further, Heinze has argued 
Critical Race Theorists adopt ‘wholly abstract, decontextualised and formalist readings of 
international norms’ 495  resulting, amongst others in non engagement of the theory with 
international human rights law.
496
 Although this theory is based on American realities and issues, 
Mattias Möschel notes that some of the main challenges considered within the framework of 
CRT are relevant and significant to Europe but, to date, this theory has ‘received scant attention 
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in European legal scholarship.’ 497  Möschel places his analysis within the framework of 
Continental Europe and explains the lack of CRT, therein, due to the lack of a conceptualisation 
of race. More particularly, he holds that the ‘fear is that by referring to race one might be 
implicitly and normatively recognizing the existence of different human races from the scientific 
viewpoint.’498 This fear stands in the way of extrapolating on CRT due to the necessity to 
conceptualise on race. In the UK, there has been some, albeit very limited reference, to this 
theory.
499
  
 
So, theorists in this arena are sensible to the societal reality of prejudices and inequalities and, as 
a result, underline that hate speech cannot contribute to the market place of ideas as an equal 
dialogue cannot come about from such speech. CRT essentially holds that institutional racism 
and prejudices that are traditionally affiliated to particular groups distort any discussion on free 
speech when it comes to hateful speech. However, they appear to alienate themselves from 
placing analyses within the framework of international human rights law which is centrifugal to 
the content of their discussions whilst other criticisms include the incapacity of this theory to 
provide solutions to the problems it identifies.  
 
3. Effects-Based Approach to Hate Speech Restriction   
3.1 Effects-Based Approach as a General Concept 
As well as looking at the legitimacy of restricting hate speech in the sphere of CRT, one can also 
consider this issue by conceptualising the effects of hate speech as grounds upon which such 
regulation is justifiable. When considering the effects of hate speech, it is important first to 
underline which particular groups may be affected by such speech. In this realm, Thomas 
Scanlon looks at the extent to which a particular expression affects the rights and interests of 
those affected by it. Scanlon argues that, in order for a State legitimately to regulate speech, it 
must determine whether and, if so, the extent to which the rights and interests of the groups of 
persons affected by the speech are violated. These groups include the participant, the audience, 
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the bystander and the citizens who are damaged by the speech in question.
500
 The position put 
forth by Scanlon is interesting as it recognises a variety of groups that may be affected by the 
speech with this broad understanding being significant in the realm of hate speech which affects 
not only the victim but also other listeners who may be persuaded by its content and society, 
more generally, whose equilibrium may be impacted by the speech. 
 
Now as to the actual effects of speech, Feinberg argues that speech which is to be prohibited 
must cause profound offence rather than mere nuisance and differentiates between the two in five 
ways. Profound offences have a particularly ominous tone, are unacceptable even to those who 
do not witness them, are unacceptable even if they take place in private,
501
 are evident even if 
one attempts to disregard them and are morally unacceptable.
502
 This commentator holds that 
racial insults result in profound outrage on the part of the victim because uttering such insults is 
morally wrong and because he or she is threatened by this behaviour.
503
 It must be noted, 
however, that an understanding of the effects of hate speech, which encapsulates a wider range 
of victims and not just the targetted person or group but also others, as set out by Scanlon, is 
more pragmatic. David O. Brink argues that hate speech ‘evokes visceral, rather than articulate 
responses, it provokes violence or, more commonly silences through insult or intimidation.’504 
Charles Lawrence extrapolates on the reaction hate speech often causes by holding that it is an 
attack that ‘produces an instinctive, defensive psychological reaction. Fear, rage, shock and flight 
all interfere with any reasoned response.’ Many victims do not find words of response until well 
after the assault, when the cowardly assaulter has departed.’ 505  These are very significant 
observations when taking into account arguments of classical theorists, such as Mill, who speak 
of the importance of dialogue and expression for a functional society. Brink and Lawrence’s 
points succinctly denote one of the reasons why this argument is not applicable to hate speech 
given that the affront it causes to the ‘other side’ cannot possibly allow its representatives to 
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engage in a reasoned discussion that will produce reasoned results. Further, hate speech may 
reinforce prejudices and feelings of inferiority in a seriously harmful way’506 Eric Barendt took 
this one step further, adopting an interesting outlook on the effects that restrictions of hate speech 
have on free speech by arguing that hate speech ‘silences the voice of members of the targeted 
group’507 and, as a result, allowing for such expression essentially restricts certain groups from 
exercising this right. 
508
 His argument was inspired by a point made by Caroline West who held 
that, in the event that permitting persons to promote hate results in other speech (counter-speech) 
being disregarded, then this curtails rather than enhances free speech.
509
 Such arguments 
conceptualise the freedom of expression within societal realities, comprehending the effects that 
hate speech has on the further marginalisation of its victims who essentially cannot respond in a 
free marketplace of ideas. In relation to the marketplace argument, scholars, such as Smolla, 
have argued that hate speech offers no value to the positive development of a society and its 
dialogue does not fall within the marketplace framework.
510
 As such, that author argued that this 
type of speech ‘states no fact, offers no opinion, proposes no transaction, attempts no 
persuasion.’511 Therefore, based on this premise and the societal in-utility of hate speech, the 
marketplace approach, discussed above, is eliminated as a precursor for permitting hate speech.   
 
Further, Waldron puts forth his argumentation based on the premise of human dignity and 
respect. The former will be extrapolated on briefly before looking at Waldron’s position. Dignity 
has been described as ‘the very founding rock of fundamental rights in post-World War II 
constitutionalism’ Dignity is a central concept of international human rights law, with 
international conventions such as the United Nations Charter and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
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Rights referring to dignity.
512
 In commenting on the case of K.A. et A.D v Belgium which looked 
at sadomachism, Muriel Fabre-Magnan argues that ‘the emergence of the human dignity 
principle is the sign that there is something superior (transcendent) to individual wills…No one 
can renounce the human dignity principle, obviously not for others but no more so for 
oneself…’ 513   The interrelationship between the ancient principle and dignitas has been 
considered by scholars through various lenses. Dignitas can be defined as including ‘worth, 
worthiness, dignity, rank, position, political office.’ 514 James Q. Whitman argues that the origins 
of dignity are indeed to be found in the ancient norms of honour which were gradually developed 
into the principle of human dignity as we understand it today
515
. However, David Feldman and 
Waldron
516
 steer away from associating the concept of human dignity as we know it today with 
that of the Roman principle of dignitas due to the contrasts between the two. More particularly, 
dignity as we know it today is applicable to all and is non-retractable whereas dignitas had to be 
awarded and could be taken away.  
 
Waldron argues that hate speech targets the ‘social sense of assurance on which members of 
vulnerable minorities rely‘517 and guarantees that all citizens adhere to principles of human 
dignity and respect. As such, he underlined that hate speech should be prohibited in that it is so 
damaging, not only on an individual level but also on a group level, that such speech can almost 
affect social harmony.
518
 Other commentators, such as Tsesis, consider hate speech to promote 
destructive messages with a menacing effect on society on a group level and not merely on an 
individual one, linking it to the rise of dangerous movements. Moreover, he dismissed theories of 
free expression in the face of the violent realities that traditionally marginalised groups have 
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experienced as a result of the systematic development of hate speech which subsequently 
become part of accepted dialogue, pinpointing examples such as slavery to illustrate this point.
519
 
Cass Sunstein recognises the harm in hate speech but also incorporates a safety net by 
underlining that hate speech should be regulated if it can be demonstrated that the prohibitions 
are targetting harms rather than ideas.
520
 The long-term effects of hate speech and the direct 
correlation within the continuing marginalisation of certain groups is recognised by Kent 
Greenwalt who holds that ‘epithets and more elaborate slurs that reflect stereotypes about race, 
ethnic group, religion, sexual preference and gender may cause continuing hostility and 
psychological damage.’521  
 
Further, the issue of stereotypes could also be introduced within the framework of hate speech 
bans. Stereotypes can be described as ‘social ideas and preconceptions that exist about a 
particular group. Stereotypes create in and out groups: us versus them.’522 Alexandra Timmer 
underlines the harmful effects of such stereotypes to include, amongst others, psychological 
distress and underachievement.
523
 An anti-stereotyping approach for the European Court of 
Human Rights has been recommended and set out by Timmer, placing a particular focus on 
gender discrimination. Such an approach can be translated and placed within the sphere of hate 
speech bans. More particularly, hate speech could be deemed to contribute to the creation of 
stereotypes against particular groups and facilitate the creation of the ‘other’ which lies at the 
heart of the discrimination, hatred and violence emanating from the context under consideration. 
In fact, in Vejdeland v Sweden,
524
 in which the ECtHR looked at homophobic speech, the 
concurring opinions of Judges Speilmann and Nussberger endorsed a Committee of Ministers 
Resolution against Croatia which looked at, amongst others, statements of the sort found in the 
Swedish case. The Resolution held that ‘these statements stigmatise homosexuals and are based 
upon negative, distorted, reprehensible and degrading stereotypes about the sexual behaviour of 
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all homosexuals.’ There has, thereby, been an incorporation of the issue of stereotypes within the 
ECtHR sphere and in relation to hate speech. This particular sphere, that of an anti-stereotyping 
approach, has not been developed per se in relation to hate speech bans but could be grounds 
upon which analysis can be made, always taking into account the detrimental effects of 
stereotyping on the victims but also on society, more generally, given the divisions and 
classifications this approach results in.  
 
In sum, as per Scanlon, there are a variety of groups who are affected by hate speech, not only 
the targetted victim. The very nature of hate speech distorts the possibility of producing and 
promoting a healthy and equal dialogue of the members of a society, which, in any case, is not 
the objective of hate speech. This, in itself, removes hate speech from the marketplace of ideas as 
it offers nothing of value but, instead, comes with dire effects such as harm to dignity, the 
production and promotion of stereotypes and the general destruction of personal and group rights. 
To extend this argument further, this reality results in hate speech leading to the violation of free 
expression as it silences particularly vulnerable and targetted groups. Moreover, the great harm 
which commentators, such as Tsesis and Sunstein, link to hate speech and the effects it has, not 
only on an individual level  but also on a societal one, makes regulation imperative for them. 
However, the questions that remain include who is to decide what constitutes hate speech and, 
thus, where to draw the line between allowing free expression on the one hand and preventing 
the harms of hate speech on the other. 
 
4. Freedom of Expression: A Legal Assessment of Theoretical Issues 
The literature below looks at the technical aspects of freedom of expression within a legal 
framework, laying out the principles developed in legal and philosophical theory regarding what 
the delimitations of free expression should be whilst also assessing the treatment of freedom of 
expression on national and/or supranational levels. The book ‘Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, 
Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination,’525 edited by Sandra Coliver, brings together a 
collection of essays which establish the international standards for dealing with hate speech and 
provides an overview of the legal regulation of hate speech in a large number of countries. This 
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book incorporates an introductory section regarding the balancing of rights and is simultaneously 
a rich source of the laws in the ambit of free speech and non-discrimination in the countries 
under consideration. During the countries’ assessments, the authors pinpoint how the balance is 
found between competing rights. Dominic McGoldrick and Thérèse O’Donnel write on ‘Hate 
Speech Laws: Consistency with National and International Human Rights Law.’526 The article 
looks at the freedom of expression in a national, European and international framework, 
extensively assesses the case of Faurisson v France and sets out criteria for determining whether 
hate-speech laws are in compliance with national and international human rights law based on 
the variety of jurisprudence examined therein. It is a significant contribution as it refers to a 
series of different national laws, such as Israeli and German, as well as case-law from different 
States such as Canada and Australia. Therefore, this article gives an insight into the legal reality 
of several countries in the sphere of hate speech, is one of the most extensive analysis of the 
Faurisson case while the criteria it ultimately recommends are useful as indicators of the 
legitimacy of measures which restrict racist expression.  For example, the authors note that 
restrictions on the freedom of expression for purposes of protecting the rights of others may 
‘extend to the protection of the community as a whole and thereby to the groups that make up 
that community.’527 In Marloes van Noorloos’ book ‘Hate Speech Revisited: a Comparative and 
Historical Perspective on Hate Speech Law in The Netherlands and England & Wales,’528 the 
author conducts a comparative study on the historical development of hate speech and extreme 
speech laws in the two jurisdictions, looking at how and why the law of the two developed as it 
did, also considering the impact of international and European law. This contribution is 
particularly original since it offers an in-depth historical appreciation of the development of laws 
relevant to hate speech in the two jurisdictions. In Belavusau’s book ‘Freedom of Expression - 
Importing European and US Constitutional Models in Transitional Democracies,’529 the author 
looks at free speech in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, assessing how these transitional 
democracies have incorporated free speech models of the CoE, the EU and the USA. Particularly 
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relevant to the current dissertation is the analysis of approaches taken to hate speech by the 
ECtHR and the EU. This book includes an assessment of, inter alia, all the relevant far-right 
cases dealt with on a Council of Europe level up until the time of writing and, also, provides an 
evaluation of the approach of the European Union to hate speech. The analysis of the EU 
approach is significant and, along with the same author’s article ‘Fighting Hate Speech through 
EU Law,’530 amounts to the first literature on regulating hate speech using European Union 
mechanisms, particularly in comparison with the more often looked at Council of Europe 
framework. Nazila Ghanea places hate speech in the realm of minority rights. More particularly, 
her book ‘Minorities and Hatred: Protections and Implications’531  looks at the protection of 
minorities through the restriction of hate speech. The book adopts the hypothesis that there exists 
a nexus between hate speech and the protection of minorities, which has not yet been adequately 
incorporated into international documents. To justify this position, the author examines the 
impact of Article 20 of the ICCPR on minorities and examines jurisprudence from several 
countries on the link between prohibiting hate and protecting minorities, also looking at 
international and European case-law. In David Kretzmer and Francine Kershman Hazan’s 
‘Freedom of Speech and Incitement against Democracy’532 the authors focus particularly on 
inciting violence and, more particularly, consider the extent to which speech that incites violence 
can be legitimately restricted by democratic States. It looks at USA and German approaches and 
the ECtHR case-law on incitement as well as theories of free speech and theoretical justifications 
of restricting speech, with the general framework emanating, in part, from the institutions’ 
approaches to the far-right. Thus, the above literature sets out the general legal framework and 
treatment of the freedom of expression in relation to extreme speech with some pieces focusing 
on particular issues such as minority rights and the incitement to violence.  
 
Although the majority of the above literature has referred to Strasbourg jurisprudence during the 
analysis of the issues, the literature mentioned below focuses solely on aspects related to this 
Court in the sphere of hate in particular and, more specifically, the issues of violent speech, the 
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role of Article 17 of the ECHR and the ‘bad tendency test,’ with particular focus placed on Féret 
v Belgium and Le Pen v France. Antoine Buyse’s ‘Dangerous Expressions: The ECHR, Violence 
and Free Speech’533 considers how the freedom of expression and the prevention of violence can 
be balanced, using, inter alia, right-wing extremist jurisprudence, such as Vona, Norwood and 
Féret, to illustrate the main arguments. Given that the analysis looks at such cases and since 
there exists an inextricable link between the far-right and violence, this article is of particular 
relevance to the topic under consideration. It indicates that the ECtHR case-law shows an 
‘overlap between cases relating to hate speech and those relating to instances of violence-prone 
speech’534 with the Court not always being clear as to the distinction between the two types of 
dangerous speech. It also demonstrates that the Court has not found a mechanism through which 
adequately to balance the prevention of violent speech and the freedom of expression. The same 
author has previously made a relevant contribution to a book entitled ‘Contested Contours – The 
Limits of Freedom of Expression from an Abuse of Rights Perspective – Articles 10 and 17 
ECHR’ 535  which focuses on the limits of freedom of expression from an abuse of rights 
perspective, considering Article 10 and Article 17 of the ECHR, placing the study within the 
framework of totalitarian regimes and particularly those of the far-right. It assesses the role of 
Article 17 of the ECHR, the relationship between Article 17 of the ECHR and other articles in 
particular Article 10 of the ECHR. The paper peruses case-law relevant to far-right expression 
and association where there has been a direct or indirect application or a discarding of Article 17 
of the ECHR. From this analysis, it concludes that the Court applies Article 17 of the ECHR to 
situations of preventing totalitarian movements from abusing Convention rights as well as to 
those pertaining to revisionism, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and incitement to violence. 
This analysis interestingly shows that the Court has not been systematic when endeavouring to 
‘categorise freedom of expression cases as falling either within the Convention’s protective 
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scope (Article 10) or outside it (Article 17).’536 It also argues that experience has demonstrated 
that the task of deciphering whether activities do, in fact, aim at destroying human rights and 
democracy is, in fact, difficult. It concludes by arguing that an indirect application of Article 17 
of the ECHR is the most suitable as it enables a proportionality test of the impugned measures 
under consideration and, thus, from a human rights perspective, is the most suitable approach. In 
Sottiaux’s article on ‘Bad Tendencies in the ECtHR’s Hate Speech Jurisprudence’537 the author 
places his analysis on the USA ‘bad tendency’ formula as a means to justify the suppression of 
ideas that put the foundations of government at risk. He argues that, although this formula has 
disappeared from American case-law, it marks the ECtHR’s hate speech jurisprudence, thus, 
resulting in a lucid relation between the expression in question and the potential danger arising 
therefrom. He illustrates his arguments by focusing on Féret v Belgium and Le Pen v France on a 
European level and R v Keegstra on a Canadian level. The author acknowledges that the US-
European comparison has occurred time and again in this sphere and, instead, looks at a Euro-
Canadian comparison. The article finds that the ECtHR’s current approach to hate speech ‘is in 
need of re-evaluation,’538 with the Court currently citing a variety of negative social and personal 
consequences which may arise from hate speech ‘without indicating how they will ultimately 
affect its proportionality analysis.’ It turns to Keegstra in which the Court distinguished between 
discriminatory speech and speech which incites hate or discrimination
539
 as a method that should 
be looked at by the ECtHR for purposes of ensuring a more equitable approach to hate speech 
and Article 10 of the ECHR. Thus, the above three pieces of writing are directly related to the 
role and impact of the ECtHR in the framework of right-wing extremism, denoting key 
weaknesses of the Court in this sphere and seeking to advance recommendations for the 
improvement of its approach. 
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5. Freedom of Association  
The literature on extreme-right association is limited in comparison to its expression counterpart. 
Three directly relevant articles can be found. Of particular relevance to this study is Stefan 
Sottiaux’ article ‘Anti-Democratic Associations: Content and Consequences in Article 11 
Adjudication’540 which seeks to evaluate the position of anti-democratic political parties under 
Article 11 of the ECHR doing so through an analysis of Refah Partisi v Turkey. Even though this 
case does not deal with right-wing extremism, per se, it is a landmark case to any analysis of 
Article 11 of the ECHR, with the conclusion drawn, as described below, being of particular 
relevance to hate speech and hateful association. The author’s assessment is placed within the 
broader framework of Loewenstein’s dilemma of whether a democracy can restrict the 
association of political parties without violating its very aims and objectives. The article’s 
‘central claim is that the Refah Court adopted a standard which is both content and consequence-
based’ and, thus, resembles the US Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. The 
article’s discussion builds up to the important question of why the ECtHR’s analysis in Refah 
Partisi required a sufficiently imminent risk test whilst such a counterpart is not evident in its 
Article 10 case-law on hate speech, with the author referring to Jersild v Denmark to illustrate 
this example. This question subsequently provides a justification of the Court’s treatment of 
Article 11 of the ECHR and, namely, that this reflects ‘the essential role the Strasbourg organs 
ascribe to political associations in preserving democracy and pluralism.’541 Further, in Meindert 
Fennema’s contribution to a book entitled ‘Legal Repression of Extreme-Right Parties and 
Racial Discrimination,’542 the author looks at the origins of anti-racist and anti-fascist legislation, 
explores the ICERD, with a particular focus on Article 4 of the ICERD, considers the 
implementation of the ICERD by States Parties, with a particular focus on how far-right parties 
can be banned under such legislation and refers to actual cases and figures and looks at initiatives 
taken by the European Union for purposes of countering racism, while dedicating a separate 
section to the discussion on revisionism. The author makes several conclusions, two of which 
stand out. Firstly, that anti-fascist legislation has its foundations in militant democracy whereas 
                                                          
540
 Stefan Sottiaux, ‘Anti-Democratic Associations: Content and Consequences in Article 11 Adjudication’ (2004)  
22 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 4 
541
 Stefan Sottiaux, ‘Anti-Democratic Associations: Content and Consequences in Article 11 Adjudication’ (2004) 
22 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights  4, 598 
542
 Meindert Fennema, ‘Legal Repression of Extreme Right Parties and Racial Discrimination’ in Ruud Koopmans 
& Paul Statham ‘Challenging International and Ethnic Relation Politics – Comparative European Perspectives’ 
(eds., OUP 2000) 
115 
 
anti-racist legislation is founded on the principle of equality which is not easily compatible with 
the freedom of expression. Secondly, that phenomena such as globalisation and migration render 
the punishment of opinion to be contrary to democracy. The central issue with the first 
conclusion is that the author places anti-fascist legislation on a pedestal, pursuing sound and 
coherent objectives which don’t find a place in the anti-racist counterpart and removing anti-
racism from the framework of a militant democracy, with no adequate justification. The second 
conclusion arises without any explicit correlation between the three aforementioned realities and 
renders the limitation to the freedom of expression undemocratic. Either way, this article is 
valuable to the academic understanding of far-right parties as it is one of a kind in providing such 
lengthy normative overview of initiatives, legislation and case-law pertaining to, inter alia, 
banning far-right parties.  
 
Conclusion  
Several of the thinkers discussed above provide for the possibility of rights being curtailed in the 
name of preventing harm to others. It is the crossroads of harm and rights and the severity and 
threshold of such harm which constitute the dichotomy that lies between libertarians and others. 
In this realm, scholarly disagreement does not lie in whether a particular right should be 
restricted in order to avoid harm to others but, rather, in deciphering whether something actually 
amounts to sufficient harm to justify such restriction. This issue becomes even more complicated 
in the realm of free expression as this is a right which many scholars consider to be of particular 
importance. The significant place held by expression has meant that libertarians and others are 
even more wary of finding that particular speech does, in fact, constitute harm. One could hold 
that this significance is extended to its vehicles, namely association and assembly, which are also 
subjects of consideration in this dissertation. Commentators who are against prohibiting hate 
speech have put forth arguments in the realm of the importance of free expression but, also, for 
other reasons such as Dworkin’s point, for purposes of general legitimacy or that to regard a 
system as legitimate necessarily entails that hate speech is permitted. Those who wish to regulate 
it have come up with a variety of arguments, such as the great damage done by hate speech on an 
individual and societal level and the inability of hate speech to contribute to a marketplace of 
ideas.  CRT has developed on the premise that racial inequalities lie at the heart of Western 
culture which prevent minority groups from equally and effectively participating in any 
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marketplace of ideas. The theory of militant democracy is another framework through which 
rights and freedoms can legitimately be restricted for purposes of protecting democracy itself. In 
light of the analysis of this chapter, the argumentation that will be put forth, hereinafter, will 
emanate from the premise that, permitting hate speech, and/or by extension associations and 
assemblies which constitute vehicles of such speech, a State paves the way for free speech to be 
abused. Permitting such hate results in the destruction of the rights and dignity of the victim on a 
micro (individual) and meso (community) level, whilst it has effects on a macro level as it 
damages community cohesion by embedding  stereotypes against the victims and their groups. 
These effects further accentuate the vulnerable and/or marginalised position victims of hate find 
themselves in. Further, the permissibility of such speech and its vehicles facilitates a furtherance 
of the power gap between the powerful in comparison to the marginalised groups, with the latter 
experiencing (systematic) silencing by such speech, association or assemblies. As argued by 
Brink ‘hate speech can poison the well of mutual respect and discourage participation in the 
deliberative community,’543 therefore directly affecting the equality required for Mill’s position 
to be enforceable in practice. In addition, the theoretical foundation of this dissertation also takes 
into account the fact that hate speech can be destructive for rights on an individual and societal 
level. It is the outcomes, such as racial discrimination and hate speech, which a militant 
democracy seeks to protect itself from by regulating association and expression that could 
potentially damage its very essence. In relation to what literature is available which interprets the 
theoretical and philosophical doctrines and principles, three conclusions can be drawn. Under the 
umbrella of right-wing extremism, one can find hate speech, hate crime and hateful types of 
associations and assemblies. These are entities within themselves but are interdependent on each 
other and to the broader framework of the extreme right movement. In this light, the first 
conclusion that can be drawn from the review is that most literature has focused on the 
aforementioned issues as entities within themselves. However, available literature has placed 
more focus on hate speech than hateful types of association, with no substantial assessment of 
the freedom of assembly in the framework of right-wing extremism as it arises within Article 11 
of the ECHR. Lastly, the comparative approach between country laws and regulations has been 
adopted with a predominant reliance on the USA-European model, with the latter meaning 
Europe as an entity or a particular European country, more often than not, Germany.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE UNITED NATIONS  
Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the international legal framework that regulates 
right-wing extremism by considering the development of international law that is relevant to this 
arena and by exploring its scope and objectives. By offering insight into the letter and spirit of 
international laws and principles, this chapter will constitute a benchmark for the subsequent 
appraisal of national laws in the two jurisdictions as well as looking at relevant principles 
formulated by UN documents particularly, the ICCPR and the ICERD. Further, with a view to 
ensuring an in-depth understanding of relevant provisions and themes, jurisprudence, General 
Comments and General Recommendations of the HRC and the CERD as well as reports of the 
UN Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
Association and on Racism and Xenophobia will be appraised. The aim of this approach is to 
determine the way in which the relevant provisions of the aforementioned instruments have been 
interpreted and implemented at a UN level. More particularly, right-wing extremism will be 
comprehended within the ambit of freedoms of expression, assembly and association and 
freedom from racial discrimination, through the prism of equality and non-discrimination. Thus, 
this chapter will start by setting out the normative framework of non-discrimination before 
continuing to look at the freedom from racial discrimination followed by the freedom of 
expression, assembly and association. It will also consider issues of sanctioning and prohibiting 
particular rhetoric and activity which overstep legitimate boundaries whilst also looking briefly 
at Article 5 of the ICCPR as another route to regulating far-right movements.  
 
1. The Principle of Non-Discrimination in UN instruments 
1.1 Introduction: The Importance of International Non-Discrimination Law 
The principle of non-discrimination, as developed by contemporary human rights law, can be 
traced back to the Charter of the United Nations which holds that the purposes of the UN are, 
amongst others, to ‘achieve international cooperation…in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion.’544 Article 13(1), therein, underlines that the UN General Assembly will assist ‘in the 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
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language or religion.’ Article 1 of the UDHR states that ‘all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.’ Article 2 of the UDHR provides that ‘everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.’ Article 7 of the UDHR constitutes the first effort to incorporate incitement to 
discrimination within the framework of discrimination, a theme which, as will be demonstrated, 
has been developed extensively and incorporated in instruments such as the ICERD  and the 
ICCPR. More particularly, Article 7 of the UDHR provides that ‘... all are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement 
to such discrimination.’ Further, the Preambles of the ICCPR and the ICESCR confirm that the 
‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’ The general non-
discrimination clauses of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, namely Article 2(2) in both documents, 
follow the same approach as Article 2 of the UDHR. The ICESCR has habitually been 
disregarded in the framework of right-wing extremism, with more emphasis being placed on the 
ICCPR, the UDHR and the ICERD. However, in an interesting reference, the monitoring body of 
the ICESCR noted that Belgium ‘should adopt measures to ensure that xenophobia, racism and 
activities of racist organizations, groups or political parties are outlawed, with a view to 
complying with the principle of non-discrimination, set forth in article 2.2.’ 545  The ICCPR 
incorporates a more specialised non-discrimination clause in the form of Article 26, therein, 
which states that ‘all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.’  
 
Both Article 2 and Article 26 of the ICCPR provide for the principle of non-discrimination but, 
as noted by the HRC in its General Comment 18, ‘Article 26 of the ICCPR does not merely 
duplicate the guarantee already provided for in Article 2 of the same document but provides in 
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itself an autonomous right.
546
 Article 26 of the ICCPR imposes certain obligations on States 
Parties when creating and implementing legislation, underlining that it must be in line with 
Article 26 of the ICCPR while Article 2 of the same provides for non-discrimination in relation 
to the enjoyment of rights as contained in the Covenant. Further, Article 26 of the ICCPR ‘is not 
limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant’ 547  as it seeks to regulate 
legislation on all matters within and beyond the ICCPR’s boundaries. For example, in Broeks v 
Netherlands, the HRC held that when ‘legislation is adopted in the exercise of a state’s sovereign 
power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant.’548 The significance 
of the principle of non-discrimination is also reflected in Article 4 of the ICCPR which deals 
with derogations in times of emergency. Paragraph 1, therein, holds that States may take certain 
measures which derogate from their obligations under this Covenant provided that, amongst 
others, they ‘do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin.’ However, the Covenant does not go as far as to make Article 26 non-
derogable. Thus, the principle of non-discrimination has been established as a central tenet of 
several international documents. General Comment 18 of the HRC underlines that ‘non 
discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any 
discrimination, constitute a basic and general principle relating to the protection of human 
rights.’549 In fact, the principles of equality and non-discrimination ‘are central to the human 
rights movement.’ 550  In relation to these terms, it has been noted that equality and non-
discrimination encompass the same theme and principle, but in a positive and negative manner 
respectively,
551
 and are, thus, sometimes used interchangeably.  
 
Notwithstanding the significance of the principle of non-discrimination, it is not defined in any 
of the above documents. The only effort to provide some kind of definition of non-discrimination 
is when it relates to a particular type, such as racial discrimination, as was discussed in chapter 
one. In order to fill this definitional gap, the HRC, by drawing from the definitions in the ICERD 
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and CEDAW, underlined that discrimination, as incorporated in the ICCPR ‘should be 
understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights 
and freedoms.’ 552  Further, through its case-law, the HRC has underlined that ‘not all 
differentiations in treatment can be deemed to be discriminatory under Article 26. A 
differentiation which is compatible with the provisions of the Covenant and is based on objective 
and reasonable grounds does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of 
Article 26.’553Even though the HRC notes that States Parties have an obligation to take the 
necessary measures to end discrimination both in the public and private spheres,
554
 there is no 
jurisprudence that relates to the aforementioned articles from that Committee or from the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in relation to right-wing extremism. Instead, 
complaints by victims of right-wing extremist movements have been dealt with by the CERD in 
the realm of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, non-discrimination as originally developed by 
the International Bill of Rights
555
, set the scene for the subsequent development of particular 
types of discrimination. Combatting right-wing extremism can be deemed to be a central 
objective of the above instruments given that international human rights law, as construed in the 
aftermath of World War II, sought to tackle the phenomenon that once brought about the 
destruction of the international community, that being radical extremism. For example, the 
drafters of the UDHR ‘made it abundantly clear that the Declaration on which they were about to 
vote had been born out of the experience of the war that had just ended.’556 As noted by the 
Lebanese delegate to the drafting process ‘the document was inspired by the opposition to 
barbarous doctrines of Nazism and Fascism.’557 These doctrines undoubtedly emanated from 
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discriminatory beliefs and practices, and so the principle of non-discrimination, as formulated by 
the international community, was a key to ensuring the objectives of the drafters. This 
mechanism was subsequently tailor-made to cater to the duties and rights arising from particular 
types of discrimination such as racial discrimination, which lie at the heart of right-wing 
extremism.  
 
2. Freedom from Racial Discrimination 
2.1 General Overview of UN Instruments 
The freedom from racial discrimination is a significant constituent of international human rights 
law, expressed in several UN documents and initiatives as one of the many grounds from which 
discrimination can emanate. It is dealt with as an entity in itself by the ICERD. This Convention 
was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965 and came into force in 1969 and is the first 
international treaty to deal directly and exclusively with the issue of racial discrimination, 
offering the most comprehensive international response to the issue yet. The ICERD and its 
monitoring body seek to eliminate racial discrimination in the public and private spheres through 
several mechanisms. The Convention includes a variety of provisions that contribute to its 
objective such as the obligation for States to create comprehensive legislation to combat this 
phenomenon,
558
 to guarantee effective protection and remedies for victims,
559
 to provide for 
education and awareness raising to combat prejudices
560
 and to punish racially discriminatory 
expression and association.
561
 In the next section, the ICERD will be discussed in more detail 
because of its importance to the issue of extremist right-wing parties and groups which habitually 
promote racial hatred and discrimination. With a view to elucidating key meanings and notions, 
jurisprudence of the ICERD’s monitoring body as well as General Recommendations and 
Concluding Observations prepared by this body will also be considered. 
 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the ICERD, it is useful to mention several other 
international sources which are relevant in relation to the prohibition of racial discrimination. 
The Charter of the United Nations, the UDHR and the International Covenants, discussed 
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previously, all stipulate that no distinction to human rights contained, therein, must be made on 
the basis of several factors, including race.
562
 In 1994, the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary 
Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance
563
 was appointed 
to focus on these issues by transmitting appeals and communications to States, undertake fact-
finding visits, publish country reports and submit annual or thematic reports to the Human Rights 
Council and interim reports to the UN General Assembly on the Rapporteur’s work.564 Several of 
the documents issued by this organ will be considered later on. Further, in 1997, the UN General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 52/11 which incorporated its decision to hold a World Conference 
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.
565
 The World 
Conference, which was held in 2001 in Durban, South Africa, was an effort to contribute to the 
struggle of eradicating all forms of racism.  The Conference resulted in the Durban Declaration 
and Programme of Action. Notwithstanding the non-binding nature of this initiative, the 
Declaration outlined a vision for the 21
st
 century where racism and racial discrimination are 
combatted effectively with the Programme of Action translating the Declaration’s objectives into 
practical recommendations. In relation to right-wing extremism, the Durban Declaration 
condemned ‘persistence and resurgence of neo-nazism, neo-fascism and violent nationalist 
ideologies based on racial or national prejudice’566 as well as racist organisations and political 
platforms.
567
 The Programme of Action requested that all States discourage racist activities and 
xenophobic tendencies that result in the rejection of migrants.
568
 It also urged States to enforce 
measures to tackle racist crime and called upon them to promote initiatives that deter and combat 
radical extremist movements which promote racism. In relation to the Durban Declaration, the 
Commission on Human Rights created the Intergovernmental Working Group to oversee the 
Declaration’s implementation.569 In 2003, the UN Secretary General appointed the Group of 
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Independent Eminent Experts,
570
 again for purposes of overseeing the implementation of the 
Durban Declaration. In relation to this institution, the UN General Assembly emphasised the role 
of these experts in ‘mobilizing the necessary political will required for the successful 
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action,’571 thereby reflecting that 
political factors as well as social and legal factors are necessary for combatting racism. Through 
the aforementioned initiatives, the international community has recognised the significance of 
dealing with this phenomenon and has taken a variety of relevant measures and established a 
number of institutions and groups in order to combat racism effectively. However, the most 
important mechanism continues to be the ICERD, which deals solely with this issue and will, 
therefore, be a central consideration of this chapter. Given that the analysis of this instrument is 
being effectuated against the backdrop of right-wing extremism, the focus will be placed on 
Article 4 of the ICERD which is central to racist expression and associations. In relation to the 
principle of non-discrimination, ‘ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred fundamentally 
deny the equality of human beings’572 and, given that racial discrimination and incitement to 
racial discrimination ‘reject the very foundation of human rights,’573Article 4 of the ICERD 
incorporates a broad understanding of the kind of acts that fall within its ambit, also allowing for 
the incitement to such racial discrimination. This article provides for the prohibition of 
propaganda and organisations promoting racial discrimination. Moreover, it underlines the 
positive duties a State has to eradicate all such ideas and acts.  Article 4 of the ICERD condemns 
propaganda and organisations endorsing racial superiority and promoting racial discrimination. 
Thus, it explicitly limits the freedom of expression and association to those disseminating ideas 
and carrying out activities relevant to this scope. It can, therefore, be said that Article 4 of the 
ICERD is the most specialised tool within the international framework that equips States with the 
duty to punish any ideas and acts of violence against persons of another colour or ethnic origin 
and prohibit any organisations which promote racial discrimination. The central issues of 
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prohibitions of speech and/or groups as well as the issue of sanctioning will be discussed later on. 
In light of the above, Article 4 of the ICERD will be assessed from three separate yet interrelated 
angles, namely non-discrimination, expression and association. In light of the interrelationship 
between Article 4(a) and 4(b) to the freedom of expression and association respectively, the two 
articles shall be appraised in the sections that deal with these two freedoms.  
 
2.2 Monitoring ICERD Obligations: The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
In order, in part, to monitor obligations of States Parties in relation to Convention provisions, 
Article 8 of the ICERD established the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) consisting of ‘eighteen experts of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality 
elected by States Parties.’ The CERD receives periodic reports from States Parties and makes 
recommendations upon them to the UN General Assembly.
574
 It may receive inter-State 
complaints
575
 which are then referred to an ad hoc Conciliation Commission
576
 with a view to 
reaching an amicable solution. The ICERD also contains an optional clause to permit 
communications from individuals or groups of individuals, within States Parties’ jurisdiction, 
claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in this 
Convention in response to which the CERD makes suggestions and recommendations to the 
State Party.
577
 Unlike the HRC, which can receive and consider communications from 
individuals only, the CERD may consider complaints from groups of individuals as well as 
individuals, as stipulated in Article 14 ICERD. Further, it is clear from the CERD’s case-law that 
communications by non-governmental organisations can also be accepted. In Zentralrat 
Deutscher Sinti und Roma et al. v Germany, the CERD clarified that such an organisation could 
present a complaint, since ‘bearing in mind the nature of the organisation’s activities and the 
groups of individuals they represent, they do satisfy the “victim” requirement within the meaning 
of Article 14(1).’578 This demonstrates that, in relation to admissibility criteria, the Committee 
was ready to interpret the spirit of Article 14 of the ICERD rather than simply its letter, by 
allowing an application from an organisation with a legitimate interest and correlation to the 
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content of the complaint.  The CERD plays a pivotal role, on an international level, in the 
regulation of right-wing extremism as it offers clarification and explanation of legal principles 
and country obligations arising from the ICERD, through its General Recommendations. An 
important example from the perspective of this study is General Recommendation 35 dealing 
with combatting racist speech. Also of importance are its Concluding Observations on particular 
States Parties as it raises points of concern or applauds measures or initiatives taken by countries 
in the more general ambit of combatting racial discrimination, often making direct statements 
vis-à-vis the regulation of right-wing extremism  Notwithstanding its non-binding nature, the 
CERD’s jurisprudence, which results from the handling of individual and group complaints 
which involve, amongst other elements, hate speech and activities, contributes to the 
improvement of relevant laws and policies if the State Party opts to adopt the recommendations 
of the Committee. The relevant documentation prepared by the CERD will be discussed 
throughout the analysis of Article 4 of the ICERD.  
 
2.3 Article 4 ICERD: General Overview 
Article 4 of the ICERD deals with the prohibition of ideas and groups that disseminate and 
promote ideas of racial superiority and hatred and carry out acts of violence against minority 
groups. In fact, Article 4 is the provision which has ‘functioned as the principal vehicle for 
combatting hate speech’579 but is also central to limiting the actions of racist associations. This 
article also notes that incitement to racial discrimination and incitement to acts of violence 
constitute a prohibited activity. More particularly, Article 4 of the ICERD provides that:  
 
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or 
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or 
which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and 
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement 
to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth 
in Article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: 
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(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or 
incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic 
origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing 
thereof; 
 
(b)  Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize 
participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; 
 
Article 4 of the ICERD is of a mandatory character
580
 and the CERD has underlined that ‘the 
prohibition of racial discrimination is a peremptory norm of international law from which no 
derogation is permitted.’581 Article 4 has been characterised as ‘the most important article in the 
Convention.’582 The CERD noted in its General Recommendation 15 on ‘Measures to Eradicate 
Incitement to or Acts of Discrimination’ that, when the ICERD was adopted, Article 4 was 
regarded as a key tool for the fight against racial discrimination.
583
 As underlined by the 
Committee, at the time of the ICERD’s adoption ‘there was a widespread fear of the revival of 
authoritarian ideologies…Since that time, the Committee has received evidence of organized 
violence based on ethnic origin and the political exploitation of ethnic difference. As a result, 
implementation of Article 4 is now of increased importance.’584 As such, Article 4 has always 
been central to any discourse on right-wing extremism.  
 
2.4 General Prohibition of Incitement to Racial Discrimination 
Article 4 of the ICERD declares punishable by law the incitement to racial discrimination and 
incitement to acts of violence and declares illegal activities which incite racial discrimination. 
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The CERD places great importance on prohibiting incitement, recognising the major potential it 
has for destruction. For example, in its Concluding Observations to Poland, it expressed concern 
that the State dismissed cases of incitement due to the alleged low impact on society
585
 and noted 
that ‘according to the Convention, all such cases are very harmful to society.’586 However, for 
incitement to racial discrimination to exist, it is necessary that there is a reasonable possibility 
that the statement could give rise to this type of discrimination.
587
 The CERD has noted that no 
conditions, such as intention or the pursuit of a particular objective such as stirring up hatred, 
need to exist for incitement to racial discrimination to be established, given that ‘article 4(a) of 
the Convention declares punishable the mere act of dissemination or incitement, without any 
conditions.’588 More particularly, the intention of the perpetrator does not need to be established 
since, as emphasised by the CERD ‘what is penalized … is the mere act of incitement, without 
reference to any intention on the part of the offender or the result of such incitement, if any.’589 
The CERD has only provided details on the aspect of intention without an extrapolation of what 
can actually constitute incitement to racial discrimination under this article. This would be useful 
for States when drafting, incorporating, amending and/or implementing the necessary legislation 
and deciding on relevant case-law.  
 
When considering the issue of incitement, the CERD often ‘recommends remedying gaps in 
legislation, preferring specific legislation on this issue.’ 590  For example, in its concluding 
observations to Israel, the CERD underlined the need to ‘expand the definition of racism so as to 
include incitement on account of ethnic origin, country of origin, and religious affiliation.’591 
Even where there exists relevant legislation, the CERD does, when necessary, provide 
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recommendations for its improvement. In its Concluding Observations to New Zealand, the 
Committee underlined its concern ‘at the absence of a comprehensive strategy to address 
incitement to racial hatred committed in cyberspace,’592 directing the State Party in this direction. 
Also, in its concluding observations to the UK, the Committee sought to broaden the scope of the 
notion of incitement to include a wide range of grounds and recommended ‘the extension of the 
crime of incitement to racial hatred to cover offences motivated by religious hatred against 
immigrant communities.’ 593  
 
2.5 State Obligations Arising from Article 4 
Article 4 of the ICERD imposes a number of specific obligations on the States Parties which are 
specifically interesting for the purposes of the current study. For example, the UN General 
Assembly has noted that, under this article, States Parties are under the obligation to adopt 
immediate and positive measures ‘to condemn all propaganda and all organizations that are 
based on ideas of racial superiority... and to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such 
discrimination.’594 It has also been reiterated that States Parties must criminalise the incitement 
to imminent violence based on religion or belief.
595
 The CERD has emphasised the significant 
character of these obligations by stating that ‘the fact that Article 4 is couched in terms of States 
Parties’ obligations, rather than inherent rights of individuals does not imply that they are matters 
to be left to the internal jurisdiction of States parties, and as such immune from review.’596 The 
CERD itself has stressed time and again that States Parties have an obligation to draft and 
implement legislation to combat racial discrimination and incitement to hatred and 
discrimination as a central part of Article 4. Furthermore, the CERD has underlined that to 
comply with the obligations of Article 4, States Parties must not only ensure the enactment of 
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appropriate legislation but also its effective implementation.
597
 As far back as its first General 
Recommendation in 1972, the Committee noted that several countries had not incorporated 
Article 4 into their national legislation, ‘the implementation of which….is obligatory under the 
Convention for all States parties.’598 Over the years, the Committee has given further instructions 
regarding this legislation. For example, in Gelle v Denmark, the Committee observed that ‘it 
does not suffice, for purposes of Article 4 of the Convention, merely to declare acts of racial 
discrimination punishable on paper. Rather, criminal laws and other legal provisions prohibiting 
racial discrimination must also be effectively implemented by the competent national tribunals 
and other State institutions. This obligation is implicit in Article 4 of the Convention.’ 599 
However, in considering remedies and redress, Article 6 of the ICERD, which more specifically 
relates to effective remedies, ‘does not impose upon States Parties the duty to institute a 
mechanism of sequential remedies, up to and including the Supreme Court level, in cases of 
alleged racial discrimination.’600 Further, in Yilmaz-Dogan v The Netherlands, the Committee 
observed that the expediency principle, which it has defined as ‘the freedom to prosecute or not 
prosecute, is governed by considerations of public policy’601  and noted that the Convention 
‘cannot be interpreted as challenging the raison d’être of that principle.’602 Nevertheless, the 
Committee noted that in light of the guarantees laid down in the Convention, the Convention 
should be respected in each case of alleged racial discrimination or incitement thereto.
603
  
 
Further, as highlighted in Gelle v Denmark, Article 4 of the ICERD imposes the obligation on 
States Parties to carry out an effective investigation into whether or not an act of racial 
discrimination has taken place, omission of which results in a breach of the said article.
604
 In 
Jama v Denmark,
605
 the Committee stipulated that States Parties must ensure that the police and 
judicial authorities conduct thorough investigations into allegations of acts of racial 
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discrimination, as referred to in Article 4 of the Convention. In L.K. v the Netherlands, the 
Committee underlined that ‘when threats of racial violence are made, and especially when they 
are made in public and by a group, it is incumbent upon the State to investigate with due 
diligence and expedition,’606 thereby highlighting that investigation needs to be speedy in order 
to be adequate. Thus, the ICERD imposes on States the obligation to incorporate sufficient 
legislation to investigate and combat racial discrimination and incitement thereto without 
dictating the nature of the remedies to be imposed.  
 
2.6 Conclusion: Prohibition of Discrimination and Racial Discrimination 
Therefore, non-discrimination is a central constituent of international human rights law, as 
initially developed by the International Bill of Rights and later incorporated in a specialised 
manner, and namely in the form of combatting racial discrimination in the ICERD. As such, 
States Parties have a duty to prevent, prohibit and punish activities that are discriminatory to 
others. Moreover, it is upon the premise of non-discrimination that limitations to expression, 
assembly and association, as discussed further down and as incorporated in the UDHR, the 
ICCPR and the ICERD, have been developed. Particularly, the exercise of these freedoms must 
not result in discrimination to others.  
 
3. Freedom of Expression   
3.1 Overview of Freedom of Expression in UN Instruments  
Freedom of opinion and expression are key components of liberal democracies as they are, in 
conjunction with each other, central vehicles that allow citizens to develop and voice their 
ideologies and belief systems in the formal and informal public domains. The importance of 
freedom of expression was underlined in Resolution 59(1) of the UN General Assembly’s first 
session, which holds that ‘freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ... the 
touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.’607  Freedom of 
expression is enshrined, in combination with the freedom of opinion, in the UDHR and the 
ICCPR. General Comment 34 of the HRC underlines that expression includes, amongst others, 
                                                          
606
 L.K. v The Netherlands, Communication no. 4/1991 (16 March 1993) A/48/18, para. 6.6 
607
 General Assembly Resolution 59(I): Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of Information (14 
December 1946) 
131 
 
political discourse,
608
 while General Comment 25
609
 emphasises the importance of freedom of 
expression for the exercise of public affairs. As well as providing protection to the freedom of 
expression which is to be limited only if certain conditions are fulfilled, international law directly 
prohibits expression in the form of dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred.  
 
The complex interrelationship between racial hatred and the freedom of expression has been 
recognised and tackled by a series of international initiatives. In 2011, the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights organised a series of expert workshops on 
incitement to national, racial or religious hatred, as reflected in international human rights law. In 
2011, the expert workshops resulted in a large amount of information regarding racial hatred as 
well as recommendations for better implementation of the relevant international human rights 
standards. The resulting document of this initiative was the so-called Rabat Plan of Action,
610
 
which incorporates the conclusions and recommendations of the final expert workshop which 
took place in 2012 in Rabat, as well as an analysis of the positions held by national legislation, 
jurisprudence and policies in the various UN states. It makes recommendations on each point and, 
therefore, constitutes a significant source when evaluating the prohibition of advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence. As will be demonstrated, the freedom of expression is provided with a high level of 
protection within the system of the UN while the same institution is careful when it comes to 
especially dangerous expression, incorporating relevant limitations and prohibitions into the 
legal framework, particularly in light of the link between the freedom of expression and racist 
speech, promulgated by extreme right-wing movements. As noted in the Rabat Plan of Action, 
the right to freedom of expression allows the open debate and criticism of religious matters and 
beliefs.
611
 A similar position is taken by the HRC, which has emphasised that the freedom of 
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expression is of paramount importance in any society, and that any restrictions to its exercise 
must meet a strict test of justification.
612
  
 
This section shall consider the development, composition and implementation of the said 
freedom in various instruments of international human rights law, taking into account the 
balancing exercise which is effectuated between potentially conflicting rights and principles as 
well as prohibitive provisions. Firstly, Article 19 of the UDHR, which established general 
notions pertaining to freedom of expression shall be considered, followed by a discussion of 
Article 19 of the ICCPR which deals with freedom of expression and legitimate limitations 
thereto and of Article 20(2) of the ICCPR, which is particularly relevant to extreme speech. This 
section will close with an analysis of Article 4(a) of the ICERD, which has been formulated to 
prohibit the dissemination of racist ideas through expression.   
 
3.2 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: General Overview 
 
Article 19 of the UDHR provides that: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom 
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
 
Article 19 of the UDHR does not expressly provide for any legitimate limitation that can be 
imposed on the freedom of expression nor does it include an express restriction of hate speech. 
This article recognises that opinions are to be held ‘with no interference,’ while no such 
qualification is made for the freedom of expression, thereby indirectly paving the way for 
restrictions of the freedom of expression formulated in later documents. Indeed, the freedom of 
expression, as provided for by the UDHR, falls under the general limitations of Articles 29 and 
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30 of the UDHR. Article 29 of the UDHR places duties on individuals towards the community 
and underlines that limitations to the exercise of rights and freedoms are to be imposed insofar as 
‘they are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order 
and the general welfare in a democratic society.’ In addition, it provides that the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Declaration ‘may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.’ Further, Article 30 of the UDHR states that ‘nothing in this 
Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in 
any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein.’ This principle was also enshrined in later provisions, such as Article 5 of the 
ICCPR and, in the case of expression of extremist groups, can be used as a yardstick for 
restriction given the potentially destructive impact of racist speech on the rights and freedoms of 
target groups.  Further, the UDHR was drafted ‘because the world community wanted to protect 
itself from Nazism, racism and fascism.’ 613 Taking into account the historical setting in which 
the UDHR was drafted as well as the importance granted to equality and non-discrimination 
throughout, it can safely be argued that this document does not afford racist speech protection as 
this type of speech is excluded as a result of the limitation clauses as well as the overall spirit of 
the UDHR. More particularly ‘the rights of equality and non-discrimination are central in the 
Universal Declaration and no rights, including speech rights, may be asserted to destroy them.’614 
As a result, from the non-destruction clause enshrined in Article 30 of the UDHR, the protection 
against incitement, as offered by Article 7 of the UHDR, and the limitation grounds, as set out by 
Article 29 therein, as well as from the historical setting of the UDHR, it can be deducted that 
hate speech and incitement to racial discrimination are not protected by this document. However, 
care must be taken when applying relevant limitations and restrictions given that, as noted by the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘defining the line that separates protected from 
unprotected speech is ultimately a decision that is best made after a thorough assessment of the 
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circumstances of each case.’615 Thus, the situation is not as simple as it may first appear given 
that certain definitions need to be clarified, always taking into account the content and context of 
the speech in question as only then may one determine if the speech is unprotected and can, 
therefore, be legitimately restricted. Moreover, what lies at the heart of this exercise is coherently 
striking the balance between the freedom of expression and the freedom from racial 
discrimination. An effort to extrapolate upon what kind of speech is unprotected was made by 
the Rabat Plan of Action which will be discussed further in the framework of Article 20(2) of the 
ICCPR.  
 
Notwithstanding the general normative framework that the Declaration sought to establish, it by 
no means provides a precise balance test to be used in applying the freedom of expression. 
Rather, the UDHR sets the scene for the more complex assessment of the actual limitations that 
can be imposed on this freedom which was subsequently provided for by the ICCPR, as 
discussed further on.  
 
3.3 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Overview 
The ICCPR was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession in 1966 and entered 
into force in 1976. Article 19 of the ICCPR provides for the freedom of opinion and expression. 
More particularly, it states that:  
 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference; 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his 
choice;  
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but 
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
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(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals. 
 
The freedom of opinion is granted an absolute status under the ICCPR with Article 19 stipulating 
that there exists the right to hold opinions without interference. However, no such provision is 
incorporated in reference to the freedom of expression which is a qualified right. General 
Comment 34 of the HRC underlines that the freedoms of opinion and expression mentioned in 
Section 1 of this provision are closely related, ‘with freedom of expression providing the vehicle 
for the exchange and development of opinions.’ 616 
 
3.4 Monitoring ICCPR Obligations: The Human Rights Committee  
Article 28 of the ICCPR establishes the HRC, which is the supervisory and enforcement body of 
the ICCPR. States Parties undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which 
give effect to the rights recognised therein. The HRC can consider inter-state complaints 
regarding violations of the rights of the ICCPR, periodic reports of the State Parties and, under 
the First Protocol to the ICCPR, the Committee can consider individual complaints or 
communications in the event of alleged violation of the rights enshrined therein. In J.R.T and the 
W.G. Party V Canada,
617
 the Committee underlined that it is only authorised to consider 
communications submitted by individuals and not associations. This is relevant in the ambit of 
racist speech as this limitation prohibits organised human rights groups or groups which promote 
the rights of particular ethnic groups from bringing complaints to the HRC.  
 
3.5 Restrictions to the Freedom of Expression under the ICCPR 
Notwithstanding the central role held by the freedom of expression in the international legal 
framework, ‘this freedom does not enjoy such a position of primacy among rights that it trumps 
equality rights.’618 Bearing this in mind, restrictions are not to be imposed lightly given that, as 
noted by General Comment 34, Article 19(2) of the ICCPR embraces ‘even expression that may 
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be regarded as deeply offensive.’ 619   In order to clarify the meaning and applicability of 
limitation clauses of the ICCPR and promote their legitimate implementation, the Siracusa 
Principles of the United Nations Economic and Social Council were construed by a group of 
experts in international law in an initiative led by a number of NGOs. Notwithstanding the non-
binding nature of these principles, they are nevertheless pertinent to any discussion relating to 
the restriction of the freedoms and rights of the ICCPR given that they constitute the only 
constructive expert effort to provide a uniform interpretation of limitation clauses of the 
aforementioned Covenant. The Principles stipulate that ‘the scope of a limitation referred to in 
the Covenant shall not be interpreted so as to jeopardize the essence of the right concerned.’620 
The restriction must be ‘provided for by law’ which means that it must be formulated with 
adequate detail so as to enable citizens to conform to it.
621
 It must be made accessible to the 
public
622
 and must not equip enforcement mechanisms with unregulated discretion to restrict 
freedom of expression.
623
 The Rabat Plan of Action underlines that restrictions to the freedom of 
expression are to be clearly defined without an overly broad scope, must respond to a pressing 
social need, must be the least intrusive measures available and be proportional to their goal.
624
 
The key process when determining whether speech should be prohibited is striking a proper 
balance between the aforementioned conflicting rights and freedoms. In relation to the ICCPR, it 
has been argued that it embraces a victim-centred approach when balancing free speech ‘against 
the listener’s right to have her inherent human dignity protected from hate speech injuries.’625 
Nevertheless, in imposing restrictions on this freedom, States must ‘not put in jeopardy the right 
itself.’626 Moreover, Article 19(3) of the ICCPR must not be interpreted as ‘license to prohibit 
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unpopular speech.’627  Thus, restricting expression is not a simple task, with an array of factors 
that must be taken into account in relation to the formulation and implementation of a restriction.  
 
3.6 Limitation Grounds of Article 19 of the ICCPR 
As already noted, Article 19 of the ICCPR is not an absolute right and, as such, can be limited 
under certain grounds. Article 19(3) of the ICCPR incorporates a three-tier test to be applied 
when limiting the named freedom, a test which the HRC has consistently applied in its views in 
individual complaints cases. Article 19(3) states that the exercise of the right of freedom of 
expression may be subject to certain restrictions that are provided by law and are necessary for 
the respect of the rights or reputations of others or for the protection of national security or of 
public order or of public health or morals. ‘Necessary,’ thereby, means that the restriction must 
be based on one of the grounds justifying limitations, responds to a pressing public or social need, 
pursues a legitimate aim and is proportionate to that aim.
628
 The potentially relevant grounds to 
be invoked when seeking to restrict freedom of expression, in the name of combatting racist 
speech and propaganda promulgated by right-wing extremist movements, are the respect for the 
rights of others, the protection of morals and the protection of public order which will be 
considered hereinafter. The burden is on the State Party to demonstrate whether a restriction 
imposed on the freedom of expression is in accordance with the Convention.
629
 The first of the 
relevant legitimate grounds for restriction, listed in Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR, is that of the 
respect for the rights of others. When dealing with racist speech and propaganda, this ground is 
the most pertinent given the impact of such activities on the rights of those who are targetted. As 
reiterated in General Comment 34, the term ‘rights,’ as construed in Article 19 (3), includes 
human rights, as recognised in the Covenant, and more generally in international human rights 
law.
630
 Thus, a victim’s right to be free from racial discrimination as a result of hate speech falls 
within the ambit of this clause. The term ‘others’ may, for example, ‘refer to individual members 
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of a community defined by its religious faith or ethnicity.’631 In Ross v Canada, the HRC noted 
that the term ‘others’ may relate to other persons or to a community as a whole.632 In this case, 
the Committee reiterated its position in Faurisson v France,
633
 in which it underlined that 
restrictions may be permitted on statements which are of a nature to enhance or heighten anti-
Semitic feelings, in order to uphold the right of Jewish communities to be protected from 
religious hatred. Moreover, as noted in the Update of the Preliminary Report prepared for the UN 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minority, ‘only the concept 
of the rights of others, the boundaries of which are fairly clearly defined, seems apt to justify the 
restrictions needed in the struggle against racism.’634 This could be because the rights of others 
can be objectively defined by turning to key international instruments and principles and because 
the ‘reference to the rights of others finds an echo in certain restrictive provisions laid down in 
the general interest by the international instruments.’635 Lastly, the Committee has drawn a direct 
correlation between racist speech and the rights and reputation of others and, particularly, the 
degree to which acts of racial discrimination and racial insults damage the injured party’s 
perception of his/her own worth and reputation.
636
 As such, the international framework offers 
important guidance in understanding and applying this particular ground, while there exists a 
functional nexus between hate speech and the rights and reputation of others, rendering this 
ground the easiest and most logical to be used when seeking to limit free speech. Secondly, 
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR states that the exercise of the freedom of expression may be subject 
to certain restrictions including the protection of public morals, which is also relevant to the 
consequences of far-right rhetoric and activity. In Ross v Canada, for example, the applicant, a 
former teacher, had been transferred to a non-teaching post as a result of his publication of books 
and leaflets which were deemed discriminatory against Jews.  Here, ‘as regards the protection of 
public morals, the State Party submit[ted] that Canadian society is multicultural and that it is 
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fundamental to the moral fabric that all Canadians are entitled to equality without discrimination 
on the basis of race, religion or nationality.’637 Nevertheless, the Committee did not confer an 
opinion on the applicability of this provision. Instead, as mentioned above, it found that 
restriction of the applicant’s expression was necessary for the protection of the rights of others. 
The disregard by the Committee of the State Party’s argument that the public morals ground was 
a legitimate reason to limit the freedom of expression in this case could have resulted from the 
abstract nature of the term ‘public morals.’ As argued by Toby Mendel in a discussion on hate 
speech, ‘public morals are not only hard to define, and change over time, but despite a number of 
cases on this, both nationally and internationally, it remains very difficult to identify what is 
being protected.’ 638  This could also be a reason why this ground is hardly ever argued to 
constitute a legitimate reason for limitation of the freedom of expression in cases more generally. 
Furthermore, in enforcing this ground there is the risk of ‘outlawing something which is merely 
not accepted by everybody.’639 Thus, in General Comment 22, the Committee observed that the 
concept of morals derives from ‘many social, philosophical and religious traditions’640 and that 
limitation as per Article 19(3) of the ICCPR ‘must be based on principles not deriving 
exclusively from a single tradition.’641 Such limitations must be interpreted in the realm of the 
universality of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination. In relation to the public 
order ground, the Siracusa Principles defined this as ‘the sum of rules which ensure the 
functioning of society or the set of fundamental principles on which society is founded.’642 
Coliver has considered this to constitute a rather problematic ground for limitation given that its 
‘boundaries … are often ill-defined and, as a result, its unclear and abstract definitional scope 
means that it can be enforced in ‘irrelevant circumstances, thus committing in reality a 
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perversion of legitimacy.’643 This could be the reason why, to date, the HRC has not enforced 
this ground as a justification for the restriction of hate speech and it is doubtful whether it will do 
so given the existence of the rights of others ground which, for reasons provided below, may be 
easier to apply. As such, this is not to say that extremist rhetoric does not damage public morals 
or public order but, instead, that these grounds are more difficult to define justly, adopt and 
support, especially in relation to the protection of the rights of others where the understanding of 
rights and the nexus between speech and victim or victims can be clearly established. Further, 
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR provides that any restrictions to the freedom of expression must be 
proportional to the legitimate aim pursued. More particularly, the HRC held that any such 
restrictions must meet the strict tests of necessity and proportionality
644
 and must not be too 
broad. 
645
 The principle of proportionality must be ‘respected not only in the law that frames the 
restrictions but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law.’646 The 
Committee underlined that the principle of proportionality is to be applied to restrictions of 
freedom of expression on three interrelated scales. Namely, any restriction must be ‘appropriate 
to achieve their protective function,’ 647and ‘must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those 
which might achieve their protective function; they must be proportionate to the interests to be 
protected.’ 648  Thus, the principle of proportionality is to be applied when considering the 
objective of the restriction, the balancing of rights at stake as well as potential limitations thereto. 
Applying the principle of proportionality to cases of freedom of expression is more difficult than 
may first appear given that it ‘entails passing a value judgement on the ideas expressed.’649 As 
noted by the HRC, in applying the principle of proportionality the competent authorities must 
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take into account the type of expression as well as what its dissemination means.
650
 For example, 
in the case of public debate concerning figures in the public and political domains, the 
significance placed on the freedom of expression is particularly high.
651
  
 
3.7 Conclusion: Freedom of Expression  
In sum, the right to freedom of expression is theoretically the most restricted right in the 
Covenant as it incorporates a qualification within itself through the reference to the ‘special 
duties and responsibilities’ that mark the exercise of this freedom.  In no other provision of the 
Covenant does the exercise of rights incorporate such a qualification. The inclusion of this 
requirement is a means to limit the negative consequences that may arise from the exercise of 
this freedom which can constitute a ‘dangerous instrument.’652  In light of the general principles 
of the UDHR, the careful formulation of Article 19 of the ICCPR and its limitation grounds, the 
HRC jurisprudence and international initiatives, such as the Rabat Plan of Action, it can be stated 
that hate speech, as such, cannot be considered responsible and, thus, legitimate speech under 
international human rights law, primarily due to the effects it has on the rights of the victims. 
The tricky task is to determine what exactly constitutes hate speech, and notwithstanding 
guidelines emanating from HRC documentation and jurisprudence as well as documents such as 
the Rabat Plan of Action, hate speech must be determined on a case by case basis.  
 
4. Article 20 of the ICCPR: 
4.1 Article 20 of the ICCPR: General Obligations on States Parties  
While Article 19(3) of the ICCPR provides for the general limitations to be imposed on the 
freedom of expression, Article 20 of the same document contains a specific prohibition on two 
types of expression. More particularly it holds that: 
 
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 
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2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
653
 
 
Whilst a brief reference will be made to the background of Article 20, the following sections will 
focus on Article 20(2) as this is of more direct relevance to the contemporary rhetoric of right-
wing extremism. Article 20 was introduced into the ICCPR upon an initiative of the Soviet 
Union.
654
 The travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR show that there was much debate as to 
whether an article prohibiting advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred should be 
incorporated in the Covenant.
655
 Concerns were expressed as to the effectiveness of legislation as 
a means of dealing with such hatred as well as to the potential abuse of this clause to the 
detriment of the freedom of expression.
656
 The final text of this article was adopted by fifty-two 
to nineteen votes, with twelve abstentions and with several States Parties making reservations 
and declarations thereto.
657
 For example, certain States held that no additional legislation needed 
to be formulated to secure the provisions of Article 20 as the requirements, therein, can be 
ensured through an interpretation of other articles in the ICCPR. For example, Belgium declared 
that ‘Article 20 as a whole shall be applied taking into account the rights to freedom of thought 
and religion, freedom of opinion and freedom of assembly and association proclaimed in Articles 
18, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed in Articles 18, 19, 
21 and 22 of the Covenant.’658 Australia interpreted ‘the rights provided for by articles 19, 21 
and 22 as consistent with article 20; accordingly…the right is reserved not to introduce any 
further legislative provision on these matters.’659 Similar approaches were followed by Malta, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and the United States of America.    
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Article 20 is different from the other articles of the ICCPR in that it does not set out a particular 
human right but instead imposes an obligation on the States to introduce limitations on the 
exercise of rights that have been dealt with in other articles, particularly those of expression and 
association. This special characteristic makes the provision rather similar in nature to Article 4 of 
the ICERD, which also mainly underlines the positive duty that States Parties have to prohibit 
practices that fall within its scope, even if these practices, as such, can be regarded as an exercise 
of fundamental rights. In implementing their duties under Article 20 of the ICCPR, States Parties 
must bear in mind their obligations under Article 19 of the ICCPR. On this point, the HRC has 
underlined that ‘Articles 19 and 20 are compatible with and complement each other. The acts 
that are addressed in Article 20 are all subject to restriction pursuant to Article 19, paragraph 
3.’660 In comparing the two articles, the Committee noted that ‘it is with regard to the specific 
forms of expression indicated in Article 20 that States Parties are obliged to have legal 
prohibitions.’661 In Ross v Canada, the Committee underlined that ‘restrictions on expression 
which may fall within the scope of Article 20 must also be permissible under Article 19, 
paragraph 3.’662 Nowak has emphasised, moreover, that Article 20 is closely interrelated to 
Article 19 but also to Articles 18 and 21.
663
 The relation between Articles 20 and 21 of the 
ICCPR is significant in the realm of right-wing extremism as this movement manifests itself in 
groups advocating hatred. However, no explanation or analysis of this interrelationship has been 
provided for by the HRC. General Comment 11 underlines that States Parties are obliged to 
adopt the necessary legislative measures prohibiting the actions referred to in Article 20 of the 
ICCPR.
664
 The General Comment stipulates that, in order to ensure an efficient and effective 
implementation of Article 20, States Parties should create legislation that renders the advocacy 
described in Article 20(2) to be against public policy and to provide for appropriate sanctions in 
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the event that this law is violated.
665
 In relation to the reference to the appropriate sanction, ‘the 
article, thus, does not require criminal penalties, at least not for less serious forms of hate 
advocacy’ 666  since the word ‘appropriate’ is used rather than ‘criminal.’ The question of 
sanctions will be discussed in more detail further down.  
 
4.2 Article 20(2) of the ICCPR: Definitions and Notions: 
A 2012 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Frank La Rue, on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression sought to expand on the issue of hate speech, 
given the continuing challenge faced in identifying ways to reconcile the need to protect the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression and to combat intolerance, discrimination and incitement 
to hatred. Notwithstanding that Special Rapporteurs do not have any legally binding powers to 
compel States to take action, they are in a position to examine and report back on a country 
situation or a specific human rights issue  Through the aforementioned report, the Special 
Rapporteur aspired to underline basic principles of international human rights law with the aim 
of identifying elements to be used in ascertaining what type of expression amounts to advocacy 
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence. Such a report can, thus, be used by the Special Rapporteur when dealing with reporting 
duties and can subsequently be used as a guide by States Parties.  
 
In an effort to elucidate the terms contained in Article 20(2) ICCPR, the 2012 Report of the 
Special Rapporteur defined advocacy as ‘explicit, intentional, public and active support and 
promotion of hatred towards the target group.’667 The Special Rapporteur underlined that Article 
20(2) covers only advocacy for hatred, which means that the hatred must amount to advocacy 
which constitutes incitement and that such incitement must lead to one of the listed consequences, 
namely discrimination, hostility or violence. The report defines ‘hatred’ as ‘a state of mind 
characterized as intense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards 
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the target group.’668 ‘Incitement’ is said to refer ‘to statements about national, racial or religious 
groups that create an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence against persons 
belonging to those groups.’669 The notion of ‘discrimination’ is also given a long and detailed 
meaning in the Special Rapporteur’s report, it being understood as ‘any distinction, exclusion or 
restriction made on the basis of race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, nationality, 
gender, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, age, economic position, 
property, marital status, disability, or any other status that has the effect or purpose of impairing 
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field of 
public life. As well as terms such as race and national or ethnic origin, which often feature in 
international documents within this arena, the definition offered incorporates grounds such as 
age, financial position, property and more. Further, ‘hostility’ is considered to be a 
‘manifestation of hatred beyond a mere state of mind,’670 but the report recognises that this 
theme has received little attention in relevant case-law and needs to be considered further.
671
 
Lastly, ‘violence’ is defined as the use of physical force or power against another person, or 
against a group or community, which either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, 
injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation. This definition goes beyond 
the physical effects of violence, also recognising its psychosocial effects.  It is adapted from the 
definition of violence given in the 2002 World Report on Violence and Health of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) which covers a broad range of outcomes including psychological 
harm, deprivation and maldevelopment.
672
 As is noted in the WHO report, ‘many forms of 
violence against women, children and the elderly, for instance, can result in physical, 
psychological and social problems that do not necessarily lead to injury, disability or death.’673 
By incorporating the above definition, the WHO, and subsequently the Special Rapporteur on the 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression recognised the fact that violence does not necessarily need 
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to result in injury or death but, nevertheless, may result in a burden on the different actors and 
individuals involved. This is of particular importance given that, defining outcomes solely in 
terms of injury or death ‘limits the understanding of the full impact of violence on individuals, 
communities and society at large.’674 
 
Thus, the aforementioned report offers more clarity on terms which are central to Article 20 of 
the ICCPR. However, problems still remain as to their exact meaning, predominantly because of 
a lack of clarity as to thresholds. For example, what is the threshold for the given emotions to be 
deemed ‘intense and irrational’? What is the threshold that has to be met to ensure imminence, 
and what is to be considered as risk? The report offers no explanation thereto. 
 
4.3 Article 20: The Threshold Test 
In order for Article 20(2) of the ICCPR to be applicable, a certain threshold must be reached. 
This can be discerned from the formulation of this provision given that it can only be enforced 
when the hatred concerned does, in fact, amount to incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence. Further, a direct correlation between the violence and the target group needs to be 
ascertained, with due care taken so that ‘neither random nor orchestrated acts of violence, which 
bear no reasonable relationship to the expression concerned, are taken on board to sway the 
decision. The Rabat Plan of Action states that there must be a high threshold when applying 
Article 20 of the ICCPR.
675
 Further, as noted in the 2012 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ‘the threshold of 
the types of expression that would fall under the provisions of Article 20 (2) should be high and 
solid.’ 676 This is also confirmed by the fact that Article 20 contains two parts, one which deals 
with the prohibition of war and the other which deals with the prohibition of advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred. By placing these two constituents under one roof it can be 
deducted that the severity of hatred which it seeks to address in the latter part is of a particularly 
severe nature. In determining whether particular speech reaches the necessary threshold, the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
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Expression followed the seven-part test proposed by the NGO Article 19, underlining that States 
must take into account the ‘severity, intent, content, extent, likelihood or probability of harm 
occurring as well as the imminence and context of the speech in question.’677 The Rabat Plan of 
Action holds that to assess the severity of the hatred and, therefore, determine whether the high 
threshold is met, the possible issues to be considered are ‘the cruelty of what is said or of the 
harm advocated and the frequency, amount and extent of the communications.’ 678 
The reason for this high threshold is that, as already noted, as a matter of principle, limitations of 
speech must remain an exception to the rule. In order to determine this threshold, the Rabat Plan 
of Action clarifies that Article 20 of the ICCPR needs to be read in conjunction with the freedom 
of expression as protected by Article 19 of the ICCPR.
679
 The interrelationship between Article 
19 and Article 20, more generally, was also considered during the drafting process of the ICCPR. 
In General Comment 11, the HRC has likewise addressed this issue, holding that the ‘required 
prohibitions of Article 20 are fully compatible with the rights of freedom of expression, as 
contained in Article 19, the exercise of which carries with it special duties and responsibilities. 
General Comment 34 holds that ‘Article 19 and 20 are compatible with and complement each 
other.’680  The HRC further held that Article 20 is subject to restrictions set out in Article 
19(3),
681
 which means that a limitation justifiable under Article 20 must also comply with Article 
19(3). Indeed, the three principles applied when restricting rights and freedoms, namely legality, 
proportionality and necessity, must also apply to Article 20 cases. 
 
4.4 Article 20(2): Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee 
The HRC has dealt with three separate communications which are directly connected to Article 
20(2) of the ICCPR and has adopted differing stances. In J.R.T and the W.G. Party v Canada, the 
applicant argued that his Article 19 rights had been violated given that the State Party had cut off 
the telephone services of tape recorded messages warning callers of international Jewry and its 
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destructive effects. Here, as well as finding no case of a breach of Article 19 of the ICCPR, given 
the anti-Semitic and thus racially discriminatory nature of the messages which the applicant 
sought to disseminate, the messages  ‘clearly constitute the advocacy of racial or religious hatred 
which Canada has an obligation under article 20 (2) of the Covenant to prohibit.’ 682 
Notwithstanding the suitability of this observation given the nature of the messages in question, 
the Committee reached this conclusion, however, without offering any interpretative explanation 
of the general meaning of the terms and concepts contained in Article 20(2) and without 
clarifying the threshold for hatred. Twenty years on, the HRC was again hesitant in voicing its 
opinion regarding the interpretation and implementation of Article 20(2) of the ICCPR, this time 
in a case where the first and second authors directly alleged a breach of Article 20(2) of the 
Convention. More particularly, in Vassilari, Maria et al. v Greece, the Committee dealt with 
alleged discrimination against Roma. A letter had been sent to the University of Patras entitled 
‘Objection against the Gypsies: Residents gathered signatures for their removal.’ The first and 
second authors filed a criminal complaint against the local associations under the Anti-Racism 
Law. The first and second applicants contended that the Patras Court failed to appreciate the 
racist nature of the impugned letter and effectively to implement the Anti-Racism Law aimed at 
prohibiting dissemination of racist speech. Upon examination of the case, the HRC considered 
that the authors insufficiently substantiated the facts of their case for the purpose of admissibility 
of their complaint under Article 20(2), making this part of the communication inadmissible.
683
 
As a result, the HRC could not arrive at any substantive conclusions as to the application and 
meaning of Article 20(2). In his dissenting individual opinion in this case, Mr. Abdelfattah Amor 
complained that the Committee had not yet provided an opinion on the applicability of Article 20 
(2) when dealing with individual communications.
684
 Mr. Amor continued to state that the 
Committee’s approach to this article was ‘neither logical nor legally sound’685 which he argued 
had resulted in the uncertainty of Article 20’s scope.  In the case of Mohamed Rabbae, A.B.S and 
N.A v The Netherlands, the authors claimed to be victims of, inter alia, a violation of their rights 
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under Article 20(2) as a result of statements made by Geert Wilders, Leader of the Dutch 
Freedom Party and, particularly that Wilders’ acquittal by the domestic court was in 
contravention with Article 20. This was the first time that the HRC gave a relatively extensive 
analysis of Article 20(2). More particularly, it held that this article secures the right of persons to 
be free from hatred and discrimination but holds that it is ‘crafted narrowly’ so as to ensure a 
protection of free speech. It recalled that free speech may incorporate ‘deeply offensive’ speech 
and speech which is disrespectful for a religion, except if the strict threshold of Article 20(2) is 
met. 
686
 The Committee recognised that the Netherlands had established a legislative framework 
so as to meet the obligations imposed by Article 20(2) and underlined that this allowed victims to 
trigger and participate in a prosecution, one which was ensured in the case in question. In this 
light, and given the existence, suitability and triggering of the framework of the Wilders’ case, 
the Committee found that the State Party has taken the ‘necessary and proportionate measures in 
order to “prohibit” statements made in violation of article 20(2)’ 687and thus found no violation.  
 
As noted by the NGO Article 19, ‘the wording of article 20 of the ICCPR is rarely, if ever, found 
enshrined in domestic legislation’688 while there exists a ‘lack of reference to Article 20 of the 
ICCPR by state authorities’ 689 and a potential ‘ignorance of these provisions.’690 Before 2016, 
the HRC had not been particularly helpful in elucidating the obligations of States Parties as these 
arise from Article 20(2) which could potentially limit the effectiveness of its implementation 
within the national systems of States Parties. However, in the case against Wilders, it essentially 
found that what States Parties had to demonstrate was that they established a functional and 
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relevant legal framework for the incorporation of Article 20(2) into national law. This obligation 
does not, however, come with an obligation to convict. 
691
 
 
4.5 Conclusion: Article 20(2) ICCPR 
In sum, Article 20(2) of the ICCPR is undoubtedly a significant article in the realm of right-wing 
extremism, imposing positive obligations on States to prohibit advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence. In doing so, it sets a 
high threshold so as to encompass activities which should fall within its ambit not affecting those 
which are simply unpleasant for the State or society. Yet again, definitional issues constitute a 
difficulty as regards the applicability of this Article, a problem which the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression sought to 
rectify through the clarification of key terms. Nevertheless, given the reservations imposed by 
some States, the lack of jurisprudence brought to the HRC on this article and the decision of the 
Committee to find inadmissible the one case that was brought on such grounds, this article 
remains under-developed, with relevant speech and activities being dealt with through the 
reservation clauses of the freedom of expression and the freedom of association.  
 
5. Article 4(a): Regulating Hate Speech through the ICERD 
5.1 Article 4(a): Introductory Points  
Article 4(a) of the ICERD deals with racially discriminatory expression. Since several general 
elements of Article 4 were considered previously, this part will focus only on the particular role 
political parties exercise in the framework of expression as well as in the long-standing debate on 
the due regard clause, as incorporated in the introductory section of Article 4 and as applicable to 
Articles 4(a) and (b). Issues of sanctions and punishment will be assessed later on. Article 4 
acknowledges the role played, or potentially played, by the freedom of expression as a tool that 
could be used to promote racial hatred and racial discrimination and, therefore, obliges States to 
‘declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or 
hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such 
acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the 
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provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof.’ The exact content 
of this article will be considered below.  
 
5.2 Article 4(a): Political Parties and Racist Expression    
The Committee has underlined the significant obligations held by politicians and political parties 
in relation to their expression and their obligation to refrain from Article 4(a) activities. For 
example, in Jama v Denmark, the CERD held that States Parties must draw the attention of 
politicians and members of political parties to the particular duties and responsibilities incumbent 
upon them pursuant to Article 4 of the Convention with regard to their speech and expression.
692
 
In a Concluding Observation to Denmark, the CERD held that ‘political parties are encouraged 
to take steps to promote solidarity, tolerance, respect and equality by developing voluntary codes 
of conduct so that their members refrain from public statements and actions that encourage or 
incite racial discrimination.’693 Moreover, the CERD broadly noted that ‘persons holding or 
carrying out functions in the public or political spheres should not be permitted to contribute to 
expressions of racism and xenophobia’694 thereby drastically interfering with the freedom of 
expression of public figures.  
 
5.3 Article 4(a): Compatibility with the Freedoms of Expression and Association 
One of the central issues, both in relation to academic commentary on Article 4(a) of the ICERD 
and its legal formulation, is the extent to which it is compatible with the freedom of expression. 
When considering this issue, one must take into consideration the ‘due regard’ clause as 
incorporated in Article 4. However, since this is applicable both to the freedom of expression and 
the freedom of association, it will be considered in section 9.8, following the appraisal of Article 
4 (b) and the freedom of association.   
 
The position of the CERD in relation to the compatibility of Article 4(a) and the freedom of 
expression is clear. In its 2001 Concluding Observations on the USA,  the CERD stated that ‘the 
prohibition of dissemination of all ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred is compatible 
with the right to freedom of opinion and expression, given that a citizen’s exercise of this right 
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carries special duties and responsibilities, among which is the obligation not to disseminate racist 
ideas.’ 695The Committee characterised as ‘the extreme position’696 the view that implementation 
of Article 4 might impair or jeopardise freedom of opinion and expression. In indicating that a 
balance must be struck between the obligations under Article 4 and the freedoms of expression 
and association, it noted that those freedoms are not absolute and that ‘liberty is not licence.’697 
Thus, in relation to the balancing exercise between freedom from racial discrimination, on the 
one hand, and freedom of expression on the other, the CERD has underlined that a balance 
between the two is the most suitable way forward but, in order to tilt the scale, it has reiterated 
the lower status of hate speech in relation to other types of speech which are granted more 
protection. Moreover as Mahalic and Mahalic note, the format of Article 4, which focuses 
primarily on protecting persons from racial discrimination, implies that ‘in case of conflict the 
balance between competing freedoms should be struck in favour of persons’ right to freedom 
from racial discrimination.’ 698  This also seems to be the route adopted by the CERD. For 
example, in its General Recommendation 15, the CERD noted that ‘the prohibition of the 
dissemination of all ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred is compatible with the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression.’ 699 Kean considers this General Recommendation to be a 
strict call for protection from racist expression and notes the disregard, therein of the due regard 
clause and the resulting obligations. 
700
 
 
When considering the balance test between the rights and duties in question and the resulting 
reservations that have been imposed by States Parties to the Article under consideration, an 
interesting point to consider is the legal status of reservations in international law. Thornberry 
pertinently questions whether the issue of reservations to Article 4 on the grounds of expression 
and/or association and assembly raises the question as to ‘whether the prohibition of hate speech 
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as expressed in ICERD is simply a rule of treaty law or represents customary international law 
on the basis of its intrinsic relationship to the norm of non-discrimination.’701 Discussing this 
issue, Thornberry refers to the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 
Nahimana et al., where the trial chamber found that ‘hate speech that expresses ethnic and other 
forms of discrimination violates the norm of customary international law prohibiting 
discrimination.’702 Finding that it falls within the framework of international customary law 
would undoubtedly have consequences as to the hierarchal significance of this article but also to 
the legitimacy of reservations imposed. However, the CERD has made no such reference. 
Nevertheless, when making a parallel with the ICTR case, the genocidal context and the heinous 
consequences of the hate speech in question must be borne in mind.  
 
6. Sanctioning Bad Expression: Limitations and Regulations 
As well as positively providing for freedom of expression and stipulating the grounds on which 
this freedom can be restricted, Article 20(2) of the ICCPR and Article 4 of the ICERD request 
that certain types of expression are punishable by law. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR stipulates that 
‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’, while Article 4(a) of the ICERD declares ‘an 
offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to racial discrimination…’ A notable difference between these two provisions is that 
the ICCPR states that speech and activities falling within the framework of Article 20(2) should 
be prohibited by law, but makes no reference to whether such activities or the perpetrators should 
be punished, whereas Article 4(a) of the ICERD clearly underlines that the activities described, 
therein, constitute an offence punishable by law. General Comment 11 of the HRC fills the 
‘sanction gap’ in Article 20 by noting that, for this article to be effective, there needs to be a law 
stipulating that propaganda and advocacy are against public policy which provides for a sanction 
in the event of a violation of the provisions therein.
703
 Thus, this section emanates from the 
premise that Article 20(2) also requires the sanctioning of activities falling within its framework. 
The type of sanction which is appropriate for extremist expression is an intricately complex 
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question.
704
 This is particularly true as neither Article 20 nor Article 4 stipulate precisely how 
these articles should be prohibited or punished. Several initiatives and documents have tried to 
elucidate how hate speech should be prohibited and/or punished, with varying positions 
emerging when dealing with the two articles. In fact, the HRC has emphasised the need to punish 
acts falling within the framework of Article 20(2) but grants the States discretion in choosing the 
type of punishment. More particularly, in its Concluding Observations to Egypt, the Committee 
held that ‘the State Party must take whatever action is necessary to punish such acts by ensuring 
respect for article 20(2).’ 705 
 
Firstly, in relation to Article 20(2), the Special Rapporteur noted that ‘there is no requirement to 
criminalize such expression’706 and, more particularly, ‘only serious and extreme instances of 
incitement to hatred, which would cross the seven-part threshold, should be criminalized.’707 The 
seven-part threshold was adopted by the Special Rapporteur in his 2012 report and has been 
further discussed in the above section related to the threshold discussion on Article 20. In less 
serious cases the Special Rapporteur is of the view that States should adopt civil laws, 
underlining that there are instances where neither criminal nor civil sanctions are justifiable. 
Thus, ‘laws to combat hate speech must be carefully construed and applied by the judiciary not 
to excessively curtail legitimate types of expression.’708 The report underlines that when hate is 
expressed by politicians and public authorities, additional sanctions should be imposed, 
including those of a disciplinary nature.
709
 The Rabat Plan of Action underlined that ‘criminal 
sanctions related to unlawful forms of expression should be seen as last resort measures’710 and 
that other types of action, such as civil and administrative sanctions and remedies, pecuniary and 
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non-pecuniary damages as well as the right of correction and the right of reply must also be 
taken into account.  
 
The Rabat Plan of Action recommended that, in order to clarify the situation of punishment and 
as a matter of general principle, without regard to a particular article, a distinction should be 
made between three types of expression, namely expression that constitutes a criminal offence, 
expression that is not criminally punishable but may justify other types of sanctions and 
expression that does not give rise to any such sanctions but is still problematic in terms of the 
respect for the rights of others.
711
 However, no explanation is made as to which types of 
expression fall within each section, but this, nevertheless, serves as a guideline for States seeking 
to regulate the sanctioning process of hate speech.  
 
In relation to Article 4(a) of the ICERD, the sanctioning of prohibited activities falling within its 
framework constituted an intricate issue from the time of its drafting. For example, the 
Colombian delegate at the Conference which adopted the 1965 ICERD stated, for instance, that 
‘punishing ideas, whatever they may be, is to aid and abet tyranny, and leads to the abuse of 
power...As far as we are concerned and as far as democracy is concerned, ideas should be fought 
with ideas and reasons; theories must be refuted by arguments and not by the scaffold, prison, 
exile, confiscation or fines.’712 The Colombian approach was not adopted but neither was a 
solely criminal approach to Article 4 offences. Article 4 underlines that any punishment must be 
granted ‘with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention.’ There has been a fair 
amount of discourse in relation to whether hate speech and incitement to racial discrimination 
should fall within the ambit of criminal law, or whether it would be more suitable to tackle such 
phenomena through the a civil law framework. This discourse has primarily come about due to 
the fact that the nature of the punishment is not explicitly stated in the Convention itself or by the 
CERD.  
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In addition to the fact that there is no clear route demonstrated by the CERD on this issue, the 
Committee has also given mixed signals as to the nature of punishment. Mahalic and Mahalic 
argue that ‘most Committee members have interpreted the phrase offense punishable by law to 
mean the imposition of criminal liability.’713 This, for example can be demonstrated by the 
CERD requesting States Parties to inform it of what special criminal legislation was designed for 
purposes of the implementation of Article 4.
714
 It has also referred to the criminal nature of 
sanctions in other documents, including its Concluding Observations to Belgium in which it 
stated that ‘adjustments should be made to the Constitution and the laws to permit more effective 
criminal prosecution of racist, nugatory or discriminatory writings.’715 Further, in relation to 
incitement, the CERD noted that ‘the severe punishment of persons found guilty of incitement to 
racial hatred has no doubt contributed to the improvements in the State Party.’716 When talking 
of racism more generally and, thus, also racist expression, the CERD noted that ‘States parties 
should fully comply with the requirements of Article 4 of the Convention and criminalize all acts 
of racism.’ 717 However, the CERD does not take an absolutist approach in relation to the nature 
of the prohibition. In Yilmaz-Dogan v The Netherlands, the Committee gave an insight on the 
leeway States Parties have in satisfying the objectives regarding the punishment of activities and 
speech that fall within the scope of Article 4. More particularly, its argumentation was based on 
the premise that Article 4 does not necessarily require criminal punishment by holding that ‘the 
freedom to prosecute criminal offences…is governed by considerations of public policy…in the 
light of the guarantees laid down in the Convention.’718 Also, in a case against Germany, the 
Committee acknowledged that the fact that the author who drafted a discriminatory letter against 
the Roma had been suspended from his employment in the police force meant that the letter 
‘carried consequences for its author, as disciplinary measures were taken against him.’719 This 
statement reflects that the Committee considered non-criminal measures to be sufficient for the 
punishment of perpetrators.  
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In relation to Article 20(2) of the ICCPR, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law, although 
only incitement which is of a particularly serious nature should, according to the Special 
Rapporteur and the Rabat Plan of Action, merit criminal punishment. The sanctioning process in 
the framework of Article 4 of the ICERD places more emphasis on the criminal nature of such 
sanctions, while also accepting other types of punishment. Moreover, the CERD has clearly 
stated that ‘it is not the Committee’s task to decide in abstract whether or not national legislation 
is compatible with the Convention but to consider whether there has been a violation in the 
particular case.’720 Thus, the guidelines as to the nature of prohibitions and punishments to be 
imposed for hate speech have been contradictory at times. This is particularly so in relation to the 
different approach taken vis-à-vis Article 20(2) and Article 4(a) which, in essence, pursue very 
similar objectives.   
 
7. Conclusion: Regulating, Prohibiting and Sanctioning Radical Rhetoric 
In conclusion, the freedom of expression is a significant right protected by a range of documents 
with hate speech being prohibited explicitly by international conventions. Although a number of 
countries expressed reservations when ratifying these documents, ‘ultimately, international 
conventions both reflect and reinforce a broad consensus that it is acceptable to constrain free 
speech in order to limit racist expression.’721 This may be ensured by limiting the freedom of 
expression of extremist groups through Article 19 of the ICCPR when the need arises and when 
limitation grounds are applicable. In addition, Article 20(2) of the ICCPR and Article 4(a) of the 
ICERD positively oblige States to prohibit hate speech. The key problems to the applicability 
and enforcement of the above articles relate to issues of definition and the type of sanction that 
should be applied as well as the reluctance by States to prohibit expression, as will be discussed 
in more detail further down. Nevertheless, what is clear is that, with a view to combatting hate 
speech through international norms, the aforementioned articles should be read in light of each 
other and in light of the broader spirit of international human rights law.  
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8. Freedom of Assembly and Association 
8.1 Overview of Freedom of Association and Assembly in UN Instruments 
As well as the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are key 
vehicles in ensuring that individuals and groups may promote their political and social belief 
systems and ideologies. Freedom of assembly and association are interrelated and are also 
interconnected with the freedom of expression.
722
 ‘All these rights allow individuals to come 
together and promote their ideas and interests’.723 General Comment 25 of the HRC states that 
citizens’ participation in public affairs and debate is facilitated by ensuring freedom of 
expression, assembly and association.
724
  
 
On a UN level, the freedoms of assembly and association are protected by the UDHR and the 
ICCPR. These freedoms are not absolute and, as the limitation clauses incorporated in the 
ICCPR provision show, and, as highlighted by UN Resolution 15/21 on the rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and of association adopted by the Human Rights Council which mandated the 
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, these 
freedoms ‘can be subject to certain restrictions, which are prescribed by law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.’ 725  Further, Article 4(b) of the ICERD recognises that the freedom of 
association can be abused by groups promoting racial discrimination and positively requests 
States to prohibit such organisations. Thus, as with the freedom of expression, the international 
framework protects the freedom of association and assembly from State interference. At the 
same time, there are some limitations which can be imposed for certain types of speech and also 
incorporate a State obligation to prohibit particular types of groups which associate for the 
purpose of promoting and inciting racial discrimination.  
 
                                                          
722
 Jeremy McBride ‘Freedom of Association’ in  Rhona Smith & Christien van den Anker ‘The Essentials of Human 
Rights’  (eds. Routledge 2005) 18 
723
 Jeremy McBride ‘Freedom of Association’ in  Rhona Smith & Christien van den Anker ‘The Essentials of Human 
Rights’  (eds. Routledge 2005) 18 
724
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25 ‘General Comments under Article 40, para. 4, of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (1996) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, para.1 
725
 Human Rights Council Resolution 15/21: Mandate of the UNSR 
159 
 
The freedom of assembly and of association are key themes in any discussion of right-wing 
extremism, given that such movements associate as political parties as well as unregistered 
groups and non-group movements in order to promote their mission and vision. Further, the 
freedom of assembly, in the form of demonstrations and rallies, is also a characteristic of such 
movements. Thus, the next section will firstly consider Article 20 of the UDHR which deals with 
assembly and association together, and then it will appraise the freedom of assembly as protected 
by the ICCPR, following which it will provide an overview of the meaning of association under 
international law and consider the grounds on which association can be legitimately restricted. 
Also, given the direct correlation between right-wing extremism and racial discrimination, the 
next section shall look at the ICERD and the obligation it imposes on States to prohibit 
organisations from promoting racial discrimination. The overarching aims of this section are to 
comprehend what tools international law grants States to respond to the assembly and association 
of right-wing extremist groups and what types of assemblies and associations fall within the net 
of prohibition. Namely, for purposes of restriction, is it sufficient for these groups and/or their 
assemblies to promote anti-democratic values or must such promotion go hand in hand with (an 
actual threat of) violence?  
 
8.2 Freedom of Assembly and Association under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Article 20 of the UDHR states that: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.  
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
 
The UDHR incorporates the freedoms of assembly and association in one article, Article 20. As 
in the case of the freedom of expression protected by Article 19 of the UDHR, Article 20 offers 
no limitation to the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. The freedom of 
assembly and association, as provided for by this document, fall under the general limitation 
clauses of Articles 29 and 30, as in the case of expression. Furthermore, limitations to the 
freedom of assembly and association, in particular, must be considered in light of the historical 
setting of the UDHR with the document being ‘born out of the experience of the war that had just 
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ended’726 as explained at the start of this chapter.  Thus, it can be argued that the Declaration, 
does not afford protection to racist associations or racist assemblies of such association taking 
into account the atrocities that occurred in the name of National Socialism, which triggered the 
development of the international human rights framework under discussion. The argument in 
favour of such a position is reinforced by the existence of the principles of equality and non-
discrimination as protected throughout the Declaration as well as the general limitation clauses. 
In addition, as discussed previously, Article 7 of the UDHR protects individuals against 
incitement to discrimination. Racist organisations are a central vehicle through which incitement 
to discrimination can be promoted. Thus, it is clear that the UDHR demands that a balance be 
struck, once again, between the right to freedom of assembly and association on the one hand 
and the prohibition of discrimination on the other hand. 
 
Just as for non-discrimination and freedom of expression, the Declaration has paved the 
normative path for the subsequent limitations, qualifications and restrictions as provided for by 
the ICCPR and incorporated them in the clauses pertaining to assembly and association. 
Furthermore, the ICERD has taken a more specified leap towards combatting racial 
discrimination through tackling associations which promote it. So, to provide an all-
encompassing understanding of the freedom in question in the realm of right-wing extremism, 
the next part will consider that it is protected by the ICCPR, followed by an analysis of the 
prohibition of particular groups under the ICERD.  
 
8.3 Freedom of Assembly under the ICCPR  
In the ICCPR, the freedoms of assembly and association are dealt with in separate, yet 
neighbouring articles.  
 
Article 21 of the ICCPR holds that: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the 
exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
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public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.  
 
The Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association has 
defined assembly as ‘an intentional and temporary gathering in a private or public space for a 
specific purpose.’727  He also stressed that assemblies play a central role in ‘mobilizing the 
population and formulating grievances and aspirations, facilitating the celebration of events and, 
importantly, influencing States public policy.’728 In his 2012 report, the Special Rapporteur, 
therefore, underlined the positive duty States have actively to protect the right to assembly and to 
enable the exercising of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Nevertheless, he thereby 
emphasised that ‘international human rights law only protects assemblies that are peaceful, i.e. 
those that are not violent, and where participants have peaceful intentions, which should be 
presumed.’729 This is notwithstanding the fact that sporadic acts of violence by others must not 
prevent individuals from exercising this right. 
730
 Thus, protection is provided to assemblies 
which are physically non-violent but also thematically peaceful. The Special Rapporteur noted 
that States must refrain from interfering with the right to peaceful assembly and that the best 
practice is ‘laws governing freedom of assembly [that] both avoid blanket time and location 
prohibitions and provide for the possibility of other less intrusive restrictions.’731 Once again, 
prohibition is to be considered ‘a measure of last resort…when a less restrictive response would 
not achieve the legitimate aim(s).’732 Here, the question is whether assemblies of extreme right-
wing groups which promote ideologies contrary to democratic values and, thus, create an 
environment conducive to discrimination contravene the ‘peaceful intentions’ condition. Taking 
the general stance of the UN towards speech and activities promoting racial discrimination and 
hate in the framework of non-discrimination and expression, and broadly interpreting the 
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aforementioned requirement of peaceful intentions to incorporate the general notion of peace and 
democracy rather than just physical peace, it can be argued that any far- right assemblies are not 
protected by this freedom.  Even though, at this point, this conclusion is based on generalised 
interpretations given the lack of further explanation by relevant bodies, the argument is 
particularly supported when considered in conjunction with Article 4 of the ICERD along this 
framework, which prohibits the promotion and incitement of racial discrimination, thereby, 
demonstrating the UN’s intolerance towards such phenomena.   
 
8.4 Freedom of Association under the ICCPR: General Overview 
Article 22, ICCPR stipulates that: 
 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right 
to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
 
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall 
not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of 
the police in their exercise of this right. 
 
The freedom of association is a far-reaching one, encompassing a variety of activities and 
processes of an association. In Communication No.1274/2004, the HRC observed that ‘the right 
to freedom of association relates not only to the right to form an association, but also guarantees 
the right of such an association freely to carry out its statutory activities. The protection afforded 
by Article 22 extends to all activities of an association […]’ 733  As noted in Kungurov v 
Uzbekistan, this ‘guarantees the right of such an association freely to carry out its statutory 
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activities’734 and, as such, ‘the denial of state registration of an association must satisfy the 
requirements of paragraph 2…’735 
 
8.5 What is an Association under International Law?  
The UN has defined an association as ‘any groups of individuals or any legal entities brought 
together in order to collectively act, express, promote, pursue or defend a field of common 
interests.’736 This definition extends ‘inter alia to civil society organizations, clubs, cooperatives, 
NGOs, religious associations, political parties, trade unions, foundations or even online 
associations such as the Internet which have been instrumental, for instance, in facilitating active 
citizen participation in building democratic societies’. 737  All such entities have the right to 
associate and this right applies for the entire life span of the association.
738
 The Special 
Rapporteur has underlined that the right to freedom of association equally protects associations 
that are not registered.
739
 Further, political parties are defined as ‘a free association of persons, 
one of the aims of which is to participate in the management of public affairs, including through 
the presentation of candidates to free and democratic elections.’ 740  Moreover, the Special 
Rapporteur notes that the central differences between political parties and other associations is 
that the former can be part of elections and subsequently form governments.
741
 Right-wing 
extremist groups can take the form of registered political parties and, thereby, as a result of this 
status, enjoy particular protection under this framework. The position of the Special Rapporteur 
on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association is that, notwithstanding the 
important role played by political parties in a society, parties which adopt an extremist ideology 
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often strike at democracy itself and, as a result, cannot enjoy the protection habitually afforded 
by the freedom of association.
742
 Right-wing extremist groups can also take the form of 
unregistered subgroups which are looser in their structure. In addition to political parties, the 
CERD has recognised the existence of ‘non-political groups and associations which disseminate 
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred.’743 Based on the above definitions, they too fall 
within the framework of an association since they seek to promote a common interest since 
international law does not require that they are registered or structured in a particular manner. 
The fact that a particular reference to such subgroups is not made in the above definition does 
not exclude them from the framework as it stipulates that the definition extends ‘inter alia’ to the 
types referred to.  
 
8.6 Limiting the Freedom of Association under the ICCPR 
The freedom of association, as enshrined in the ICCPR, is an important but not absolute human 
right as it can be limited for certain reasons and in certain circumstances which remind us of 
those in which the freedom of assembly and the freedom of expression can be limited. Article 
22(2) of the ICCPR holds that such restrictions can be imposed on this right if they are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security 
or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of rights and freedoms. The HRC has tried to clarify the interpretation of the freedom 
of association under the ICCPR. In Zvozskov v Belarus, the HRC underlined that the reference to 
democratic society, in the context of Article 22, indicates that the functioning of association 
including those ‘which peacefully promote ideas not necessarily favourably viewed by the 
government or the majority of the population, is a cornerstone of a democratic society.’744 In 
Belyatsky et al. v Belarus, the Committee noted that ‘the mere existence of reasonable and 
objective justification for limiting the right to freedom of association is not sufficient. The State 
Party must further demonstrate that the prohibition of an association is necessary to avert a real 
and not only hypothetic danger to national security or democratic order.’745 General Comment 31 
of the HRC on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the 
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Covenant holds that ‘where such restrictions are made, States must demonstrate their necessity 
and only take such measures as are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’746 In addition, 
the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association notes 
that any restriction should be ‘strictly proportional to the legitimate aim pursued and used only 
when softer measures would be insufficient.’747 The Special Rapporteur underlined that ‘the 
suspension and the involuntary dissolution of an association are the severest types of restrictions 
on freedom of association’748 and that such practices should only be permissible where there is a 
‘clear and imminent danger resulting in a flagrant violation of national law, in compliance with 
international human rights law.’749 In relation to limitations, he stressed that ‘freedom is to be 
considered the rule and its restriction the exception.’ 750   In Belyatsky et al. v Belarus, the 
Committee held that the State Party must prove that ‘less intrusive measures would be 
insufficient to achieve the same purpose.’751 It is, thus, clear that the dissolution of an association 
should be a measure of last resort, imposed only when the limitation grounds, as incorporated 
into this article, are applicable, always taking into consideration the principle of proportionality 
and ensuring that the limitations are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society.   
 
In relation to the limitation of the freedom of association of political parties in the form of their 
prohibition, the Special Rapporteur noted that these entities can choose and promote ideas that 
are unpopular with authorities and the public more generally as this permits pluralism.
752
 
However, in the event that a political party or any of its candidates ‘uses violence or advocates 
for violence or national, racial or religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence … or when it carries out activities or acts aimed at the destruction of the 
rights and freedoms enshrined in international human rights law…can it be lawfully 
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prohibited.’753 The word ‘can’ is interestingly placed here, as this means that States may opt to 
prohibit them but are not under an obligation to do so. This does not bode well with the 
obligations arising from Article 4(b) of the ICERD, as discussed further on, which oblige States 
to prohibit such parties. 
 
In conclusion, notwithstanding the imposition of negative obligations on States to refrain from 
interfering with the above rights, the ICCPR also grants States the tools to interfere when 
considered necessary in order to pursue a legitimate aim. In curtailing the freedom of association, 
prohibitions of groups should be considered the option of last resort unless they contravene 
principles of international human rights law. Once again, taking into account the establishment, 
spirit and objectives of the international legal framework and key principles, therein, such as 
non-discrimination and equality, States may prohibit right-wing extremist organisations under 
the ICCPR, but no explicit obligation to do so is contained therein.  
 
8.7 Limiting the Freedom of Association and Assembly under Article 4(b) of the ICERD  
Article 4 of the ICERD is particularly significant in the realm of right-wing extremism given that 
this movement organises itself through a variety of forms of association. Moreover, Article 4 
‘reflects the growing trend towards restricting racism that spread throughout the world in the 
postwar era.’754 However, any limitations of the freedom of association under Article 4(b) of the 
ICERD must be compatible with the freedom of association. The CERD has been alert to 
potential abuses of this clause as is reflected, for example, in its Concluding Observations to 
Russia in which it expressed its concern ‘that the definition of extremist activity in the federal 
law of July 2002 is too vague to protect…associations against arbitrariness in its application.’755 
In order to uphold Article 4(b) effectively and ensure a balanced approach, it is necessary to 
strike a legitimate balance between the freedom of association on the one hand and the freedom 
from discrimination on the other. It is a particularly tricky task and ‘when specific anti-racist 
measures are concerned, opinions may diverge as to their compatibility with the requirements of 
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the limitation clause.’756 The international legal framework obliges States to prohibit certain 
types of association. More particularly, Article 4(b) of the ICERD requests that States Parties 
‘declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, 
which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such 
organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law.’ The CERD has underlined that ‘all 
provisions of article 4…are of a mandatory character, including declaring illegal and prohibiting 
all organizations promoting and inciting racial discrimination.’757 In implementing this provision, 
States Parties must pay due regard to the principles embodied in the UDHR and the rights set out 
in Article 5 of the ICCPR. So, Article 4(b) imposes direct prohibitions of particular organisations 
and, thus, directly limits the freedom of association and, also, potentially affects the freedom of 
assembly as it declares illegal and prohibits ‘organized and all other propaganda activities,’ 
including activities which may take the form of an assembly.  The majority of Committee 
members maintain that Article 4(b) categorically requires States Parties to outlaw racist 
organisations as well as their activities and that States Parties do not have a choice between these 
two tasks, but are obliged to undertake both.
758
 This interpretation is in line with the stance taken 
during the drafting of Article 4(b) where an amendment to declare illegal and prohibit only the 
activities of a racist organisation and not the organisation itself was rejected.
759
 As noted in 
General Recommendation 15 of the CERD, organisations promoting racial discrimination ‘have 
to be declared illegal and prohibited.’760 And, not only that, ‘participation in these organizations 
is, of itself, to be punished.’761 The CERD has granted leeway to States Parties to decide on the 
precise nature of the punishment, welcoming, for example, a variety of penalties, including 
financial penalties, on parties promoting racial discrimination.
762
 However, the CERD has 
referred to sanctions amounting from Article 4(b) as being of a criminal nature. For example, in 
its Concluding Observations to Zimbabwe, it expressed its concern that the relevant law ‘does 
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not adequately address all the elements of article 4, particularly as regards the prohibition and 
criminalization of all organizations and propaganda activities that promote and incite racial 
discrimination.’ 763  In a report to Hungary, it recommended amendments to the Hungarian 
Criminal Code in order to incorporate the requirements of Article 4(b) of the ICERD. 
764
 
 
The CERD has found that organisations which advocate racial discrimination, whether or not 
they commit acts of violence do, in fact, breach the peace.
765
 Further, the CERD has underlined 
that groups promoting racist ideologies should fall within the framework of Article 4(b) 
regardless of their size or scope.
766
 In one of its reports on the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland, the CERD found that, by not prohibiting the BNP and other groups and organizations of 
a racist nature and by allowing them to pursue their activities, the United Kingdom was failing to 
implement Article 4, which calls for a condemnation of all organisations attempting to justify or 
promote racial hatred and discrimination.
767
 Furthermore, the CERD has noted that the 
obligations arising from Article 4(b) include the prohibition of organizations in their entirety and 
not simply the prohibition of their activities.
768
 Indeed, many Committee members appear to 
share the view that Article 4(b) requires States Parties to prohibit ad limina (from the beginning) 
the establishment of racist organizations.
769
 For example, the CERD has recognised that, ‘Article 
4(b) places a greater burden upon such States to be vigilant in proceeding against such 
organizations at the earliest moment.’770 Thus interpreted, the provision demonstrates the need to 
protect States from the danger of permitting racist organisations from functioning undeterred, 
gaining financial support, recruiting members, implementing their mandate and becoming 
powerful, thereby, rendering later prohibition difficult.
771
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In sum, it is legitimate and, under Article 4(b), an obligation for States to ban an association, 
whether it is a political party or an unregistered group, if they are promoting anti-democratic 
values which incite racial hatred, regardless of whether or not they are violent. However, 
regardless of the obligations set out in Article 4(b), the Special Rapporteur has argued that a 
prohibition of a political party must be a last resort method, which renders the situation more 
complex than it already is because of conflicting demands on States. Nevertheless, it can safely 
be said that the supression of racist political associations (including bans) finds both direct and 
indirect support in human rights treaties, conventions, and declarations drafted by the UN. Some 
such treaties, notably Article 4 of the ICERD, go as far as making it compulsory or strongly 
recommended for States to impose certain restrictions on racist organisations, with such 
measures being in line with duties and obligations arising from the UDHR and Article 5 of the 
ICERD. Thus, the central point upon which Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 4 of the ICERD 
differ is that the latter obliges States to prohibit groups promoting racial hate and discrimination 
whereas the former simply lays out the tools for States to interfere. In order to ensure a uniform 
approach to the assembly and association of right-wing extremism, these two articles must be 
read in conjunction with each other.  
 
8.8: The Due Regard Clause of Article 4 ICERD  
The central point of interest when considering Article 4(a) and Article 4(b) of the ICERD is the 
potential conflict that may arise as a result of the obligations emanating from the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of association. The question of whether the prohibition of 
associations under Article 4(b) is consistent with the ‘due regard’ clause has been a matter of 
debate within the academic, legal and political arenas with the obvious concern being that the  
prohibition of racist organisations can lead to abuse and places undue limitation on the right to 
freedom of association. As a result, many State representatives have explained that their 
governments have not outlawed racist organisations due to ‘the difficulty of reconciling the right 
to freedom of association with the requirements of Article 4(b).’ 772  This argumentation is 
extended to the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly, as reflected in the 
reservations below. During the drafting process of Article 4, several States Parties voiced their 
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concerns regarding its impact on other human rights and particularly expression and association.  
In fact, it is this very characteristic of the ICERD which has led Article 4 to being ‘the subject of 
different interpretations and a substantial number of reservations’773 which have generally taken 
the form of explicitly limiting national obligations under this article, in light of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
Nevertheless, the ‘due regard clause,’ as incorporated, therein, acts as a safety net to the 
freedoms in questions and constitutes the thematic backdrop against which the aforementioned 
balance is to be found. Namely, this clause seeks to ensure that any regulation arising from 
Article 4 does not disregard the freedoms of expression, association and assembly. 
 
Article 4 of the ICERD states that the provisions in parts a, b and c must be implemented ‘with 
due regard to the principles embodied in the UDHR and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 
of this Convention’ which include, inter alia, the freedoms of opinion, expression, assembly and 
association. In particular, the due regard clause was inserted to ‘protect against overly broad 
limitations on the freedoms of expression and association.’774 For example, during the drafting 
procedures, Belgium underlined the importance it attaches to Article 4 being read with due 
regard to the UDHR and the rights outlined in Article 5 of the ICERD and ‘therefore considers 
that the obligations imposed by Article 4 must be reconciled with the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.’ 775  France 
followed a similar path stating that it interprets the due regard clause of Article 4 as ‘releasing 
the States Parties from the obligation to enact anti-discrimination legislation which is 
incompatible with the freedoms of opinion and expression and of peaceful assembly and 
association.’776 Italy held that ‘the obligations deriving from the aforementioned Article 4 are not 
to jeopardize the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of peaceful 
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assembly and association.’777 This approach, that being the balancing of potentially conflicting 
rights, has also been adopted by other States Parties such as the United States of America which, 
upon signing the ICERD, placed a reservation on Article 4 which stipulated that ‘the 
Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of individual rights, such 
as the right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to 
authorize legislation or other action by the United States of America incompatible with the 
provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America.’778 Moreover, a total of twelve 
States out of the eighty seven signatories and one hundred and seventy seven Parties have 
imposed such reservations.
779
 
 
In relation to the meaning of the due regard clause, Mahalic and Mahalic refer to the equality 
principle laid down in Article 1 of the UDHR, the non-discrimination clause in Article 7 of the 
UDHR, the right to an effective remedy in Article 8 of the UHDR and the requirements of an 
international order whereby the rights set out in the Declaration are fully realised, as provided for 
by Article 28 therein. In this light, they argue that ‘to have due regard for the Universal 
Declaration is to have due regard for the very principles upon which Article 4(a) and Article 4(b) 
are premised’780 Furthermore, as well as the aforementioned provisions, the UDHR provides for 
the freedom of expression under Article 19 and the freedom of assembly and association under 
Article 20 respectively. These articles do not incorporate limitation clauses but, instead, fall 
under the general limitations provided for by Articles 29 and 30. Thus, in order to give adequate 
regard to the UDHR principles in this ambit, one must decipher whether the speech in question 
contravenes Article 29 and particularly the respect for the rights and freedoms of others, morality, 
public order and the general welfare of a democratic society or whether it destroys any of the 
other rights set out in the Declaration. Only then can it be ascertained whether or not freedoms of 
expression or assembly, as provided for by Articles 19 and 20 of the UDHR, can be invoked as 
rationales to limiting obligations set out in Article 4 of the UDHR.  
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Through its jurisprudence and other instruments, the Committee has given insight into how the 
‘due regard’ clause is to be interpreted and applied in this field. In Jewish Community of Oslo et 
al. v Norway, the Committee attempted to explain what is meant by this doctrine by stating that 
‘it related generally to all principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not 
only freedom of speech’.781 In this light it held that ‘to give the right to freedom of speech a more 
limited role in the context of Article 4 does not deprive the due regard clause of significant 
meaning, all the more so since all international instruments that guarantee freedom of expression 
provide for the possibility, under certain circumstances, of limiting the exercise of this right.’782 
On this premise, the Committee noted that Mr. Sjolie, who had headed the march of a group 
known as the ‘Bootboys,’ in commemoration of the Nazi leader Rudolf Hess, made statements 
which were ‘of an exceptionally/manifestly offensive character and are, thus, not protected by 
the due regard clause.’783 As a result, his acquittal by the Supreme Court of Norway gave rise to 
a violation of Article 4 and consequently Article 6 of the ICERD. In reaching this decision, the 
Committee held that the ‘freedom of speech has been afforded a lower level of protection in 
cases of racist and hate speech dealt with by other international bodies.’784 The Committee’s 
approach in this case, thus, demonstrates that the ‘due regard’ clause cannot be enforced 
unconditionally and that, in the event of racist speech, it does not constitute grounds for 
protecting the freedom of expression. This is reaffirmed by the CERD’s position in General 
Recommendation 15, where it notes that ‘the obligation not to disseminate racist ideas is of 
particular importance.’785 Indeed, the CERD has underlined that the due regard clause cannot be 
called to be interpreted as ‘cancelling or justifying a departure from the mandatory obligations 
set forth in Articles 4(a) and 4(b).’786  
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As well as considering the meaning of the due regard clause more closely in the above case, the 
CERD has tried to tackle the conflict between the competing rights through a variety of 
documents, a conflict which lies at the heart of the due regard debate. As early back as 1983, the 
CERD noted that concern that Article 4 would contravene the objectives enshrined in the 
freedoms of expression, assembly and association was ‘another factor hindering the full 
application of Article 4.’787 Instead, the Committee suggested that a ‘balance has to be struck 
between article 4(a) and freedom of speech, and between article 4(b) and freedom of 
expression.’788 In striking this balance, the Committee has noted that States Parties have an 
‘obligation to respect the right to freedom of opinion and expression when implementing Article 
4.’ 789   Nevertheless, neither the ‘due regard’ clause, as established in the ICERD, nor the 
principles set out in the UDHR offer a clear understanding of the balance that needs to be struck 
between freedoms or of how that balance is to be reached. The CERD has attempted to elucidate 
the meaning of the due regard clause and its impact on the interpretation and application of 
Article 4. It has underlined the need to understand the UDHR in its entirety when considering the 
due regard clause.  
 
In sum, although the due regard clause was incorporated as a safety net for the protection of key 
freedoms, it seems to have caused an array of problems in relation to the interpretation and 
application of Article 4 of the ICERD. Mahalic and Mahalic argue that the due regard clause 
does not greatly limit the obligations arising from Article 4 given that, under Article 29 (3), no 
one can enjoy the freedom of expression or association in a manner that goes against protecting 
others from racial discrimination whereas Article 30 does not allow the exercise of these 
freedoms in a manner which destructs the rights of others to be free from racial discrimination.
790
 
Also, in relation to having due regard to Article 5 of the ICERD, the Committee has stated that 
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this article cannot be used as a tool for avoiding duties arising under Article 4.
791
 In light of the 
above, it can safely be held that the due regard clause should not hamper the applicability of 
Article 4, if both are read and interpreted correctly, placing primary emphasis on the spirit of 
international human rights law.  However, as reflected by the reservations imposed, thereto, as a 
result of the due regard clause, this is not the case.  
 
9. Another Route? Article 5 of the ICCPR: The Destruction of the Rights of Others 
The HRC has also turned to Article 5 of the ICCPR when dealing with right-wing extremism. 
Article 5(1) of the ICCPR provides that ‘nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation 
to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.’  It could be argued that racist 
expression is destructive to the right of victims to be free from racial discrimination. This article 
prohibits and addresses a type of action that would have the effect of destroying the rights of 
freedoms protected in the ICCPR. An interesting interpretation and implementation of Article 5 
can be seen in M.A. v Italy,
792
 where the HRC applied Article 5 rather than Article 20(2) when 
considering a communication that did not primarily deal with advocacy but rather with the 
reorganisation of a dissolved fascist party. More specifically, the HRC found that the act for 
which M.A. was convicted, being the reorganisation of the dissolved fascist party, did not receive 
the protection of the ICCPR as a result of the provisions of Article 5. By applying this article, the 
Committee implied that the acts for which M.A was convicted are not protected by the Covenant. 
Unfortunately it did not further state any reasons why it reached this decision and it did not 
provide any interpretative understanding of key themes and provisions related to the applicability 
of Article 5. The lack of substantive reasoning in relation to Article 5 is unfortunate, since a 
sound assessment of Article 5, in the realm of hate speech, would have provided for a better 
understanding of the balance to be struck between the freedom of association and assembly and 
the destruction of the rights and freedoms of others. Such a correlation, if adequately established, 
could also be extended to right-wing rhetoric in the realm of freedom of expression.  
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10. Conclusion: Regulating, Prohibiting and Punishing Far-Right Association and Assembly  
In conclusion, the international legal framework foresaw that associations and assemblies are 
powerful tools for far-right movements and sought to limit the scope of these freedoms within 
such arenas through the aforementioned tools which provide the opportunity to States to interact 
and, in the case of Article 4(b) of the ICERD, impose a positive obligation on States to limit 
these freedoms. Notwithstanding that such restrictions aptly extend to non-violent anti-
democratic assemblies and associations, the, at times, conflicting duties imposed on States 
through vital differences between the content of key tools in conjunction with the hesitation of 
States to adopt positive obligations, as incorporated in Article 4(b) of the ICERD in the name of 
protecting assembly and association, undoubtedly hamper the actual enforceability of these 
provisions. Article 5 of the ICCPR and the non-destruction clause have featured in one relevant 
case but no further jurisprudence or commentary is available in this sphere. Furthermore, no 
guidance is offered as to why Article 5 was enforced in M.A v Italy rather than another article or 
why this article was enforced in the particular case and not in another case also involving either 
far-right rhetoric or association.  
 
11. Chapter Conclusion: Militant Democracy as a Central Tenet of International Human Rights 
Law.  
The above analysis reflects that the United Nations has recognised that, in order to ensure the 
protection of democracy, there occur certain circumstances in which restrictive measures must be 
taken in relation to expression, association and assembly. Although these rights are of utmost 
importance to a functioning democracy, they are to be restricted if their exercise is to harm 
others or society. In addition, by directly prohibiting advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred in the ICCPR and racist association and expression in the ICERD, the UN impose direct 
obligations on States Parties to prohibit forces which are destructive to democracy. Thus, 
militant democracy has become part of the narrative of international human rights law and, as 
will be reflected in the analysis of the two jurisdictions, has subsequently found its way through 
to national legal restrictions of forces, such as far-right forces, which may be destructive to a 
democracy.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE  
Introduction  
This chapter will look at the tools available at a CoE level to regulate the far-right. Firstly, it will 
consider the ECHR with a view to assessing the meaning, scope and objectives of relevant 
provisions and, more particularly, Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol 12 of 
this Convention, which deal with the doctrine of non-discrimination, Article 10 on the freedom 
of expression, Article 11 on the freedom of assembly and association and Article 17, the non-
destruction clause which provides that nothing in the Convention may be interpreted and applied 
in such a way as to result in the violation of rights and freedoms. After assessing the relevant 
articles and connected case-law, the chapter will look at the margin of appreciation enjoyed by 
States Parties within the framework of these rights and freedoms. Case-law of the ECtHR and the 
former European Commission of Human Rights (EComHR)
793
 shall be reflected upon with a 
view to ascertaining their modus operandi when called to decide upon cases involving the 
aforementioned articles in the realm of right-wing activities and speech. It is important to 
consider the case-law of the EComHR as well as that of the ECtHR given that earlier cases 
related to right-wing extremism were only dealt with by the Commission because, due to their 
inadmissibility, they never reached the Court. However, with regard to the later cases that were 
examined by the Court directly, one notes a continuum in the overall stance of the Commission’s 
approach, namely that right-wing speech and activities fall outside the framework of Convention 
protection. An assessment of Commission case-law and a comparison with the Court’s case-law, 
in such cases, becomes particularly significant in the scope of appraising the use of Article 17 of 
the ECHR by the two institutions, with the Commission having applied it more regularly than the 
Court. Furthermore, considering how such older cases involving revisionism, negationism and 
anti-Semitism were dealt with and looking at how themes and rules developed, therein, can be 
applied today to cases involving Islamophobia, Romaphobia and anti-immigrant rhetoric, makes 
for an interesting and important analysis. After this, the chapter will consider how the ECtHR 
approaches racist crime. In addition, and given the use of the Internet by the far-right, the last 
section of this chapter will consider the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, 
Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through 
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Computer Systems and its role in challenging the far-right. Thus, the overarching aim of this 
chapter is to consider the application of the Convention’s provisions and the development of 
Strasbourg’s approaches to the rhetoric and actions of right-wing extremist parties, associations 
and their representatives, with some reference to case-law of the EComHR where relevant. 
 
1. Council of Europe  
The CoE was born from the ashes of World War II with its founding members committing to a 
future that respected human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Court and its case-law will lie 
at the epicentre of this chapter. However, an overview of other bodies and their role in the sphere 
of tackling the far-right will be made here. The European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) is a body of the Council of Europe made up of independent experts which 
monitors phenomena such as racism, intolerance and discrimination. It issues country reports and 
makes recommendations which are referred to and discussed in this dissertation. The European 
Commission for Democracy through Law, also known as the Venic Commission is an advisory 
body of the Council of Europe providing legal advice to its member states 
794
in the sphere of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  Importantly for this dissertation it has prepared 
guidelines on the Prohibition and Dissolution of Political Parties discussed herein. The ECHR 
was opened for signature on 4 November 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953. The 
Contracting Parties undertake to secure the rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR. All of 
the COE’s 47 Member States are parties to this Convention. It provides a system of individual 
judicial redress resulting in binding judgements. For that reason, the Convention has been 
described as the ‘greatest monument to the Council’795 that is ‘the most comprehensive and 
developed system for supranational human rights protection.’796 The analysis in this chapter will 
commence with a consideration of the principle of non-discrimination, as provided for by the 
ECHR. It will then proceed with the analysis of the scope of Article 10 and Article 11 of the 
ECHR and the way in which they are applied in cases involving right-wing extremism. It will 
then consider the, at times, controversial and rather unclear role of Article 17 of the ECHR in 
removing some types of expression deemed to be hate speech from the scope of the Convention 
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and close with an appreciation of the meaning and impact of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
on the outcome of such cases. 
 
2. The Principle of Non-Discrimination in Council of Europe Instruments 
2.1 General Overview of Non-Discrimination in the ECHR 
The principle of non-discrimination is protected by the ECHR and its Protocol 12. To elucidate 
the duties and obligations arising, therefrom, the ECtHR has defined discrimination as ‘treating 
differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar 
situations.’797 No objective and reasonable justification means that ‘the distinction in issue does 
not pursue a legitimate aim or that there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.’798 Moreover, in order for an 
application to be successful under this article, the ‘discriminatory intent or effect’799 of the object 
or act or measure complained of must be established. 
 
Article 14 of the Convention provides that ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any grounds such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.’ This article can, thus, be enforced when a right or 
freedom as set out by the Convention is at stake, thereby, limiting its applicability and effect 
within that document. As noted in Marcx v Belgium, ‘although Article 14 (art. 14) has no 
independent existence, it may play an important autonomous role by complementing the other 
normative provisions of the Convention and the Protocols: Article 14 safeguards individuals, 
placed in similar situations, from any discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
set forth in those other provisions.’800 Notwithstanding the ‘accessory character’801 of Article 14, 
its importance must not be undermined since ‘it is as though Article 14 (art. 14) formed an 
integral part of each of the provisions laying down rights and freedoms.’ 802  However, the 
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‘discrimination complaints often do not add very much to the other allegations’803 and, as a result, 
the Court decides not to deal with the Article 14 aspect of the case.
804
 
 
Article 1 of Protocol 12 holds that: 
The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.  
 
It further holds that ‘no one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any 
grounds such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.’ By applying the non-discrimination principle 
to any right provided for by law extends the applicability of this principle beyond the framework 
of the Convention and into the realm of rights and freedoms enshrined in the national legal 
system of a State Party, in the event that the latter is more extensive than the former. However, 
the Protocol has only been adopted by eighteen out of the forty-seven States Parties and, thus, its 
actual impact remains limited. Nevertheless, with regard to the interrelationship between 
Protocol 12 and Article 14, the Court has underlined that they should be understood in a similar 
way given that ‘notwithstanding the difference in scope between those provisions, the meaning 
of this term in Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 was intended to be identical to that in Article 14.’805 
 
2.2 Race as a Ground for Discrimination  
Right-wing extremist groups implement activities and promote ideas and beliefs which incite 
racism and religious discrimination as reflected, for example, in the anti-immigrant rhetoric 
which is characteristic of such movements. Unlike the UN framework and particularly the 
ICERD, at a CoE level there exists no Convention dedicated to this theme. The only measure 
implemented to tackle it has been the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, 
Concerning the Criminalization of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through 
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Computer Systems. However, as can be discerned from its title, it deals with computer systems 
only. Nevertheless, Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol 12 both name race as a 
prohibited ground for discrimination, while the Court has extrapolated upon the theme of racial 
discrimination in the cases discussed below.  
 
From the time of the EComHR, the particularly serious nature of racial discrimination has been 
underlined. In 3 East African Asians v The United Kingdom, the Commission noted that 
‘discrimination based on race could, in certain circumstances, of itself amount to degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 3.’806 This viewpoint was also adopted by the Court in 
Timishev v Russia, in which it was held that racial discrimination is a ‘particularly invidious kind 
of discrimination’807  with ‘perilous consequences.’808  This position was reiterated in Aksu v 
Turkey
809
 which dealt with Romaphobia. In Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Court held that, in the context where discrimination is based on race or ethnicity, the notion of 
differential treatment without an objective and reasonable justification, as referred to above, 
‘must be interpreted as strictly as possible.’810  
 
In relation to racial violence, the Court underlined that it is ‘a particular affront to human dignity 
and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a 
‘vigorous reaction.’811 In Nachova v Bulgaria, the Court also referred to the general obligation of 
States Parties, under Articles 2 and 14, to conduct effective investigations where there exists the 
possibility that the motivation for violence was of a racist nature.
812
 This duty is also extended to 
cases where the motives are of a religious nature with States Parties having the duty to establish 
‘whether or not hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events.’ 813  However, in 
establishing whether such racial motivation exists for purposes of the enforcement of, inter alia, 
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Article 14 of the ECHR, the Court adopts a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
814
 
According to established ECtHR case-law, such a standard may be attained following the ‘co-
existence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted 
presumptions of fact.’815 The necessity for a high standard of proof was reiterated in subsequent 
cases, such as Cobzaru v Romania,
816
 in which the Court also held that ‘the expression of 
concern by various organisations about the numerous allegations of violence against Roma by 
Romanian law enforcement officers....does not suffice to consider that it has been established 
that racist attitudes played a role in the applicant’s ill-treatment.’817 Interestingly, in Milanović v 
Serbia, the Court made no reference to establishing proof beyond a reasonable doubt but, 
instead, referred to the fact that proving religiously prejudicial motivation ‘may be difficult in 
practice’818 and, thus, the State’s obligation to investigate is ‘an obligation to use best endeavours 
and is not absolute.’819  Therefore, aside from the route followed in Milanović, proving such 
motivation is a difficult task given that it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, thus, it 
is possible that such acts fall outside this framework due to difficulties vis-à-vis attaining this 
standard. In fact, Interights, which was an intervener in Nachova v Buglaria, criticised this 
standard as ‘erecting insurmountable obstacles to establishing discrimination’ 820  and 
recommended a balance of probabilities standard of proof for such cases. 
821
 
 
The only time that Article 14 of the ECHR was directly applied in the field under consideration 
was in the case of Aksu v Turkey. Here, the Court dealt with Romaphobic rhetoric which the 
applicant alleged had been promoted in three publications which had received government 
funding. For example, these publications included references that Roma were ‘engaged in illegal 
activities, lived as thieves, pickpockets, swindlers, robbers, usurpers, beggars, drug dealers, 
prostitutes and brothel keepers and were polygamist and aggressive.’822 The case was dealt with 
under the framework of Article 8 of the ECHR read in conjunction with Article 14. The reason 
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for this shift in technique was that the applicant was not the one expressing the views, as the 
Court had habitually been confronted with, but, rather, a person of Roma origin who had been 
insulted by the expression. As noted by Belavusau, ‘procedurally, this case illustrates the 
paradox that hate speech cases typically reach Strasbourg exclusively as claims against States by 
haters, alleging violation of their rights to free speech.’823 Even though it found no violation of 
Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14, the Court reiterated the need for the State to implement 
effective measures to combat negative stereotyping against the Roma. 
824
 
 
In sum, notwithstanding that Article 14 of the ECHR will be surpassed in the event that another 
article of the Convention can be relied upon, and whilst Protocol 12 has not been extrapolated on 
by the Court’s jurisprudence due to its limited ratification, the principle of non-discrimination is 
significant to any discussion on right-wing movements given that their activities and ideologies 
emanate from an unjustified difference in the treatment of people belonging to particular groups. 
The Court has recognised that discrimination can result from racial and religious causes and, as 
reflected in the case-law, States are under a particularly strict duty to investigate violence arising 
from such discrimination which, as dictated by the majority of ECtHR cases, must subsequently 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the theoretical and jurisprudential scene has been set 
by the Court for future cases in the realm of right-wing extremism within the framework of non-
discrimination with Article 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 12 constituting available, but, to date, 
rarely used tools.  
 
3. Freedom of Expression 
3.1 General Overview of Article 10 of the ECHR 
Article 10 of the ECHR protects the right to freedom of expression. More particularly, it states 
that: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
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public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
First and foremost, the provision stipulates that ‘everyone’ has the right to freedom of expression, 
including both natural and legal persons.
825
 Unlike Article 19 of the ICCPR, Article 10 of the 
ECHR does not grant the right to hold opinions an absolute status. Furthermore, as with Article 
19, Article 10 recognises that the freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas, carries with it duties and 
responsibilities. Importantly, Article 10, unlike other articles of this Convention, incorporates a 
further qualification in the form of duties and responsibilities when exercising this right, 
demonstrating that the drafters realised and sought to conceptualise the dangers which potentially 
come with free expression and the due care that must be taken by the person expressing his or 
her opinion(s). A State may intervene in the exercise of these freedoms as long as the restriction 
is provided for by law and is necessary in a democratic society to pursue one of the aims 
provided for by Article 10(2). Paragraph 2 of this Article appears to allow more room for 
limitation than Article 19(3) of the ICCPR because, as well as respecting the rights or reputations 
of others, the protection of national security or public order and public health or morals, Article 
10(2) stipulates that legitimate formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
826
 can be made for 
purposes of territorial integrity, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the prevention of 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it limits the possibilities for 
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restrictions by providing that they should be necessary in a democratic society and not simply 
necessary in order to achieve one of the listed objectives, as is the case in Article 19(3).  
 
The Convention does not include a particular provision on advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, as is the case 
with the ICCPR. Nevertheless, this has not prevented the ECtHR from ruling against cases 
involving speech which has such aims, nor did it prevent it or the former EComHR from 
rendering such cases inadmissible. As well as the limitation clauses of Article 10, Article 17 has 
also been of importance in this respect. This provision will be discussed separately in section 5 
below. 
 
According to long-standing case-law of the ECtHR, the rights set out in Article 10(1) are to be 
interpreted and applied in a broad manner, given that ‘there is no room in general for an 
argument that Article 10 extends only to true information: opinions, speculations and criticism 
are all covered.’827 In Handyside v The United Kingdom, the Court held that the ‘freedom of 
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic society], one of the basic 
conditions for its progress and for the development of every man.’828 The Court has repeatedly 
underlined the central position of the freedom of expression in a democratic and pluralist society. 
More particularly, in Observer and the Guardian v The United Kingdom, it held that the freedom 
of expression is applicable not only to information or ideas that are ‘favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb.’ 829  Nevertheless, as will be reflected further down, the Court has taken a militant 
understanding of democracy, with a democratic society in its judgements being ‘tolerant but not 
inert.’830 The Court has accepted that a democracy should protect itself and its basic principles 
and must ‘fight against abuses, committed in the exercise of freedom of speech, that openly 
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target democratic values.’831 Thus, even though this freedom is undoubtedly significant, it must 
nevertheless coexist harmoniously with other rights and freedoms with democracy having the 
duty militantly to protect itself from the abuse of expressive freedom.  
 
There is a considerable amount of case-law of the ECtHR and the EComHR in relation to Article 
10 of the ECHR, including cases involving hate speech promulgated by representatives of 
extreme right-wing movements. To consider and evaluate this jurisprudence, the section will 
now consider the kinds of speech protected by the freedom of expression and then look at hate 
speech and how this is and has been understood and interpreted by the above institutions.  
 
3.2 What Kind of Speech?  
From the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, one can discern a hierarchy of different forms of speech with 
political, artistic and commercial speech being the main identifiable categories
832
 as well as 
freedom of the press
833
 and whistleblowing.
834
 Within this categorisation of speech, political 
speech is most highly valued. As stated in Lingens v Austria, the freedom of political debate ‘is 
at the very core of the concept of a democratic society,’835 with Wingrove v The United Kingdom 
noting that there is little scope under Article 10(2) to restrict political speech or issues of public 
interest.
836
 In Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, the Court acknowledged that the varying 
value level and subsequent extent to which a State will enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in 
interpreting and imposing restriction on expression depends on a range of issues including the 
type of speech.
837In this case, it held that ‘there is little scope under Article 10(2) of the 
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Convention for restrictions on political speech.’ 838  As well as the type of speech and the 
importance attached thereto, the Court has also considered the significance of the form and tone 
used for the expression in question as well as its content,
839
 giving the notion of expression a 
wide scope within the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Indeed, freedom within the realm of choice of 
language and manner of expression is evident in the official recognition of the freedom to shock 
as referred to above. The right to hyperbolic and provocative language and speech is a central 
part of political speech and, in this light, polemical,
840
 sarcastic
841
 and satirical
842
 language is 
permitted. Moreover, a certain degree of exaggeration is broadly understood to be accepted, 
particularly in discussions on political issues.
843
  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of political speech, the Commission, and now the Court, have 
both emphasised the duties politicians have in contributing to the overall peace and coexistence 
of a democratic society. For example, in Sener v Turkey, the Commission emphasised the 
importance of the duties and responsibilities related to the exercise of the freedom of expression 
within the political sphere and observed that ‘it is important for persons addressing the public on 
sensitive political issues to take care that they do not support unlawful political violence.’844 
Interlinked with this, and particularly significant to the ambit of xenophobic speech uttered by 
politicians and the weight that is to be attached to such political speech, are the two cases of 
Féret and Le Pen. In Féret v Belgium, the leader of a radical right political party - National Front 
brought a claim to Strasbourg for his conviction of incitement to racism. More particularly, this 
case dealt with anti-immigrant statements and recommendations made by Mr. Féret in leaflets 
distributed during an electoral campaign. Statements made, included, amongst others ‘Stop the 
Islamization of Belgium’ and ‘Save our people from the risk posed by Islam, the conqueror.’ 
Here, the Court emphasised that ‘political speech that stirred hatred based on religious, ethnic or 
cultural prejudices was a threat to social peace and political stability in democratic States.’845 It 
also underlined how significant it is for politicians to take care when expressing themselves in 
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public so as to avoid promoting feelings of intolerance but rather defending democracy and the 
values underlying it.
846
 Therefore, although the Court recognised that political parties and their 
representatives ‘must enjoy broad freedom of expression to be able to attract voters, where racist 
or xenophobic comments were concerned, the electoral context helped to kindle hatred and 
intolerance and the impact of this type of speech grew worse and more harmful.’847 In Le Pen v 
France, the Court dealt with a case brought by the president of the French extreme-right party, 
National Front, for the alleged breach of his Article 10 rights due to his conviction for inciting 
hatred against Muslims during an interview with Le Monde newspaper. He stated, inter alia, that 
‘when I tell people that when we have 25 million Muslims in France we French will have to 
watch our step, they often reply: ‘But Le Pen, that is already the case now!’ – and they are right.’ 
Although no explicit reference was made by the Court to the particular duties of politicians in 
contributing to overall social cohesion and the overall responsibilities attached to political speech 
as was the case in Féret, this line of reasoning was implicitly reflected in the judgement. For 
example, the Court underlined the significance of allowing free political speech but also 
underlined the need to protect the rights of others and the importance of combatting racial 
discrimination.
848
 In this case, as opposed to other similar cases, the application was deemed 
manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible.  
 
3.3 Hate Speech: Semantics and Notions 
The task of ensuring a smooth interrelationship between the freedom of expression and 
principles, such as equality and non-discrimination, is central to any discussion pertaining to hate 
speech uttered by right-wing extremist movements. This section will look at examples of the 
general position of the Commission and the Court when faced with hate speech, with the 
following sections examining the formulas construed and implemented by the institutions for 
purposes of ruling on hate speech. The Commission established the position that hate speech is 
not entitled to Convention protection in the cases of Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v The 
Netherlands and Kühnen v the Federal Republic of Germany. Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek was 
the first case involving right-wing extremism in which Article 17 was enforced. Here, the 
Commission dealt with a leaflet addressed to ‘white Dutch People’ and advocated a policy which 
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sought to remove all non-white people from the Netherlands. The Commission held that this 
policy contained elements of racial discrimination and held the view that ‘the expression of the 
political ideas of the applicants clearly constitutes an activity within the meaning of Article 17 of 
the Convention.’849 The Commission’s exclusionary approach to racist rhetoric continued in 
Kuhnen v Federal Republic of Germany, which ‘left no doubts that racist expression cannot be 
rehabilitated even half a century after the Second World War for the sake of libertarian 
argument.’850 In this case, the applicant held a seminal position in an organisation that was 
allegedly attempting to re-institute the Nazi party, prohibited in Germany. In this context, he 
prepared and disseminated pamphlets which included, amongst others, statements such as ‘We 
are called 'Neo-Nazis'!  So what! ...  We are against: bigwigs, bolshevists, Zionists, crooks, 
cheats and parasites.’ He was sentenced to three years and four months’ imprisonment. The 
Commission found that the applicant’s proposal, as expressed in the pamphlets, contravened one 
of the basic values underlying the Convention, ‘namely that the fundamental freedoms enshrined 
in the Convention are best maintained by an effective political democracy.’851 In this case, the 
Commission found that the applicant sought to use the freedom provided in Article 10 as a tool 
to carry out activities which oppose the spirit of the Convention. 
 
In the seminal case of Jersild v. Denmark, the Court dealt with statements expressed on 
television by a group called the “Greenjackets” (“Grønjakkerne”) which included, inter alia, that 
‘a nigger is not a human being, it’s an animal, that goes for all the other foreign workers as well, 
Turks, Yugoslavs and whatever they are called.’ Here, the Court held that expression constituting 
hate speech, which may be insulting to particular individuals or groups, is not protected by 
Article 10 of the Convention.
852
 In this case, the Court affirmed that ‘Article 10…should not be 
interpreted in such a way as to limit, derogate from or destroy the right to protection against 
racial discrimination under the UN Convention.’853 In Lehideux & Isorni v France, the Court 
dealt with a publication in Le Monde which defended the memory of Marshal Pétain
854
. In this 
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case, the Court held that ‘justification of a pro-Nazi policy could not be allowed to enjoy the 
protection afforded by Article 10.’855 In Garaudy v France, the Court dealt with the publication 
of a book, ‘The Founding Myths of Israeli politics,’ which included statements such as ‘the myth 
of six million exterminated Jews that has become a dogma justifying and lending sanctity (as 
indicated by the very word Holocaust) to every act of violence.’ In this case, the Court explained 
why revisionist speech is to be considered hateful and harmful speech by holding that ‘denying 
crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of racial defamation of Jews 
and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or rewriting of this type of historical fact 
undermines the values on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based and 
constitutes a serious threat to public order. Such acts are incompatible with democracy and 
human rights because they infringe the rights of others.’856 In Norwood v The United Kingdom, 
the applicant was a Regional Organiser for the BNP, an extreme-right wing political party. He 
displayed a large poster in the window of his flat, supplied by the BNP, with a photograph of 
the Twin Towers in flames, the words “Islam out of Britain – Protect the British People” and a 
symbol of a crescent and star in a prohibition sign. Here, the Court found that ‘a general, 
vehement attack against a religious group, linking the group as a whole with a grave act of 
terrorism, is incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, notably 
tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination’857 and, thereby, fell outside the scope of Article 
10. In Soulas v France, the authors of a book discussing the alleged incompatibilities between 
European and Islamic cultures complained of an interference of their Article 10 rights due to 
their conviction by the national court for inciting hate propaganda. In reaching its judgement, the 
ECtHR found that phrases such as ‘it is only if an ethnic civil war breaks out that the solution 
can be found’ could potentially incite aggression against a particular group858  and is, thus, 
unacceptable speech under Article 10, but was not deemed serious enough to fall within the 
framework of Article 17.
859
 In Balsytė-Lideikienė v Lithuania, the applicant was founder and 
owner of a company which published the Lithuanian Calendar 2000 and received an 
administrative warning for statements contained in the calendar which were considered insulting 
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to persons of Polish, Russian and Jewish origin. Statements included, amongst others ‘The soviet 
occupying power, with the help of the communist collaborators, among whom, in particular, 
were many Jews, for half a century ferociously carried out the genocide and colonisation of the 
Lithuanian nation’ The Court held that the passages contained statements ‘inciting hatred against 
the Poles and the Jews. The Court considered that these statements were capable of giving the 
Lithuanian authorities cause for serious concern’ 860  and gave the State a wide margin of 
appreciation to decipher and deal with the case 
861
and, as a result, found no violation of Article 
10.  
 
Although this dissertation, for reasons explained in its introduction, places focus on racial hatred 
and activities expressed and carried out by right-wing extremist groups, a reference must be 
made to the case of Vejdeland and Others v Sweden. This is predominantly because this case 
dealt with homophobic speech expressed in leaflets disseminated by a far-right association 
named ‘National Youth’ and was, thus, part of an organised network of intolerance. The 
applicants of this case had been convicted by the Swedish Supreme Court of agitation against a 
national or ethnic group for the dissemination of leaflets which contained, amongst others, 
statements that homosexuality has ‘a morally destructive effect on the substance of society,’ that 
‘HIV and AIDS appeared early with the homosexuals and that their promiscuous lifestyle was 
one of the main reasons for this modern-day plague gaining a foothold’ and that ‘homosexual 
lobby organisations are also trying to play down pedophilia.’  In finding no violation of the 
freedom of expression, the Court held that ‘although these statements did not directly 
recommend individuals to commit hateful acts, they are serious and prejudicial allegations,’ 862 
and, by applying Féret, noted that incitement to hatred does not necessarily entail a call for 
violence. 
863
 The Court also underlined that ‘discrimination based on sexual orientation is as 
serious as discrimination based on race, origin or colour.’ 864 From the above cases, it can be 
discerned that hate speech can be subjected to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties by 
the State. Therefore, although the Convention does not specifically limit and/or sanction speech 
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that promotes racial or ethnic hatred,
865
 the Court predominantly deals with relevant cases, as 
they arise, under Article 10, with one notable yet unexplained shift to Article 17 in Norwood as 
well as the Articles 8-14 case of Aksu.   
 
Further, probably in view of comprehending and evaluating hate speech in its entirety, the Court 
has sometimes made a psycho-social appraisal of its effects. In Féret v Belgium, the Court held 
that personal attacks and defamation of groups of people violate the dignity and security of the 
target group. More particularly, it noted that the statements were ‘inevitably of such a nature as 
to arouse, particularly among the less informed members of the public, feelings of distrust, 
rejection or hatred towards foreigners.’ 866  However, in the dissenting opinion of Judge 
András Sajó, joined by Judges Vladimiro Zagrebelsky and Nona Tsotsoria, the majority saw 
humans as ‘nitwits…incapable of replying to arguments and counter-arguments, due to the 
irresistible drive of their irrational emotions.’867 This, it was argued, contravened the idea of 
freedom of expression which incorporates the principle of informed choice. In addition, the 
Court considered the wider implications of hate propaganda within the sphere of social peace and 
political stability and further noted that ‘to recommend solutions to immigration-related 
problems by advocating racial discrimination was likely to cause social tension and undermine 
trust in democratic institutions.’868  In Le Pen v France, the applicant’s statements were found to 
be of such nature as to promote rejection of and hostility against the targetted community, in this 
case the Muslim community.
869
 
 
When confronted with the possibility of limiting Article 10 in the name of hate speech or even, 
as discussed later on, of ousting it from Convention protection through Article 17, a variety of 
questions and ambiguities arise when seeking a balance between conflicting rights and freedoms. 
Namely, what is hate speech? At what point and under which conditions does speech constitute 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence? When does speech surpass the threshold of 
simply shocking, offending and disturbing? In some cases, such as that of Balsytė-Lideikienė 
v Lithuania, the Court made reference to the Recommendation of the CoE Committee of 
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Ministers on hate speech
870
 as a definitional framework for this phenomenon. However, there is 
no regular reference to this definition nor is there a formulation of a separate definition by the 
Commission or the Court to be applied gradually in the framework of hate speech and, while 
there are sporadic references to the effects of hate speech, as considered in this chapter, the 
aforementioned questions remain open. Establishing the meaning of hate speech, and 
distinguishing it from controversial yet acceptable speech, is clearly central to any adequate legal 
analysis. It is a job rendered even more complicated for the ECtHR given the margin of 
appreciation and the resulting discretion enjoyed by Contracting Parties under certain 
circumstances. However, the Court has not set out a coherent test to be employed when seeking 
to determine whether a particular case is one of hate speech. As a result, this lacking definitional 
backdrop to hate speech is ‘unsatisfactory from the point of judicial interpretation, doctrinal 
development and general predictability and foreseeability.’871  In addition to lack of coherence, 
this may also result in the possible misapplication of relevant principles, as was the case in 
Willem v France where the Court agreed with the conviction of the mayor of a French town who 
had publicly requested a boycott of Israeli products as a means of protesting the anti-Palestinian 
policies of Israel. Like the national judiciary, the ECtHR considered that the applicant had not 
been convicted for his political opinions but for inciting the commission of a discriminatory, and, 
therefore, punishable act.
872
 It is, to say the least, debatable whether Article 10(2) or Article 17 
aim at curtailing this genre of expression. Either way, and regardless of any technical difficulties, 
as noted by Belavusau and reflected in this chapter, ‘the expression of racial hatred is not 
covered by the protective scope of Article 10(1).’873 
  
3.4 Freedom of Expression: Reasonableness Review of Restrictions and Limitations 
As noted by Antoine Buyse, ‘few issues are as contested as the limits of freedom of 
expression.’874Against the backdrop of a lacking extrapolation on hate speech, the Court has 
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developed a tripartite justification test that emanates from Article 10(2) of the Convention, the 
key question being whether a particular interference is in line with the Convention. In 
determining whether there has been an interference with the freedom of expression, the Court 
implements the classical Sunday Times test, which, in line with the requirements of Article 10(2), 
includes ascertaining whether the interference is necessary in a democratic society and, more 
specifically, whether there was a ‘pressing social need’ for the interference, whether the 
interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons for 
interference are relevant and sufficient in light of the aims listed in Article 10(2). Moreover, the 
interference must be ‘prescribed by law’, which means it must have a basis in domestic law 
which is sufficiently accessible and foreseeable.  
 
3.4.1 Prescribed by Law 
The ECtHR has held that the term ‘law’ must be interpreted in a manner that recognises and 
embraces the different types of law that make up the legal reality in the country concerned. In 
Sunday Times, the Court stated that the word ‘law’ includes written law as well as the case-law 
interpreting it. When discussing the doctrine of contempt of court, it underlined that common 
law, even though unwritten, does in fact constitute law.
875
 In the same case, the Court held that 
there are two requirements emanating from this provision. Firstly, the law must be readily 
accessible to citizens, namely ‘the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in 
the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case.’ 876  Secondly, it must be 
‘formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct….to foresee, to 
a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail.’ 877  However, the Court recognised that, in attempting to ensure certainty and 
foreseeability, excessively rigid laws may result which are unable to adapt to altering 
circumstances and situations. As a result, the Court noted that ‘many laws are inevitably couched 
in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application 
are questions of practice.
878
 In Olsson v Sweden, the Court underlined that the phrase ‘prescribed 
by law’ refers not only to the law itself but also embraces the quality of the law, requiring it to be 
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in line with the rule of law.
879
 Further, the Court recognised that, in attempting to ensure the 
organic nature of the law in an ever-changing society, vagueness can be an ensuing issue. Also, 
in Sanoma Uitgevers BV v The Netherlands, the Court held that domestic law must ‘afford a 
measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights 
safeguarded by the Convention.’880 In Féret v Belgium, the Court found that the national courts 
relied on a national law which criminalised certain acts inspired by racism or xenophobia and, 
thus, the interference was indeed prescribed by law.
881
 This part of the Court’s test, that being the 
determination of whether interference has been prescribed by law, has not posed a problem for 
hate speech case-law and, thus, this part of the Court’s review on reasonableness will not be 
further considered.  
 
3.4.2  Necessary in a Democratic Society 
Article 10 (2) of the ECHR outlines that the interference in question must be ‘necessary in a 
democratic society.’ As stated beforehand, the second part of the condition is not included in 
Article 19 of the ICCPR, which simply outlines the factors which make a restriction necessary. 
In Handyside v The United Kingdom, as well as recognising the central role held by the freedom 
of expression in a democratic society, the Court outlined the characteristics that make up such a 
society, namely ‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic 
society.’882 In United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey, the Court held that 
‘democracy is the only political model contemplated by the Convention and, accordingly, the 
only one compatible with it.’ 883  In Ždanoka v Latvia, the Court more generally held that 
‘democracy constitutes a fundamental element of the European public order.’884 However, in 
order to ensure a functioning democracy, the conflict between the freedom of expression in the 
realm of problematic speech and the values of equality and non-discrimination must be resolved. 
The resulting balancing test emanates from the premise that one must grant due consideration to 
‘the democratic importance of freedom of speech on the one hand and the harmful consequences 
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of hate propaganda on the other hand.’885 In Klass v Germany, the Court affirmed that ‘some 
compromise between the requirements for defending democratic society and individual rights is 
inherent in the system of the Convention.’886  In Thoma v Luxembourg, the Court held that 
restrictions on rights guaranteed by the Convention must be narrowly construed and enforced in 
the interest of public and social life, in its entirety, as well as in the interest of individuals making 
up that society.
887
 In Ždanoka v Latvia, the Court held that ‘in order to guarantee the stability and 
effectiveness of a democratic system, the State may be required to take specific measures to 
protect itself.’888 However, as noted in United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey, 
the problem which arises is how to strike an equitable balance in defending democracy whilst 
simultaneously protecting individual rights and freedoms. For the purpose of mitigating the 
potential risks involved, this balancing must be conducted meticulously, with due care and 
consideration given to all the actors and institutions involved. Regardless of a certain variation 
made by the Court when deciphering the margin of appreciation, a State should, in fact, be the 
guiding light in the balancing exercise between the different rights at stake so as to ensure that 
individuals and groups do not use and abuse the genuine aims and objectives of Article 10(1) for 
purposes contrary to the Convention. This is the precise outcome which the Court attempts to 
avoid in cases involving right-wing extremism, either through the enforcement of Article 10(2) 
or of Article 17.  
 
Further, in Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, the Court found that whilst the adjective 
‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article 10(2) ‘is not synonymous with indispensable, neither 
has it the flexibility of such expressions as admissible, ordinary, useful, reasonable or desirable 
and that it implies the existence of a pressing social need.’889 When assessing the pressing social 
need and the proportionality of the interference, the State must consider whether the expression 
contributes ‘to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs’890 or 
whether the expression is simply aimed at destructing democratic principles and values. In 
                                                          
885
 Stefan Sottiaux, ‘Bad Tendencies in the ECtHR's Hate Speech Jurisprudence’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional 
Law Review 1, 48  
886
 Klass and Others v Germany, App. no. 5029/71 (ECHR 6 September 1978) para. 59 
887
 Thoma v Luxembourg, App. no. 38432/97 (ECHR 29 March 2001) para. 48 
888
 Ždanoka v Latvia, App. no. 58278/00 (ECHR 16 March 2006) para. 100 
889
 Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, App. no. 6538/74 (ECHR 26 April 1979) para.59 
890
 Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, App. no. 13470/87 (ECHR, 20 September 1994) para. 49 
196 
 
relation to far-right rhetoric, the Commission directly interlinked the prohibition of National 
Socialist activities with the preservation of a democratic society. More particularly, in X v. 
Austria, the applicant was convicted on charges of neo-Nazi activities and sentenced to nine 
months’ imprisonment for violating a constitutional act dealing with Nationalist Socialist 
Activities. The Commission examined whether the restriction was necessary in a democratic 
society and stated that Austria recognised the dangers to social order brought about by National 
Socialism, and held that ‘it is scarcely to be supposed that the EComHR, whose duty it is, after 
all, to preserve this democratic order in the European States will disagree with her.’891 
 
3.4.3 Legitimate Aim 
In order to be accepted, interference to the freedom of expression must pursue a legitimate aim. 
In this realm, the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others should be central to any 
discussion pertaining to hate speech, taking into account the need to protect the rights of those 
groups who may be subject to such hatred. In assessing limitations on the freedom of expression, 
the Court in Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria considered whether the expressions are 
‘gratuitously offensive to others and, thus, an infringement of their rights and which, therefore, 
do not contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human 
affairs.’892 In Seurot v France, the Court dealt with the dismissal of a teacher who wrote an 
article for a school newsletter describing French people of North African origin as “Muslim 
hordes that it was impossible to assimilate.” Here, the Court found that the interference to the 
expression in question pursued at least one of the legitimate aims of the Convention, namely the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others.
893
 In finding no violation of Article 10 in Féret v 
Belgium, the Court accepted a national restriction of racist and xenophobic expression as being 
necessary for the protection of the rights of others and for preventing disorder. The Court 
summarised the effects of hate speech on the rights of others, namely that ‘insults, ridicule or 
defamation aimed at specific population groups or incitation to discrimination, as in this case, 
sufficed for the authorities to give priority to fighting hate speech when confronted by the 
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irresponsible use of freedom of expression which undermined people’s dignity, or even their 
safety.’894 
 
Given the devastating effect of the atrocities committed by Nazis during World War II, 
revisionist speech has been central to the development of hate speech law on a CoE level, with 
the Commission and the Court having adopted a stable approach to any kinds of speech which 
seek to negate the occurrence of the Holocaust. They have dealt with such cases in the sphere of, 
inter alia, protecting the rights of others. For example, in X v the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the individual displayed pamphlets describing the Holocaust as a ‘zionist swindle or lie’ on his 
garden fence. His conviction included a civil prosecution for group defamation and a criminal 
conviction for incitement to hatred. The Commission affirmed that such interference is necessary 
in a democratic society and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the rights of 
others. Here, the Commission underlined that a democratic society ‘rests on the principles of 
tolerance and broadmindedness which the pamphlets in question clearly failed to observe.’895 In 
Remer v Germany, the Commission held that a conviction for incitement to racial hatred by 
publishing information which denied that Jews had been gassed in Nazi Germany fell within the 
legitimate aims of preventing disorder and crime as well as protecting the rights of others. 
896
 
However, just a month after Remer, in Honsik v Austria, the Commission did not make reference 
to the legitimate aims pursued in allowing restrictions on this type of expression as contained in 
Article 10 of the ECHR, but instead simply stated that the restriction in question was necessary 
in a democratic society as incorporated in Article 10 given that, if permitted, this expression 
would contribute to the destruction of the rights and freedoms of the Convention. The approach 
in Honsik appears to be a mélange of Article 10 and Article 17 with the Court enforcing the 
former but essentially upholding the purpose of the latter, an issue which will be discussed more 
extensively further on.  
 
Interrelated to revisionist speech and within the framework of promoting National Socialism as 
an ideology, through rhetoric of hate more generally, the Court and, previously, the Commission, 
have repeatedly stressed their incongruence with the Convention’s central objectives. For 
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example, in B.H., M.W., H.P. and G.K v Austria, the Commission held that the prohibition of 
activities involving expression of national socialist ideas was necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security and territorial integrity as well as for the prevention of crime 
and, hence, found the interference to be within the realm of Article 10(2) of the ECHR.  
Moreover, it noted that ‘National Socialism is a totalitarian doctrine incompatible with 
democracy and human rights and that its adherents undoubtedly pursue aims of the kind referred 
to in Article 17 of the ECHR.
897
  This case, thus, found a violation of Article 10 and concluded 
with a reference to Article 17. 
 
Thus, hate speech has been legitimately restricted for the purpose of protecting the rights of 
others and, in certain contexts, for the purposes of protecting national security, territorial 
integrity and the prevention of crime and disorder with Honsik being the only aforementioned 
case not clearly applying one of the legitimate aims as incorporated in the article under 
consideration.  
 
3.4.4 Proportionality 
The doctrine of proportionality is significant in considering restrictions to Article 10 as it is a key 
issue to be taken into account when looking at the reasonableness of an interference, as reflected 
in Article 10 cases below. More particularly, as established in Handyside, ‘every formality, 
condition, restriction or penalty imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued.’898 In the case of Lehideux and Isorni v France, the proportionality principle was 
the game breaker. Here, the Court noted that the choice of criminal proceedings rather than other 
means of intervention through the civil pathway was ‘disproportionate and, as such, unnecessary 
in a democratic society.’ 899 As a result, the Court found a breach of Article 10. As the Court 
noted in Incal v Turkey,
900
 and reiterated in other cases, such as Balsytė-Lideikienė v Lithuania, 
the government must avoid resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where it is possible to 
use other means. In the case against Lithuania, it nevertheless held that governments could adopt 
measures, even of a criminal nature which have the potential to respond ‘appropriately and 
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without excess to such remarks.’901 Furthermore, the nature and severity of the penalties are key 
factors to be taken into consideration when appraising the proportionality of an interference of 
Article 10.
902
 Within the same mindset, in Féret, the Court considered the proportionality of the 
restriction which was of a non-criminal nature, thereby, reflecting the Contracting party’s 
restraint when resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where other means are available.  
 
3.5 Violence as a Key Element to Prohibiting Expression  
Closely related to hate speech is the concept of violence. The majority of cases in which the 
ECtHR considered this theme, and particularly its glorification and/or incitement, were in 
relation to cases against Turkey dealing particularly with the Kurdish issue. Although this form 
of expression does not fall within the concept of right-wing extremism per se, the rationales and 
discussions, therein, are pertinent to the discussion of right-wing extremist rhetoric and will, 
therefore, be referred to. Moreover, in relation to inciting violence though expression, the Court 
and Commission have been clear, stating that a conviction for the offence of incitement to 
violence through expression is a justified interference with freedom of expression as it seeks to 
ensure public safety and prevent disorder or crime.
903
 Violence was also a central issue in 
Erdoǧdu and Ince v Turkey, in which the Court stated that an interviewee ‘expressed his view of 
the Kurdish question and related matters in moderate terms and he did not associate himself in 
any manner with the use of violence.’904 As a result, the Court found that there had been a 
violation of Article 10 as the restriction imposed was to deter public discussion on important 
political issues rather than limiting hate speech. In Sener v Turkey, the Court found that the 
statements in question could be deemed to be shocking and disturbing for the public but the 
author did not associate himself with the use of violence in any context and, on the contrary, 
promoted the need to employ peaceful methods in resolving the Kurdish issue. In considering 
inciting or fuelling violence, the Court underlined that it is necessary to take into consideration 
the contextual backdrop in which the expression occurs. Namely, in Karatas v Turkey, the Court 
underlined that, in light of the sensitivity of the security situation in south-eastern Turkey and the 
subsequent need for the authorities to be alert to acts capable of fuelling additional violence, the 
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measures taken against the applicant can be said to meet the legitimate aims of protecting 
national security and territorial integrity and preventing disorder and crime.
905
 The issue of 
violence was extrapolated on in concurring opinions in Gerger. More specifically, the joint 
concurring opinion of Judges Palm, Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall and Greve in Gerger v 
Turkey underlined that it is necessary to focus less on words employed and more on the context 
in which expression occurred. In particular, the questions that need to be answered include 
whether the language was intended to inflame or incite to violence and whether there was a real 
and genuine risk that it might actually do so. In Judge Bonello’s concurring opinion in Gerger, it 
was underlined that violence needs to be real and actual with punishment of those promoting 
violence being justifiable in a democratic society ‘only if the incitement were such as to create a 
clear and present danger.’906  In Gűndűz v Turkey, the Court recognised that some protection can 
be granted to expression which is contrary to the objectives of the Convention as long as it does 
not constitute incitement to violence or hatred. Here, the Court considered that simply defending 
Sharia was not to be regarded as hate speech if there is no reference to violence.
907
 In Dicle v 
Turkey, the Court underlined the significant role that violence plays when determining whether 
hate speech exists and, thus, if expression should be restricted. More particularly, it held that the 
expression under consideration did ‘not encourage violence, armed resistance or insurrection and 
does not constitute hate speech.’908 Intertwined with inciting violence is the incitement to hatred, 
as referred to in Féret v Belgium. Here the Court underlined that ‘incitation to hatred did not 
necessarily call for specific acts of violence or other offences. Insults, ridicule or defamation 
aimed at specific population groups or incitation to discrimination, as in this case, sufficed for 
the authorities to give priority to fighting hate speech when confronted by the irresponsible use 
of freedom of expression which undermined people’s dignity, or even their safety.’909 
 
In relation to the glorification of violence, in Leroy v France, the Court dealt with a restriction to 
the expression of a cartoonist who published a drawing of the attack on the twin towers of the 
World Trade Centre in a newspaper with a caption which parodied the advertising slogan of a 
famous brand: “We have all dreamt of it... Hamas did it.” Here, the Court found no violation of 
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Article 10 by stating that the drawing supported and glorified the violent destruction of the twin 
towers. The Court based its finding on the caption which accompanied it and noted that the 
applicant had expressed his moral support for those whom he presumed to be the perpetrators of 
the attacks.
910
  
 
3.6 Freedom of Expression – Concluding Comments  
In sum, the freedom of expression is clearly a significant constituent of any analysis pertaining to 
the utterances of extremist right-wing groups, associations, political parties and their 
representatives. Relevant cases, which initially dealt with anti-Semitism and neo-Nazi rhetoric 
can be seen from the early days of the Commission. Notwithstanding that the context of the cases 
may have altered as time has gone by to include issues such as Islamophobia, anti-immigration 
rhetoric and Romaphobia, the position of the Commission and the Court remains steadfast.  More 
particularly, even though there exists an inadequate definitional framework in relation to the term 
‘hate speech,’ in the framework of the judicial deliberations, it is clear that both the Court and 
Commission deem this type of speech to be undeserving of the protection of the Convention, 
with the institutions referring either to the limitation grounds found in Article 10(2) or expelling 
the speech from Convention protection through Article 17, which will be discussed further down. 
With regard to speech inciting violence, this must definitely be prohibited when it seeks to incite, 
fuel or glorify violence, with the interrelated term of ‘hatred’ taking on a broad meaning as 
extrapolated in Féret.  
 
4. Freedom of Assembly and Association  
4.1 General Overview of Article 11 ECHR  
Article 11 of the ECHR on the freedom of assembly and association provides that: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
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security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by 
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State. 
 
In Socialist Party v Turkey, the ECtHR underlined that the protection of opinions and the 
freedom to express them, within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention is one of the core 
objectives of the freedoms of assembly and association. It further held that this relationship 
‘applies all the more in relation to political parties in view of their essential role in ensuring 
pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy.’911 Article 11 encompasses both the freedom 
of association and the freedom of assembly, unlike its international counterpart in the ICCPR, 
which deals with these two rights in separate articles. It is clear that Articles 10 and 11 are 
interrelated and interconnected and, as a result, many of the central issues and standards 
discussed in the sphere of Article 10 are equally relevant in respect of Article 11.  
 
In the following sections, the freedom of association will be looked at, starting with an analysis 
of what constitutes an association, followed by an evaluation of the circumstances in which this 
freedom can be restricted. After that, the freedom of assembly and how it has been assessed by 
the ECtHR in the realm of right-wing extremism will be considered.  
 
4.2 What Constitutes an Association? 
As noted initially by the EComHR in Young, James and Webster v The United Kingdom, for an 
association to exist it must be voluntary and must pursue a common goal.
912
 However, an 
association cannot be a casual gathering of persons seeking to enjoy each other’s company but 
must, instead, be characterised by a certain degree of organisation and stability.
913
 The EComHR 
and the ECtHR, the Report of the Venice Commission 
914
 and the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
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Rights
915
 all deem political parties to constitute an association within the realm of Article 11 of 
the Convention. For example, the ECtHR holds that ‘political parties are a form of association, 
and that, in view of the importance of democracy in the Convention system, there can be no 
doubt that political parties come within the scope of Article 11.’916 In a number of cases, the 
Court has reiterated the significant position held by political parties in a democracy. In United 
Communist Party of Turkey and  Others v Turkey, the Court stated that ‘in view of the role 
played by political parties, any measure taken against them affected both freedom of association 
and, consequently, democracy in the State concerned.’917 Further, it underlined the particularly 
important role played by political parties in comparison to other associations or groups in a 
democracy given that ‘by the proposal for an overall societal model which they put before the 
electorate and by their capacity to implement those proposals once they come to power, political 
parties differ from other organizations which intervene in the political arena.’918  In Dicle (on 
behalf of the Democratic Party (DEP) v Turkey, the Court stated that, to ensure a functional 
democracy, political bodies should be able to make public proposals, even if they conflicted with 
mainstream governmental policy or prevailing public opinion.
919
 Thus, notwithstanding the 
important role an association plays or should play in a democracy, this does not mean that it is 
endowed with an indefinite and unmonitored capacity to participate and promote values and 
themes that are contrary to principles underlying democracy, nor does it mean that the methods 
used by it to achieve its aims and objectives can go against these principles. In KPD v Germany, 
the Commission recognised that there always exists the possibility that, in enforcing the rights as 
provided for by Article 11 (as well as Article 10) of the ECHR, a political party may, in fact, be 
seeking to pursue the destruction of democracy.
920
 Also, the Court noted that a political party 
may work towards a change in the law of a State only under the condition that ‘the means used to 
that end must be legal and democratic … [and]… the change proposed must itself be compatible 
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with fundamental democratic principles.’921 As a result, a political party inciting violence or 
policies and practices which contravene democratic principles cannot seek protection under 
Article 11 against any resulting penalties. As is the case with Article 10, democracy entails 
concessions and compromises between individuals and groups making up a society in order to 
satisfy the needs of all the different associations whilst simultaneously preserving values, such as 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are inherently interrelated to democracy.  
 
In Vona v Hungary, the Court dealt with the role of Article 11 in the realm of social 
organisations rather than political parties. It distinguished between political parties and social 
organisations and movements, stating that they may have the ability to influence the 
development of politics and public discourse but, unlike political parties, they enjoy less legal 
privileges to do so.
922
 Nevertheless, given the actual political impact which social organisations 
and movements have when any danger to democracy and its principles is being evaluated, due 
regard must be given to this impact
923
. As a result, this article is central to any coherent analysis 
of right-wing extremism which often takes the form of a political party as well as other types of 
associations. 
 
4.3 Legitimate Interferences to the Freedom of Association 
The freedom of association is a central tenet of a functioning democracy. In relation to this 
freedom, the ECtHR noted that ‘the way in which national legislation enshrines this freedom and 
its practical application by the authorities reveals the state of democracy in the country 
concerned.’924 Nevertheless, this freedom is not granted an absolute status by the ECHR as it can 
be legitimately restricted for the purposes provided in part two of the article. The grounds which 
legitimately exist to restrict the freedom of association are nearly identical in both the ICCPR 
and the ECHR, with the European Convention including the prevention of disorder or crime 
whilst the ICCPR refers to the interests of public order. In deciphering whether dissolution is 
permitted, the Court clearly considers the limitation clause as provided for by Article 11 (2). 
More particularly, the Court looks at whether the interference is prescribed by law, is necessary 
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in a democratic society, pursues a legitimate aim and is proportional to the aim pursued. At a 
first glance, the approach taken by the Court in limiting Articles 10 and 11 is similar. However, 
when one looks at the relevant case-law, it becomes clear that this is not, in fact, the case. In 
view of the central role political parties and, to an extent, social movements play in a democracy, 
the necessity standard applied when restricting association is strictly interpreted.  
 
The method adopted by the ECtHR, in relation to restrictions imposed on allegedly anti-
democratic parties, has been predominantly established by several cases involving Turkey as 
well as the recent case of Vona v Hungary, which dealt with a social association/movement 
rather than with a political party directly, notwithstanding an affiliation between the association, 
movement and political party, as will be explained further on. Even though the Turkish cases do 
not involve extreme right-wing movements, as understood in this analysis, the methodology 
created and implemented by the Court as a means to assess legitimacy of dissolution is relevant 
to this discussion. Refah Partisi v Turkey dealt with the dissolution of an Islamic political party 
and the suspension of the political rights of the other applicants who were leaders of the party at 
that time. Vona v Hungary included several types of association. More particularly, the 
Hungarian Guard Association (Magyar Gárda Egyesület) had been founded by ten members of 
the political party Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom), an 
extreme right-wing party. The applicant was chairman of the association. Uniformed members of 
the Movement held rallies and demonstrations throughout Hungary, including in villages with 
large Roma populations, and called for the defence of “ethnic Hungarians” against so-called 
“Gipsy criminality”. These demonstrations and rallies were not prohibited by the authorities. One 
of these demonstrations, involving about two-hundred activists, was organised in 
Tatárszentgyörgy, a village of some 1,800 inhabitants. The police were present and did not allow 
the march to pass through a street inhabited by Roma families.  In 2007, in reaction to this event, 
the Budapest Chief Prosecutor’s Office lodged a court action seeking the dissolution of the 
Association. The Prosecutor’s Office was of the view that the Movement constituted a division 
of the Association, and indeed its activity represented a significant part of the association. In 
2008, the Budapest Regional Court ruled in favour of the Prosecutor’s Office and disbanded the 
Association. The Regional Court acknowledged the symbiotic relationship between the 
Association and Movement but noted that the legal effect of the judgement was, nevertheless, 
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limited to the dissolution of the Association, since in the Court’s view the Movement did not 
have any legal personality. In 2009, the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the judgement of 
the Regional Court but established a closer connection between the two entities, also extending 
the scope of the judgement to the Movement. Given the central role Vona has in the sphere of the 
Court’s treatment of right-wing extremist association and assembly, and given the important 
legal principles developed in Refah Partisi and subsequently upheld in Vona, the analysis of the 
legitimate restriction of association will focus predominantly on these two cases.  
 
It must be noted that the Court has set a high threshold for the limitation of association. In Refah 
Partisi, the Court underlined that where the prohibition of political parties is concerned ‘only 
convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on such parties’ freedom of 
association.’ 925 In Vona, the Court underlined that the threshold should be even higher for 
associations given that ‘the incidental advocacy of anti-democratic ideas is not sufficient in itself 
to justify banning a political party on grounds of compelling necessity even less so in the case of 
an association which cannot make use of the special status granted to political parties.’ 926  
 
An assessment of the methodology imposed by the Court to assess the legitimacy of interference 
to this freedom will follow. 
 
4.3.1 Is the Interference Prescribed by Law?  
In order to satisfy the expression ‘prescribed by law,’ the Court follows the same route of 
determination as it does with the freedom of expression. More particularly, the interference must 
be based on domestic law which is foreseeable and accessible. As mentioned in the framework of 
freedom of expression, it is impossible to ensure such precision given the organic nature of 
situations which the law seeks to regulate. A law which provides a certain extent of flexibility 
and discretion is not, per se, inconsistent with the requirement of precision provided that the ‘the 
scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having 
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regard to the legitimate aim in question, to give the individual adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference.’927 
 
4.3.2 Does the Interference Pursue a Legitimate Aim?  
In Refah Partisi, the Court found that, in light of the importance of secularism in Turkey, the 
interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting national security and public safety, 
prevention of disorder of crime and protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
928
 Thus, the 
analysis of the legitimate aim occurred against the backdrop of secularism with the Court taking 
into account an appraisal of the situation in the State under consideration and specifically the 
‘general interest in preserving the principle of secularism in that context in the country' 929 as 
well as its own previous statements of secularism being a fundamental principle in line with the 
rule of law, human rights and democracy. 
930
 Further, in this case, the Court held that the 
dissolution of a political party with an anti-democratic mandate is ‘also consistent with 
Contracting Parties’ positive obligations under Article 1 of the Convention to secure the rights 
and freedoms of persons within their jurisdiction.’931 In Vona v Hungary, the Court mentioned 
that the interference pursued a legitimate aim of ensuring public safety, preventing disorder and 
protecting the rights of others, regardless of the applicant’s argument that no specific instance of 
disorder or violation of the rights of others had been demonstrated.  
932
 The Court then went on 
to reiterate that a State is entitled to take preventive action to ensure the protection of the rights 
of others, in this case Roma persons, in the event that their rights and democratic values are at 
serious risk, one such value being the ‘co-existence of  members of society free from racial 
segregation.’ 933 In this realm, the Court noted that the removal of the threat to the rights of 
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others could only be ensured by ‘removing the organisational back-up of the Movement provided 
by the Association.’934 
 
4.3.3 Is the Interference Necessary in a Democratic Society?  
In Refah Partisi, the Court held that the dissolution of an association should constitute the last 
resort, with less intrusive measures being implemented when possible. In applying the necessity 
test, ‘the right of association is accorded particular protection in the maintenance of pluralist 
opinion and democracy.’935 As is the case with the freedom of expression and Article 10(2), the 
restrictions to Article 11 are necessary in a democratic society only when there exists a pressing 
social need to invoke the restrictions. In order to make this determination, the Court must 
consider three factors, namely whether a risk to democracy was sufficiently imminent, whether 
the acts and speeches of the leaders and members of the political party were imputable to the 
party as a whole and whether the acts and speeches imputable to the political party promoted a 
societal model incompatible with the concept of a democratic society.
936
  Further, in determining 
the necessity of the impugned measure, the Court must appreciate the contextual and, sometimes, 
historical setting in which a particular dissolution occurs. For example, in Refah Partisi, the 
Court considered the general interest in preserving secularism in Turkey.
937
 The issue of context 
was deemed significant in other Article 11 cases, such as Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v Spain, 
where the Court underlined that, in view of the Spanish experience in the field of terrorist 
attacks, a link with ETA and the applicant parties could objectively result in a threat to 
democracy. 
938
 
 
4.3.4 Is the Interference Proportionate to the Legitimate Aim Pursued? 
In Refah Partisi, the Court noted ‘that the nature and severity of the interference are…factors to 
be taken into account when assessing its proportionality.’939 In Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v 
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Spain, the Court held that, in order to determine whether an interference was proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued, it must consider it in light of the case as a whole.
940
 In Refah Partisi, the 
Court noted that, after the party’s dissolution, only five of its MPs temporarily forfeited their 
parliamentary office and their role as leaders of a political party. The one hundred and fifty two 
remaining MPs continued to sit in Parliament. In Vona, the Court noted that no additional 
sanction was imposed on the Association or the Movement or their members who were in no 
way prevented from continuing political activities in other forms.  
 
4.4 Violence as a Key Element in Limiting Association  
As is the case with the freedom of expression, the issue of violence is central in ascertaining 
whether there has been a breach of Article 11. In Refah Partisi, the Court considered that the 
members of the party in question mentioned the possibility of resorting to force to overcome the 
obstacles that Refah Partisi was facing in the political arena.
941
 The Court recognised that, while 
its leaders did not, in government documents, call for the use of force and violence as political 
weapon, ‘they did not take prompt practical steps to distance themselves from those members of 
[Refah] who had publicly referred with approval to the possibility of using force against 
politicians who opposed them.’942 In Vona v Hungary, the Court underlined that, unless the 
impugned association can reasonably be regarded as a hotbed for violence or incarnating a 
negation of democratic principles, restrictions to the freedom of association are incompatible 
with the Convention.
943
  
 
4.5 Limiting Association - Destruction of Democracy 
Limitations and restrictions may be imposed on practices, mandates and activities which are 
promoted and implemented by political parties and social organisations and movements through 
the enforcement of Article 11(2) and/or Article 17. In particular relation to political parties, the 
Court emphasised the need to protect them vigorously ‘in view of their essential role in ensuring 
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pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy.’944 In fact, it has repeatedly underlined that 
the dissolution of a political party and restricting party members from carrying out their activities 
for a particular time period are measures to be resorted to only in the most serious of cases.
945
 
Notwithstanding the high threshold that is to be attained in relation to the potential or actual 
destructiveness of an association, in the two central cases of Refah Partisi v Turkey and Vona v 
Hungary, the Court upheld the dissolution of the Turkish Welfare Party and the Hungarian right-
wing extremist social movement and association respectively. With regard to the latter, the Court 
underlined that the dissolution of associations and movements is ‘a sanction of comparable 
gravity’946 to that of political parties and, therefore, such a measure must be as relevant and 
sufficient as in the case of dissolution of a political party. It also recognised that, in the case of an 
association and in light of its more limited national influence, ‘justification for preventative 
restrictive measures may be less compelling than in the case of a political party.’947 Moreover, it 
distinguished, yet again, between a political party and other types of association by noting that 
‘the incidental advocacy of anti-democratic ideas is not enough, per se, for banning a political 
party in the sense of compelling necessity and even less so in the case of an association.’948 
Despite these statements, the actual judgements reflect that the same route and analysis are taken 
for registered and unregistered movements and groups, with the guiding factor always being 
whether the interference in question is permitted under Article 11(2) or whether the activities of 
such an entity fall outside the scope of the Convention, as per Article 17.  
 
In seeking to determine the potentially destructive impact of an association, the Court has 
warned of associations which may hide their true intentions in trying to avoid prohibitions or 
sanctions. In Refah Partisi, the Court considered that the ‘constitution and programme of a 
political party cannot be taken into account as the sole criterion for determining its objectives 
and intentions.’949 The political experience of the Contracting States has shown that, in the past, 
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political parties with aims contrary to the fundamental principles of democracy have not revealed 
such aims in their official publications until after taking power. As a result, the Court notes that 
‘the content of the programme must be compared with the actions of the party’s leaders and the 
positions they defend. Taken together, these acts and stances may be relevant in proceedings for 
the dissolution of a political party, provided that as a whole they disclose its aims and intentions.’ 
950
 In relation to Vona, it was the totalitarian and racist nature of the association that led to its 
destructiveness. The Court made clear that it does not tolerate racist expression or activity and 
acknowledged that the Movement relied on a race-based opposition to the Roma minority.
951
 
Moreover, the Court noted that ‘it is not at all improbable that totalitarian movements, organised 
in the form of political parties, might do away with democracy, after prospering under the 
democratic regime.’ 952   In the concurring opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque, it was 
underlined that the ECtHR had reiterated the significance of combatting racial discrimination 
including hate speech and racial violence. Furthermore, it underlined that ‘the vulnerability of 
the group against whom discrimination and violence takes place has been a factor in the Court’s 
analysis.’953 This opinion also emphasised the positive duty States Parties have to ‘criminalize 
speech or other forms of dissemination of racism, xenophobia or ethnic intolerance, prohibit 
every assembly and dissolve every group, organization, association or party that promotes 
them.’954  
 
Thus, as noted by the Court in Refah Partisi and then in Vona, political parties which aim for the 
destruction of democracy cannot enjoy Convention protection against penalties imposed on those 
grounds. However, due care must be taken not to surpass the legitimate objective, which, in this 
case, is the protection of democracy. Therefore, the Court has stipulated that limitations and 
restrictions are not to be taken lightly and that ‘only convincing and compelling reasons can 
justify restrictions on such parties’ freedom of association.’955 
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4.6 Dissolution of an Association – Establishing a Sufficiently Imminent Risk 
The intricately complex question of timing in the realm of dissolution of associations must be 
considered with due care to avoid unsubstantiated actions which constitute a breach of Article 
11, on the one hand, whilst avoiding harmful consequences of destructive associations on the 
other. In Refah Partisi v Turkey, the Court held that a State may reasonably prevent the execution 
of a policy which is against the letter and spirit of the Convention. Also, the Court underlined 
that a ‘State cannot be required to wait, before intervening, until a political party has seized 
power and begun to take concrete steps to implement a policy incompatible with the standards of 
the Convention and democracy, even though the danger of that policy for democracy is 
sufficiently established and imminent.’956 In that case, the Court established a threshold for the 
dissolution of associations through the ‘sufficiently imminent risk to democracy’ test. In Vona v 
Hungary, the Court found that the State may also take such preventive measures to protect 
democracy against such non – party entities ‘if sufficiently imminent prejudice to the rights of 
others undermines the fundamental values upon which a democratic society rests and 
functions.’957 Here, the Court reiterated the provision related to the timing of intervention, stating 
that ‘the State cannot be required to wait, before intervening, until a political movement takes 
action to undermine democracy or has recourse to violence.’958 
 
4.7 The Freedom of Racist Association and its Effects in the Workplace 
In two cases brought against the United Kingdom, namely, the Associated Society of Locomotive 
Engineers & Firemen (ASLEF) v The United Kingdom and Redfearn v The United Kingdom, the 
Court had to decipher the freedom of association rights in the sphere of a far-right party, namely 
the BNP, vis-a-vis membership of a trade union and employment respectively. In ASLEF v The 
United Kingdom, the applicant, a trade union, alleged that it had been prevented by the national 
courts from expelling one of its members due to his membership of the BNP. In considering this 
case, the ECtHR held that the central question was whether the State had struck an equitable 
balance between the rights of the member and those of the trade Union.
959
 It held that Article 11 
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of the ECHR entailed the right of trade unions to choose its members
960
 and so, this, in addition 
to the fact that no particular hardship was suffered by the member as a result of his expulsion 
from the trade union 
961
 led to a violation of the trade union’s Article 11 rights.962 In Redfearn v 
The United Kingdom, the applicant had been dismissed by his employer following his 
identification as a candidate for the BNP in upcoming local elections. In considering whether the 
applicant’s right to freedom of association, as enshrined in Article 11, had been violated, the 
ECtHR noted that the appropriate remedy for dismissing a person on his political beliefs would 
be a claim for unfair dismissal under national law,
963
 a remedy which the applicant was not 
entitled to because he had not been employed for the one year qualifying period.
964
 Thus, in light 
of the absence of this remedy and taking into consideration that the BNP was not illegal under 
national law,
965
 the Court found that a ‘legal system which allows dismissal from employment 
solely on account of the employee’s membership of a political party carries with it the potential 
for abuse.’ 966 In finding a violation of Article 11, the Court made no reference to the nature of 
BNP’s mandate, ideology, structure or objectives, which are directly interlinked with far-right 
extremism.  
 
4.8 Freedom of Association: Conclusion  
Thus, the freedom of association is clearly a significant doctrine to consider when looking at the 
conduct of extreme right-wing political parties, associations and movements. In this ambit, the 
Court dealt with a wave of Turkish claims eventually culminating in the landmark case of Refah 
Partisi. Notwithstanding the significant points of law developed that are directly applicable to 
the sphere of right-wing extremism, it only once had to deal with a right-wing extremist 
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association per se, namely in Vona v Hungary. By assessing the above cases, it is concluded that 
the discourse pertaining to the interpretation of Article 11 has resulted in a content-based, 
pragmatic approach to the limitations that can be legitimately imposed thereon. This applies 
particularly in relation to Vona v Hungary which not only incorporated principles and points, as 
developed in the previous Turkish cases, but also constitutes in itself a well-rounded precedent 
for future cases as a result of a balancing of rights and duties as these emanate from Article 11. 
As such, Vona has set the judicial scene for permitting the banning of extremist right-wing 
groups. Further, in the sphere of employment, the Court endows trade unions with the right to 
choose membership on grounds of ideologies and belief systems but imposes upon States to 
protect its citizens from being dismissed from their employment on such grounds.  
 
4.9 Freedom of Assembly 
4.9.1 Freedom of Assembly – General Overview 
As well as the freedom of association, the freedom of assembly is a significant constituent of 
Article 11. The freedom of assembly constitutes a significant tool for right-wing extremist 
groups to promote their belief-systems through demonstrations, rallies and marches. The 
importance of assembly was noted in Fáber v Hungary where the Court held that interferences to 
the freedom of assembly and expression ‘other that in cases of incitement to violence or rejection 
of democratic principles….do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger it.’967  This  
section will consider two cases which are directly linked to the far-right use of assembly to 
promote ideas and values, namely Fáber v Hungary and Vona v Hungary while briefly 
mentioning the case of Vajnai v Hungary. The aim is to consider in what circumstances the 
Court permits this freedom to be restricted and on what grounds.  
 
4.9.2 Legitimately Limiting Assembly 
Fáber v Hungary involved the silent holding of an Árpád-striped flag by the applicant near a 
demonstration held by the Hungarian Socialist Party against racism and hatred. The police 
supervising the scene called on the applicant either to remove the banner or leave. The applicant 
refused to do so and was subsequently taken into custody and placed under interrogation, 
following which he was fined two hundred Euros for disobeying police instructions. In 
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considering whether the above facts led to a breach of Article 11 of the ECHR, the ECtHR held 
that this case requires ‘the right to freedom of assembly to be balanced against the right to 
freedom of expression and, allegedly, against the right of others to freedom of assembly.’968 
Further, it underlined that the freedom of assembly protects a demonstration that may annoy or 
offend persons and that the rights enshrined in this article must apply to all assemblies ‘except 
those where the organisers and participants have violent intentions or otherwise deny the 
foundations of a democratic society.’969 It further noted that the display of this particular flag, 
which was used by a totalitarian regime in Hungary, may create feelings of uneasiness but these 
sentiments ‘cannot alone set the limits of freedom of expression. To hold otherwise would mean 
that freedom of speech and opinion is subjected to the heckler’s veto.’970 In considering whether 
Article 17 could come into play, the Court recognised that, even though expression is not always 
allowed in certain times, places and contexts given the obligation to protect the honour of those 
murdered and their relatives, it was satisfied that the use of this flag did not include any abusive 
element, such as the contempt for the victims of a totalitarian regime.
971
 The Court did not offer 
any coherent explanation as to how it reached this conclusion, which can be arguably 
controversial given that the applicant was standing at the steps leading to the Danube 
embankment, the location where in 1944/45, during the Arrow Cross regime, Jews were 
exterminated in large numbers, holding a flag which albeit not illegal could be deemed offensive 
and, to use the Court’s own words, to reject democratic principles.  
 
In ensuring that the impugned measure is proportional to the legitimate aim pursued in the sphere 
of the freedom of assembly, the Court held that a balance must be struck between Article 11(2) 
and Article 10(2).
972
 In this case, the Court underlined that in determining the proportionality of 
a particular form of interference, the location and timing of the display of a symbol with multiple 
meanings plays a significant role. This is precisely why this decision may be considered 
somewhat peculiar. More particularly, as noted by the dissenting opinion of Judge Keller, the 
flag that was being held was associated in public opinion with the Nazi regime in Hungary and 
was raised at a place where grave human rights violations were committed during World War II. 
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If one takes into account that, in previous cases involving holocaust denial and related issues,
973
 
the Court and the Commission repeatedly found that such speech should not be afforded 
Convention protection, why then should this flag, which constitutes a form of expression during 
an assembly, be allowed? Notwithstanding that the Court recognised that where an applicant 
expresses contempt for victims of totalitarian regimes this may call for an application of Article 
17, it declared that ‘it is satisfied that in the instant case no such abusive element can be 
identified.’974 Unfortunately though, it reached this conclusion loosely with no explanation on 
how it did so. In finding a violation of Article 10, the Court took into account the non-violent 
nature of the applicant’s conduct, the distance held from the other demonstration and the absence 
of the potential risk of disturbance.
975
 So, in determining the risk of disturbance and thus 
reaching its verdict, the previously discussed ‘sufficiently imminent risk’ test finds a counterpart 
in the realm of the freedom of assembly and, particularly the right to demonstrate, with emphasis 
on the scale of potential consequences rather than their timing. More particularly, in this case, the 
Court held that the mere existence of a risk is not sufficient to ban a demonstration. Instead, 
authorities must concretely assess the possible scale of potential disturbance in order to be able 
to choose the appropriate measures to neutralise the threat of violence.
976
 Moreover, the peculiar 
element of this case is how the Court could have departed so much from previous cases 
involving, in particular, reviving the traumas of World War II. 
 
Before proceeding to Vona, reference must be made to the case of Vajnai v Hungary, which, 
although dealing with the left rather than the right-wing, contained similar facts to Fáber and the 
presentation of symbols. In Vajnai, the applicant only alleged a violation of Article 10. This case 
dealt with a form of visual expression during a demonstration, namely the wearing of a symbol 
associated with the past dictatorship and particularly a five-pointed red star. The applicant was 
subsequently prosecuted for wearing a totalitarian symbol in public. When finding that the 
impugned measure breached Article 10, the Court held that this expression could not be denied 
Convention protection simply because it makes certain individuals or groups feel uneasy or 
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because they are considered by some to be disrespectful.
977
 The reasons for the differences 
between these cases shall be extrapolated on further on.  
 
In Vona v Hungary, discussed previously, the Court also dealt with the issue of demonstrations 
given that the group in question carried out rallies using a paramilitary formation which was 
‘reminiscent of the Hungarian Nazi (Arrow Cross) movement which was the backbone of the 
regime that was responsible for…the mass extermination of Roma in Hungary.’978 Although the 
Court recognised that it was not requested to consider the extent to which the demonstrations 
constituted a legitimate exercise of the freedom of assembly, the demonstrations, nevertheless, 
had to be taken into account with a view to revealing the association’s actual objectives and 
mandate.
979
As a result, it made relevant comments and considerations in relation to the freedom 
of assembly. It held that, if the freedom of assembly is repeatedly enforced in the form of 
intimidating marches and rallies involving large groups, the State can take the necessary 
restrictive measures to ‘avert the danger which such large-scale intimidation represents for the 
functioning of democracy,’ 980 In deciding on the demonstrations, the ECtHR, as well as the 
national courts, placed particular emphasis on the fact that the rallies involved, inter alia, the 
display of the Arrow Cross symbols which brought about a ‘public menace by generating social 
tension and bringing about an atmosphere of impending violence.’981  As a result, and even 
though the Court underlined that no violence occurred during the association’s rallies, their 
military style formation and marching through villages, wearing ominous armbands reminiscent 
of the Arrow Cross and calling for racial division must have an ‘intimidating effect on members 
of a racial minority, especially when they are in their homes as a captive audience.’ 982  As 
summed up in the Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque, when considering the 
dissolution of a political party, one must also consider its ‘overall style... meaning its symbols, 
uniforms, formations, salutes, chants and other modes of expression.’983  
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In this light, the Court found that the activity of the association ‘exceeds the outer limit of the 
scope of protection secured by the Convention for expression or assemblies and amounts to 
intimidation.’984  Moreover, it pinpointed the interrelation between the freedom of expression 
and the freedom of assembly by underlining the fact that, in cases where expression is coupled 
with conduct and that conduct is ‘associated with the expression of ideas is intimidating or 
threatening or interferes with the free exercise or enjoyment by another of any Convention right 
or privilege on account of that person’s race, these considerations cannot be disregarded even in 
the context of Articles 10 and 11.’985 Here, it is apt to note that in relation to symbols used during 
assemblies, in the cases of Fáber v Hungary
986
 and Vajnai v Hungary
987
 which dealt with 
prosecuting the holding of an Árpád-striped flag
988
 and the wearing of a five-pointed red star
989
 
respectively, the Court found the impugned measures to have breached Article 10 and/or Article 
11. The reason for these differentiations is that Fáber and Vajnai lacked the intimidating and 
threatening environment created by the assembly in its entirety within the framework of Vona.  
 
4.9.3 Freedom of Assembly – Concluding Comments 
In sum, three conclusions can be made from the above analysis. Firstly, there exists a close 
interrelationship between Article 10 and Article 11. Secondly, that, in theory, assemblies which 
reject democratic principles should not be permitted.
990
 However, the bizarre point is that the 
symbols used in Fáber, were, in fact, representative of regimes and ideologies which reject 
democratic principles, allowing us to conclude that the Court fleetingly used the phrase ‘rejection 
of democratic principles’ without giving too much thought to the content and context of the cases. 
Thirdly, that the issue of violence plays a major role in deciphering whether an assembly should 
be permitted. As it noted,  if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the 
Convention is not to lose out on its meaning and objective, national authorities must be tolerant 
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towards peaceful gatherings, in situations where demonstrators do not engage in acts of 
violence.
991
 However, violence took a broad meaning in Vona, just as it did in its expression 
counterpart  Féret.  More particularly, in denouncing the rallies in Vona, it underlined that 
violence as a condition for permitting impugned measures did not necessarily entail actual 
violence but also incorporated the intimidation felt by victims targetted by the rallies, thereby, 
extending the scope of this condition. 
992
 In fact, it was the intimidating and racially 
discriminating nature of the rallies in Vona which directly affected the ‘others’ which 
subsequently allowed for a restriction on such exercises of the right to assembly. 
993
  
 
4.10 Freedoms of Association and Assembly – Concluding Comments 
In a nutshell, associations which seek to destroy democracy
994
 and assemblies which go beyond 
simply annoying or causing offence to persons who do not share the same belief system
995
 do not 
enjoy the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention. This is the general thematic 
framework regardless of cases, such as Fáber, which can be considered to be a hiccup when 
placed in the broader framework of dealing with expression and association relating to World 
War II hate. In the realm of right–wing extremism, the case of Vona, which was very much 
founded on principles developed in Refah Partisi, constitutes a significant precedent for other 
groups and movements promoting such ethnically exclusionist and/or expulsionist rhetoric and 
activities.  
 
5. Article 17 of the ECHR: Non-Destruction Clause 
5.1 Article 17 – Theoretical and Jurisprudential Overview 
Article 17 of the ECHR provides that: 
 
nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of 
                                                          
991
 Fáber v Hungary, App.no. 40721/08 (ECHR 24 July 2012) para. 47 
992
 Vona v Hungary, App. no. 35943/10 (ECHR 9 July 2013) para. 61 
993
 Vona v Hungary, App. no. 35943/10 (ECHR 9 July 2013) para. 66 
994
 The threshold as underlined in Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, App. no  41340/98, 
41342/98, 41344/98 (ECHR, 13 February 2003) para.98 
995
 The threshold as underlined in Stankov and the United Macedonian Organization Ilinden v Bulgaria, App. nos 
29221/95 and 29225/95 (ECHR 2 October 2001)  para.86 
220 
 
the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the Convention. 
 
‘Article 17 was originally included in the Convention in order to prevent the misappropriation of 
ECHR rights by those with totalitarian aims.’996 Further discussion on Article 17 and militant 
democracy is included in chapter two. The Court has enforced this article both in relation to 
freedom of expression and freedoms of association and assembly, but it has been mainly adopted 
in the realm of expression.  In his concurring opinion in Lehideux v France, Judge Jambrek 
expounded the meaning of actions which may trigger the implementation of Article 17 by noting 
that the aim of the actions in question must ‘be to spread violence or hatred, to resort to illegal or 
undemocratic methods, to encourage the use of violence, to undermine the nation’s democratic 
and pluralist political system, or to pursue objectives that are racist or likely to destroy the rights 
and freedoms of others.’997 In Witzsch v Germany, the Court similarly observed that ‘the general 
purpose of Article 17 is to make it impossible for individuals to take advantage of a right with 
the aim of promoting ideas contrary to the text and the spirit of the Convention.’998 As noted by 
the Court in Ždanoka v Latvia, the possibility exists that persons or groups may use the rights 
and freedoms emanating from the Convention in order to conduct themselves in such a manner 
as to destroy the rights or freedoms protected therein.
999
 As a result, the Court considered that 
‘no one should be authorised to rely on the Convention’s provisions in order to weaken or 
destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society.’1000 It is, thus, clear that Article 17 lies at 
the crossroads between regular situations and states of emergency, given that it may be excused 
from regular tests imposed by the Convention but is not as broad as Article 15. 
1001
 In relation to 
the duties imposed on States by the spirit of this article, Buyse has argued that ‘Article 17 
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enables States to act to protect freedoms and democracy but does not force them to do so.’1002 
However, when discussing Article 17 in Glimmerveen and J.Hagenbeek v the Netherlands, the 
Commission held that, in allowing the applicants to promote their belief-system with no 
restriction, the Dutch authorities would, in fact, be encouraging discrimination, which is 
prohibited by the ECHR and the ICCPR, thereby at the very least implying a positive obligation 
emanating from the article in question. 
 
5.2 Article 17 and Hate  Speech  
In the realm of hate speech, Article 17 has been applied more regularly, in whole or in part, by 
the Commission. Apart from Norwood and two revisionist cases, all relevant cases before the 
Court have been dealt with under the limitation clauses of Article 10. The following section will 
look at the application of Article 17 by the two institutions. In Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. 
the Netherlands, the facts of which are described above, the Commission ousted the speech in 
question from Convention protection through Article 17.  More particularly, the Commission 
noted that the policy promoted by the applicants contained elements of racial discrimination and, 
thus, held the view that ‘the expression of the political ideas of the applicants clearly constitutes 
an activity within the meaning of Article 17 of the Convention.’1003 Kühnen v Federal Republic 
of Germany, the facts of which are described above, marks the beginning of the Commission’s 
approach which can be characterised as a mélange of Article 10 and Article 17. More particularly, 
it found that the applicant sought to use the freedom provided for by Article 10 as a tool to carry 
out activities, namely ones related to National Socialism, which oppose the spirit of the 
Convention and which would contribute to the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
the Convention. As such, the Commission held that the interference was necessary in a 
democratic society within the ambit of Article 10 (2) of the ECHR and so the application was 
manifestly ill-founded and, thus, inadmissible.
1004
 This approach continued in other cases such as 
Ochensberger v Austria in which the applicant was accused of having edited, published and 
distributed articles which, having regard to the contents of these articles, constituted National 
Socialist activities. Here, the Commission agreed with the national court that the applicant’s 
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publications incited the reader to racial hatred, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. As a result, it 
found that the applicant was essentially seeking to use the freedom of information enshrined in 
Article 10 as a basis for activities which were contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention 
and which, if admitted, would contribute to the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
the Convention.
1005
 In Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland, Bezirksverband München-
Oberbayern v Germany,
1006
 the applicant organisation was ordered by the Municipality to take 
the appropriate steps to ensure that, on the occasion of one of their meetings, the persecution of 
Jews under the Nazi regime was not denied or called into question. In its decision, the 
Municipality noted that the applicant organisation, in a local as well as in a supraregional party 
publication, had issued invitations to the above-mentioned meeting, indicating that a well-known 
revisionist historian, David Irving, would attend it and comment on the question of whether the 
Germans and their European neighbours could further afford to accept contemporary history as 
means of extortion. As to the preventive nature of the interference at issue, the Commission 
noted the high probability of punishable statements given the subject of the discussion and the 
participation of Mr. Irving. In this case, the Commission found the interference of Article 10 to 
be justified given that the protection of public interest by preventing crime and disorder as well 
as the protection of the reputation and rights of Jews surpassed the freedom of the applicant 
organisation to hold a meeting and that, therefore, the interference was necessary in a democratic 
society. The Commission fleetingly took into account Article 17 when looking at the provisions 
of the Penal Code and the Assembly Act which aimed to secure the peaceful co-existence of the 
population in Germany. It made no appraisal of this Article or its relevance to the present case 
and its facts and, in reaching its final conclusion, simply referred to Article 10.  
 
The aforementioned cases were all dealt with by the Commission with Garaudy v France being 
the first case involving revisionism and related issues being dealt with by the Court and, here, the 
Court enforced Article 17 directly. It held that the promotion of a pro-Nazi policy could not be 
allowed to enjoy protection granted by Article 10 by stressing that there exists a ‘category of 
clearly established historical facts – such as the Holocaust – whose negation or revision would be 
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removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17.’1007 More particularly, the Court held 
that the revisionist nature of the book in question is contrary to the objectives of the Convention, 
namely justice and peace, and is a serious threat to public order. It, therefore, held that the 
applicant’s complaint as to an alleged violation of Article 10 was incompatible ratione materiae 
with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35(3) and must be rejected 
pursuant to Article 35(4). This approach was adopted soon after in Witzsch v Germany, which 
also dealt with revisionist speech. 
1008
 
 
The approach of implementing Article 17 when dealing with hate speech continued in the realm 
of the more contemporary extremist rhetoric in one case involving Islamophobia, namely 
Norwood v The United Kingdom, the facts of which are mentioned above.  The poster in question 
was held by the Court to be ‘incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the 
Convention, notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.’1009 In this light, the Court 
underlined that the expression in question fell within the ambit of Article 17 and, thus, no 
assessment under Article 10 would take place. However, it offered no explanation as to how and 
when the line should be drawn between speech which is prohibited as a result of the provisions 
of Article 17 and speech which can be restricted as a result of the limitation clauses of Article 10. 
The decision to apply Article 17 in Norwood can be characterised as rather random and a 
manifestation of the unpredictable nature of this article. For example, why was Article 17 
enforced in Norwood but not enforced, let us say, in Féret? The Court offers no explanation, 
thereto, and subsequently no explanation as to the applicability of these articles in such cases. 
Nevertheless, especially in a world of changing trends, patterns and phenomena, the task of 
determining whether a particular type of activity seeks to destroy the rights of others is very 
difficult indeed. In De Becker v Belgium, the Commission underlined that Article 17 applies only 
to persons who threaten the democratic system of the contracting parties and then to an extent 
strictly proportionate to the seriousness and duration of such a threat.
1010
 In Lehideux and Isorni 
v France, the concurring opinion of Judge Jambrek attempted to set out the conditions for the 
application of Article 17. More particularly, he held that, in order for this article to be enforced, 
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the aim of the offending actions must be ‘to spread violence or hatred, to resort to illegal or 
undemocratic methods, to encourage the use of violence, to undermine the nation’s democratic 
and pluralist political system, or to pursue objectives that are racist or likely to destroy the rights 
and freedoms of others.’1011 Either way, no satisfactory extrapolation on the use of Article 17 is 
offered by the Court with discrepancies in the treatment of Norwood and Féret complicating the 
situation further. 
 
5.3 Article 17 and Free Association and Assembly 
In relation to Article 17 being applied in the framework of association, the Court has deliberated 
on some relevant cases. In Refah Partisi, the Court clearly separated justifications for 
interferences as emanating from Article 11(2) and Article 17 and held that any discussion as to 
the applicability of Article 17 would have to commence only after an appraisal of Article 11(2) 
in the realm of the given interference. 
1012
 This position was also implemented in Vona v 
Hungary. In relation to the applicability of Article 17 in Refah Partisi, the Court noted that, since 
the complaints brought forth under Article 17 concerned the same facts as those examined under 
Article 11, no separate examination was necessary.
1013
 This is an almost distressing conclusion 
on Article 17 as it denotes that the treatment of Article 17, and the legal formula to be applied 
when seeking to determine its potential application, match that of Article 11 which, given the 
gravity of the cases that should fall within the framework of Article 17 and given the general 
abstraction in relation to the latter, renders an understanding of this article even more 
complicated. However, in Vona v Hungary, the Court actually took the time to consider the 
applicability of Article 17 to this case. More particularly, it eliminated the possibility of recourse 
to Article 17 predominantly due to the lack of totalitarian elements of the association and 
movement in question and also due to the lack of violence during the demonstrations in question 
and the seriousness of the restriction imposed, that being the elimination of the legal existence of 
the association.
1014
 In these circumstances, the Court could not conclude that the Association’s 
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activities were intended to justify or propagate totalitarian oppression serving totalitarian 
groups.
1015
  
 
In Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v Germany (Liberation Party), the applicant, describes itself as a 
‘global Islamic political party and/or religious society.’ It was established in Jerusalem in 1953 
and advocated the overthrow of governments throughout the Muslim world and their 
replacement by an Islamic State in the form of a recreated Caliphate. Even though this case does 
not come within the sphere of right-wing extremism, as understood and applied in this thesis, the 
religious extremism interlinked to the case and the subsequent treatment by the Court provide 
important points of assessment. In this case, the ECtHR underlined that the first applicant 
attempted to abuse Article 11 of the ECHR for purposes which are ‘clearly contrary to the values 
of the Convention, notably the commitment to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts 
and to the sanctity of human life.’1016 Further, it underlined that, during the meetings of the local 
section of the association chaired by the second applicant, statements calling for violence against 
Jews were made and that the leaflets handed out included the promotion of recourse to violence 
to establish the domination of Islam. Also, the Court underlined that Sharia is ‘incompatible with 
the fundamental principles of democracy, particularly with regard to its criminal law and 
criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres 
of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts.’1017 For these reasons, the Court 
found that the dissemination of the ideology promoted by Hizb ut-Tahrir constituted an activity 
falling within the scope of Article 17 of the Convention.  
 
In Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v Russia, the Court dealt with a complaint against Russia for 
the prohibition of Hizb ut-Tahrir. In considering the applicability of Article 17 to the said case, it 
reiterated its findings in Hizb ut-Tahrir v Germany and that the aims and objectives of this 
association were clearly contrary to the values of the Convention. Here, the Court dealt with an 
unregistered association operating on an international scale with approximately two hundred 
followers in Gremany but with no known sub-organisation in Germany. Even though the entity 
was unregistered with a limited amount of followers, the fact that its aim and objectives sought 
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to destroy Convention values and principles led to the Court ousting it from the protection of the 
Convention through the application of Article 17.
1018
  
 
Thus, in the framework of association, Article 17 has been applied in two connected cases which 
involved elements of radical Islam, violence and anti-Semitism. Most interesting to this 
discussion is firstly the decision in Refah Partisi that an analysis of Article 11 would have to 
precede any consideration of the applicability of Article 17, thereby contributing to the creation 
of a comprehensive appraisal of the issues at stake and, secondly, the non-applicability of Article 
17 in Vona, despite the intimidating and potentially destructive facts of this case. On this point, 
Buyse argued that the Court’s stance ‘was triggered by a desire to consider the merits of the case 
in-depth rather than dismissing it right away under Article 17.’ 1019  
 
5.4 Article 17 – Concluding Comments  
Three key issues can be deduced from an analysis of Article 17. Firstly, in the realm of 
expression, this article has been applied more often by the Commission than the Court. Secondly, 
the Court has rarely applied Article 17 to expression cases with the sore thumb definitely being 
Norwood as no legitimate justification can be attached to its use in relation to that case when 
comparing it to other similar cases in which Article 10(2) rather than Article 17 was relied on. 
Such a deviation from common practice has contributed to the unpredictability of Article 17’s 
applicability. Thirdly, the Court’s analysis in Refah Partisi, as reproduced in Vona, as to the 
necessity of assessing limitation grounds before enforcing Article 17, is a contributing factor to 
ensuring a safer use of this article. In a nutshell, the application of this article has constituted a 
source of criticism given that ‘it is not clear in which instances the provision applies.’1020 Buyse 
has argued that ‘this inconsistency is most probably due to the inherent tension between human 
rights protection and an abuse of rights clause’1021 but also due to the difficulties in proving such 
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an abuse of rights.
1022
 In addition, David Harris, Michael O’Boyle and Colin Warbrick have 
suggested that all speech should be considered under Article 10 and its limitation grounds in 
order to prevent ‘States from having abusive recourse to Article 17.’1023 This argument could 
potentially be extended to radical associations and assemblies. Leigh argues that this would 
result in ‘greater consistency and predictability in decision-making in hate speech cases.’1024 But 
then again, would this not offer the chance to those acting upon totalitarian aims and objectives 
to taste at least a little bit of the democracy that they wish to use and abuse?  
 
6. The Margin of Appreciation: Its Role in the Interpretation and Application of Article 10 and 
Article 11 of the ECHR  
In dealing with cases involving, inter alia, alleged breaches of Articles 10 and 11, the Court has 
‘devised and applied its well-known margin of appreciation doctrine as an instrument to 
negotiate between conflicting interests in a multi-layered legal order.’1025 This doctrine has been 
developed by case-law of the ECtHR and now constitutes a central doctrine taken into 
consideration in ensuing jurisprudence.  Article 1 of Protocol 15 which was developed in 2013 
amends the Convention and incorporates the doctrine therein by holding that: 
At the end of the preamble to the Convention, a new recital shall be added, which shall read as 
follows:  
 
“Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have 
the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the 
Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention,” 
 
Protocol 15 will enter into force as soon as all the States Parties to the Convention have signed 
and ratified it. This is still pending.  
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In Handyside v The United Kingdom, the Court stated that ‘it is for the national authorities to 
make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of 
necessity in this context.
1026’ This is because it is impossible to find a uniform conception of 
morals in all Contracting Parties and, anyhow, this conception varies according to the time and 
the place.
1027
 Also, as stated in Müller and Others v Switzerland, State authorities are in a better 
position than international judges to rule on the necessity of a restriction given the contextual and 
moral framework of their country.
1028
 Furthermore, as well as allowing States Parties a margin of 
appreciation in determining whether there exists a pressing social need that would justify a 
restriction, the Court also provides them with leeway when deciphering other issues. For 
example in Rekvényi v Hungary, the Court held that the national authorities enjoy a certain 
margin of appreciation in determining whether the impugned interference is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim in question. 
1029
 
 
The margin of appreciation is granted to the legislature, the judiciary and other relevant 
bodies.
1030
  It can be argued that when a State is permitted, through the margin of appreciation, to 
decide on whether or not a particular type of speech or form of association or assembly is 
offensive and, therefore, a source of violation of other rights and freedoms, it is inevitably 
empowered with much subjectivity given that the personal approaches, attitudes and convictions 
of members of governing bodies may influence any such decisions. Nevertheless, the 
Contracting States do not enjoy an unmonitored and endless margin of appreciation given that 
the ECtHR has the last say in deciding whether an interference with the freedom of expression is 
in fact in line with Article 10.
1031
 Thus, the ‘domestic margin of appreciation goes hand in hand 
with a European supervision.’1032 In Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, the Court underlined 
that, in exercising its supervisory powers, its role is to determine whether an interference ‘was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national 
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authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient.’1033 In Özgür Gundem v Turkey, the Court 
underlined that ‘in exercising its supervisory judgement, the Court must look at interference in 
light of the case as a whole, including the content of the impugned statements and the context in 
which they were made.’1034 
 
The width of this margin very much depends on the type and subsequent significance of the right 
being considered. In the framework of expression, the Court ‘has generally been particularly 
restrictive in its approach to the margin of appreciation but has been prepared to accept a wider 
margin in relation to issues likely to offend personal convictions in the religious or moral 
domain.’1035 This was manifested in Soulas v France, where the Court held that States should be 
granted a wider margin of appreciation in cases where they limit hate speech or discriminatory 
speech because of the risks they pose to social relationships and the treatment of immigrants.
1036
 
In relation to this case, Andrew Lester, David Pannick and Javan Herberg criticised the Court’s 
decision to uphold a restriction on anti-immigrant and Islamophobic speech. More particularly, 
they held that, by applying the margin of appreciation, the Court did not recognise the 
significance of protecting and promoting plurality of opinions.
1037
The wide margin of 
appreciation is also granted to States if expressions ‘incite to violence against an individual, a 
public official or a sector of the population.’1038 However, as noted by Buyse, the Court does not 
‘conclusively explain when this is the case.’ 1039 
 
In relation to the freedom of association, the Court has underlined that the States enjoy only a 
narrow margin of appreciation.
1040
 In relation to assembly, in Fáber v Hungary, the Court held 
that adopting preventive measures to ensure public order during a demonstration and counter-
                                                          
1033
 Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, App. no. 6538/74, (ECHR 26 April 1979) para. 62 
1034
 Gundem v Turkey, App. no. 23144/93 (ECHR, 16 March 2000) para. 57 
1035
 Lehideux and Insorn v Frnace, App. no. 24602/94 (ECHR 23 September 1998) Joint Dissenting opinion of 
Judge Foighel, Loizou and Sir John Freeland.  
1036
 Soulas and Others v France, App. no. 15948/03 (ECHR 10 July 2008) para. 38  
1037
 Andrew Lester, David Pannick and Javan Herberg, ‘Human Rights Law and Practice’ (3rd edn. LexisNexis 
2009) 
1038
 Ceylan v Trukey, App. no. 23556/94 (ECHR 8 July 1999) para. 34,   
1039
 Antoine Buyse, ‘Dangerous Expressions: The ECHR, Violence and Free Speech’(2014) 63 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 2, 494 
1040
Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, App. nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41344/98 (ECHR, 13 
February 2003) para.10,  Vona v Hungary, App. no. 35943/10 (ECHR, 9 July 2013) para.69 
230 
 
demonstration enjoys a wide margin of appreciation.
1041
 This is due to the equal importance of 
the competing rights and because the national authorities are most suited to evaluate the security 
risks and the measures which should be implemented to overcome the risks.
1042
 Despite this 
qualitative statement regarding the wide nature of the State’s discretion, the Court went on to 
find that there was, in fact, a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR. This is because the 
significance attached to this right is so great that it cannot be curtailed in any way ‘so long as the 
person concerned does not himself commit any reprehensible act on such occasion.’ 1043 
Interestingly enough, in this case, the Court underlined factors which should be considered by 
the State in the exercise of its margin of appreciation, particularly past violence at similar events 
and the impact of a counter-demonstration on the targetted demonstration. Considering these 
factors would allow the State to appraise the danger of violent confrontation between the two 
groups who are demonstrating.
1044
 
 
Thus, the margin’s width depends on the right at stake, with a strict overall approach being taken 
to expression, association and assembly with some exceptions being determined vis-à-vis 
expression. Lord Lester of Herne Hill stated that ‘the concept of the margin of appreciation has 
become as slippery and elusive as an eel. Again and again the Court appears to use the margin of 
appreciation as a substitute for coherent legal analysis of the issues at stake.’1045 It could well be 
argued that the margin of appreciation affects the regulated approach that has been developed by 
the Court in determining the scope of freedom of expression as well as the freedom of 
association. More particularly, the application of this approach ‘is made less predictable by the 
influence of the controversial margin of appreciation doctrine.’1046 Nevertheless, this doctrine is 
undoubtedly necessary for a Court working with a plethora of traditions and practices which has 
the potential of ensuring predictability and certainty whilst simultaneously appreciating cultural, 
moral and legal relativism.  
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7.  The EctHR and Racist Crimes  
The EctHR has dealt with three cases which involved racist crime, as this is conceptualised in the 
current dissertation. Nachova and Others v Bulgaria, involved the killing of two Bulgarian 
nationals of Roma origin by the police. This case constituted the first platform through which the 
Court set out its approach to racist crimes.  More particularly, the Chamber noted that:  
 
‘it is particularly important that the official investigation is pursued with vigour and 
impartiality, having regard to the need to reassert continuously society's condemnation of 
racism and ethnic hatred and to maintain the confidence of minorities in the ability of the 
authorities to protect them from the threat of racist violence.’1047 
 
This position was subsequently endorsed by the Grand Chamber and essentially attaches 
particular severity to racist crimes. It underlines the significance of effective investigation given 
the messages of condemnation that arise, therefrom, but also the instilling of confidence in 
potential target groups. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that, in the event of racist crimes, in 
particular those resulting in death by State agent: 
 
‘State authorities have the additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any 
racist motive…Failing to do so and treating racially induced violence and brutality on an 
equal footing with cases that have no racist overtones would be to turn a blind eye to the 
specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights…’ 
 
This position was also endorsed by the Grand Chamber and is significant as it recognises the 
importance of establishing a racist motive insofar that the racist crime is perpetrated by the State. 
However, and probably due to the facts of the particular case, this additional duty only extends to 
racist crime perpetrated by the State and not by private individuals. The imposition of this 
additional duty comes with a recognition by the Court that proving racial motivation ‘will often 
be extremely difficult in practice’ 1048  and, as such, notes that the duty to investigate such 
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motivation is an ‘obligation to use best endeavours and not absolute.’1049 The above-described 
approach of the Court in relation to racist crime was applied in Šečić v Croatia which involved 
the beating of a Roma by a skinhead group. Importantly, in this case, the Court extended the 
additional duty to unmask any racist motive, as referred to in Nachova, to racist crimes 
committed by private individuals.
1050
 In 2016, the Court dealt with a case against Greece, which 
involved the serious beating of an Afghan undocumented migrant living in the infamous area of 
Agios Panteleimon, which has been particularly affected by racist crime carried out by the hit 
squads of Golden Dawn. Following the incident, the applicant was hospitalised and upon his 
release was detained on grounds of illegal stay. A deportation order was issued and the applicant 
was under criminal investigation on the grounds of illegal entry into Greece. The applicant was 
released ten days later and served with his deportation order. It must be noted that the Court dealt 
with the condition of the victim’s detention and the investigation of the violence perpetrated 
against him. Relevant to this discussion is the latter element, namely the investigation of the 
violence perpetrated against him. In the judgement, the Court referred to four reports on racist 
violence in Greece issued by the Ombudsperson, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch 
and the Racist Violence Recording Network which, amongst others, underline the rise of racist 
violence in Greece and the inactivity of the Police to bring perpetrators to justice.
1051
 Thereby, by 
considering such reports, the Court placed the violence perpetrated against the applicant in the 
more general context of racist violence in Greece and the approach adopted by the Police to such 
violence. In fact, the Court underlined the significance of placing this particular case within the 
general context of the rise of racist crime in Greece at the material time.
1052
 It noted that the 
Police took no steps to identify perpetrators with a history of racial violence and affiliation to 
extremist groups
1053
 and ignored the racist violence context which had been the subject of the 
aforementioned reports.
1054
  Moreover, the Court recognised the importance effectively to 
investigate racist crimes, as set out in Nachova. 
1055
 As a result, the Court found Greece to be in 
violation of Article 3 in relation to the ineffective investigation of the crime, thereby, recognising 
                                                          
1049
 Nachova and Others v Bulgaria, App. nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98 (ECHR 6 July 2005) para. 159 
1050
 Šečić v. Croatia, App. no. 40116/02 (ECHR 31 may 2007) para. 67 
1051
 These are all discussed in chapter seven 
1052
 Sakir v Greece, App. no. 48475/09 (ECHR 24 March 2016) 71 
1053
 Sakir v Greece , App. no. 48475/09 (ECHR 24 March 2016) 65 
1054
 Sakir v Greece, App. no. 48475/09 (ECHR 24 March 2016) 71 
1055
 Sakir v Greece, App. no. 48475/09 (ECHR 24 March 2016) 64 
233 
 
the positive obligation to investigate cases of ill-treatment, as is, in any case, the accepted 
position of the Court. 
1056
 
 
8. The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of 
Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems 
The Internet is one of the most powerful contemporary tools used by individuals and groups to 
express ideas and opinions and receive and impart information.
1057
 It ‘magnifies the voice and 
multiplies the information within reach of everyone who has access to it.’1058 Notwithstanding 
the positive aspects of this development in the realm of free speech and exchange of ideas, the 
Internet also provides a platform for the promotion and dissemination of hate.
1059
 In fact, the 
Internet has seen a sharp rise in the number of extreme-right websites and activity.
1060
 As well as 
facilitating the promotion of hate, the Internet has also strengthened the far-right movement more 
generally by bringing hate groups together and converging the lines of previous fragmentation, 
thus contributing to the creation of a ‘collective identity that is so important to movement 
cohesiveness.’1061 This has occurred on an international level, thereby, ‘facilitating a potential 
global racist subculture.’1062 Although hate existed long before the creation of the Internet, this 
technological advancement has provided an effective and accessible means of communication 
and expression for hate groups and individuals whilst simultaneously adding a new dimension to 
the problem of regulating hate
1063
 particularly due to the nature of the Internet as a global and, to 
an extent, anonymous medium. It is the anonymity of the Internet which deeply hampers the 
implementation of traditional legal procedures and enforcement of traditional laws
1064
 as the 
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perpetrator cannot readily be determined, whilst the global nature of the Internet means that, 
even if a perpetrator can be identified, bringing him or her to justice may not be possible due to 
jurisdictional limitations.
1065
 The CoE recognised the dangers attached to the above-described 
developments and, thus, put forth the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, 
discussed in this section.  
 
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime is the first multilateral treaty that aims at 
combatting crimes committed through computer systems and has, to date, been ratified by forty 
seven countries.
1066
 This Convention was signed and ratified not only by CoE States but also by 
the USA which, although it is not a member of this entity, has observer status. Interestingly, 
however, the USA acceded to the Convention only after the issue of online hate was removed 
from the table of discussion.
1067
 This reality demonstrates that ‘fundamental disagreements 
remain as to the most appropriate and effective strategy for preventing dissemination of racist 
messages on the Internet’ 1068  which subsequently contribute to the weakening or even 
nullification of regulatory measures which may be adopted by particular States, given that 
Internet regulation requires co-operation for both technical and legal reasons, as discussed above. 
To fill the resulting gaps, the CoE subsequently developed an Additional Protocol to criminalise 
online racist and xenophobic acts committed through computer systems. This has been ratified 
by twenty four countries. 
1069
 The CoE recognised the limitations in implementing a unilateral 
approach to the issue of online hate in the form of racist or xenophobic hate and, thereby, sought 
to ensure a common set of standards for participating States and promote co-operation amongst 
them in the criminalisation of relevant acts. 
1070
 This document is seen as a ‘supplement’1071 to 
the Convention to ensure that the latter’s procedural and substantive provisions encompass 
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racism and xenophobia online. Thus, a series of the Convention’s articles apply mutatis mutandis 
to the Protocol under consideration including, amongst others, Article 13 on sanctions and 
measures and Article 22 on jurisdiction. However, even on first sight, this document comes with 
several significant limitations which will be discussed hereinafter. Firstly, as demonstrated in its 
title, this Protocol tackles only racist and xenophobic hate, completely disregarding other forms 
of hate on grounds including, but not limited to, sexual orientation, gender identity and disability, 
whilst religion is considered a protected characteristic within the definitional framework set out 
by Article 2 of the Additional Protocol. Thus, there seems to be an unjustified prioritisation of 
online hate with the CoE almost arbitrarily seeking to regulate the effects of racism and 
xenophobia online, leaving victims of other types of hate without a respective legal framework.  
 
The Additional Protocol defines what is meant by racist and xenophobic material and underlines 
the measures to be taken at a national level in relation to the dissemination of such material,
1072
 
racist and xenophobic threats and insults professed through computer systems
1073
 as well as in 
relation to the denial, gross minimisation, approval or justification of genocide or crimes against 
humanity.
1074
 The Protocol also renders the intentional aiding and abetting of any of the above a 
criminal offence. It must be noted that, unlike Article 9 of the Cybercrime Convention which 
deals with child pornography, the Protocol does not criminalise the possession and procurement 
of racist and xenophobic material.
1075
 As noted in the Explanatory Note of the Protocol, in order 
to amount to offences, racist and xenophobic material, insults and revisionist rhetoric must occur 
on a public level, a point which has been incorporated for purposes adhering to Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
1076
 In relation to the acts that are to be deemed offences, 
it becomes clear that the freedom of expression is ‘the sacred cow against which the legislation 
seeks to justify its apparent encroachment for the sake of providing a measure to prohibit 
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cybercrimes motivated by race hate.’1077  To illustrate this, one can turn to Article 3 of the 
Additional Protocol on the dissemination of racist and xenophobic material through computer 
systems, with part 1, therein, providing that: 
 
‘each party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed intentionally and 
without right, the following conduct: distributing or otherwise making available, racist 
and xenophobic material to the public through a computer system.’ 
 
However, Part 3 holds that a party may reserve the right not to apply the above paragraph to 
those cases of discrimination for reasons of upholding free expression. Thus, the Protocol, as an 
initiative to combat online hate, has been ‘thwarted through the compromise they have made to 
concerns about freedom of expression’1078 with much less regard evidently being had for other 
freedoms such as that of non-discrimination. It could, thus, be argued that the Protocol and its 
efficacy is undermined by the approach adopted by the CoE which grants an unequal and 
unjustifiable emphasis on expression rather than non-discrimination and equality.
1079
 
 
In relation to general limitations that may be imposed on the applicability of Article 3, Part 2, 
therein, holds that a State may choose not to attach criminal liability to conduct referred to in 
Part 1 if this does not promote violence or hatred insofar as other effective remedies are available. 
This is notwithstanding the fact that the Protocol itself is entitled as a document which seeks to 
criminalise racist and xenophobic acts committed through computer systems. Whilst 
criminalising racist and xenophobic threats has no opt-outs, Article 5 of the Additional Protocol 
on racist and xenophobic insults provides that a State has the right not to apply part 1 of this 
article, in whole or in part, which sets out the legislative and other measures that may be adopted 
to criminalise racist and xenophobic insults. Although no direct reference to free expression is 
made here as the justifier of such limitation, it could implicitly be assumed that concerns 
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regarding the freedom of expression led to the formulation of the aforementioned reservation 
available to those who want it. Many of the States which ratified the Protocol took the 
opportunity to incorporate reservations. It generally appears that Article 4 on racist and 
xenophobic threats is the one granted the most protection as it extends to private as well as 
public communications, unlike the other acts found in the Protocol while Article 4 no opt-out 
possibility as do the others. 
 
The issue of intent is also significant when seeking to appraise the Protocol. This document 
renders illegal the dissemination of material, threats, insults and revisionist rhetoric offences as 
well as aiding and abetting the committal of such offences in the event that such acts and/or 
expressions are effectuated and/or uttered intentionally. This is particularly significant in the 
realm of the liability of the Internet Service Provider (hereinafter ISP) which simply constitutes 
the platform through which problematic speech may arise. The Explanatory Report to the 
Additional Protocol holds that the precise meaning of ‘intentionally’ should be interpreted at a 
national level.
1080
 However, it did clearly stipulate that it is not sufficient for an ISP, which 
simply constitutes the host of the material, to be found guilty of any of the Protocol’s offences if 
the required intent under domestic law does not exist.
1081
 Thus, on the one hand it does limit the 
liability of unknowing ISPs but leaves the general conceptualisation of intent unsure and 
contingent on national positions. However, the Protocol does not regulate or prohibit the finding 
of permissive intent in the event that an ISP is made aware of racist or xenophobic material or 
expression and does not take the necessary measures to remove it, thereby, leaving some doors 
open for finding potential liability in the inaction of ISPs. Such permissive intent is found, for 
example, in Germany’s Information and Communications Service Act of 1997 which underlines 
the liability of ISPs in the event that they knew of hateful content, had the ability to block it but 
chose not to.
1082
 Further, in the realm of ISPs, the Protocol remained silent on the very 
significant question of jurisdiction in the event of a conflict of law between the hosting country 
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and the other. 
1083
 Although for EU countries, the Directive on Electronic Commerce
1084
 would 
govern with Article 3, therein, providing that ISPs are governed by the laws of the Member State 
in which they are established,
1085
 the situation is not clear in the event that a non-EU country is 
involved in a particular dispute. 
1086
 
 
Although the Protocol may contribute to promoting harmonisation on agreed upon principles and 
procedural, technical and legal cooperation amongst States, it remains problematic. This is the 
case not only due to its inherent limitations, as described above, but also due to the fact that the 
USA is not part of it. This, in addition to the absence of any form of extradition treaties between 
the USA and other countries in the sphere of online hate speech, deeply restricts the efficacy of 
the Protocol’s aims and objectives. Moreover, it may well appear that the Protocol has sought to 
achieve the lowest possible common denominator, maybe for purposes of maximising 
ratification. Either way, the aforementioned delimitations may serve as stumbling blocks when 
seeking to meet the objectives of the Protocol. Furthermore, as well as limitations as a result of 
an over-emphasis on the freedom of expression, it could be argued that the Protocol constitutes 
an ineffective base through which online hate can be restricted since it adopts traditional 
conceptions of State boundaries, State sovereignty, on issues such as the freedom of expression 
mentioned above, and more generally, treats the issue of online hate as any other issue using 
traditional means of communication, throwing in the concept of international cooperation 
without effectively and pragmatically considering the challenges of the Internet. However, ‘the 
Internet is a very different animal from that we are used to, which requires handling in a different 
way,’1087 although this has not yet been taken on board.  
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Conclusion  
In sum, the ECtHR grants States the limitation clauses in Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR as 
tools to restrict expression, associations and assemblies that go beyond the protective framework 
of the Convention, with Article 17 enforced, theoretically, in the framework of conduct or speech 
which seeks to destroy democracy. Militant Democracy can, thus, be seen both in the realm of 
the limitation grounds of Articles 10 and 11 and is fully embodied in Article 17. Five points can 
be discerned from the above analysis. Firstly, that speech and association interlinked to right-
wing extremist groups are not permitted by the Convention, whereas right-wing assemblies 
which are not intimidating or violent are permissible. Secondly, that the Court reaches this 
decision through an appraisal of the limitation clauses of the relevant articles or, in some 
circumstances, through the application of Article 17. Thirdly, that in relation to expression, the 
Court’s assessment occurs against a weak theoretical backdrop of key notions and definitions, 
more particularly as to what hate speech is and at what point such speech does, in fact, become 
illegal.  Fourthly, that the Court offers no clear guidelines as to when Article 17 of the ECHR 
rather than the limitation clauses should be applied, a point best illustrated by the random 
application of Article 17 in Norwood. Lastly, that the margin of appreciation doctrine is 
necessary, on the one hand as a regulator of a varying range of beliefs and ideologies which mark 
the Contracting Parties although, on the other, rendering even more difficult the pursuit of any 
kind of cohesion and predictability in the judicial approach to the speech and conduct under 
consideration, with approach meaning the technical tackling of these cases and not the Court’s 
general stance. However, the ECtHR has recognised that racist crimes are particularly destructive 
of fundamental rights and, as such, States must take the necessary steps to determine racist 
motives and to carry out investigations with particular vigour so as to demonstrate the 
condemnation of such crimes. As such, the ECtHR recognises the particularly severe 
characteristic of racist crimes and places them high on the hierarchy of severity. In addition to 
the ECtHR’s role in interpreting and applying the ECHR in the sphere of hateful expression, 
assembly and association as well as racist crime, the CoE is also particularly significant in a 
discussion on the far-right given the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention. This is a 
significant step given that the Internet is a central platform which is used and abused by the far-
right to disseminate hateful messages, target their victims and incite discrimination, violence and 
hatred against them although the Protocol is lacking as per its scope as it is arbitrarily limited to 
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racism and xenophobia. In addition, given the Internet’s nature as a global, boundary-free entity, 
for the Protocol to be of practical use in combatting its hateful usage of the Internet, it would 
have to be signed by all countries. Notwithstanding the limitations of this Protocol, it fills a 
conspicuous gap in terms of regulating racism and xenophobia online. Unfortunately, it has not 
been ratified by the countries under consideration in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Introduction  
This chapter will look at measures formulated by the EU which contribute to challenging right-
wing extremism. This analysis is necessary, not only because both countries under consideration 
are EU Member States, but also because of the 2014 European Parliament election results which 
saw their far-right parties performing well.
1088
 It must be reiterated that in June 2016 the UK 
voted to leave the European Union although this is not a straight-forward and automatic task, as 
further discussed in chapter six so, at the time of writing and for a while afterwards, the UK 
remains and will continue to remain a member of the Union, bound by its laws. It has been 
argued that measures ‘restricting racist speech and racist organizations as such are not within the 
field of competence of the European Union.’1089 Nevertheless, as will be reflected in this section, 
the EU has taken certain steps in this direction with the EU having first dealt with right-wing 
extremism in the 1980s within the wider framework of combatting racism following the 1984 
European Parliament elections which saw a high percentage of extreme-right voting, especially 
in France.
1090
  In relation to extremist ideologies, the European Parliament noted in a 2007 
Resolution that these are ‘incompatible with the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.’1091 This chapter will look at Article 
7 of the Treaty on the European Union (hereinafter TEU) which deals with a possible risk of a 
serious breach or the existence of a serious and persistent breach to values such as the rule of law. 
To allow for a comprehensive understanding of this mechanism, its analysis will be preceded by 
an assessment of the rule of law looking at its key characteristics and then at its incorporation 
into the EU framework. There will be an assessment of a real and actual risk to the rule of law 
within the EU, through a consideration of Hungary and the constitutional and democratic shock 
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caused by the Fidesz party. More particularly, the relevant section will consider the mechanisms 
employed and/or recommended by the EU to tackle the violation of Article 2 TEU principles by 
the Member State. There will then be an evaluation of the New EU Framework to Strengthen the 
Rule of Law and the Council’s Annual Dialogue on the Rule of Law which constitute some of 
the more recent additions to the EU’s resource kit for the preservation of the rule of law. The 
discussion of the above instruments emanates from the premise that right-wing extremist groups 
pose a direct threat to a liberal democracy and, thus, to the rule of law.  After dealing with the 
rule of law framework and how the EU attempts to protect itself from potential or actual threats 
to the rule of law and interrelated doctrines, the chapter will consider the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU and especially its provisions which relate to the freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and assembly and freedom of non-discrimination, the 1996 Joint Action adopted 
by the Council concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia, its follow up 2008 Council 
Framework on combatting certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of 
criminal law and the relevant European Parliament Resolutions. In addition to the 
aforementioned measures taken to combat racism and xenophobia, which directly mention or 
incorporate the regulation of activities and utterances of right-wing extremist groups, the EU 
adopted the Council Directive for combatting discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic 
origin within areas such as employment, trade unions, social protection and access to goods and 
services. In effect, ‘since the adoption of the Race Directive in 2000, the EU has had a legislative 
prohibition of racial discrimination.’1092 The bedrock of this Directive is Article 19 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU), which holds that the Council 
‘may take appropriate measures to combat discrimination sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’ However, the Directive does not extend, per se, to 
practices and rhetoric promulgated by right-wing movements given that, notwithstanding the 
significance of this development in the fight against racism and xenophobia which are 
consequences of right-wing rhetoric, more generally, it does not deal with the regulation of right-
wing extremist groups. This viewpoint is adhered to even though there exists a correlation 
between the increasing number of extremist organizations and the exacerbation of fears in 
society that may subsequently result in the manifestation of racism in a variety of arenas such as 
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employment, housing, education and health.
1093
 Finally, this chapter will look at two reports, the 
Evrigenis Report and the Ford report, which were formulated during the early stages of the EU’s 
involvement in the regulation of right-wing extremism. It must be noted that the EU has not yet 
adopted any binding legislation in relation to regulating right-wing extremism per se, other than 
the mechanisms provided for in Article 7 which are applicable to other issues as well as the far-
right.  
 
1. Rule of Law 
1.1 Rule of Law: General Overview 
The rule of law is conceptually significant with ‘appeals to the rule of law remain[ing] 
rhetorically powerful.’ 1094  However, the rule of law ‘is an exceedingly elusive notion’ 1095 
resulting in a ‘considerable diversity of opinions as to its meaning,1096 with the doctrine falling 
prey to abuse.
1097
 Several scholars have sought to put forth an all-embracing, contemporary 
definition of the rule of law. For example, Guillermo O’ Donnell has described it as the state of 
affairs in which there exists an equitable implementation of a written and publicly announced 
law by competent authorities, adhering always to the principle of non-retrospective application, 
giving no consideration to personal characteristics such as status or class.
1098
 However, the 
definition of the rule of law remains a tricky issue, with temporal and geographical variations 
affecting its universal understanding and applicability as one single doctrine. Either way, it is 
undoubtedly a central tenet of a democratic society, interconnected with human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and thus, a founding principle of the EU. To set the scene of the 
assessment of the protection and promotion of the rule of law within an EU framework, this 
section will provide a brief overview of the historical origins of the doctrine as well as its aims 
and objectives. It must be noted that it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to assess 
extensively the variation of definitions brought forth and to provide an historical account of the 
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development of the doctrine. Instead, a general overview of key points and developments will be 
provided.  
 
1.2 Rule of Law Origins  
The rule of law can be traced back to Ancient Greece and particularly to the works of Plato and 
his student Aristotle.
1099
 Aristotle wrote that ‘rightly constituted laws should be the final 
sovereign and personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, 
should be sovereign…’1100 The rule of law also developed during Roman times, with Cicero 
condemning a King who did not abide by the law, arguing that he was ‘the foulest and most 
repellent creature imaginable,’ 1101  thus demonstrating the supremacy of law. The doctrine 
continued into the Middle Ages with particular influences emanating from ‘the contest between 
kings and popes for supremacy, Germanic customary law, and the Magna Carta.’ 1102 
Furthermore, in recent years, scholars have noted that Prussia was a region in which the rule of 
law was promoted and upheld predominantly as a result of the establishment of the Supreme 
Administrative Law Court having ‘formalized a meaningful rule of law in Prussia that provided 
greater protection for individual rights.’1103 In modern times, the rule of law was further defined 
and embedded mainly through the German, French and Anglo-Saxon frameworks
1104
 which 
developed the doctrines of rechtsstaat, état de droit and the rule of law respectively, and which 
all essentially sought to ensure a just society through regulating State Power and preventing its 
arbitrary exercise. However, the doctrines go about it in different ways and through a different 
set of objectives, as they stem from ‘differences among political and legal histories and 
traditions.’1105  The term rechtsstaat was developed at the end of the eighteenth century ‘to 
                                                          
1099
 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory’ (eds. Cambridge University Press 2004)  7 
1100
 Ernest Barker, ‘The Politics of Aristotle -  Translated with an Introduction, Notes and Appendixes By Ernest 
Barker’ Book III, Chapter 11, para 19  at 127 (OUP 1946). 
1101
 Niall Rudd, ‘Marcus Tullius Cicero - The Republic and The Laws – A New Translation by Niall Rudd’ (eds. 
OUP 1998) Book II, para.48, 50 (1998 OUP)  
1102
 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory’ (2004 Cambridge University Press)  15 
1103
 Kenneth F. Ledford, ‘Formalizing the Rule of Law in Prussia: The Supreme Administrative Court 1876-1914’ 
(2004) 37 Central European History 2, 204 
1104
 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘The Rule of Law, and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy’ (2001) Cardozo Law 
School, Working Paper Series No.36, 43 <www-bcf.usc.edu/~usclrev/pdf/074503.pdf> 5 
1105
 Martin Krygier, ‘Rule of Law and Rechtsstaat’ (2013) University of New South Wales Research Paper No. 
2013-52, < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2311874> [Accessed 15 April 2015], 1 
245 
 
capture a new phenomenon, the modern state with its monopoly of force.’1106 In Germany, this 
doctrine ‘precludes the possibility of the primacy of law over the State…Conversely, the English 
doctrine of the government of law is most clearly distinguished by grounding the rule of law on 
the superiority of law…’1107 Further, the French état de droit was originally advanced by Duguit 
and Carré de Malberg,
1108
 became part of the French legal system after World War II and was 
fully realised in 1971 after the adoption of constitutional review of parliamentary laws.
1109
 
Although essentially founded on the template created by its German counterpart, the French 
doctrine developed extensively and today ‘does not mean State rule through law but rather 
constitutional state as legal guarantor of fundamental rights.’1110 
 
It is now necessary to pinpoint what the above doctrines actually entail by looking at the central 
fathers of their development including A.V Dicey, Immanuel Kant and some other classical and 
more modern scholars. In his 1885 ‘Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution’ 
Albert Venn Dicey ‘associated the rule of law with rights-based liberalism and judicial review of 
governmental action.’1111 Dicey’s explanation of the rule of law was composed of three central 
tenets namely ‘the absolute supremacy of regular law as opposed to prerogative or arbitrary 
power…second, equality before the law….third, that constitutions are not the source but the 
consequence of individual rights defined and enforced by courts….’ 1112  Thus, Dicey’s 
conception of the doctrine incorporated an understanding that it was the Courts rather than a 
constitution which could check the legality of an act. 
1113
 While Dicey’s above explanation 
continues to be looked at as ‘an indispensable point of departure, contemporary discussions are 
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marked by multiple and at times competing understandings and categorizations.’ 1114 Further, the 
rule of law is looked at from two approaches, from a formal and a substantive one.
1115
 The 
former entails that this doctrine is necessary for the functioning of a legal order, regardless of the 
make-up of the law.
1116
 The latter entails that the legal system ‘embraces a particular public 
morality.’ 1117 
 
The rechtsstaat, as a doctrine has evolved over a period of approximately two hundred years and 
was first looked at by theorists such as Karl Rotteck, Karl Theodor Welcker and Robert von 
Mohl.
1118
 German writers habitually place the analysis of the doctrine within the realm of 
Immanuel Kant’s work since the rechtsstaat emanates from ideas formulated by him in works 
such as the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
1119
 Notwithstanding this, the term was 
first created by Wilhelm Petersen in 1798 as an antithesis of the polizeistaat (Police State).
1120
 
Kant’s aim in embellishing this doctrine was to establish ‘a universal and permanent peaceful 
life’1121  and to achieve this, he argued that a State must ensure that its people must have 
‘legislative guarantees of their property rights secured by a common constitution. The supremacy 
of this constitution…must be derived a priori from the considerations for achievements of the 
absolute ideal in the most just and fair organization of people’s life under the aegis of public 
law.’1122 In sum, this conceptualisation of the rechtsstaat, which underlined the importance of a 
constitution and the enforcement of a supreme constitution for the safeguard of citizens’ rights, 
was prominent amongst theorists in the nineteenth century. 
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The liberal understanding of the rechtsstaat was split into natural law and positive law 
approaches with the former being based on its Kantian assessment. Carl von Rotteck, whose 
work was particularly influenced by Kant, argued that an individual could enjoy rights ‘not as a 
citizen but as a legal entity’1123 and that these could be enjoyed ‘even without the state.’1124 
Unlike the natural law approach adopted by von Rotteck, Mohl looked at the doctrine from a 
positive law point of view. For example, in Mohl’s assessment of the Württemberg constitution, 
‘he treated the reality of the State as a condition, which imposed itself on human behaviour.’1125  
Conservative perspectives of rechtsstaat, including that of Friedrich Julius Stahl ‘who grounded 
his doctrine of rechtsstaat on the monarchic principle,’1126 considered that the rechtsstaat ‘must 
determine with precision and with certainty the boundaries and the limits of its activity, as well 
as the free sphere of its citizens, according to the modalities of the law.’1127 Given the broad 
understanding that can be attached to the rechtsstaat, this doctrine was adopted by most of the 
Central and Eastern European countries following the cold war and before that by Portugal and 
Spain. 
1128
 Thus, ‘depending on time, place and author, [the rule of law’s] requirements range 
from strong public institutions and legal certainty to substantive justice.’ 1129  Today, when 
considering the major European legal traditions of Britain, Germany and France, one may 
pinpoint differences and variations between the interpretation and understanding of the doctrine 
under consideration. However, authors such as Laurent Pech argue that these ‘divergences 
should not be overstated’1130 with Dimitry Kochenov arguing that ‘the meaning of the concepts 
that correspond to the Rule of Law in the legal systems of EU Member States….differs to a 
considerable extent.’ 1131 It must be noted that, for purposes of this study, the term ‘rule of law’ 
will be referred to without necessarily adopting the meaning of this doctrine in the English sense. 
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1.3 Rule of Law: Final Comments on the Rule of Law as a Doctrine 
Thus, the rule of law ‘is among the essential pillars upon which any high quality democracy 
rests.’1132 While the above mentioned flaws may realistically exist in any democratic system, it 
has been argued that, even if the rule of law is in fact respected this ‘does not guarantee that 
violations of human dignity do not occur.’1133 This is predominantly because the rule of law is a 
virtue or law but not a moral value.
1134
 In a nutshell, issues of non-arbitrary and equal application 
of a just law mark the above definitions, although as noted by one scholar, the actual application 
of the rule of law is marked by increasing limitations including, inter alia, flaws in the law, its 
application, access to justice and relations between the person and the State,
1135
 thereby 
undermining the objectives of the doctrine. However, for purposes of this chapter, the key 
elements of the rule of law shall be borne in mind as necessary prerequisites for a functional and 
equitable system of democratic powers.
1136
 As noted by Friedrich Hayek, the rule of law ‘is not 
only a safeguard, but a legal embodiment of freedom.’ 1137  In the end, it is against such a 
backdrop, rhetorical or not, that violations of principles such as fundamental freedoms and 
human rights can be assessed.  
 
1.4 Rule of Law: General Overview of the Rule of Law in EU Law 
The European Commission has characterised the rule of law as ‘the backbone of any modern 
constitutional democracy’1138 and ‘one of the main values upon which the Union is based.’1139 It 
has been argued that ‘quite paradoxically for the organization created in the wake of WWII, the 
EU’s concern for democracy and the rule of law is of relatively recent origin.’1140 Before the 
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incorporation of the doctrine into Treaties ‘its normative basis in EU law was not quite clear.’1141 
During that time, to elucidate its position in European law, the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter the ECJ) recognised that the European Community was a ‘Community based on the 
rule of law’1142 and the EC Treaty was a ‘polity based on the rule of law.’1143 In time, the rule of 
law and interconnected doctrines including, inter alia, human rights, have increasingly 
influenced the formulation of primary and secondary sources of EU law. Article 2 of the TEU 
provides that ‘the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.’ As noted in that article, these 
values are necessary for a society where ‘pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’ As underlined by the Commission ‘the 
respect of the rule of law is intrinsically linked to respect for democracy and fundamental 
rights.’1144 The principles incorporated in Article 2 have been described as ‘vague…[but] not 
meaningless,’1145 with no treaty underlining which interpretation should be incorporated in the 
European context and no definition or elucidation of the doctrine having been offered.
1146
  The 
importance of the rule of law and the other values have also been emphasised in Article 49 of the 
TEU which notes that only European States, which respect these values, may apply for 
membership of the EU.  The adherence to the rule of law is also part of the Preambles of the 
TEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  The New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law, which will be discussed further on, notes that ‘the principle of the rule of law has 
progressively become a dominant organizational model of modern constitutional law’1147 The 
European Commission holds that the principles upon which the rule of law is based include, 
amongst others, legality, legal certainty, respect for fundamental rights and equality before the 
law, notwithstanding that the nature of the rule of law may vary according to a country’s 
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constitutional reality.
1148
 It is for purposes of promoting, amongst others, the dignified and 
equitable rule of law as a means of ensuring a functional democracy that Article 7 of the TEU, as 
discussed below, has been developed. This tool is of particular importance to this thesis given 
that it is not only one which can theoretically be used to combat right-wing extremism in Europe, 
but is one that partly emanated from the handling or mishandling, as will be looked at below, of a 
perceived threat posed by a right-wing extremist political party, namely the Freedom Party 
(Freiheitspartei Österreichs - FPÖ) of Austria. Before proceeding to the following analysis, it 
must be noted that EU documents and judicial decisions refer to the term ‘rule of law’ and, in, 
for example, the French and German translations refer to the ‘état de droit’ and ‘rechtsstaat’ 
respectively as if the doctrine is the same in all legal traditions. This, as a starting point, may 
cause conceptual and definitional problems in relation to the interpretation and implementation 
of, for example, the treaty articles. It has been argued that, in order to rectify the current 
confusing situation, ‘an autonomous Union concept of the Rule of Law needs to be 
identified.’1149 Europe is currently experiencing breaches (or risks thereto) of the core values 
enshrined in Article 2 TEU due to the socio-political, constitutional and/or financial 
developments in Member States, including but not limited to Hungary and Greece. For example, 
in the former, one notes the constitutional shock experienced in the Fidesz led Hungary and, in 
the latter, the success of violent Golden Dawn which holds third place in the parliament.
1150
 
Notwithstanding such developments, the political and academic communities in Europe seem to 
believe that the EU does not possess tools which are effective both in theory and practice, for 
purposes of tackling the far-right.
1151
 
 
1.4.1 Article 7 of the TEU: Safeguarding the Rule of Law in EU Member States?  
1.4.1 (i) Article 7: General Overview 
Article 7 of the TEU holds that in the event of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach by a Member 
State’ of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU which include, inter alia, the rule of law, human 
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rights and non-discrimination, the Council will hear the position of the State in question and may 
address recommendations to it as a means of overcoming the risk. If however, there continues to 
be a ‘serious and persistent breach’ by a Member State of the said values, the State in question 
may have certain rights suspended including voting rights in the Council, to be alleviated if the 
breach of values ceases to exist. Thus, this article is composed of a two-part mechanism which 
includes preventive measures in the form of exchanges with the State and recommendations 
made to it within a spirit of removing the risk which can be imposed, in the event that the risk 
materialises into a serious and persistent breach of Article 2 values. Here, it must be noted that a 
central problem faced by the EU in relation to Article 2 is ‘who is to decide what is democracy, 
the rule of law etc?’1152 and thus, who is to decide what constitutes a breach to these values? This 
is further complicated by the fact that the Member States’ understanding of the principles 
enshrined in Article 2 differs and ‘whether we ultimately really share values seems a much more 
subjective matter to verify.’1153  As such, it has been argued that for this article to be effectively 
understood and for the Article 7 mechanism to be effectively enforced, it will be necessary to 
‘create an acquis on values, which does not exist.’1154 The sanctioning mechanism preceded the 
preventive mechanism, having been incorporated by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The 
preventive mechanism came into effect in 2001 with the Treaty of Nice. Moreover, it must be 
noted that Article 7, unlike other instruments such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights, is 
unique, innovative, if not bold, in that it applies not only to areas covered by EU Law,
1155
  
rendering Article 7 a provision of ‘strategic value.’1156  
 
                                                          
1152
 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance  – Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements 
Analyzed’  (2014) 33 Polish Yearbook of International Law, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2438271&download=yes> 165 [Accessed 10 October 2015] 
1153
 Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Safeguarding democracy  inside the EU, Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order’ (2013) 
Transatlantic Academy 2012-2013 Paper Series No.3, 18 
1154
 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance - – Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements 
Analyzed’  (2014) 33 Polish Yearbook of International Law, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2438271&download=yes> 165 [Accessed 10 October 2015] 
1155
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of the Treaty on 
the European Union – Respect for and Promotion of the Values on which the European  Union is Based, COM 
(2003) 606 Final, para.1.4 
1156
 Wojciech Sadurisk, ‘Adding a Bite to a Bark? A Story of Article 7, the EU Enlargement and Jörg Haider.’ 
(2010) Sydney Law Journal, Legal Studies Research Paper No.10/01, 29 
252 
 
Therefore, Article 7 of the TEU seemingly ‘fills a gap in the Union’s approach to human rights 
protection’1157 through its preventive and sanctioning mechanisms. However the reality vis-à-vis 
its actual application is quite different, as will be assessed further on.  When dealing with the risk 
or breach of principles as grounds for activating the Article, the Commission has noted that a 
breach may include a piece of legislation or an administrative instrument.
1158
 The Parliament has 
criticised the Commission’s account of what could fall within this framework, providing its own 
appraisal which includes a ‘Member State’s failure to act on violations of human rights’1159 in 
the areas of, inter alia anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia.
1160
 In the field of right-wing 
extremism, it is precisely the incorporation of this failure to act which enhances the efficacy of 
Article 7, extending its scope to the majority of situations where right-wing movements, either as 
political parties or as non-party entities, constitute a threat to the rule of law, human rights and 
democracy with their rhetoric and activities being tolerated by the State.  
 
There is a high threshold for the implementation of Article 7 with the nature of these 
mechanisms being described as ‘a last resort.’1161 For a violation to fall within the threshold of 
seriousness, as incorporated in Article 7, it is probable that the breach in question will ‘radically 
shake the very foundations of the EU.’ 1162  As such, the threshold is ‘much higher than in 
individual cases of breaches of fundamental rights such as established….by the Court of 
Justice.’1163 These statements, which were made by the Commission, give a general indication of 
the genres and seriousness of the violations which can involve only the most serious breaches of 
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Article 2. The high threshold attached to this provision is also reflected by the Commission’s 
elucidation of the key terms used in this article, namely the ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ and a 
‘serious and persistent breach.’ More particularly, the risk or breach must not merely be an 
individual breach of fundamental rights but must ‘concern a more systematic problem,’1164 a 
requirement which the Commission describes as the ‘added value’ 1165 of the provision, saving 
its application for the most serious of breaches.  In relation to the first part of the article and the 
risk of a serious breach, this must be ‘clear excluding purely contingent risks from the scope of 
the prevention mechanism.’1166  As to the seriousness of the risk or actual breach, both the 
purpose and the result must be taken into account.
1167
 In brief, Article 7 is ‘hard to satisfy’1168 
especially if one takes into account the numbers and votes needed for making a reasoned 
proposal for the existence of a risk to Article 2 and, further, for the determination of such a 
breach.
1169
 This high threshold arises from the fact that, as noted by Kuijer, this article is one 
with ‘far-reaching consequences’ and a ‘punitive nature’1170.  The actors involved in the process 
are the Member States, the Parliament, the Commission and the Council. Interestingly, as noted 
by Pech, the fact that the ECJ was not incorporated in any way in this procedure ‘is a not so 
subtle indication that the Member States understand these mechanisms as political ones and 
whose value is essentially if not exclusively symbolic.’1171 In relation to this, it must be noted 
that extensive debate on the possibility of incorporating the ECJ in deciding Article 7 sanctions 
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occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s, which led to an outright rejection of the Court’s role in 
that realm.
1172
 Also, the European Parliament noted that this article ‘may not be invoked in 
support of any right to, or policy of, permanent monitoring of the Member States of the 
Union.’1173 The reasoning behind this position could be that anything else would undermine the 
spirit of Article 7 and would inevitably be deemed unacceptable on an operational level, 
extending the powers of the Union too far. However, in a contradictory 2013 Resolution, the 
European Parliament requested that ‘Member States be regularly assessed on their continued 
compliance with the fundamental values of the Union and the requirement of democracy and the 
rule of law.’1174 
 
1.4.1 (ii) Article 7 – Foundations for the Combatting of Right-Wing Extremism 
Given that this dissertation deals with right-wing extremism, an interesting point to consider is 
an event which partially resulted in the inclusion of the preventive mechanism of Article 7(1) 
TEU and, namely the participation of the right-wing Freedom Party (Freiheitspartei Österreichs 
-FPÖ) in the Austrian government.
1175
 After gaining second place in the 1999 elections, the 
Freedom Party formed a coalition with the People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei - 
ÖVP),
1176
 with the FPÖ taking control of six of the ten ministries.
1177
 The FPÖ has been 
described as a populist, right-wing party, trivialising Nazi atrocities and promoting racially 
prejudicial rhetoric. 
1178
 The correlation between the participation of the FPÖ in the Austrian 
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government and the inclusion of the preventive mechanism in Article 7 is not only an academic 
assumption but has, in fact, been  underlined by a European Parliament report. As noted therein, 
‘respect for fundamental rights within the EU has become a major political issue, not only owing 
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, but also because of the concern which the inclusion of an 
extreme right-wing party in the government of one of the Member States has given rise to. The 
political responses to that event included proposals from many quarters to strengthen the 
measures provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union.’1179 This short paragraph 
makes three separate yet interrelated observations, which are significant as they demonstrate the 
EU’s stance to far-right parties within a human rights framework. Firstly, it establishes an 
explicit link between the need to protect fundamental rights and, thus, the implicit fear of a 
violation of fundamental rights in an environment affected by far–right ideology. Secondly, it 
denotes that the right-wing movement is not something to be taken lightly, with the EU having 
demonstrated ‘concern’ regarding such ideology within a system of government. Thirdly, it 
adopts a militant model whereby the EU acting as a single entity needs to protect itself from the 
consequences of the participation of such a party in the government of a Member State. Even 
though the event under consideration ‘provoked intense political turmoil in the European 
Union,’1180 the sanctioning mechanism of Article 7 was not put in place and, instead, fourteen 
Member States, acting in their capacity as a group of States rather than the EU, imposed certain 
sanctions,
1181
 such as ceasing bilateral communications with the Austrian government.
1182
 As a 
result, the Austrian case demonstrated that ‘Brussels has little if any leverage over a member 
country once it gains admission to the European club.’1183 The question which immediately 
comes to mind is why the sanctions were not imposed by the EU. The president of the 
Commission had noted that it was ‘the duty of a strong supranational institution not to isolate one 
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of its members, but instead to keep it firmly in the fold.’1184 An academic position which has 
been put forth as an explanation of the EU’s decision not to impose sanctions is that, at the 
material time, the Austrian government had not actually violated EU Law.
1185
 However, this 
statement seems to ignore the sanctioning mechanism of Article 7 of the TEU which existed 
during the Austrian saga, imposing a duty on the EU and its institutions to sanction breaches of 
the rule of law. Instead of sanctions, on an EU level, a Committee was established to consider 
whether Austria complied with common European values, particularly in relation to the rights of 
minorities, immigrants and refugees and to comment on the nature of the FPÖ. The resulting 
report noted that ‘the European history of the twentieth century reinforces the positive obligation 
on the part of European governments to combat any form of direct or indirect propaganda for 
xenophobic and racial discrimination and to react against any kind of ambiguous language which 
introduces a certain trivialization or negative normalization of the National Socialist past.’1186 
Three significant conclusions can be drawn from this paragraph. Firstly, that the atrocities 
committed during the mid 20
th
 century should act as a catalyst for due care to be taken by 
governments in the field of right-wing rhetoric and activity. Secondly, that the mandate of a far-
right party is difficult to reconcile with common European values and, thirdly, that the 
government has a general duty to combat right-wing rhetoric which may include, inter alia, the 
trivialisation of Nazism. The duty of the government to ensure a just society was reiterated with 
the report noting that there is a ‘clear, positive obligation on the part of the Austrian Government 
actively to defend the values enshrined in Art.6 of the Union Treaty, in particular human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.’1187  Also, the report recommended that the measures taken by 
the 14 Member States should be lifted because ‘if continued would become 
counterproductive’ 1188  the measures already having ‘stirred up nationalist feelings in the 
country.’ 1189  Thus, the report helps our understanding of today’s Article 7 in two ways. 
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According to the report, a government has a horizontal responsibility vis-à-vis breaches of the 
values of Article 2 and that sanctioning measures may not always be the way forward, shedding, 
in this way, doubt on the sanctioning mechanism incorporated in Article 7(2). As argued, ‘it is 
almost unanimous that imposing sanctions on Austria was highly questionable.’1190 Nevertheless, 
rather than arguing for the imposition of no sanctions for such an event, taking into account the 
horizontal duty of a State to protect the rule of law and interrelated notions and, considering the 
fact that the leader of the party was promoting right-wing rhetoric which goes against the 
foundations of the EU, a more equitable argument could simply have been the imposition of ‘less 
drastic measures’1191 rather than no measures at all.  Finally, as well as significant observations 
made by the report, it was also one of the documents which promoted the need for ‘preventative 
and monitoring procedures into Article 7 of the EU Treaty, so that a situation similar to the 
current situation in Austria could be dealt with within the EU from the very start.’1192  
 
1 .4.1 (iii) Article 7 – Concluding Comments  
As underlined at the beginning of this assessment, this article seemingly contributes to the EU’s 
protection of human rights through sanctions and preventive mechanisms. At a first glance, it 
could even be described as unique, innovative and even bold as it circumvents any limitations of 
the EU’s powers on the supervision and sanctioning of violations to the rule of law and 
interrelated doctrines in its Member States. However, it has been argued that the likelihood of its 
actual application any time soon is limited
1193
 with the possibility that the central obstacle to its 
implementation could lie in the fact that, as noted by the Commission, the Article 7 procedure 
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seeks to tackle issues through a ‘comprehensive political approach.’1194 In practical terms, it is 
the political nature of this article with ‘a lot of behind-the-scene leverage and not implying any 
active participation of the ECJ’1195 which limits its application given the overt reliance on the 
Council for the determination of an Article 2 breach and, further, making particular reference to 
Hungary, the Commission noted ‘strong political unwillingness to use the mechanism provided 
for by Article 7 TEU.’1196 As noted by Müller, it would be delusional not to acknowledge that 
politics play a role in the decision of the EU to intervene in a particular case,
1197
 especially one 
occurring within the national sphere. As a result, many scholars have been negative towards its 
potential application referring to it as ‘unusable,’ 1198  as an ‘empty gesture’ 1199  and a ‘dead 
letter.’1200 In blunt terms, State representatives are just too worried to enforce Article 7 in the fear 
that one day it will happen to them.
1201
 Either way, it cannot be disputed that, at least on a purely 
theoretical level, this article contributes to the enhancement of the Union as a protector of 
principles of democracy and the rule of law with it also constituting a source of deterrence 
against abuse. Could this be why Article 7 has not been enforced to deal with the situation in 
Fidesz’ Hungary which has been in power since 2010 and has been implementing a series of 
‘questionable policies inspired by the right-wing extremist Jobbik party’?1202 It has been stated 
that the Hungarian case is exactly what Article 7 was created to tackle yet no constructive steps 
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in this direction have yet been made. It is the reliance on political will for the upholding of 
values enshrined in Article 2, whatever these may actually mean, which has led to 
recommendations to make this article ‘enforceable law’1203 rather than merely depending on 
politics and politicians. Although, as recognised, this mechanism ‘provides an insufficient legal 
basis for a successful intervention,’1204 it could be argued that it still serves for something. More 
particularly, as a result of this mechanism, Member States ‘must always be ready to defend the 
legitimacy of their actions in light of principles they cannot individually set aside,’1205 even 
though they do not, in reality, risk being sanctioned. In 2012, due to the obstacles and limitations 
noted above, President Barosso noted that what is needed is ‘a better developed set of 
instruments, not just the alternative between the soft power of political persuasion and the 
nuclear option of Article 7 TEU.’ 1206 The following sections shall look at what mechanisms 
have been established to fill the limitations noted by Barrosso and, particularly, the 
Commission’s New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law and the Council’s Annual 
Dialogue on the Rule of Law.  
 
1.5 Threats to the Rule of Law Case-Study: Hungary  
1.5.1 The Deterioration of the Rule of Law: The case of Hungary 
The practical treatment of anti-democratic activities can be further considered through a rule of 
law lens on an EU level by considering the case of Hungary and particularly the constitutional 
and democratic turmoil brought about by the Fidesz party, led by Victor Orbán. To do so, this 
section will provide a brief overview of some of the key constitutional changes that were made in 
Hungary and the reaction of the EU to these changes. In 2010, Fidesz won the majority of seats 
in the national parliament and soon after that, with its two-thirds majority, autonomously adopted 
a new Constitution
1207
 which came into force on 1 January 2012.
1208
 Amongst other things, the 
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new Constitution ‘sets a controversial change in fiscal policy, appeals to a religious and mono-
ethnic ethos of Hungarian society [and] defines marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman...’ 1209 Moreover, it sought to ‘eliminate any kind of checks and balances, and even the 
parliamentary rotation of governing parties.’ 1210  It has been described as being ‘in a direct 
conflict with the fundamental values of the EU political constitution, such as democracy, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights.’1211 In fact, the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU 
characterised the constitutional developments in Hungary as a ‘constitutional crisis.’ 1212 
Importantly, in 2015 and following statements of Hungary’s right-wing Prime Minister Orbán on 
the reintroduction of the death penalty, the European Commission made clear this would lead to 
the application of Article 7 TEU
1213
 and that the European Commission ‘is ready to use 
immediately all the means at its disposal’ 1214  to ensure that Hungary complies with its 
obligations under EU law and respects Article 2 TEU. The European Parliament issued a 
resolution on the situation in Hungary in respect of the death penalty statements but also the 
government’s stance on immigration and its alleged interrelation with security threats and urged 
the Commission to activate the first stage of the New EU framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law, therefore initiating a monitoring process of the situation of democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights, assessing a potential systematic and serious breach of Article 2 values and 
evaluating the emergence of a systemic threat to the rule of law in that Member State that could 
develop into a clear risk of a serious breach within the meaning of Article 7 TEU. The 
Parliament requested the Commission to report back on this matter to Parliament and the Council 
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before September 2015.
1215
 There was no response and the European Parliament issued another 
Resolution in December 2015 reminding the Commission of the issue.
1216
 Following the 
Austrian case discussed above, the situation in Hungary constitutes the first real instance where a 
Member State is so openly and directly violating principles including, inter alia, the rule of 
law.
1217
 As such, Hungary can be referred to for purposes of responding to the question of what 
the EU institutions are able and/or willing to do when posed with a violation of the rule of law 
within its own territory.  
 
1.5.2 Response of the European Union to the Hungarian Constitutional Crisis 
When considering the reaction of the EU to the Hungarian constitutional crisis, the first point 
that must be noted is that resort to Article 7 TEU was not completely disregarded in this case, 
with the European Parliament putting forth this idea as a possible course of action. However, the 
leading European People’s Party did not adhere to this view and this avenue was dismissed.1218 
This points to a bleak future for Article 7 TEU ever being implemented, with doubts arising in 
any reasonable mind as to what kind of situations could actually meet the threshold of this article 
and instigate its implementation. Either way, the European Parliament settled for a Report, 
namely the Tavares Report, adopted in mid-2013 which has been characterised as ’by far the 
strongest and most consequential official condemnation of the Fidesz consolidation of 
power.’1219  With the adoption of this report,1220 the European Parliament has established a new 
framework of several avenues through which Article 2 TEU principles are to be protected and 
promoted. 
1221
 Although this report emanated from and sought to tackle the situation in Hungary, 
the general recommendations made, therein, vis-à-vis the protection of Article 2 principles are 
applicable to the EU more generally and, thus, constitute additions to the EU basket of rule of 
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law protection mechanisms.  Even though some of the follow-up procedures described, such as 
the Article 2 Trialogue composed of EU institutions to receive and assess information provided 
by the Hungarian government, are designed and tailored particularly for this case, such a 
mechanism could constitute a precedent for future cases. As noted by one scholar, they are 
‘important tools in the toolkit that European institutions can now use to ensure that a member 
state of the European Union maintains its European constitutional commitments.’1222 It must be 
noted further that resort to Article 7 was reiterated, therein, as explained below.  
 
The most concrete mechanisms proposed by the report include the establishment of an ‘Article 2 
TEU Alarm Agenda’1223 to be kick-started the moment a threat to Article 2 violation is discerned. 
This Alarm Agenda ‘effectively blocks all other dealings between the Commission and Hungary 
until Hungary addressed the issues raised in the report.’1224 Further, the report recognises the 
need to ‘tackle the so-called Copenhagen dilemma’1225  where the strictness attached to pre-
accession state of affairs vis-à-vis Article 2 standards does not continue post-accession. To this 
end, it calls for the ‘establishment of a new mechanism to ensure compliance by all Member 
States with the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and the continuity of the 
Copenhagen criteria; this mechanism could assume the form of a Copenhagen 
Commission…’ 1226  which will entail, amongst others, a noticeably enhanced role for the 
FRA.
1227
 The proposal for the creation of a Copenhagen Commission has been ‘the most recent 
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in a queue of incoherent responses’1228 to the breach of Article 2 by Member States. In addition 
to these mechanisms, the report reiterates, inter alia, the need for close cooperation between 
competent institutions
1229
 and the launching of debates on the relevant themes.
1230
 Moreover, it is 
noteworthy that Article 7 TEU was not dismissed by this document as it noted that the 
Conference of Presidents should consider the possibility of resorting to this mechanism in the 
event that Hungary does not adhere to Article 2. 
1231
  
 
1.5.3 European Court of Justice: Its Role in the Hungarian Situation  
During the aforementioned constitutional crisis which has not yet been redressed, the European 
Commission considered and, in two of the three cases, sought recourse to the ECJ under Article 
258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in relation to the 
independence of the Central Bank of Hungary and the independence of the judiciary by looking 
particularly at the lowering of the retirement age of judges
1232
 and the abolishment of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Data Protection and replacement of this institution with a 
governmental agency.
1233
  All these changes were brought about following the election of Fidesz 
as ruling party and directly fall within the framework of the rule of law. In relation to the first 
case, following effective discussion and cooperation with the Hungarian government, the 
Commission was satisfied that the government had taken the necessary steps to rectify the 
situation and, as such, did not proceed to bringing the case before the ECJ.
1234
 The first case that 
the Commission brought against Hungary involved the lowering of the retirement age of judges 
from seventy to sixty two, putting forth arguments revolving around age discrimination. In a fast 
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track process the ECJ ‘ruled quickly and forcefully against Hungary’1235 and, although Hungary 
delayed the enforcement of the judgement until all judges were essentially fired, they then 
compensated the judges who took early retirement. As a result, ‘the decision did nothing to 
change the facts on the ground. The new government was able to remake the judiciary with its 
preferred new judges despite having lost the case.’1236 With regard to the case that dealt with the 
data protection officer, the European Commission argued that Hungary violated the 
independence of this officer, a view which the ECJ agreed with. As Scheppele argues, ‘the case 
broke little new legal ground’1237 but, it was nevertheless, significant because not only does it 
demonstrate Hungary’s breach of fundamental values but, also ‘exposes the limitations of 
ordinary infringement proceedings for bringing a Member State into line.’1238  
 
The most interesting point for purposes of the present discussion is that the rule of law narrative 
was completely disregarded by the ECJ as if it never existed, even though the themes looked 
upon directly emanated from a dangerous disregard of Article 2 TEU principles, including the 
rule of law.  As noted by Bugarič, ‘they ultimately fail to address broader institutional issues that 
threaten the very foundations of the rule of law…’ 1239 In seeking to find a solution to the 
structural problems faced by recourse to Article 258 TFEU in the wider framework of promoting 
the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Member States, Scheppele proposed an 
adjustment to Article 258 TFEU through the enforcement of a systemic infringement action 
through which, when bringing a case before the ECJ, the Commission can provide the Court with 
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‘a holistic argument about how the pattern infringes not only specific points of European law but 
also its most fundamental values.’1240 Such a system would have allowed the Court to consider 
incidents such as the lowering of the retirement age of judges in Hungary in the realm of the 
constitutional overhaul of the country rather than looking at it in isolation. What must be noted is 
that the actions of the ECJ considered the aforementioned issues as single problems without 
placing them within the broader framework of Hungary’s unconstitutional approach. This, in turn 
allowed the government to ‘argue that it has responded satisfactorily to the outstanding 
complaints without having to change anything essentially about its illiberal reforms.’1241 
 
1.5.4 Hungary: Concluding Points 
Hungary is a testing ground for the efficacy and efficiency of the mechanisms available for the 
protection and promotion of the rule of law within the EU regarding the framework of State 
activity which is founded, in whole or in part, on far-right ideas. A July 2014 observation held 
that, due to external pressure, some ‘cosmetic changes’ 1242  were made by Hungary, taking 
minimal action on the concerns expressed by entities such as the European Parliament.
1243
 This 
indicator demonstrates that, ‘not by any standards do the results of the test qualify a success.’1244 
It appears that the Tavares Report, although rich in innovation, ideas and good will, did not result 
in the amelioration of the rule of law situation in Hungary. In addition, the ECJ, when looking at 
by-products of this new constitutional reality, did not place its analysis within a rule of law 
setting. What is left is the resort, or at least more serious consideration of resort to Article 7 TEU, 
as anyhow proposed by the Report.   
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1.6 A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law 
The New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, created by the European Commission, 
seeks to ensure that the rule of law is adequately upheld in all Member States and to offer 
solutions for purposes of tackling situations of a ‘systemic threat’1245 to the rule of law. More 
particularly, this framework is to be activated before the mechanisms of Article 7 are 
applicable,
1246
 therefore, contributing to the overall structure through which the rule of law and 
interrelated themes are respected and promoted by Member States and through which risks or 
violations of these principles are adequately dealt with by the EU. Further, it is applicable in 
cases where Member States are ‘taking measures or are tolerating situations which are likely to 
systematically and adversely affect the integrity, stability or the proper functioning of the 
institutions and the safeguard mechanisms established at national level to secure the rule of 
law.’1247 This paragraph is important since it denotes that the State has a responsibility not only 
for directly causing a violation of the rule of law but also for tolerating a situation which violates 
the rule of law, which, as noted above, is relevant to situations where right-wing parties not in 
power or non-party groups are threatening the democratic state of a country. Thus, in this 
Framework, the Commission has rectified the position it put forth in its 2003 Communication to 
the Parliament on Article 7, as discussed above, to include that the State may be guilty of any 
omission and not just its direct actions. This Framework decision implements a tripartite formula 
to achieve its objectives, namely assessments, recommendation and follow up.
1248
 In the event 
that the State does not adequately follow up the Commission’s recommendation, the latter will 
consider activating the preventive or sanctioning mechanism of Article 7.
1249
 In relation to the 
assessment procedure, the Commission will consider all the relevant information and make an 
assessment as to the existence of ‘clear indications of a systemic threat to the rule of law…’1250 
In doing so, it can refer to sources of institutions such as the CoE and the EU’s Agency for 
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Fundamental Rights.
1251
 If such a threat is determined, the Commission will enter into a 
confidential dialogue with the Member State concerned, relying always on the State’s ‘duty of 
sincere cooperation.’1252 If the Commission then finds that the Member State is not taking the 
adequate steps necessary for redressing the threat, it will proceed to making a public 
recommendation to the State that the threat is resolved, within a set time-frame, and that such 
solutions are then communicated to the Commission. This recommendation may also incorporate 
means and methods that can be implemented by the State for the resolution required.
1253
 The 
Commission will oversee the follow up of the State in question to the recommendation put forth 
and, if no satisfactory steps have been taken within the established temporal framework, then 
only then will the Commission take into account the ‘possibility of activating one of the 
mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU.’1254 Thus, through this mechanism, the State is given 
enough chances through dialogue, recommendation and follow up to rectify the problem and, 
even if it does not take the necessary steps, the Framework does not necessarily result in the 
implementation of Article 7 but only the possibility of such an occurrence. In October 2015, 
Poland saw the first majority government come to power since 1989 in the form of the Law and 
Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). Since its rise to power, this party has undertaken several 
changes similar to those taken by Hungary. In Poland, these have included changes which affect 
the impartiality of the Constitutional Tribunal and media pluralism. In light of these changes, the 
EU has commenced a structured dialogue under the Rule of Law Framework. 
1255
 The efficacy of 
this procedure in relation to Poland remains to be seen, with little hope arising given the 
experiences from Hungary and the inherent weakeness of this Framework.  
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In sum, the Framework can be characterised as an ‘early-warning tool to enable the Commission 
to enter into a structured dialogue with the Member State concerned.’ 1256 However, given the 
fact that there are no automatic legal sanctions in the event that a Member State opts to disregard 
the Commission’s Recommendation, with recourse to Article 7 TEU only constituting a 
possibility, as noted above, this mechanism has been characterised as ‘anything but 
revolutionary.’1257 Moreover, the non-binding nature of the Commission’s recommendation and 
the mere possibility of kick-starting Article 7 renders the potential of effective implementation of 
this mechanism limited since, in a Member State where ‘the ruling elite has made a conscious 
choice not to comply with EU values, engaging in a rule of law dialogue is unlikely to be 
fruitful.’1258 Notwithstanding the intrinsic shortcomings of this Framework, one may, at least 
conceptually, argue that it is too early to assess this Framework due to the fact that it is still 
recent. If anything, it constitutes an addition to the basket of mechanisms that can be instigated 
when faced with rule of law threats within the EU. Either way, it remains to be seen whether it 
will, in fact, be implemented, with higher hopes being attached to this Framework than the 
implementation of Article 7, as it will be Commissioners rather than the Heads of State which 
will be instigating and setting into force the mechanisms of this Framework, their actions bearing 
less political cost.   
 
1.7 Council of the European Union – Annual Rule of Law Dialogue 
The Council of the European Union criticised the European Commission’s framework, discussed 
above, on the grounds that ‘it would breach the principle of conferral’1259 and, thus, put forth its 
own mechanism for tackling rule of law issues, this being an annual dialogue among all Member 
States within the Council for the promotion of the rule of law. The Council noted that such a 
dialogue will occur ‘on the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equal treatment of 
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all Member States’1260 and that it would be conducted on a ‘non-partisan and evidence-based 
approach’1261 noting that the principle of conferral and the identity of Member States will be 
respected. Essentially, this procedure is a chat about the rule of law and ideas of promoting it 
within the EU, with no legal or political consequences or sanctions and no mention of Article 7 
TEU in the event that problems or threats are identified. Moreover, it applies equally to all 
Member States, providing no margin for focusing on a problematic State or States. As noted by 
the First Vice President of the Commission, in charge of issues including the rule of law, the 
Council’s dialogue as well as the Commission’s Framework are both ‘grossly inadequate to 
tackle the problem of rule of law backsliding post EU accession.’1262 In fact, the term ‘dialogue’ 
in itself projects the spirit of this procedure which limits itself to discussion and talk with no 
consequences or actions arising, therefrom, and, as such, cannot sincerely be relied on as a 
protector of the rule of law in the Union.  In addition, using the aforementioned statement made 
by Barosso as a benchmark, namely that there is a need for instruments that are not as harsh as 
Article 7 and not as soft as mere political persuasion, one can reach two conclusions. Firstly, that 
the Council’s dialogue has not fulfilled the identified need as it is mere dialogue and, secondly, 
that the Commission’s Framework, although limited in that it is non-binding and recourse to 
Article 7 is not automatic in the event that all else fails, is a step up from the Council’s 
mechanism. Either way, the current set of instruments does not fulfill the needs, as set out by 
Barosso, and, in addition to the fact that Article 7 is essentially a no-go area for Member States, 
leaves the Union exposed to rule of law violations.  
 
1.8 Rule of Law: Concluding Comments 
In sum, the rule of law constitutes a theoretically effective and efficient framework through 
which right-wing extremism, an accepted threat to this doctrine, may be combatted on an EU 
level. Once again, the preventive and sanctioning measures incorporated in the above-discussed 
mechanisms emanate from the EU’s need to protect itself and, possibly, the country in question, 
from destructive forces. However, despite the growing number of available mechanisms, the fact 
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remains that ‘outside the accession framework, the EU does not enjoy a solid set of resources 
and procedural standards’ 1263 when it comes to the rule of law and, thus, practical reliance on 
this doctrine remains rather illusory.  
 
2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  
The interrelationship between the EU and human rights is not a simple one to assess. It has been 
argued that ‘under the orthodox account of the EU Law, the Union lacks any general competence 
in the field of human rights.’1264 Nevertheless, this interrelationship is ever-developing with the 
Union being marked by a ‘more strongly embedded paradigm of fundamental rights in the Union 
law.’1265 For example, Article 7 TEU now grants the EU a supervisory role in relation to the 
protection of Article 2 principles, such as human rights, and, since the Treaty of Nice, allows the 
EU to prevent breaches to the rule of law and related notions. Other initiatives have included the 
incorporation of Article 6 of the TEU which, inter alia, renders the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU a source of European Law and stipulates that the Union is to ratify the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  It has been argued that this push towards 
endowing the EU with a role in the field of human rights has partly emanated from concerns over 
whether the newer Eastern Member States would continue to uphold their obligations in the 
ambit of democracy and human rights once their membership has been approved. 
1266
 The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU was ratified in 2000 on the premise that ‘the peoples of 
Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future 
based on common values.’1267 Notwithstanding the significant step forward taken by this charter, 
its actual impact is restricted due to its non-binding nature and its applicability only in the event 
that the institutions and States implement EU Law.
1268
 The articles relevant to a discourse on 
right-wing extremism are those pertaining to the freedom of expression, the freedom of 
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association and assembly, the prohibition of discrimination, the general limitation clause, the 
non-destruction clause and the prohibition of abuse of rights. Article 11 of the Charter states that 
‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.’ Article 12 of the Charter states that ‘everyone has the right 
to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels…’ Notwithstanding 
that any limitations to these rights are absent from these articles, the Charter incorporates a 
general limitation clause in the form of Article 52 which notes that limitation shall be ‘provided 
for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of 
proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest, recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others.’ This article also states that ‘in so far as this Charter contains rights which 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more 
extensive protection.’ Therefore, as in the case of the ECHR, militant democracy is also found in 
the Charter which permits limitations to expression, association and assembly insofar as such 
limitations are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, concepts which are 
provided for by the ECHR and which have been duly interpreted and defined by the (ECtHR). 
However, Article 52 refers only to the meaning of these rights as covered by the Convention and 
not as interpreted by the Court.  The distance kept by the EU from the CoE was further enhanced 
at the end of 2014 by the ECJ. In considering the EU’s accession to the ECHR, the Court noted 
that, if this were to occur, the EU would, inter alia, be bound by ECtHR judgements of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
1269
After setting out a series of legal obstacles to acceding to 
the Convention, the ECJ found that to do so would be incompatible with EU law.
1270
 Moreover, 
due to the lack of relevant case-law in relation to the application of the Charter’s provisions, it is 
not possible to ascertain, merely from this document, what kind of limitation of expression is in 
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fact proportional. Even though, on an EU level, Feryn
1271
 ‘marks the long-awaited birth of what 
can be symbolically entitled a European law of freedom of expression,’1272 this case dealt with 
hate speech within the employment setting and not hate speech promulgated by right-wing 
extremism and, therefore, the contextual difference does not permit us to extend principles and 
points developed, therein, to the framework of far-right  rhetoric. 
 
In addition, the Charter incorporates Article 53, which notes that the provisions, therein, shall not 
be interpreted as ‘restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’ as 
recognised by the EU, international law, international agreements, such as the ECHR, and by the 
Constitutions of Member States. In referring to international law, the Charter, thereby, 
incorporates provisions, such as those contained in the ICERD, which positively stipulate the 
banning of racist parties and groups. In addition, Article 54 holds that  ‘nothing in this Charter 
shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at 
the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised in this Charter or at their limitation 
to a greater extent than is provided for herein.’ Article 21 provides that ‘any discrimination based 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, 
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, 
birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’ Thus, expression or association of 
right-wing groups which result in such discrimination could be prohibited as a result of Article 
21 but also in light of Article 54 which prohibits the destruction of the rights and freedoms of 
this Charter, including the freedom from non-discrimination.  Article 21 is of particular 
relevance to hate speech and hate crime expressed and conducted by right-wing groups, given 
that, notwithstanding a general reference to the adoption of international law, there is no 
particular article dealing with racial discrimination and its prohibition within this Charter.  
However, given the lack of ECJ jurisprudence on central themes, such as far-right therotic and 
activity, and given that it was decided that the EU would not accede to the ECHR and is, thus, 
not bound to follow the interpretations set out by the ECtHR, the way in which the issue of, for 
example, expression is interpreted and understood in the realm of far-right rhetoric is not lucid.   
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In sum, the Charter provides a brief overview of rights that could be quoted by right-wing groups 
as a justification for extremist speech or activity and provides the possibility to limit such 
extremism in a general manner through Articles 52, 53 and 54 with Article 21 being the only 
positive obligation directly imposed on Member States to prohibit racial discrimination, albeit 
through a broad discrimination clause. The rather generalised articles and the absence of relevant 
ECJ case-law mean that there does not yet exist a well-rounded insight into key meanings and 
notions. Instead, what is demonstrated through the aforementioned articles is the objective of the 
Charter simply to lay down key rights and obligations without entering into too much detail on 
central terms and themes, nevertheless reflecting the general spirit of the EU against actions that 
are contrary to human rights, whatever such spirit may entail.  
 
3. 1996 Joint Action adopted by the Council Concerning Means to Combat Racism and 
Xenophobia 
The 1996 Joint Action
1273
 was the first comprehensive initiative taken by the EU to combat 
racism and xenophobia within EU Member States by promoting a harmonised criminal law 
amongst Member States as a means to this end.  Prior to this initiative, no steps had been taken to 
tackle racism through EU mechanisms apart from two reports prepared by Commissions of 
Inquiry, as discussed below. However, during the 1990’s, the EU was faced with increasing 
pressure from the European Parliament and civil society to incorporate measures against such 
discrimination.
1274
 Joint Actions were the legal means available between 1993 and1999 and were 
later replaced by the Framework Decisions following reforms brought about by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. As noted by Bell, while Joint Actions were, in theory, legally binding, ‘the absence 
of any jurisdiction for the ECJ over Joint Actions meant that the main lever for compliance was 
political will’1275 and, therefore, their actual application and legal enforceability were limited.  
The 1996 Joint Action had the objective of adopting rules to combat racism and xenophobia and 
ensure harmonisation of criminal law on this issue amongst States in order to prevent 
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perpetrators ‘from exploiting the fact that racist and xenophobic activities are classified 
differently in different States by moving from one country to another in order to escape criminal 
proceedings or avoid serving sentences…’ For the purposes of this Joint Action, a plethora of 
activities constitute a criminal offence, with the most relevant to right-wing extremism being the 
participation in the activities of groups, organisations or associations which involve 
discrimination, violence, or racial, ethnic or religious hatred with other activities including the 
public incitement to discrimination, violence or hatred in respect of a group of persons or a 
member of such a group defined by reference to colour, race, religion or national or ethnic origin, 
the public condoning, for racist or xenophobic purposes, of crimes against humanity and human 
rights violations, the public dissemination of material containing expressions of racism and 
xenophobia as well as  public denial of certain international crimes. Such actions fall within the 
sphere of activities conducted and ideas professed by right-wing groups. Interestingly, the Joint 
Action criminalises what is habitually referred to as revisionism only when it ‘includes 
behaviour which is contemptuous of, or degrading to, a group of persons defined by reference to 
colour, race, religion or national or ethnic origin’ whilst publicly condoning crimes against 
humanity and human rights violations is only criminalised when it is carried out for ‘a racist or 
xenophobic purpose,’ thereby, demonstrating the weight placed by the Joint Action on intent in 
that group of offences.  Moreover, when reading the list of punishable activities, a similarity can 
be discerned between the offences listed, therein, and Article 4 of the ICERD. The Joint Action 
sought to ensure cooperation between Member States for the aforementioned offences through a 
variety of means, such as the seizure and confiscation of material intended for public 
dissemination, acknowledgement that the offences are not of a political nature in order to prevent 
refusal for mutual cooperation, provision of information to another Member State to initiate legal 
proceedings and the establishment of contact points in the Member States responsible for the 
collection and exchange of information for purposes of investigation and proceedings. 
Interestingly, the Joint Action assumed a legal and cultural cohesion between Member States in 
relation to criminal law but also in relation to the restriction of the freedom of expression and 
freedom of association, which are directly related to the offences listed therein. This weakness 
could be considered an obstacle to the proper interpretation and implementation of its provisions, 
a weakness which was partially rectified in the subsequent Framework Decision, as discussed 
below.  
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It has been noted that ‘there is very little evidence on how the Joint Action has been applied in 
practice.’1276 However, two years after its entry into force, the Council noted that only Austria 
and Luxembourg made amendments to their legal systems in order to conform with the 
provisions therein.
1277
 Thus, the overall contribution that the Joint Action has made to the fight 
against racism and xenophobia remains questionable. However, it did constitute the foundation 
upon which the next tool, namely a Framework Decision, was developed.  
 
4. Council Framework Decision 2009/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on Combatting Certain 
Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law  
The incorporation of the fight against racism in today’s Article 67.3 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) demonstrated the increasing dedication of the EU to 
contributing thereto. This article foresees collaboration between Member States in criminal 
matters pertaining to racism and xenophobia by holding that ‘the Union shall endeavour to 
ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and 
xenophobia, and through measures for co-ordination and co-operation between police and 
judicial authorities and other competent authorities, as well as through the mutual recognition of 
judgments in criminal matters and, if necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws.’  
 
In light of the provisions, therein, and building on the 1996 Joint Action, the Commission put 
forth a Framework Decision on combatting racism and xenophobia through criminal law which 
was adopted in 2008, after seven years of negotiations.
1278
 The negotiations were lengthy and 
complex, predominantly due to the ‘disparity of the Member States legal systems and traditions 
as regards the protection of the right to freedom of expression.’1279  In fact, the conflicting 
appraisals adopted by States in the realm of restricting freedom of expression and also freedom 
of association are a recurring theme in the drafting of such documents, as can be reflected, for 
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example, in the reservations imposed on Article 4 of the ICERD, discussed in the international 
framework. As such, the Framework Decision underlines that it respects the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of association and assembly, as provided for by the ECHR and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and, thus, adheres to the limitation clauses attached 
thereto and through which any conditions, limitations, restrictions to or penalties for the offences 
listed can be introduced. In this ambit, Article 7 of the Framework Decision holds that it shall 
‘not have the effect of requiring Member States to take measures in contradiction to fundamental 
principles relating to freedom of association and freedom of expression.’ Further, in relation to 
criminal law, the Framework Decision recognised that full harmonization of criminal law is not 
possible given that the Member States’ cultural and legal traditions differ. Notwithstanding the 
purpose of this provision stemming from a potential to provide a realistic outlook on the 
objectives of this document, ‘such wording leaves a certain, albeit very unclear, margin for the 
States to assess a pure racist…scope of the concrete hate speech utterances.’ 1280 
 
Article 1 of the Framework Decision outlines that Member States must punish incidences of 
publicly inciting to violence or hatred against a particular group through public dissemination or 
distribution of material, publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivializing international crimes 
as defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Court or the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal directed against a group when the conduct is carried out in such a manner 
likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group. However, as noted, without an ECJ 
assessment of what falls within the framework of conduct that is likely to incite violence or 
hatred against a group or a member of such a group, ‘it remains difficult to assess the potential of 
the severity of criminalizing speech.’1281 Against a backdrop of a lacking judicial extrapolation 
of key notions and themes, three interesting observations can be made in relation to the list of 
offences incorporated in the Framework Decision. Firstly, the ‘participation in the activities of 
groups, organizations or associations, which involve discrimination, violence, or racial, ethnic or 
religious hatred,’ as incorporated in the 1996 Joint Action, is not named as an offence. This 
provision ‘was opposed from the outset by nearly all States except Germany and so it was 
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deleted from the draft text.’1282 Secondly, the public incitement of discrimination, which was 
incorporated in the Joint Action, has been removed, allowing only for incitement to violence or 
hatred. Thirdly, the offence of grossly trivialising international crimes, such as genocide, has 
been added to the list of publicly condoning and denying such crimes. As is the case in the Joint 
Action, publicly condoning, denying and, now, grossly trivialising an international crime, such 
as the Holocaust, is only a criminal offence insofar as it is effectuated in a manner likely to incite 
violence or hatred against such a group, thereby permitting such expression as long as it does not 
potentially lead to an undesirable consequence. Article 1(4) provides Member States with further 
leniency when faced with the public denial or trivialisation of international crimes, such as 
genocide, as these can, if a Member State wishes, be restricted to crimes which have been 
established by a final decision of a national and/or international court. It must be noted that no 
reference is made to gross trivialisation in this ambit and one can only assume that this is an 
oversight by the drafters rather than a purposeful exclusion for which there exists no reasonable 
explanation. In addition, Article 1(2) grants Member States the liberty to punish all the 
aforementioned actions and/or expressions only when they are carried out in a way ‘likely to 
disturb public order or which is threatening, abusive or insulting.’ The objective of this provision 
is problematic given that it can safely be said that the offences listed in this article cannot occur 
without disturbing public order or without being threatening, abusive or insulting. Thus, not only 
is it difficult to understand in what types of situation this provision could be enforceable, but, 
simultaneously, it indirectly foresees that the type of activities or words described, therein, can 
be carried out or expressed without resulting in harm. Further, Article 1(3) interlinks religion 
with race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, adopting the principle of intersectionality 
as is the case, for example, in the ICERD.  
 
In addition, Article 2 of the Framework Decision provides that instigating, aiding and abetting 
the aforementioned offences are all punishable activities, marking a positive development in 
relation to the Joint Action where such activities are not punishable. Article 3 notes that criminal 
penalties for the offences should be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ with the conduct 
included in Article 1 being punishable by penalties of between one and three years’ 
imprisonment. In addition to the offences incorporated in the document, Article 4 notes that 
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Member States must take the necessary steps to ‘ensure that racist and xenophobic motivation is 
considered an aggravating circumstance’ or that it is at least taken into account by courts in the 
determination of punishment, demonstrating another positive development from the time of the 
Joint Action. Article 5 is a significant article given that it deals with the liability of legal persons. 
It holds that Member States must take all the necessary steps to ‘ensure that a legal person can be 
held liable for conduct referred to in Articles 1 and 2, committed for its benefit by any person, 
acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal persons\, who has a leading position 
within the legal person...’ Importantly, the liability of legal persons ‘shall not exclude criminal 
proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators or accessories in the conduct...’ 
However, the Framework Decision states that legal persons cannot include ‘the State or other 
public bodies in the exercise of State authority and public international organisations’ thereby 
excluding the State and its institutions from criminal liability in the event that it or they promote 
racial hatred and/or violence. Thus, this article leaves an ‘important discretion for a State to 
grapple with certain political movements’1283 thereby, equipping it with the tools to combat right-
wing extremist groups promoting rhetoric and conduct as described in this document. However, 
and, although no definition of ‘State’ is provided, one could presumably conclude that a political 
party that is part of the government would fall within the definition of a State and, thus, outside 
the scope of this liability. In relation to penalties for legal entities active within the right-wing 
extremist movement, the most relevant include the exclusion from entitlement to public benefits 
or aid
1284
 and the placement under judicial supervision.
1285
 
 
In relation to the enforceability of the Framework Decision, the 2014 Report prepared by the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on its implementation noted that ‘in 
accordance with Article 10(1) of Protocol No. 36 to the Treaties, prior to the end of the 
transitional period expiring on 1 December 2014, the Commission does not have the power to 
launch infringement proceedings under Article 25 TFEU with regard to Framework Decisions  
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adopted prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.’1286 As a result, the EU and its 
institutions are left with limited powers to push States in the direction of adequate enforcement. 
As noted in the recent report, a number of Member States have not fully and/or suitably 
transposed the Framework Decision’s provisions ‘namely in relation to the offences of denying, 
condoning and grossly trivialising certain crimes.’1287 
 
Thus, the Framework Decision does contribute, at least on a theoretical level, to combatting 
right-wing extremism, notwithstanding its great leap backwards from the Joint Action vis-à-vis 
the criminalisation of participation in racist groups. Nevertheless, it deals with an array of 
activities carried out by such groups, embellishes and adds certain notions, such as the 
consideration of a racist motivation as an aggravating circumstance, and deals separately with the 
penalties which are to be imposed on legal persons, thereby, encompassing some of the vehicles 
used to promulgate right-wing rhetoric, albeit leaving out the significant vehicle of political 
parties.  The limitations brought by this Decision, as discussed above, demonstrate that 
‘combatting racism can encounter strong political resistance....[with] the text resembling ‘a 
lowest common denominator.’1288 This, in addition to the limitations of the EU in launching 
infringement proceedings, as noted above, render the efficacy and actual application of the 
Framework Decision in a unified and adequate manner in all Member States doubtful, with little 
progress having been made to date. More particularly, as noted in the 2014 Report on the 
Framework Decision, ‘at present it appears that a number of Member States have not transposed 
fully and/or correctly all the provisions of the Framework Decision’1289 In fact, the report urges 
the ‘full and correct legal transposition of the existing Framework Decision.’1290 Indeed, it has 
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been argued that ‘the full implementation of the Framework Decision will radically alter the 
legal landscape in Europe.’1291 This remains to be seen.  
 
5. European Parliament Resolutions  
The European Parliament has taken certain initiatives which incorporate regulating right-wing 
extremism, the most relevant of which are discussed in this section. In 1993, the European 
Parliament adopted a Resolution on the Resurgence of Racism and Xenophobia in Europe and 
the danger of right-wing extremist violence.
1292
 It draws attention to the ‘proliferation in the 
Member States of extreme right-wing groups, parties and movements’1293 and holds that ‘these 
practices pose a grave threat to those democratic values which form the basis of the common 
heritage of the Member States.’1294 It reaffirms the duty of EU institutions to ‘combat any group 
or movement liable to pose a threat to democracy and basic human rights.’ 1295 However, it does 
not extrapolate on the term ‘combat’ and does not provide any further recommendations in 
relation to how such movements can be combatted. In 1994, it passed a resolution on racism, 
xenophobia and anti-Semitism
1296
 which arose following its concern about the electoral success 
of racist parties in Europe and particularly in countries such as Austria, France, the UK and 
Belgium, whilst simultaneously expressing its contentment at the decrease in votes given to the 
respective party in Germany. The Resolution deplores the fact that ‘certain political forces are 
using the existing crisis in employment and the economy to stir up xenophobic and racist 
sentiments and exploit them for electoral ends.’ 1297  It notes ‘with concern the increasing 
sympathy with which the positions of extreme right-wing movements and political parties are 
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being received in several Member States of the Union and a candidate country.’ 1298 
Notwithstanding the concern and condemnation of the right-wing in this Resolution, the 
Parliament proceeded to make recommendations for combatting racism through initiatives such 
as education and NGO projects, making no reference to the banning and/or regulation of right-
wing extremist groups, activities and rhetoric. In 1995, it adopted the Resolution of the European 
Parliament on racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism 
1299
 which noted that whenever there is ‘a 
risk that organizations or people with racist, xenophobic or anti-Semitic behaviour make contacts 
across the borders of a Member State, the criminal aspects should be studied by Europol.’1300  
Furthermore, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution in 1997
1301
 to express ‘its regret at 
racist and xenophobic statements by politicians and parties at national and European Level’1302 
and called upon ‘democratic parties to use all democratic means to ostracise racist movements 
and groups.’1303  However, this Resolution makes no reference to the meaning of what can 
constitute democratic means nor does it make further direct recommendations in relation to the 
regulation of right-wing groups, but instead suggests measures, such as education and national 
and local projects and youth exchanges, to promote tolerance and understanding. In 2005, the 
European Parliament called upon States to withdraw public funding from political parties that do 
not abide by human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
1304
 In 2007, the European Parliament 
passed a Resolution on combatting the rise of extremism in Europe where it underlined that 
‘extremist political movements is a European challenge that requires a joint and coordinated 
approach.’ 1305 It further went on to stipulate, for the first time so directly, that the combat of 
extremism must not negatively affect the protection of the freedom of expression and 
                                                          
1298
 European Parliament Resolution on Racism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Semitism, 27 October 1994 (OJ C 323/154, 
20.11.1994)  
1299
 European Parliament Resolution on Racism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Semitism, 27 October 1994 (OJ C 323/154, 
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association. 
1306
 It called upon other political forces to avoid supporting and forming alliances 
with extremist political parties either directly or indirectly. 
1307
 
 
Thus, the issue of right-wing extremism has been an issue of concern to the Parliament since 
1993. Notwithstanding certain measures to combat this phenomenon, such as non-alliance with 
such parties and the ostracising of such groups through the implementation of all democratic 
means, whatever that may mean, no Resolution has been as explicit as the ICERD in mentioning 
the banning and prohibition of such parties or groups. This could be due to the experience of the 
limitations imposed on the relevant Article to that Convention due to concerns over the freedom 
of expression and freedom of association and, also, due to the Parliament’s concern over this 
given that it did, in fact, note that any measures must not violate those rights.  
 
6. Other Measures 
Following the 1984 European Parliamentary elections and the rise in the success of right-wing 
parties, the Parliament established a Committee of Inquiry into the rise of racism and fascism in 
Europe which resulted in the Report of the Committee of Inquiry, known as the Evrigenis 
Report,
1308
 which provides comprehensive, definitional and conceptual frameworks of key terms 
and phenomena, gives an overview of the situation in Member States and makes 
recommendations for combatting this phenomenon.  Notwithstanding that the Report focuses on 
the rise of racism and fascism in Europe and extensively discusses the development of the right-
wing movement in Member States, the recommendations made relating to the direct regulation of 
the phenomenon are limited with more emphasis being placed on tackling the causal factors 
leading to their formation and why they flourish. More particularly, recommendations include 
the immediate ratification of relevant international conventions,
1309
 the ‘creation of a European 
legal area in order to prevent the activities of…extremist organizations…and the distribution of 
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illegal propaganda material,’1310 and that national legislations on combatting political extremism 
are constantly revised and their application ensured. 
1311
 
 
In 1990, the European Parliament re-examined the issue through a second Committee of Inquiry 
which resulted in the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Racism and Xenophobia, or the 
Ford Report, which, once again, underlined the need for action, looked at the situation in 
Member States and produced recommendations to combat racism and xenophobia with some 
dealing directly with right-wing extremist groups. Such recommendations included the 
establishment of a system for monitoring developments in the field of racism, anti-Semitism and 
xenophobia, including extreme-right and fascist groups 
1312
 and that a periodic report be prepared 
every eighteen to twenty four months by the Commission of the European Communities on the 
current situation in relation to racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, including extreme right 
and fascist groups.
1313
 These reports were valuable initiatives that contributed to the development 
of knowledge in relation to right-wing extremism.  
 
In sum, these reports are significant in that they reflect the early steps taken by the European 
Parliament to look into the issue of right-wing extremism and provide concrete recommendations 
for Member States to combat it. They also allow for an appraisal of developments taken on this 
level within the framework considered. For example, in 1985, the Evrigenis Report 
recommended the creation of a European Legal Order to prevent the activities of right-wing 
extremist groups but this has not yet been realised. However, and notwithstanding that both 
reports recommend that Member States which have not yet ratified the ICERD do so 
immediately,
1314
 and, by extension, requests the implementation of Article 4, therein, nowhere in 
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the above reports are there suggestions pertaining to the prohibition or banning of right-wing 
extremist parties or other less restrictive measures such as non-alliance with such parties.  
 
7. European Union Framework – Concluding Comments  
In conclusion, the strongest and most real tool with real potential and consequences, which the 
EU has at its discretion to tackle right-wing extremist movements, is Article 7 of the TEU. This 
is not only due to its primacy vis-à-vis its positioning on the ladder of EU sources but also due to 
its innovative, second chance nature incorporated in the dual preventive – sanctioning 
mechanism offered therein. Nevertheless this article has not yet been applied, with a lacking 
political will to kick-start real preventive and sanctionary measures, as demonstrated in the case 
of Hungary. According to the letter and spirit of the article, one could come up with a multitude 
of examples in which this article could and should be implemented, many of those relating to the 
European far right. Moreover, the New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law which 
broadens the scope of the second-chance nature approach adopted by the EU to risky situations, 
the mechanisms proposed by the Tavares report, such as the ‘Copenhagen Commission’ and, to a 
much lesser extent the Council’s Annual Rule of Law Dialogue, all constitute tools which can be 
used to protect the rule of law from, inter alia, right-wing extremism. However, the efficacy of 
the tools, apart from Article 7 TEU, is doubtful since they are primarily non-binding, non-
consequential recommendations. In addition to the above, the EU has come up with other 
instruments that could be implemented in this sphere. The 1996 Joint Action was the only 
initiative which sought to criminalise participation in such groups, a measure which was 
removed by the subsequent Framework Directive. Notwithstanding that the Charter provides for 
the principle of non-discrimination and limits freedom of expression and association in certain 
circumstances, regardless of the fact that the Framework Decision criminalises activities and 
speeches conducted by such movements, and, even though the European Parliament expresses 
concern in relation to right-wing groups, the EU has yet to adopt comprehensive and binding 
legal measures which are particular to the regulation of such movements.  These measures, 
which should incorporate a coherent definitional framework of right-wing extremism and clearly 
outline the steps that should be adopted by Member States towards the regulation of the 
phenomenon, are particularly timely given the rise of the movement on a national and regional 
level within the EU. It could be discerned, from the Parliament’s Resolutions and the Framework 
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Decision, that the EU wishes to avoid outright bans and prohibitions of such groups and resort to 
other less restrictive measures which have been referred to in more recent years, such as cutting 
public funding, either due to sincere concern for the freedoms of expression and association or in 
fear of a repeat of the limitations imposed on the ICERD’s prohibitive provision. Either way, 
what can safely be said and is reflected from the above is that the far-right is incongruous with 
European common values but has not yet been challenged by the European family.  
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CHAPTER SIX: ENGLAND AND WALES  
Introduction  
This chapter will map out the domestic legal framework that exists to challenge right-wing 
extremist movements in England and Wales. Discussion of relevant policies, where available, 
shall be made. This analysis will be effectuated against the backdrop of a contextual framework 
which will set out the legal culture of England and Wales and, in particular, its common law 
system, discussing the unity of England and Wales as one legal system. Based on this, it will 
explain why the dissertation is studying England and Wales and not the UK as a whole. Given 
the developments, following the referendum of the 23
rd
 June 2016 in which 52% of the British 
people opted to exit the European Union, there will also be a discussion of the impact of the 
referendum on the legal and political culture of the United Kingdom as well as the link between 
the results and the rise in hate crime and hate speech in the country. A backdrop will then be 
given of right-wing extremist entities active in England and Wales, adopting Minkenberg’s 
structure, composed of political parties, non-party movements and the subculture milieu, taking 
care to distinguish between any violent, non-violent and quasi-violent mandates. After the 
contextual setting has been established, the chapter will provide an overview of the definitional 
framework of key terms including, but not limited to, right-wing extremism, right-wing terrorism, 
racist speech, racial hatred and religious hatred emanating from the legal and policy frameworks 
of England and Wales. The relevant definitions are repeated in this chapter due to the 
particularities which stem from the legal and policy frameworks of England and Wales as, for 
example, in relation to the national construction and conceptualisation of race, racism and racial 
discrimination. Against the aforementioned contextual setting, the chapter will proceed to 
consider the interpretation and incorporation of the UK’s, and thus, England and Wales’ 
obligations as these emanate from international and European frameworks. In relation to 
international obligations, the section will consider the status of Article 20(2) ICCPR and Article 
4 ICERD in national law. In order to determine the State’s adherence to international obligations, 
reservations and/or interpretative declarations imposed on provisions of international 
conventions shall be assessed as well as documents of the HRC and the CERD. On a CoE level, 
the Human Rights Act 1998
1315
 (HRA 1998) will be looked at which has incorporated the ECHR 
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Rights; however a draft Bill has yet to be put forth.  
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into national law. On this level, it must be noted that the Additional Protocol to the Convention 
on Cybercrime Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature 
Committed through Computer Systems has not been transposed into national law. Although no 
further discussion will arise from this document, the fact of non-transposition is a finding in itself 
in the realm of the tools available for a State to challenge hate. On an EU level, the chapter will 
consider the position of the UK vis-à-vis the Framework Decision on Combatting Certain Forms 
and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law.
1316
 After assessing its 
adherence to international and European obligations, the chapter will look at its domestic 
framework in the realm of challenging far-right movements. To this end, it will firstly pinpoint 
how the key freedoms of non-discrimination, expression, assembly and association are 
established therein. This is the starting point since these rights and freedoms are the central 
mechanisms used by the far-right to disseminate hate. In addition to this, the normative 
foundation of this dissertation emanates from deciphering where to draw the line between the 
exercise of human rights and freedoms on the one hand and preventing, for example, the 
destruction of democracy and/or the rights of others and/or the destruction of dignity on the other. 
After this framework is set out, the chapter will appraise the role of criminal law in relation to 
the far-right, looking firstly at the public order ambit which is the one most habitually used to 
challenge the rhetoric and activities of the far-right. Then, it will consider the more recent anti-
terror legislation which, as will be demonstrated below, has come into play in relation to the 
regulation of violent elements of the far-right movement. After looking at criminal law, and how 
it deals with ensuring public order and anti-terror, the chapter will proceed to appraise how 
national law treats political parties before registration and during their functioning. The purpose 
is to determine what tools and sub-tools are available and can be used for challenging far-right 
parties contesting elections. The principle of non-discrimination in the realm of parties’ 
mandates, but also vis-à-vis activities of their members, will also be considered in this section. 
By perusing all the above frameworks, this chapter incorporates all means and methods adopted 
by England and Wales which, directly or indirectly challenge the far-right. The chapter will then 
proceed to conclude on key themes identified throughout the chapter, making reference to the 
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compatibility between national law and international and European law and, more generally, 
appraising whether the current system is well-enough equipped to challenge the far-right.  
 
1. Contextual and Definitional Framework 
1.1 Jurisdiction  
It is necessary to explain why the dissertation looks at England and Wales and not the UK as a 
whole and, also, why it is looking at England and Wales and not only England. The UK was the 
result of a merger of independent countries. In relation to Wales, the Wales Acts 1535-1542 were 
a series of parliamentary acts through which Wales was annexed to England rendering the 
English legal system applicable to Wales.
1317
 This State is habitually referred to as England and 
Wales and it is this particular part of the UK which will constitute the focus of this analysis. In 
1707, the Union with England Act
1318
 provided that England (and Wales) and Scotland became 
one single State named the United Kingdom of Great Britain
1319
 with one Parliament.
1320
 Further, 
the 1800 Union with Ireland Act joined Great Britain and Ireland as one State, represented by 
one Parliament.
1321
 Following the division of Ireland, with the Southern part wanting 
independence from the UK and the Northern part seeking to remain therein, the Irish Free State 
Agreement Act
1322
 was passed in 1922 and Ireland became an independent country. The result of 
these developments was the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. 
 
The UK has three legal systems. These are English Law, which is the generic term applied for 
the law governing England and Wales, Northern Ireland Law, which applies in Northern Ireland, 
and Scots Law, applied in Scotland. The first two emanate from principles of common law and 
the latter is a mélange of civil and common law. Differences also exist in relation to the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary. More particularly, the Scottish government is led by 
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a First Minister and a cabinet of Ministers, responsible for policy.
1323
 Scotland’s executive was 
established by the Scotland Act 1998.
1324
 However, the powers of the executive are limited to 
issues that are devolved to Scotland through the Scotland Act 1998.
1325
 These are all matters 
falling outside the framework of those reserved for the UK Parliament which are issues of 
national importance and, thus, remain within the powers of the UK government. Some of the 
issues which the UK Parliament reserves as ones to be dealt with solely by the UK Parliament, 
include, amongst others, the registration and funding of political parties, defence issues and 
foreign affairs.
1326
 Within the ambit of Northern Ireland, an equivalent, the Northern Ireland 
Act,
1327
 was also passed in 1998, creating the Northern Irish executive and legislature and 
devolving powers in the areas which are not reserved to
1328
 or excepted from
1329
 the UK 
Parliament. These cover a broader range of issues than their Scottish counterpart including, inter 
alia, elections, immigration, firearms and safety. In addition, Wales received more executive and 
legislative powers with the Government of Wales Act 1998 creating the National Assembly for 
Wales which was subsequently reformed by the Government of Wales Act 2006. The National 
Assembly enjoys legislative powers over a total of twenty issues which are directly provided for 
by Schedule 5 of the 2006 Act and include, amongst others, tourism and social welfare.
1330
 Up 
until 2011, the National Assembly could not legislate on the issues prior to consultation with the 
UK Parliament or the Secretary of State for Wales, a reality which was overturned following the 
“yes” vote in the 2011 referendum on the issue.1331 In addition, the 2006 Act created the Welsh 
Assembly Government, a devolved government which also functions within the framework of 
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Wales’ devolved powers. There is no respective devolution process for England. All issues that 
are not devolved to the aforementioned institutions are legislated by the United Kingdom 
Parliament and executed by the UK Government.   
 
In relation to the judiciary, the Supreme Court of the UK is the ultimate Court for England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland on all civil and criminal matters and for Scotland on civil matters 
only.
1332
 The court system is unified for England and Wales and falls under Her Majesty’s Courts 
and Tribunals Service (HMCTS)
1333
 with Northern Ireland and Scotland having their own court 
system while the tribunal system covers England, Wales and, at times, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland.
1334
 Even if statutes considered within this dissertation are applicable to Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, the interpretation of their provisions is effectuated by Courts which are under a 
separate court system and, in the case of Scotland, follow a different legal culture than England 
and Wales and, therefore, the interpretation of relevant provisions may differ. In relation to 
Scotland, a decision of the UK Supreme Court on English Law is a persuasive authority in Scots 
Law where the same legal principles apply but are not binding per se.
1335
 In theory the same is 
the case for Northern Ireland whose judiciary is not bound by decisions of English Courts but, in 
practice, academics and practitioners often cite English decisions as if they were part of domestic 
law. Therefore, the differences between England and Wales and Northern Ireland vis-a-vis 
judicial interpretations are not as rigid as with Scotland, but they do exist.
1336
 Furthermore, in 
relation to criminal law, it is the Crown Prosecution Service
1337
 (hereinafter CPS), which is 
responsible for the prosecution of criminal cases investigated by the police in England and Wales. 
Thus, the competent authority which decides on, amongst others, if particular conduct is racially 
hateful, has jurisdiction over England and Wales only.  
In sum, Northern Ireland and Scotland have a separate court system and, in the case of Scotland, 
do not fall fully and completely within the framework of the UK Supreme Court. Judicial 
decisions on English law do not bind the Courts of Scotland and Northern Ireland and, thus, 
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interpretations of statutes may differ. On the other hand, England and Wales have one unified 
court system. Also, in the case of Scotland, the legal system is different, with characteristics of 
both common and civil law. Northern Ireland and Scotland are part of the UK but have devolved 
parliaments and governments which are allowed to function alone in certain areas which are 
broader than those of Wales. 
 
In light of the above, when considering particular legislation and policy, it may well be that some 
of the documents that are to be considered do not fall within the framework of the devolved 
powers granted to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Apart from national instruments, this is 
extended to the issue of international and European obligations which bind the UK as a whole. 
However, since variations exist between the type of legal and court systems in England and 
Wales and Scotland, and whilst Northern Ireland also adopts the common law but has its own 
court system and case-law and, given that there is a separate prosecution body for England and 
Wales, it would not be possible to make a comparison of the UK as one single legislative, 
executive and judicial unit. As a result, England and Wales, albeit with some separations 
occurring under the 2006 Government Act which do not, anyhow, directly affect this dissertation, 
are unified as a legal system and unified as a court system. For this purpose, only England and 
Wales, as one entity and one jurisdiction, will be assessed. Notwithstanding the above, it must be 
noted that when making the assessment of the nature of the far-right movement and how this is 
manifested in the forms of political parties, non-party groups and the subculture milieu, reference 
will usually be made to the UK and not to England and Wales. This is because the majority of 
entities do not restrict their activities to England and Wales but function within the context of the 
UK as a State. This reference will be used broadly notwithstanding that, in some cases, parties, 
such as the BNP and the UKIP function with those names in all of the regions of the UK whereas 
groups, such as the EDL, have respective formations and names in Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland but fall under the general umbrella of the Defence League ideology.  
 
 
1.2 The EU Referendum: Legal, political and social ramifications  
A referendum was held on the 23
rd
 June 2016 on whether the UK should remain a Member State 
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of the EU.
1338
 52% of the population voted to leave the EU and 48% to remain therein.
1339
 Leave 
won the majority of votes in England and Wales whilst remain won the majority in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. 
1340
  
 
The formal process for a Member State to leave the EU is governed by Article 50 of the Treaty 
of Lisbon which provides that: 
 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. 
In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and 
conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking 
account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be 
negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the 
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, 
unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously 
decides to extend this period. 
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council 
representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the 
European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. 
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the 
procedure referred to in Article 49. 
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In light of the above article, it is clear that departure from the EU is not an automatic or a simple 
process but is rather one that commences with a notification of mere intention to depart, 
expressed by the Member State to the EU. This is then followed by a negotiation procedure for 
the departure itself and the future relationship between the two. Article 218(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union which is a provision of an article that governs 
agreements between third countries or international organisations is the one governing the 
negotiation procedure for departure. This provides that: 
 
The Commission, or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign 
and security policy, shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision 
authorising the opening of negotiations and, depending on the subject of the agreement 
envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the Union's negotiating team. 
 
Following negotiation procedure which involves the Member State, the European Commission or 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the departure 
negotiation is concluded by the Council of the European Union which acts by a qualified 
majority only after it receives the consent of the European Parliament. After the process is kick-
started by the country, the next steps up to the point of actual departure involve the central 
European institutions, with requirements such as parliamentary approvals and qualified 
majorities. In relation to the timeframe, it is first necessary for the Member State to give notice 
of its intention to depart, a step which triggers the aforementioned negotiation process. During 
this process, EU treaties continue to apply to the Member State whilst they cease to apply either 
from the date of enforcement of the withdrawal agreement which is concluded after the above-
described process is followed or within two years after the notification of intention to leave or 
longer than that, if an extension has been agreed upon. Significantly, the Member State, in this 
case the UK, will not be part of the discussions of the European Council concerning this 
procedure. In relation to the kick-starting of the process, this has yet to happen. The previous 
Conservative Prime-Minister announced his resignation immediately after the referendum results 
and was soon replaced by Theresa May. His intention was for the aforementioned negotiation 
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procedure to be commenced (and thus Article 50 to be triggered) by his successor.
1341
 On a 
national level, the 1972 European Communities Act,
1342
 which is the statute which incorporated 
the UK into the European family
1343
 and granted supremacy to EU law, will be repealed. In 
addition, other laws related to the EU will need to be subject to repeal or amendment or may 
even be kept as part of national law. It must be noted that in November 2016, the High Court 
ruled that, as a matter of UK constitutional law, the government cannot trigger Article 50 of the 
Lisbon treaty and commence formal exit negotiations with the EU without the input of the 
national parliament. The government is appealing this decision. 
1344
 The EU referendum results 
are of historic importance for the UK and for the EU and its future. The impacts of this 
referendum and the departure of the UK from the EU will undoubtedly have an effect on the 
legal, political, social and financial landscape of the UK in a large number of areas. For purposes 
of this thesis and its content, two issues must be underlined. Firstly, the analysis of EU law and 
its role on challenging the far-right in Member States applies to this country and will continue to 
do so up until the point that a withdrawal agreement is enforced. Secondly, hate has been directly 
interlinked with this referendum.  As noted by ENAR, hate speech was directly intertwined with 
the exit campaign which ‘escalated into real life’ following the referendum.1345 According to the 
National Police Chief’s Council, there was a 57% rise in the reporting of hate crime on the 
Police’s online reporting tool. 1346Although the Police underlined that this demonstrates a rise in 
the use of the online reporting tool rather than a rise in hate crime
1347
, the positive temporal 
correlation between the referendum results and the rise should be of concern.  
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1.3 The Face of the Far-Right in the United Kingdom: A General Overview    
This section will provide an overview of the phenomenon of right-wing extremism in the UK, 
referring to the key characteristics of this movement and groups present, therein, through an 
analysis of political parties, non-party groups and the subculture milieu. It must firstly be noted 
that, far-right parties in the UK, such as UKIP and, to a lesser extent, the BNP ‘are not static in 
their policies, beliefs and practices, they may and do evolve over time.’1348 The development of 
the far-right movement in the UK can be traced back to the period after the First World War 
where it sought to place limits on immigration, focusing predominantly on Jewish 
immigration.
1349
 The focus on Jews in the far-right rhetoric during that particular temporal 
framework can be explained as a result of certain realities. Firstly, such a focus was habitual in 
the rhetoric of European far-right parties of the time.
1350
 Secondly, Jews have historically 
undergone discrimination in this country (and not only) with the process of their equality and 
emancipation, therein, being a particularly slow process in comparison to other European 
countries.
1351
 Moreover, the path to equality for Jews had been laid down in 1830 and, thus, even 
after the period following World War I, community relations had not reached a positive turning 
point. This is reflected in, for example, the passing of the Aliens Act 1905 which incorporated 
immigration controls for the first time and which, it has been argued, sought to control Jewish 
immigration arriving from Eastern Europe.
1352
 In the wake of the 20
th
 century, Jews experienced 
anti-Semitism which went hand-in-hand with Germanophobia given the fact that, during that 
time, Jews were considered in the same ambit as Germans. As a result, Jews with German 
sounding names often anglicised them to avoid discrimination.
1353
  On a more general level, the 
far-right worked against the backdrop of racism more widely. In Britain, racism has historically 
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been common,
1354
 endorsed not only by the far-right but also by members of the judiciary
1355
 and 
legislators.
1356
 The development of racism and racist attitudes in the UK is clearly interlinked 
with colonialism and post-colonialism and has undergone transformation according to the 
temporal realities of immigration. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
correlation between racism and colonialism manifested itself ‘in the form of the articulation 
between nationalism and patriotism in the construction of the very definition of Englishness and 
Britishness.
1357
 Following the colonial period and with the entrance of commonwealth 
immigrants to Britain which led to a ‘dramatic contact and integration of Africans and 
Asians,’1358 racism became further embedded into the daily reality of British life. It has been 
noted that previous arrivals of immigrants, such as the Irish, had a different societal impact in 
relation to that which arose from the arrival of new Commonwealth citizens. More particularly, 
the effects that the arrival of the latter had on the development of racism were significant and this 
could be partly attributed to the ‘catalytic role black and brown people played in the process of 
Britain redefining her identity and place as a post-imperial nation…’1359 Racism did not limit 
itself to the aforementioned period of colonialism or change and ‘xenophobia, nationalism and 
authoritarianism are still very much present in Britain.’1360 Sasha Williams and Ian Law refer to a 
2009 You Gov poll which found 43% of its respondents agreeing with the vision of the BNP 
although they would not support the particular party.
1361
 This points to the fact that outright 
racism is not accepted in Britain today but the framework for racist ideas, and, potentially 
practices and rhetoric, does exist. On the other hand, Ronald Niezen argues that, in the British 
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context, indigeneity, which presupposes the inherent link of the first descendants of a place with 
the right to self-determination,
1362
 is a ‘badge worn with pride.’1363 However, this concept has 
been twisted by parties such as the BNP, with the aim of legitimising its appearance and 
attracting more voters. A further differentiation of past and present racism in the UK has been 
discussed by Floya Anthias, who describes the current situation as a reality of ‘neo-racism’ 
which assumes a transformation from a biological conceptualisation of race and, thus, racism to a 
type of cultural racism. However, she poignantly argues that although the backdrop is now 
purportedly that of culture, racism in the UK emanates from the crux of ‘black victims and white 
perpetrators.’1364 To illustrate this point, Anthias argues that other groups in the country such as 
Jews, Irish, Cypriots and Gypsies are rarely considered in works that consider neo-racism whilst 
focus is placed on Asians, Afro-Caribbeans and Muslims which she incorporates into the racism 
debate and defines as ‘another signifier for what is also called Asian.’1365 Much discussion on 
racism and interconnected phenomena, such as institutional racism and hate crime, came about 
following the racist murder of youngster Stephen Lawrence in 1993
1366
 and the resulting 1999 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry which was formulated for purposes of inquiry into the investigation 
and prosecution of his death. The report held that a ‘racist incident is any incident which is 
perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.’1367  The concept of perception in 
relation to a racist incident came with an array of negative reactions due to its broad nature, with 
a trial judge dealing with a case of racist violence holding that ‘whatever the general approach to 
definitions of racist, in the context of the substantive criminal law at least, certainty is of 
paramount importance.’1368 
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Notwithstanding the examples of racism, mentioned above, this country has ‘never had an 
electorally significant extreme right party’1369  with several factors presented to explain this, 
including the obstacles posed by the first-past-the post system and the pride Britons take in their 
role against Nazism.
1370
 Another obstacle which has been cited is the extreme nature of the older 
entities constituting the far-right who were associated with violent street activities.
1371
 Removing 
the obstacles of outright extremism and violence as a result of an allegedly reformed BNP, as 
described below, and a prim and proper UKIP, could be one of the factors which have led to the 
rise of the far-right since the start of the twenty-first century. During this time, the country 
witnessed the far-right undergoing increasing electoral success predominantly in the form of the 
BNP and the UKIP. There exist several, partly conflicting, opinions regarding the threat 
currently faced by the UK in relation to far-right extremism. In 2014, referring to developments 
such as the activities of the Islamic State
1372
 and the Rotherham scandal,
1373
 a senior Home 
Office adviser warned that ‘this is one of the most worrying periods in right-wing extremism, 
given the growth in right-wing groups and the recent news events which are making them more 
angry.’1374 However, the 2015 State of Hate report,1375 issued by Hope not Hate,1376 notes that 
the British far-right is smaller but more violent in comparison to 2014.
1377
 This is a worrying 
development compared to the findings of the 2014 report which noted that the far-right in the UK 
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‘ends 2014 in its worst state for almost 20 years.’1378 In relation to the political participation of 
far-right parties, it must be noted that far-right groups have found it difficult to mobilise due to 
the functioning of the electoral system but also because of its increasing fragmentation.
1379
 
Nevertheless, there does exist an ‘appetite for a successful far-right party to emerge’1380 as 
manifested in the rise of UKIP, with internal issues of entities such as the BNP and the EDL 
having led to the demise of the latter. Either way, it cannot be ignored that the far-right does, in 
fact, impact the general political climate of this country, with mainstream political parties 
seeking to attract the electorate which is concerned about immigration and Islam. For example, 
in 2015, David Cameron described migrants seeking to arrive in the UK from Callais as ‘a 
swarm of people.’1381 Another example of bigotry rhetoric moving into mainstream politics is 
Cameron’s speech on the failure of multiculturalism in 2011.1382 Further, an older but direct 
example of this impact was the Labour Party’s statement in 2002 that it was people’s ‘fear of 
migration, and asylum seekers in particular, which was responsible for an increase in support for 
the BNP and that, therefore, the government had to be seen to be addressing these concerns.’1383 
Although the influence of the far-right on the mainstream is evident in other countries as well, 
the particularities attached to the first-past-the-post system,
1384
 which constitute serious obstacles 
for smaller parties to enter the national parliament, have the simultaneous effect of further 
pushing mainstream parties into the realm of the far-right so as to attract populist votes which 
voters may be afraid to give to smaller parties, in case these are lost due to the electoral system.    
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Immigration, Islam and multiculturalism lie at the heart of the far-right movement in the UK 
with ‘Islamophobia [having] increasingly become part of extreme right-wing terrorist 
ideology.’ 1385  However, as noted by Hope not Hate, one of the difficulties the far-right 
movement is currently facing is its own identity since its key actors, although manipulating the 
fertile ground upon which Islamophobia can feed off and develop, ‘find it hard to disengage from 
their old racist and thuggish tendencies and beliefs.’1386 Since Islamophobia is such a central 
issue to the far-right in this country, it is necessary to put forth relevant figures on some the 
victims of far-right speech and activity in England and Wales. The latest report on the issue is 
from 2011 which found 2.7 million Muslims living in England and Wales in comparison to 1.55 
million in 2001.
1387
 Further, the Muslim population is growing at faster rates than the overall 
population with more children and fewer elderly persons.
1388
 In addition, although an emphasis 
on Muslims as targets of the far-right is indisputable, ethnic minorities also fall victim to this 
movement. As such, the relevant statistics of ethnic minorities living in England and Wales are 
necessary, with a 2011 survey demonstrating that 83.35% of the population is White British with 
the remainder belonging to an ethnic minority group.
1389
 What will be discerned from this 
section’s analysis is that, even though an equivalent of the systematically violent extremism as 
manifested by the likes of Golden Dawn in Greece cannot be found in the UK today, the far-right 
does manifest itself in the form of several political parties, non-party groups and the subculture 
milieu, which will be assessed hereinafter. Although in the past, the far-right in the UK was more 
violent than today, this is not to say that it is now free from violent elements. For example, in 
relation to terrorism offences, the Government’s anti-terror Contest Strategy1390 noted that in 
2011 there were fourteen people, associated with extreme right-wing groups, serving prison 
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sentences for terrorism offences, even though none of these groups is defined as a terrorist 
group.
1391
 Further, approximately 8% of the persons referred to the Channel programme were 
linked to the far-right.
1392
 In addition, violence has marked the activities of far-right groups with 
members of the Aryan Strike Force being convicted for, inter alia, terrorism-related offences in 
2010 and a BNP member and former election candidate being convicted in 2007 for  keeping 
chemical explosives for purposes of preparing for the ‘evils of uncontrolled immigration’1393 and 
the ‘forthcoming race war.’1394  
 
1.3.1 Political Parties  
To map out the development of the political activity of the far-right movement, information 
regarding the performance of far-right political parties in the last two general elections shall be 
put forth. There is currently only one such political party in the Parliament, that being UKIP, 
which holds one seat following the 2015 general elections. It must be noted that UKIP’s winning 
of just one seat in the 2015 elections does not reflect the number of votes received but results 
from the ‘first past the post’1395 electoral system adopted by the country. Either way, UKIP did 
see a large increase in votes, going from 919,546 in 2010 to nearly four million in 2015
1396
 and 
also, as already noted, won the greatest number of votes in the 2014 European Parliament 
elections. The BNP, which in 2015 saw a 99.7% fall in votes in relation to the 2010 general 
elections,
1397
 has become almost extinct. Also, in the general elections of 2010, the National 
Front received 10,784 votes falling to 1,114 in 2015. An overview of the political parties, groups 
and the subculture milieu will be provided below. Before World War II, the British extreme-right 
was occupied by several small and insignificant parties including the Britons Society, The Fascist 
League, The Yorkshire Fascists and The British Fascisti. The ‘only serious attempt at fascist 
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mobilisation was undertaken by the British Union of Fascists’1398 which occurred in 1932, during 
times of economic hardship.  Although it was an electoral failure, the party did have a large but 
unstable membership with 40,000 – 50,000 members in 1934.1399 The party was proscribed in 
1940 and is the only political party of the UK ever to have been proscribed.
1400
 This occurred 
under the Defence Regulation 18b (AA) of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939.
1401
 
 
1.3.1 (i) The National Front  
The National Front was created in 1967 as a ‘result of an uneasy merger between rival 
groups’1402 such as the League of Empire Loyalists, the Racial Preservation Society and the 
Greater Britain Movement.
1403
 This developed into Britain’s fourth largest political party in the 
Seventies.
1404
 It had a reputation of violence
1405
 and racist rhetoric which included anti-
immigration and anti-Semitism and a belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxons.
1406
 The National 
Front was prohibited from accessing public halls under the control of the Council, particularly 
when these were controlled by the Labour Party. More particularly, the Labour Party prohibited 
this party from using local buildings in more than one hundred areas it controlled.
1407
 As such, 
the need to go onto the streets was further accentuated and ‘high profile street processions 
became one of the Front’s principal means of attempting to communicate with a wider 
audience.’ 1408  It must also be noted that, during the 1970s, The National Front became 
increasingly involved in racist violence.
1409
 The party  slowly fizzled out following Margaret 
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Thatcher’s rise to power1410 in 1979 and is, today, nearly obsolete, with its membership ranging 
between two and three hundred persons.
1411
 This number is the membership of both National 
Fronts since the party split into North/South sections. Either way, it continues to attract members 
that have a ‘fanaticism for racism, ultra-nationalism and outright Nazism.’1412 The party was de-
registered by the Electoral Commission in 2014 due to administrative issues and re-registered in 
2015
1413
 and today has links with violent far-right groups and activities.
1414
 The New Dawn Party 
was born from the ashes of the losing faction of the National Front. 
1415
 
 
1.3.1 (ii) The British National Party  
The BNP was founded in 1982, predominantly by members of the National Front, and, was 
initially led by John Tyndall
1416
 who remained leader until 1999.
1417
 This party describes itself as 
a party of civic and ethnic British nationalism which embraces national sovereignty and the 
integrity of the indigenous British.
1418
  The BNP adopts a stern anti-immigration rhetoric, 
pledging to ‘stemming and reversing the immigration and migration of peoples’ 1419  and to 
restoring the indigenous British as the majority group of the country.’1420 Since 2001, anti-Islam 
rhetoric and activity have heavily influenced the party’s mandate.1421 During Tyndall’s time, the 
party was strongly committed to the ‘core pillars of biological racism, radical xenophobia and 
anti-democratic appeals’1422 as well as to anti-Semitism.1423 It argued for forced deportation of 
non-white immigrants, suggested that the British Empire should be restored and suggested 
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several authoritarian measures that stemmed from Nazi times.
1424
 It went down a similar path as 
that of The National Front with marches and rallies marred by violence and attacks on the 
opposition which ‘sought to create ethnic divisions by encouraging – or even perpetrating racial 
assaults.’ 1425  As people’s finances and education improved, this radical approach was 
increasingly failing to attract support.
1426
 Following the party’s take over by Nick Griffin, several 
changes were made so as to soften its image and make it more attractive to mainstream voters. 
As Griffin noted, he wanted to make such amendments and transformations so as to avoid ‘the 
inevitable media smear of Nazi.’1427 Steps included replacing the party’s British Nationalist 
newspaper with the ‘Voice of Freedom’ newspaper, a magazine entitled ‘Identity’ and 
establishing a record company to produce English folk music to replace its previous association 
with white supremacist music.
1428
 Further, in 2005, the party published new guidelines for its 
activists named ‘Language and Concepts and Discipline Manual.’ Therein, it noted that the party 
was not to be referred to, by members, as fascist but, rather, as a ‘right-wing populist party’ 
which embraces ‘like many political parties all over the world, the right-of-centre views 
traditional to ordinary working people who are not leftist.’1429 Through this description, the party 
sought to present itself as a regular party for regular people, with no extreme views but, simply, 
the opposite side of a leftist believer. Further, under Griffin, the party went from adopting a hard-
line approach to the forced deportation of non-white persons to that of the promotion of assisted 
repatriation.
1430
 However, it must not be ignored that ‘although the emphasis has shifted, racism 
was still at the core of the BNP’s mandate.1431 BNP’s affiliation to violence was more emphatic 
during the 1990’s with a 1997 Human Rights Watch Report noting that, while the BNP is ‘not 
directly responsible for a large degree of racist violence, it does recruit from skinhead and 
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football hooligan groups that are involved in racist violence.’1432 Further, some of the party’s 
members have been convicted for incitement to racial hatred
1433
 and racist attacks.
1434
  
 
The BNP initially made no particular impact on the British political scene despite receiving a 
local government seat in 1993.
1435
 However, as the twenty-first century approached, the 
increasing public concern over immigrants and settled Muslims, the perceived inefficacy of the 
mainstream parties to function effectively
1436
 as well as worries over the country’s economy,1437 
all provided a sphere through which the BNP could, and, did, develop effectively.  A perfect 
point to illustrate this advancement was that between 1992-2010, the number of votes the party 
received in general elections ‘increased more than seventy-fold, rising from seven thousand to 
more than half a million.’1438 The BNP was the central player of the far-right between 2001-
2010,
1439
 with electoral success including over fifty councillors, one position on the Greater 
London Assembly
1440
 and two seats in the European Parliament in 2009.
1441
 Given its increasing 
success between 2001-2010, the party set high hopes for the 2010 general elections, placing great 
emphasis, in its manifesto, on the betrayal of the British people by mainstream political 
parties.
1442
 However, following 2010 and until today its situation has gone ‘from bad to 
worse.’1443 With approximately three hundred to five hundred members, the party’s demise is 
predominantly due to debt, internal strife, organisational problems and bad political tactics.
1444
 
As a result, this party has splintered, with some of its members having returned to the National 
Front and others moving to new groupings such as the British Democratic Party and the English 
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Democrats.
1445
 In 2014, its leader Griffin was expelled for allegedly causing internal strife. 
Supporters of Griffin formed British Voice in 2014, a small, irrelevant party, which received no 
support from Griffin himself. He, instead, formed British Unity, a non-member organisation with 
about two thousand Facebook followers, active only online.
1446
 By the 2015 general elections, 
the party only fielded eight candidates, in comparison to three hundred and thirty eight in 2010 
and won just 0.44% of the vote.
1447
 In January 2016, the Electoral Commission de-registered the 
BNP for failure to conform to the annual confirmation of registration details with the 
Commission and pay the annual fee of £25.
1448
 It carried out all necessary procedures and was 
re-registered within a month. The BNP, although radically weakened, has undoubtedly left its 
mark on the far-right scene. For example, Britain First, discussed below, has also emerged from 
the ashes of the BNP and at the end of 2014, Jack Sen, a BNP spokesperson, left the party to 
form another far-right group, The British Renaissance.  Moreover, the BNP has contributed to 
infecting the rhetoric put forth by the mainstream parties as manifested, for example, in 
Cameron’s argument that multiculturalism has failed or the Labour Party’s position that the 
government needed to be considered active in tackling concerns which had led to the rise of the 
BNP, such as migration. 
 
1.3.1 (iii) The United Kingdom Independence Party  
UKIP was founded in 1993 with the central aim of removing the UK from the EU.
1449
 During the 
first ten years of its existence, the party contested twenty-five parliamentary by-elections, 
averaging about 1.7%.
1450
 However, twenty years on, in 2013, the party demonstrated that it had 
made a deep and serious impact on British politics, taking significant steps in local elections and 
European elections whilst gathering over 30,000 members and often polling ahead of the Liberal 
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Democrats as the third most popular party in the UK.
1451
 As a result, this party has been 
described as ‘the most significant new British political party in a generation.’1452 In relation to 
UKIP’s development, it is important to reiterate that one of the factors preventing smaller parties, 
such as UKIP, from proceeding politically is the first-past-the-post electoral system of the 
UK,
1453
 as was demonstrated in the 2015 elections. While UKIP received nearly four million 
votes,
1454
 and would have constituted the third largest party of the Parliament had there been a 
system of proportional representation, it received just one seat due to the country’s electoral 
system. The party has not remained within its original sphere of Euroscepticism, but has 
increasingly become active in the field of, inter alia, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric 
and has ‘developed a suite of radical right-wing policies.’1455 Even though Nigel Farage 1456 
insisted that ‘he is not a racist and that his party is colour blind,’1457 by 2010 the party was setting 
out a ‘combination of nationalist, xenophobic, Eurosceptic and populist policies.’1458 In brief, 
UKIP’s three main pillars include ‘hard Euroscepticism anti-immigration and a populist backlash 
against the established political class.’ 1459  Further, there exists a plethora of examples that 
pinpoint the party’s far-right ideology such as a UKIP member and candidate for local elections 
arguing that ‘Islam is a cancer that needs eradicating, multiculturalism does not work in this 
country clear them all off to the desert with their camels that’s their way of life.’1460 Other 
statements include a former UKIP’s candidate for council elections holding that ‘I reckon dogs 
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are more intelligent, better company and certainly better behaved than most Muslims.’1461 These 
statements are not isolated examples and simply add to the general approach UKIP adopts to 
immigration and the need to limit it. UKIP’s bigotry and prejudice are not restricted to particular 
ethnic or religious groups as there exists an ‘inherent homophobia within UKIP’1462 with several 
of its representatives having made homophobic remarks. For example, UKIP's by-election 
candidate, Roger Helmer, argued that the National Health Service should fund gay cure 
therapy
1463
 and stated that homosexuality is ‘abnormal and undesirable.’1464 In relation to the EU 
referendum, UKIP found fertile ground on which to disseminate its anti-immigrant and anti-EU 
rhetoric. More particularly, following the sexual attacks on women in Cologne at the end of 2015, 
Farage held that ‘after Cologne, the EU referendum is about nothing less than the ‘the safety and 
security of British women.’ 1465  UKIP’s stance, described above, has resulted in several 
academics suggesting that UKIP and the BNP ‘may be drawing on the same well of support and 
may be part of the same phenomenon.’1466 It has even been argued that ‘UKIP feels like the BNP 
– only with blazers.’1467 It has also been noted that what the two parties have in common is ‘the 
psychological suggestion that ordinary people are being betrayed by the political class. They are 
paying too much fuel tax, too much council tax, they are being pushed around by 
foreigners….[they] have become victims in their own countries.’1468 Furthermore, an empirical 
study of UKIP’s electorate demonstrated that, although the central reason for its support is 
Euroscepticism, it has also rallied people who are ‘deeply hostile towards immigrants….and 
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strikingly similar to supporters of the BNP.’1469 In fact, senior activists of the UKIP admit that, 
following the demise of the BNP, UKIP ‘actively targeted voters who had previously held their 
nose while supporting extremists.’ 1470  This has led to UKIP being looked at as a ‘polite 
alternative to the right-wing extremist BNP.’1471 This politeness may also be traced back to the 
fact that the UKIP was founded on the doctrine of euroscpeticism, free of any affiliation to 
themes such as biological racism and racial violence, a point which it sees as a ‘reputational 
shield’ which has further been developed by the party in other instances. For example, in 2013 
Farage criticised the government’s plan to facilitate irregular migrants to leave the UK as ‘nasty’ 
and ‘not the British way.’1472 Very interestingly, it seems that this shield has also been effective 
in avoiding scrutiny by civil society. More particularly, the 2014 State of Hate report, issued by 
Hope not Hate, does not incorporate UKIP in its analysis of the far-right, even though it noted 
that ‘while UKIP is not the BNP and Farage is not Griffin, it is clear that most former BNP 
voters feel quite at home in the UKIP stable.’1473 This dissertation will incorporate UKIP in its 
analysis given that, notwithstanding the party’s reputational shield and its efforts to remain 
legitimate in the eyes of the electorate, the crux of the matter is that it nevertheless advocates 
ideas and values that are against principles of human rights and equality and puts forth 
statements and uses language prejudicial to particular groups, with some examples referred to 
above.  As such, it would be unwise and unfair to disregard this party in the present analysis only 
because of a bit of politeness which, in any case, has served as a vehicle of success for ‘Britain’s 
politically underrepresented populist impulses.’1474  
 
1.3.1 (iv) Britain First  
Britain First was formed in 2011 and registered with the Electorate Commission in 2014 by ex- 
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BNP members
1475
 and has approximately eight hundred to one thousand members.
1476
 By 2014, 
it was the ‘most active group to emerge from the collapse of the BNP and EDL’1477 seeking to 
‘fill a vacuum left by the declining BNP and splintering EDL.’1478 It put forward candidates for 
the European Parliament elections in Wales, receiving 0.9% of the votes.
1479
 However, up until 
2014 it was best known for its strong online presence with more than half a million followers on 
Facebook
1480
 and its mosque attacks and Christian Patrols,
1481
 although, during 2015, it stopped 
mosque raids and provocative street actions, attempting to appear mainstream, with its leader 
standing in the London Mayoral election in 2016.
1482
 The founder of the group stepped down due 
to the increasingly racist and provocative nature Britain First’s rhetoric and activities were 
taking.
1483
 Matthew Collins, Director of Research for Hope not Hate, noted that Britain First ‘is 
the most dangerous group to have emerged on the British far right scene for several years.’1484 
However, 2015 was a year of ‘stagnation’ for Britain First which did not manage to mobilise 
support offline as it had done online.
1485
 Britain First will be further looked at in the section on 
case-law due to prosecutions being brought in relation to its assemblies and also a harassment 
incident carried out by its leader.  
 
Other small to miniscule far-right parties include Liberty GB registered in 2013 with two 
hundred and ninety members. It’s position is that  mainstream parties are ignoring the dangers 
posed by immigration, Islam and the dilution of British culture
1486
 and envisages the 
implementation of ‘politics bordering on the revolutionary’1487 to save Britain. In the 2014 EU 
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Parliamentary elections it received a very small number of votes.
1488
 In the same year, its party 
leader, a former UKIP member, was arrested on suspicion of racial or religious harassment 
whilst quoting passages from Winston Churchill’s Book ‘The River War’1489 which a member of 
public was offended by.
1490
 However, no further action was further taken against him. In addition, 
there is the British Democratic Party, formed in 2013 by an individual who was a former chair of 
the National Front and an MEP for the BNP.
1491
 
 
1.3.1 (v) Non-Party Groups: The English Defence League (and others) 
The EDL was created in 2009 following a Luton protest by an extremist group Islam4UK against 
British soldiers, occurring at the same time as a homecoming parade for soldiers returning from 
Afghanistan.
1492
 The EDL identifies itself as a ‘defender of English values and by extension and 
intention, Western values…against the threat of Islam.’1493 Its sister organisation, the Welsh 
Defence League, was also created in 2009.
1494
 The EDL is founded on Islamophobic beliefs, 
predominantly carrying out Islamophobic activities.
1495
 However, there is evidence that it has 
increasingly targetted left-wing groups, such as the incident in 2011 where a group shouting 
EDL broke a window of a building where a Unite against Fascism
1496
 meeting was being 
held.
1497
 The EDL is a street-based organisation promoted through social network pages, with its 
activities being marches and demonstrations which have often resulted in violence in several 
cities
1498
  with alcohol and football hooliganism often marking such events.
1499
 It takes to the 
streets rather than to politics to advance its Islamophobic beliefs with a ‘more fluid coalition of 
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supporters’1500 rather than a system of formal membership. Interestingly, and due to the absence 
of ethnic or other conditions for participation, the EDL has attracted groups such as Jewish anti-
discrimination groups and gay rights activists for the promotion of anti-Islam positions thereby 
‘increasing interaction among previously disconnected networks.’1501 The EDL has been ‘at the 
forefront of violence around major Muslim centres and mosques’1502 with the Home Secretary 
banning their demonstrations on several occasions for purposes of ensuring public order.
1503
 
Policing its marches and demonstrations cost the UK over seven million pounds in 2012
1504
 
while it is estimated that there are seven-hundred criminal convictions directly linked to the EDL 
and its activists.
1505
 The EDL’s most successful years were between 2009-2011, a period during 
which it was ‘without doubt the largest social movement in the country.’1506 However, from 2011 
onwards, the EDL has ‘dwindled, split and split again’1507 as a result of media exposure to, inter 
alia, the agreement professed by some of its members with the actions of murderer Anders 
Breivik
1508
 and the allegations of one of its founding members being a pedophile
1509
 as well as 
other internal problems.
1510
 Today, EDL continues its ‘steady decline into oblivion.’1511The 
problems faced by the EDL resulted in many members breaking away and forming their own 
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groups, such as the English National Resistance, the English Democratic Party
1512
 and the EDL 
Infidels which are ‘showing a taste for more traditional fascist politics.’1513 In fact, the Infidels 
developed into a ‘network of regional fascist gangs pursuing a far more confrontational and 
violent agenda.’1514 Other non-party groups include National Action which has been described as 
‘dangerous.’1515  One of its members, Zack Davies, was convicted of attempted murder for a 
racist attack on an Asian man in a local supermarket in Mold, North Wales in January 2015. The 
Court found that he had developed ‘extreme racist views’1516 and that his attack against his 
victim was ‘planned and racially motivated.’ 1517 
 
The Aryan Strike Force defines itself as a ‘white nationalist organisation’1518  that seeks to 
remove all persons from ethnic minority backgrounds from the UK. Members of this group have 
been convicted for terrorism-related offences. Blood and Honour is an extremist music network 
promoting national socialism and anti-communism with divisions in the UK and abroad. It was 
set up in 1987 and used the Nazi swastika on the cover of one of its magazine issues.
1519
 In 
addition to music festivals, it has a radio show and issues a magazine to promote its ideology.
1520
 
Interestingly, Blood and Honour’s online manual advises its followers that ‘the underground cell 
should also carefully plan its operations and avoid any contact with those engaged in the legal 
part of the struggle – for its own security’s sake but also so as not to jeopardize the ordinary 
political work by linking these organisations to subversive violence and what might be labeled as 
terrorism.’1521 The Racial Volunteer Force is a violent white supremacist group established in 
2003 which published a magazine ‘The Stormer’ for promoting the group’s racist ideas. In 2005, 
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five Radical Volunteer Force supporters were imprisoned after being found guilty of conspiring 
to incite racial hatred through the articles which they disseminated. One such article was entitled 
‘Roast a Rabbi’ which included how to make an incendiary device and offered ‘one hundred 
team points’ to the first one to set fire to a synagogue.1522   
 
1.3.1 (vi) The Subculture Milieu - Combat 18  
With regard to the subculture milieu, Combat 18 is the only movement which ‘has no public 
profile whatsoever but a network of supporters.’1523 This is a neo-Nazi movement formed in 
1992 by the security wing of the BNP and bases its ideology on ‘hard-line racism and opposition 
to immigration.’1524 Combat 18 resulted from the creation of a security group for the BNP, 
however, this relationship did not work well since the BNP wanted to tone down its racist stance 
whilst the former did not want to go ahead with this but, instead, pursued a ‘violent uprising 
against the State, a race war.’1525 The BNP ‘was trying to go legitimate… they [C18] didn’t want 
to go legitimate…’ 1526 Combat 18 even turned on BNP members who wanted to go ahead with 
electoral, rather than street politics.
1527
 As can be seen on the website of Aryan Strike Force, the 
two are closely interrelated. In fact, that website denotes the importance of Combat 18 being 
‘leaderless,’1528 ‘memberless’ and ‘faceless’1529 as this means that ‘there isn’t even need to claim 
whatever action you do, the activism is and should always remain faceless… This is proven to be 
the most successful way to strike fear into our opponents, and this is the only way we will win 
this war!’1530 Combat 18’s members have been associated with murder and violence. 1531 The 
more violent groups such as Aryan Strike Force and the subculture milieu may have a minor 
following in comparison to some parties or non-party groups but continue to exist as they cater to 
right-wing extremists with a taste for violence.  
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1.3.1 (vii) Other Far-Right Groups and Movements  
There exist several other small non-party groups
1532
 which are all recent and all promote racist 
and Islamophobic ideas. There are also other small but radical parties and groups which sprung 
up following the Second World War but lasted only a short while including the National 
Socialist Movement
1533
 and the Greater Britain Movement
1534
 The National Democrats and the 
New Nationalist Party are also in existence but have a very small number of members and, 
although aim to function within a legitimate ambit, often see their members carrying out violent 
activities. 
1535
 
 
1.3.2 The Far-Right in the United Kingdom: Concluding Comments 
In sum, UKIP directly dominates the far-right representation on a political level, albeit with a 
marginal representation on a national and local level, whilst the movement, makes an impact on 
the rhetoric and promises made by other parties with a view to attracting voters concerned with 
issues such as Islam and immigration. Even though a strong far-right presence is not evident in 
Parliament, due to the electoral system which deprived UKIP of eighty-two seats and, even 
though some argue that the far-right is declining in the UK, the fact remains that it is still present 
both in the political sphere, the non-group sphere and the subculture milieu. An array of groups 
and parties has emerged from the splintering of the BNP and the EDL leading to increased 
fragmentation and disorganisation of the movement and that, in addition to an electoral system 
which does not favour small parties, has contributed to the current state of the far-right in the UK 
rather than a lack of actual or potential supporters of this ideology.  
 
1.4 Definitional Framework  
This section shall look at how this country defines key words under consideration in this 
dissertation with the aim being to set out the terminological setting upon which the subsequent 
legal and policy analyses will be based.  
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1.4.1 Racial and Religious groups 
In order to consider the formulation of racial groups in the legislation and case-law of England 
and Wales, it is important firstly to set out how the notion of race developed on a theoretical 
level in the country’s recent history. In the Victorian era, it was against the backdrop of Britain 
as a colonial power that Britons developed their understanding of race in relation to Africans and 
Indians, although this was based on secondary sources such as literature, as the people 
themselves had no contact with those whom the State colonised.
1536
 It must be noted that 
imperialism came with the ‘widespread assumption of white superiority’1537 and, thus, deeply 
affected the construction of the concept of race. In the period immediately after the Second 
World War, race as a notion was used much less on a number of levels, including social and 
scientific ones,
1538
 given the manner in which it had been used and abused by the Nazi 
regime.
1539
 In relation to the science industry, it was noted that ‘the violence and hysteria of the 
Nazis…threatened to discredit race science.’1540 However, on a societal level, matters changed 
following the arrival of new Commonwealth immigrants to the UK with race becoming, once 
again, increasingly used in the press but also in political and daily speech to refer to the different 
groups inhabiting the country.
1541
 This continues to be the situation today, where race is used in a 
variety of legal, political and societal frameworks for purposes of differentiating between 
different groups, catering to the particular needs each group may have and forming policies and 
legislation and taking other initiatives based on such needs. Importantly, however, race is no 
longer used in the mainstream to differentiate biologically between inferior and superior groups 
inhabiting Britain. In the realm of far-right rhetoric and with the exception of some white 
supremacist groups, a biological conceptualisation of race has been substituted by a cultural one, 
although the difference between these two types of racism has been contested by Anthias, as 
discussed in section 1.2. It was in 1965 that the concept of race had to be tackled and transposed 
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into legislation, namely with the Race Relations Act 1965, which was the first piece of 
legislation that sought to address the issue of racial discrimination. Although race is referred to, 
therein, and in successive Acts, including the latest one, the 2010 Equality Act, as a 
characteristic upon which a racial group could be formed, there is no definition of race, therein, 
or in any subsequent piece of legislation. The Equality Act 2010
1542
 does not define racial groups, 
per se, but provides an overview of what it understands by this term. More particularly, it holds 
that ‘a racial group is a group of persons defined by reference to race’1543 with race including 
colour, nationality or ethnic or national origins.
1544
 The same Act offers no definition or 
extrapolation of religious groups but limits itself to defining religion or belief and the protected 
characteristic of religion or belief.
1545
 This Act repealed the Race Relations Act 1976
1546
 which 
had initially held a racial group to mean ‘a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, 
nationality or ethnic or national origins, and references to a person’s racial group refer to any 
racial group into which he falls.’1547 However, determining what constitutes a racial group has 
been considered a notoriously difficult task in this country. Lord Simon has argued that the task 
of deciding whether a particular group constitutes a racial group is ‘rubbery and elusive,’1548 a 
point which will be reflected from the below discussion. In finding that Sikhs
1549
 constitute a 
racial group defined by their ethnic origin,
1550
 in the case of Mandla and another v Dowell Lee 
and another,
1551
 the House of Lords held that the term 'ethnic' in Section 3 of the 1976 Act was 
‘to be construed relatively widely in a broad cultural and historic sense.’1552 The Court noted that, 
in determining whether a particular group was an ethnic group, it ‘had to regard itself, and be 
regarded by others, as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics’1553 including two 
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essential ones, namely a long shared history and a cultural tradition.
1554
 Further, in Commission 
for Racial Equality v Dutton,
1555
 the Court of Appeal held that there was ‘sufficient evidence to 
establish that gypsies were an identifiable minority group…they did accordingly constitute a 
racial group within the meaning of Section 3(1) of the [Race Relations Act 1976]’ 1556  In 
O’Leary v Allied Domecq & Others,1557 the Court held that Irish travellers constitute an ethnic 
group under the Race Relations Act 1976, with the judge characteristically noting that ‘modern 
Irish travellers are guided by the culture and traditions which have been handed down by 
generations. They do not go around reading history, they practise it.’1558 Furthermore, in looking 
at racial discrimination in Seide v Gillette Industries Ltd,
1559
 which dealt with anti-Semitic 
comments made in an employment setting and R v JFS
1560
 that dealt with the admissions policy 
of a Jewish school, the Courts held that Jews
1561
 are part of a racial and religious group.  
 
Furthermore, ascertaining what is meant by a racial group is not only significant in the ambit of 
anti-discrimination legislation, but, also in the framework of criminal law which seeks to tackle, 
inter alia, racist violence. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998
1562
, amongst others, creates certain 
racially and religiously aggravated offences and offers definitions for both racial groups and 
religious groups. Section 28(4), therein, provides that a racial group is ‘a group of persons 
defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national 
origins.’ In R v Rogers, the House of Lords found that the Act adopts a ‘broad non-technical 
approach’1563 to the definition of a racial group and that this makes sense ‘not only as a matter of 
language, but also in policy terms.’1564 Such an approach ensures that ‘racist language will not be 
excluded by reasons of exclusive or inclusive criteria.’1565 As noted by the House of Lords, it is a 
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contextual analysis of the particular case which will reveal whether a racial group is targetted in 
a racist way
1566
 and, it is, thus, a question for the fact-finder to address. In R v White (Anthony 
Delroy,)
1567
 the Court held that the term ‘African’ could refer to ‘race’ or ‘ethnic origin’ and thus 
fell within Section 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 regarding the committal of a racially 
aggravated offence. The defendant appealed his conviction holding that the term ‘African’ could 
not constitute a race or ethnic group, and although the Court of Appeal held that the term 
‘African’ could not refer to an ethnic group, it rejected this appeal holding that this term could 
fall within the ambit of race. Once again, the Court reiterated the non-technical meaning that 
should be attributed to the language of the legislation and referred to the importance and 
relevance of ordinary speech. The Court held that in ordinary speech the term African ‘denoted a 
limited group of people regarded as of common stock…and the word was used to mean black 
Africans.’ 1568  In Attorney General’s Reference (No.4 of 2004), 1569  the Court of Appeal 
considered whether the use of the word ‘immigrant’ for a victim of an offence could fall within 
the framework of a racial group under Section 28(4) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The 
Court found that the judge in the lower Court had made an error of law in ruling that the use of 
the phrase ‘immigrant doctor’ could not fall within the meaning of the ‘racial group.’ It 
underlined that whether or not the use of this term demonstrated hostility to the victim within the 
framework of the relevant section was a question for the jury to decide.  The CPS has noted that 
the definition of racial groups is far-reaching and that ‘gypsies and some travellers, refugees or 
asylum seekers or others from less visible minorities would be included within this 
definition.’1570  Notwithstanding the above cases and the incorporation of broad words, such as 
‘immigrant,’ in the framework of legislative protection from discrimination and hate and, even 
though the CPS held the definition of racial groups to be far-reaching, there was one group who 
was evidently left out of the protective framework, that being the Muslims. For example, in 
Nyazi v Rymans Ltd,
1571
 the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that ‘Muslims include people of 
many nations and colours, who speak many languages and whose only common denominator is 
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religion and religious culture’1572 and, therefore, found that that the appellant was not entitled to 
protection against discrimination under the Race Relations Act 1976. The position was finally 
rectified in 2006 where discrimination on grounds of religion or belief was incorporated within 
the non-discrimination framework through the Equality Act. 
1573
 The 2010 Equality Act repealed 
this section and provided that religion or belief is a protected characteristic. This Act described 
‘any religion’ including ‘a lack of religion’ while belief means ‘any religious or philosophical 
belief’ including a lack of such belief. 1574 
 
In the realm of criminal law, before the incorporation of the  Religious and Racial Hatred Act 
2006 which provided for religious hatred offences, the only protection religious groups could 
receive in the realm of hateful offences was that granted by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
which, following amendments made by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 
incorporated religious aggravation. The lacking framework had direct effects on the impunity of 
far-right organisations, such as the BNP, in relation to religiously discriminatory rhetoric. For 
example, when a member of the BNP disseminated material which was considered offensive and 
threatening to Muslims, Merton Borough informed the CPS which held that Muslims were not 
covered by the Public Order Act 1986 and, thus, no proceedings against the party or its member 
could commence.
1575
 The arbitrariness of the legislation in this realm, more generally, was 
further accentuated in this case considering that the same member was found guilty of 
disseminating hateful material against Jews.
1576
 Another example includes a 2004 decision of the 
Police not to prosecute the BNP for distributing material entitled ‘Islam: Intolerance, Slaughter, 
Looting, Arson, Molestation of Women.’ 1577  As a result, the disregard of protection from 
discrimination and hate of religious groups who were not also considered to be members of 
racial groups was problematic. In fact, NGOs had, for some time, argued that an inequality 
existed between Sikhs and Jews on the one hand and Muslims on the other since the former, as 
noted above, were recognised as racial groups whereas no such recognition has been granted for 
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Muslims.
1578
 Moreover, there was never any sufficient extrapolation on what could be considered 
as an arbitrary exclusion of religious groups as an entity from this framework. This was rectified 
by the enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 which entered into force in 2007 
and which incorporated religious hatred as an offence in the public order framework. Article 29A 
of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act stipulates that religious hatred is ‘hatred against a group 
of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.’ It must be noted 
that the Explanatory Notes to the 2006 Act stated that a religious group is a ‘a group of persons 
defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief. This includes at least the 
religions widely recognised in the UK, such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, 
Buddhism, Sikhism, Rastafarianism, Baha’ism, Zoroastrianism and Jainism as well as branches 
or sects within those religions and non-religious groups such as Atheists and Humanists.’ 1579 
These religions were incorporated in the explanatory notes for exactly the reasons pointed out, 
that they are religions active and apparent in the British context due to several factors. So, for 
example, Christianity is the State religion, arriving in Britain under the Romans.
1580
 Jews came 
to England at the start of the Norman conquest in the eleventh century and were expelled by 
Edward I in 1290.            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Following that, there were no Jews in England up until the rule of Cromwell. There was no 
formal readmission policy of Jews to England but a small group of persons in London were 
known and were permitted to remain.
1581
 In 1753, a Bill was introduced that aimed to naturalise 
and emancipate Jews but, in the same year, this was repealed as a result of public outcry. It was 
only in 1830 that the path to equality for Jews was laid down.
1582
 The history of Jews in Wales is 
similar to that in England with Jewish settlement being traced back to the eighteenth century and, 
to a greater extent, to the nineteenth century.
1583
 Other religions have come about predominantly 
due to more recent immigration and, particularly, the arrival of Commonwealth immigrants. For 
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example, Zoroastrianism is the ‘religion of Britain’s oldest South Asian minority,’1584  other 
religions such as Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism and Rastafarianism arrived in the UK with the arrival 
of immigrants from, amongst others, Pakistan, India and Jamaica.
1585
 Buddhism arrived in the 
UK as a result of ‘pull factors of interested westerners and from the ‘push factors of socio-
political circumstances in the East.’1586 In relation to Baha’ism, this came to England in 1898 and 
grew ‘leading to a pioneer movement beginning after the Second World War.’1587 It must be 
noted that the Explanatory Notes note that the recognised religions include at least the above 
religions, leaving the door open for other religions in the framework of the Act. In addition to the 
above, in order to comprehend what is understood by a religion, one can also turn to a recent 
judgement of the Supreme Court which found that ‘there has never been a universal legal 
definition of religion in English law’1588 and held that religion is to mean ‘a spiritual or non-
secular belief system…which claims to explain mankind’s place in the universe and relationship 
with the infinite, and to teach its adherents how they are to live their lives…’1589 This is a broad 
definition, that encapsulates an array of beliefs, thereby incorporating several religious groups 
into its understanding.  
 
1.4.2 Stirring up Racial and Religious Hatred – A Substitute for Hate Speech? 
The Public Order Act 1986 provides that acts intended or likely to stir up racial hatred include 
the use of words or behaviour or display of written material, the publishing or distribution of 
written material, the public performance of play, the distribution, showing or playing of a 
recording and/or the broadcasting of a programme in a cable programme service.
1590
 The offence 
of stirring up religious hatred has been defined and incorporated into the 1986 Public Order Act 
by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, with Sections 29B-F of the latter addressing the 
issue of stirring up religious hatred in the same way as it does its racial hatred counterpart.. Thus, 
the closest one can get to a definition of hate speech in England and Wales are the 
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aforementioned provisions, namely the use of words intended or likely to stir up racial or 
religious hatred. Important, however, is the observation of the CPS when discussing potential 
material that may incite hatred, namely that ‘hatred is a strong term and the offence does not 
necessarily encompass material that stirs up ridicule, prejudice, or which causes offence.’1591  
 
In relation to the position of freedom of expression within the realm of stirring up racial or 
religious hatred, it must be noted that, vis-à-vis the latter, Section 29J of the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act stipulates that ‘nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which 
prohibits or restricts discussion criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or 
abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief 
system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a 
different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system.’ Thus, in 
relation to speech that could stir up racial hatred, no freedom of expression allowance is 
stipulated by legislation, whereas, restrictions to speech targetted towards a religion that falls 
within the ambit of Section 29J shall not be permitted. Incorporating Section 29J has been 
characterised as providing a ‘most valuable right for those who wish to speak freely against the 
religious ideas held be some people. To criticise an idea is not to insult the person who holds the 
idea.’1592 Garry Slapper characterises this as logical given that ‘people do not choose their race. 
But people can choose their ideas.’1593 Notwithstanding the poignancy of this observation, it 
could be argued that the backdrop of the differentiation of free expression, vis-à-vis race on the 
one hand and religion on the other, is also because of the outright societal condemnation of 
criticising a person’s race which finds no justification on the grounds of debate and discussion. 
Further, it could be argued that, simply because religion is a choice and race is not should not 
directly correlate with the supposition that the latter should receive more protection than the 
former. The significance of preventing a dogmatic and restrictive State in which free speech is 
curtailed cannot be undermined, nevertheless, the incorporation of Section 29J could be a 
contributive factor to the fact that there are ‘no reported cases interpreting it, and prosecutions 
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under the religious hatred provisions are rare.’1594 Since this statement was made, one relevant 
case against a BNP member has been brought forth, which will be assessed in section 5.3.1. At 
this point, it suffices to say that the case did not result in a conviction. 
 
Although the national legislation incorporates a provision on stirring up racial and religious 
hatred through different forms of expression and whilst the encouragement of terrorism is illegal, 
what is missing is legislation which clearly and directly defines and bans hate speech. 
Interrelated to this is the UK’s decision to make a reservation to Article 4 of the ICERD and 
Article 20 of the ICCPR. The first reservation was based on free speech grounds and the second 
on the grounds that the country had already legislated on relevant matters ‘in the interests of 
public order.’ From the above, two issues can be discerned that will be extrapolated on further, 
firstly that freedom of expression is put forth as a justification for not banning speech that falls 
within the realm of hate speech and, secondly, that this country seems to have historically 
considered issues of potentially harmful speech within the arena of preserving public order.  
 
1.4.3 Racial and Religious Aggravation 
Section 28 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 defines a racially or religiously aggravated 
offence as one in which the ‘offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility 
based on the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group.’ The 
temporal framework of this hostility is defined as occurring before, during or after committing 
the offence, while membership of a group also includes any association with members of a 
particular group. Interestingly, to prove the existence of racially or religiously aggravated 
offences, hostility and not hatred of the victim’s membership of a particular group must be 
demonstrated. With regard to the variations between the two terms of hostility and hatred, it must 
be noted that neither of them is defined in the statutes. However, the CPS holds that hostility 
‘can be taken to bear its ordinary meaning. It is generally accepted that hatred is a stronger term 
than hostility.’ 1595 As such, the Law Commission1596 underlines that an offence is easier to prove 
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if only hostility must be demonstrated since hatred reflects ‘intense, dislike enmity or 
animosity.’1597 As noted, ‘hatred is a very strong emotion,’1598 so, the act of stirring up hatred is 
‘a much stronger thing than simply bringing into ridicule or contempt, or causing ill-will or 
bringing into distaste.’1599 In fact, ‘stirring up racial tension, opposition, even hostility may not 
necessarily be enough to amount to an offence.’1600 This means that a low threshold vis-à-vis the 
offender’s intent in the realm of aggravation is required in comparison to stirring up offences 
which incorporate the requirement of hatred.  Moreover, the Law Commission notes that 
‘ultimately it will be a matter for the tribunal of fact to decide whether a defendant has 
demonstrated or been motivated by, hostility.’ 1601  The same meaning of racial or religious 
aggravation has been incorporated into the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which, inter alia, makes 
provisions for the criminal justice system. Section 145, therein, provides for increased sentences 
for racial or religious aggravation in relation to offences that are not incorporated into the 
relevant provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act. The Criminal Justice Act adopts the same 
definition of racially or religiously aggravated crime as the Crime and Disorder Act, thereby 
integrating hostility rather than hatred.  
 
1.4.4 Hate Crime 
Hate Crime, per se, is not defined in national legislation but, instead, has been defined on a 
policy level. In 2007 institutions such as the Police, the CPS and the National Offender 
Management Services,
1602
 as well as other institutions which are part of the criminal justice 
system, came up with a definition of hate crime. This is ‘any criminal offence which is perceived, 
by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone 
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based on a personal characteristic.’1603 The institutions defining hate crime recognised five key 
grounds upon which hate crime occurs, namely race or ethnicity, religion or belief, sexual 
orientation, disability and transgender identity. As noted by a group of NGOs, hate crime is a 
‘relatively new concept, and due to the broadening of reports of hate crime, as opposed to racist 
crimes specifically, race specific data on hate crime have become less comprehensive over the 
past few years.’1604 Hate crime became of increasing importance particularly after the murder of 
Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and the subsequent investigation.
1605
 Conceptually, reducing hate 
crime is considered by the government as central if this country is to ‘embrace[the] rich mix of 
different races, cultures, beliefs, attitudes and lifestyles’1606 that exist in the UK.   
 
1.4.5 Racial and Religious Discrimination or Harassment  
There is no definition of racial or religious discrimination in national law, with such phenomena 
falling within the general framework of discrimination, as defined by the Equality Act 2010. The 
central purpose of this Act is to ensure equality in the socio-economic life of citizens, extending 
its scope to a multitude of arenas such as employment (including occupational pending 
schemes),
1607
 education,
1608
 access to goods and services,
1609
 the functioning of associations
1610
 
and other areas particular to certain protected characteristics such as transport for disabled 
persons.
1611
 Section 13(1), therein, holds that, direct discrimination arises when one person treats 
another less favourably because of a protected characteristic, including race and religion. Further, 
this section holds that, if the protected characteristic is race, then less favourable treatment 
includes segregation, although segregation is not considered less favourable treatment in the 
ambit of religion.  The Act also holds that indirect discrimination exists if one person applies a 
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relevant provision, criterion or practice to another based on a protected characteristic. Section 
26(1) of the Equality Act 2010 holds that harassment occurs when a person engages in unwanted 
conduct related to a protected characteristic and the conduct has the purpose or effect of violating 
the victim’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment. In ascertaining whether conduct constitutes harassment as per this Act, Section 
26(4) underlines that the Court must consider the perception of the complainant, the 
circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have the effect it does 
on the complainant.  In deciphering whether harassment has occurred, intention does not need to 
be demonstrated since Section 26(1) refers to the purpose or effect of the conduct. The settled 
approach to ascertaining the existence of harassment was formulated in Driskel v Peninsula 
Business Services.
1612
 In this case, the claimant had to demonstrate that the conduct she 
perceived to amount to harassment was unwanted and that this perception was reasonable. What 
distinguishes harassment from discrimination under the framework of this Act is that the former 
results in the creation of a particular type of adverse environment for the victim, for example, 
intimidation, whereas the latter is not interlinked with the creation of such an environment but 
the actual treatment (direct or indirect) by the perpetrator. In relation to direct discrimination, 
Section 13(1) holds that ‘a person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected 
characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.’  Section 19(1) 
holds that ‘a person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion 
or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's.’ 
Harassment, as incorporated in the framework of the Equality Act 2010, can be applicable to the 
rhetoric and mandate of far-right groups insofar as their members act in a racially harassing way 
in the arenas set out by this legislation. However, to date, only Part 7 of this Act regarding 
associations has been applied to the far-right with the cases brought against the BNP regarding 
its racially discriminatory constitution which excluded non-whites from party membership. 
 
Harassment, as an offence more generally and not solely within the spheres set out by the 
Equality Act, is incorporated in the 1997 Protection from Harassment Act. In seeking to 
conceptualise harassment, this Act does so in a broad sense, underlining that harassment includes 
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alarming the person or causing the person distress
 1613  
whilst noting that prohibited conduct also 
includes speech.
1614
 The 1997 Act does not incorporate the purpose or effect model but, rather, 
holds that the perpetrator knows or ought reasonably to know that his or her conduct will result 
in harassment. 
1615
 Section 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 incorporates a provision on 
racially or religiously aggravated forms of harassment as incorporated in the 1997 Act. 
Harassment is also incorporated in the public order framework which refers to intentional 
harassment,
1616
 thereby, limiting the scope of its applicability in comparison to the previously 
mentioned Acts. The 1997 Act, with the racially or religiously aggravated element, can come 
into play where members of the far-right harass an individual or individuals because of their race 
or religion. When such harassment leads to a disarray of public order then the 1986 Act can be 
invoked. Importantly, during deliberations on this Act, the House of Lords held that its aim is to 
protect victims of harassment, including those of racial harassment and also underlined that 
racial violence is directly intertwined with the offence of putting people in fear of violence.
1617
 
Particular modes of harassment such as harassment of a person in his home, is incorporated into 
the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. It was this piece of legislation, and particularly Section 
42A, therein, which was used to convict Paul Golding, leader of Britain First, after he harassed 
the sister-in-law of a man linked to the 7/7 bombings. He was also convicted of wearing a 
political uniform signifying association with a political organisation, as proscribed by the Public 
Order Act 1936. 
1618
 
 
1.4.6 Terrorism  
Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000
1619
 defines terrorism as including the use or threat of action 
for ‘the purposes of advancing political, religious, racial or ideological cause.’ The inclusion of a 
racial cause was incorporated later by Section 75 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.
1620
 Actions 
include, amongst other, serious violence against a person, serious damage to property and serious 
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risk to public health or safety.
1621
 Part 5 of this section holds that ‘a reference to action taken for 
the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed 
organisation.’ It must be noted that this definition has been described by commentators as too 
wide, with one author noting that the ‘breadth of the S.1 definition arguably compounds the 
perceived latitude of several new offences in the 2006 Act.’ 1622  Organisations, 1623  such as 
Liberty,
1624
 have argued that the far-reaching nature of the definition has allowed for the creation 
of far-reaching criminal offences and police powers.
1625
 Following a request from the 
government, Lord Carlile acted as an independent reviewer of terrorism laws and made several 
recommendations to the government with a view to limiting the broadness of the definition, 
including an amendment of the 2000 definition of terrorism to, inter alia, remove offences 
against property from the definition of terrorism.
1626
 However, in its response, the government 
noted that the definition of terrorism is ‘both comprehensive and effective and there is no 
evidence that the broadness of the definition has caused problems in the way that it has 
operated.’1627 As a result, the 2000 definition of terrorism has remained in place without any 
amendment. The Government’s anti-terror Prevent Strategy recognises that right-wing extremist 
activity could fall within the framework of terrorist activity. 
1628
  
 
1.4.7 Extremism  
Since the revised 2011 Prevent Strategy, the government defines extremism as ‘vocal or active 
opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty 
and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.’ In a 2013 Report from the Prime 
Minister’s Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism, it was noted that extremists 
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include, inter alia, far-right extremists.
1629
 The CPS holds that violent extremism includes, 
amongst others, ‘the demonstration of unacceptable behaviour by using any means or medium to 
express views which…foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK. 
Such conduct can give rise to a number of offences which include, for example, incitement to 
racial hatred.’ 1630 
 
2. International Framework  
This section shall consider whether and, if so, how, the UK has interpreted and applied its 
obligations in the realm of challenging right-wing extremism as these emanate from international 
and European conventions. To do so, and, taking into account that the UK has not incorporated 
the ICCPR or the ICERD into national law, the analysis of its obligations on a UN level shall be 
effectuated by considering the reservations adopted by the country on relevant articles of the 
aforementioned conventions and reports submitted by the UK to the relevant Committees and the 
Concluding Observations adopted by them as well as, where appropriate, the list of issues raised 
by the Committees and the State Party’s responses to them, always looking at the latest available 
documents. No case-law in relation to the UK exists as this country has not accepted the 
individual complaints procedure for the ICCPR or the ICERD. On a CoE level, and with a view 
to determining the position held by the ECHR on Human Rights, and particularly the articles 
which are directly related to the discussion of right-wing extremism, this section shall set out the 
relevant articles of the HRA 1998 and provide an overview of the provision for Courts to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility as this could potentially affect the application of this Act. On this 
level, it must be noted that the decision not to sign or ratify the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Cybercrime concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic 
Nature Committed through Computer Systems hampers the country’s position in fighting racist 
speech and material disseminated through the internet, and places it outside the ever important 
framework of international co-operation which is centrifugal to countering this phenomenon. In 
relation to the EU, reference will be made to the Council Framework Decision on combatting 
certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. It must be 
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noted that this section will deal solely with a theoretical analysis of documents submitted to and 
from UN, CoE and EU committees and bodies as well as the HRA itself with the aim of setting 
out the theoretical framework of the interpretation and incorporation of the country’s UN, CoE 
and EU obligations into domestic law and practice. Further analysis of these issues will be 
effectuated in the section on domestic jurisprudence.   
 
2.1 International Framework – The United Nations 
2.1.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Kingdom 
The UK signed the ICCPR in 1968 and ratified it in 1976. However, it has not yet incorporated 
the ICCPR into national law nor has it signed or ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
The State Party’s latest report was considered in the Human Rights Committee’s session between 
June and July 2015. In the report submitted by the UK, the government held that it ‘remains to be 
convinced of the added practical value to people in the UK of rights of individual petition to the 
United Nations.’1631 In reaching this conclusion, it noted that ‘the United Nations committees 
that consider petitions are not courts, and they cannot award damages or produce a legal ruling 
on the meaning of law whereas the United Kingdom has strong and effective laws under which 
individuals may seek remedies…’1632 It further held that the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women  and the Disability 
Convention were ratified as testing grounds, with the country’s experience to date not having yet 
provided sufficient evidence to decipher the added value of committees and the individual 
petition process. 
1633
 Article 20 (2), which is the part most relevant to the current analysis, 
provides that ‘any advocacy for national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.’ The UK incorporated a 
reservation on this article holding that it ‘interprets Article 20 consistently with the rights 
conferred by Articles 19 and 21 of the Covenant and having legislated in matters of practical 
concern in the interests of public order…reserve the right not to introduce any further 
legislation…’ In the latest report submitted by the country to the Human Rights Committee, it 
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was underlined that there exists no intention to withdraw this reservation or introduce any new 
legislation for the reasons underlined in the reservation clause itself. 
1634
 In its reply to the list of 
issues put forward by the HRC, the UK extrapolated on the reasons for which it imposed this 
reservation, which are nearly identical to those it gave in relation to the reservations in its report 
to the CERD as justifications for the imposition of a reservation on Article 4, referring namely to 
permissible speech as long as it does not incite violence or hatred.
1635
 
 
2.1.2 International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the United 
Kingdom 
The UK signed the ICERD in 1966 and ratified it in 1969 but has not yet incorporated it into 
national law. In September 2011, the CERD published its Concluding Observations on the 
country’s eighteenth and nineteenth periodic reports. The UK delayed submitting the above 
which were due in 2006 but were sent in 2010. The country’s next report was due in 2014 but 
was submitted in 2015. In the latest Concluding Observations prepared by the CERD on the 
country’s report, it was noted that, although the State Party maintains its position that it has no 
obligation to make the Convention part of national law, ‘the Committee reiterates its continuing 
concern that the State Party’s courts may not give full legal effect to the provisions of the 
Convention unless it is expressly incorporated into its domestic law or the State Party adopts 
necessary provisions in its legislation. The Committee requests the State party to reconsider its 
position so that the Convention can more readily be invoked in the domestic courts of the State 
party.’1636  NGO’s, such as the Runnymede Trust, 1637  have held that the government should 
incorporate the ICERD into national law,
1638
 introducing legislation requiring the judiciary to 
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take the Convention’s provisions into account where relevant. 1639 In its 2015 report to the CERD, 
the UK maintained its position regarding the non-incorporation of the ICERD into national law 
given that there already exists a comprehensive anti-racial discrimination framework within 
national law. 
1640
 
 
As well as not incorporating the ICERD into national law and imposing the limitation on Article 
4 in the name of striking balances with other freedoms, the UK has not yet made a declaration 
under Article 14.
1641
 By making an Article 14 declaration, the UK would recognise ‘the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals or 
groups of individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State 
Party of any of the rights set forth in this Convention. No communication shall be received by 
the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.’ As is the case 
with the ICCPR, this further limits the effectiveness and practical effect of the ICERD since 
victims of violations of the rights enshrined, therein, cannot seek to address their complaint at the 
CERD set up for, inter alia, receiving such complaints.  As a result, in its Concluding 
Observations of 2011, the CERD requested the State Party to reconsider its position vis-à-vis 
Article 14.
1642
 In its 2015 report, the UK reiterated that it did not consider this mechanism to be 
of added value for this country and its people.
1643
 
 
The most relevant article of the ICERD to the current analysis is Article 4, discussed in chapter 
three, which deals with condemning racist propaganda and organisations. Article 4 of the ICERD 
provides, inter alia, that States Parties condemn all racist propaganda and organisations, 
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declaring the dissemination of racist ideas and racist organisations illegal. The UK issued a 
reservation on Article 4, noting that:  
 
‘It interprets Article 4 as requiring a party to the Convention to adopt further legislative 
measures in the fields covered by sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of that article only 
insofar as it may consider with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in Article 5 of the 
Convention (in particular the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association) that some legislative addition to or 
variation of existing law and practice in those fields is necessary for the attainment of 
the end specified in the earlier part of article 4.’1644  
 
On this point, the United Kingdom noted in its 2010 report submitted to the CERD that it 
maintains its position vis-à-vis the reservation imposed on Article 4 since it has: 
 
‘a long tradition of freedom of speech which allows individuals to hold and express views 
which may well be contrary to those of the majority of the population, and which many 
may find distasteful or even offensive. This may include material produced by avowedly 
racist groups and successive Governments have held the view that individuals have the 
right to express such views so long as they are not expressed violently or do not incite 
violence or hatred against others. The Government believes that it strikes the right 
balance between maintaining the right to freedom of speech and protecting individuals 
from violence and hatred.’ 1645 
 
It reiterated the above point in its 2015 report to the CERD.
1646
 Thus, the UK holds that racist 
speech and material produced by racist groups should be permitted for the purpose of protecting 
free speech above as these do not incite or promote violence and hatred. However, in appraising 
                                                          
1644
 Report submitted by States parties under Article 9 of the Convention to the CERD: United Kingdom, 
CERD/C/GBR/18-20, para. 106 
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the reservation, the UK only makes reference to the freedom of expression and its boundaries, 
providing no overview of its interpretation of the freedom of association and the freedom of 
assembly which are essentially the vehicles used by racist groups or, for that matter, any other 
groups, to produce material and express racist opinions. Further, in this framework, the UK 
interprets the freedom of expression in a broader manner than the ECtHR in cases such as Féret 
v Belgium and Norwood v The United Kingdom, and, ironically, more broadly than its national 
Courts in cases such as DPP v Norwood discussed later on. In a nutshell, the above Courts, in the 
cases referred to, did not deem hate speech to be protected speech, even if such speech did not 
directly constitute a call for violence. Moreover, the aforementioned position is also contrary to 
the legislative reality of the country and, more particularly, is contrary to the Public Order Act 
since Article 18, therein, prohibits insulting as well as abusive and threatening words, behaviour 
and/or material. This reservation, thus complicates the understanding of the UK’s approach to 
racist speech. In its most recent Concluding Observations, the Committee noted that the State 
Party must lift its reservation to Article 4, taking into account the non-absolute nature of the 
freedom of expression and the racist statements in the media which may result in a rise in racial 
discrimination.
1647
 However this reservation has not yet been lifted.  
 
3. European Framework 
3.1 The Council of Europe: The Human Rights Act 1998: Incorporating the European 
Convention on Human Rights into Domestic Law  
The HRA 1998 received Royal Assent
1648
 in 1998 and came into force in October 2000. It aims 
to give ‘further effect’1649 to the rights and freedoms enshrined in Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the 
ECHR, Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol and Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol as read with 
Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention.
1650
 For purposes of this discussion, it suffices to say that, 
since 2000, the freedoms of expression, association, assembly and the right to non-
discrimination, as provided for by the ECHR, have become a codified part of national law. Along 
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with the codification of freedoms such as that of expression came the limitation grounds to such 
freedoms, as enshrined in the ECHR. This was the first time that human rights and freedoms 
became codified in the legal system of this country given the lack of a written constitution and 
no previous statute in this area. However, this is not to say that these were not part of the 
country’s legal framework, as reflected by the long title of the Act which makes reference to the 
purpose of giving ‘further effect’ to already established rights. This Act makes public authorities, 
including Courts and Tribunals, bound to a statute which requires them to act in conformity with 
the ECHR articles transposed into the HRA.
1651
 In fact, it is only public authorities that are 
bound by the provisions therein.  Further, Courts must ‘so far as it is possible’1652 interpret 
primary and secondary legislation in a way compatible to Convention rights.  The point of 
contention, however, is a situation in which a Court cannot, in fact, interpret legislation in 
accordance with a convention right. In such a case, Section 4 holds that ‘if the Court is satisfied 
that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of that 
incompatibility.’ Such a declaration can only be issued by certain Courts1653 and, as noted in R v 
A, must only be enforced as ‘measure of last resort.’1654 However, the effects of the declaration 
are curtailed by the fact that they do not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement 
of the provision in respect of which it is given and is not binding on the parties of the 
proceedings.
1655
 The central objective of this provision is to ensure that the HRA does not 
influence the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty.
1656
 Regardless of the limitations imposed on 
the declaration of incompatibility, and, even though it is Parliament’s role to make or change a 
law, the efficacy of this tool, as provided for in Section 4 of the HRA, must not be undermined 
given that there ‘will often be significant political pressure to amend incompatible primary 
legislation.’1657 It is noteworthy that, although the ECHR’s articles are included in Schedule 1 of 
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the Act, two freedoms, namely, that of expression and that of religion are incorporated into the 
Act itself. In relation to the former, which is directly relevant to this discussion, Section 12 lays 
down certain conditions for cases in which a Court is considering granting any relief which 
might affect the exercising of Article 10. These conditions pertain to notifying the respondent of 
the relief or taking reasonable measures to do so in the event that he or she is not present, 
restraining publications and having particular regard to the freedom of expression in the ambit of 
journalistic, literary or artistic material.
1658
 Incorporating the freedom of expression into a section 
of its own in the HRA demonstrates the significance which the drafters of the statute granted it.  
 
The HRA, and particularly ECtHR judgements and their role in the national legal framework of 
the UK, have resulted in a plethora of negative reactions by governmental and non-governmental 
actors of the country. This has particularly been the case in relation ECtHR judgements 
regarding deportation of foreign criminals and suspected terrorists and the tabloid attention 
subsequently received by them.
1659
 As such, in its 2010 general election manifesto, the 
Conservative Party highlighted its desire to ‘replace the Human Rights Act with a UK Bill of 
Rights.’ 1660  However, instead of repealing the Act and as a ‘compromise with the liberal 
democrats’ 1661  the government appointed a commission which drew up a proposal which 
suggested that the Act be repealed.
1662
 This document proposed, inter alia, to reduce the 
ECtHR’s status to that of an advisory body,1663 to release British Courts from the obligation to 
consider ECtHR case-law,
1664
 to clarify meanings of the right not to receive degrading treatment 
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or punishment
1665
 and to withdraw from the ECHR if the proposals cannot be put in place.
1666
 
However, no constructive steps were taken by the government to materialise the 
recommendations contained in the proposal. During his 2015 election campaign, the current 
Prime Minister of the UK announced that he planned to scrap the Act and replace it with a 
British Bill of Rights.
1667
 Following the 2015 elections, which resulted in a majority government 
for the Conservative Party, the efforts to repeal the Act appear more intense with a draft bill 
potentially being put forth in the spring of 2016.
1668
 These plans have come with staunch 
criticism from the political and academic world. For example, the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights has argued against this, noting that it goes against international human rights.
1669
 Some 
academics have argued that to do so ‘would create at least as many problems as would be 
solved’1670 and that it would place UK’s ‘relationship with international and European human 
rights law in jeopardy’1671  
 
3.2 The European Union: The Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on Combating 
Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law 
Since the time of its drafting, the UK has been rather wary of this Framework Decision and had 
previously rejected drafts of this document in the name of free speech.
1672
 The mark of the UK 
on the development of this document is reflected in the latter’s staunch embracement of the 
preservation of public order, as the central tenet through which hate is to be regulated is reflected 
in Article 1 (2). More particularly, this Article holds that Member States may choose only to 
punish conduct which is either (i) carried out in a manner likely to disturb public order or (ii) 
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which is threatening, abusive or insulting, mirroring Section 18 of the 1986 Public Order Act. 
The UK did not pass or amend legislation for purposes of adopting the Framework Decision 
given that it already contains provisions which meet the document’s objectives. In fact, in 
comparison to other countries, this country has been effective in achieving the purpose of this 
Framework Decision. For example, it has the highest criminal penalty for stirring up hate (its 
form of hate speech) in the EU,
1673
 and has provided the EU with case-law and detailed statistics 
which demonstrate that racist and xenophobic motivation is taken into consideration.
1674
 
Nevertheless, certain deviations from the Framework Decision do exist in this country. For 
example, the list of grounds upon which people are victims of racism and xenophobia, as 
included in the Framework Decision, are not fully transposed in UK law which leaves out 
descent but incorporates all the rest.
1675
 Further, elements which are clearly missing from 
national legislation are the requirements of Article 1(c) and (d) of the Framework Decision. 
Article 1(c) of the Framework Decision provides for the criminalisation of publicly condoning, 
denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as 
defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, directed against a 
group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, 
descent or national or ethnic origin when the conduct is carried out in a manner likely to incite to 
violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such a group. Article 1(d) adopts the 
same wording, structure and approach as contained in Part (c) but deals with the crimes defined 
in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. The country under 
consideration has no legislation to criminalise such offences,
1676
 thereby falling short of the 
requirements of Article 1 (c) and (d) of the Framework Decision.   
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4. National Legal Framework  
This section shall provide an analysis of the domestic legal framework of England and Wales 
that can be relied upon when challenging far-right extremism. The section will look at the 
relevant legislation in the sphere of speech, material and activities of far-right entities and 
consider how, in practice, the judiciary has interpreted and applied such legislation when 
confronted with the far-right movement.  Before proceeding with an insight into the particular 
legislation and jurisprudence and, given that the problem questions within this dissertation are 
assessed through a human rights lens, the section will firstly look at the human rights framework 
of the country as this will facilitate any subsequent discussion. To this end, it will set out how the 
freedoms of expression, association and assembly are conceptualised and incorporated into 
domestic law. It will subsequently appraise how England and Wales balance these rights with 
other interests, namely public order and anti-terrorism. Following this, the section will consider 
how the law regulating the registration and functioning of political parties as well as the electoral 
process in itself may separately or in conjunction with each other affect the development of the 
far-right, regardless of whether such laws, regulations and systems have the purpose of 
countering such movements. This approach is necessary since it will enable an understanding of 
the handling of all the entities which make up the far-right and the manner in which they are 
tackled by England and Wales. An overview of the statutes’ objectives as well as the sections 
relevant to this discussion shall be effectuated and followed by an analysis of interrelated case- 
law so as to enable an understanding of the way in which Courts and Tribunals have interpreted 
and applied the legislative tools available to them as a means of challenging the far-right. In 
relation to legislation created in the ambit of criminal law, a historical account of its development 
shall be made before the analysis of this area of law, given the multiple changes undergone and 
brought about by different statutes.   
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4.1 Human Rights: Conceptual Backdrop  
4.1.1 Freedom of Expression 
It has been suggested that, even before the incorporation of the HRA 1998, the freedom of 
expression was anyhow constructed and protected in the common law framework.
1677
However, 
the fact remains that there was no statutory protection of the right to the freedom of expression 
up until the passing of the HRA in 2000. That was the first time that the meaning of the freedom 
of expression and a reference to the limitations that can be legitimately imposed thereto, as so 
provided by Article 10 of the ECHR, were incorporated into national legislation. In fact, 
referring to two cases, namely R v Secretary of State for the Home Department
1678
 and Reynolds 
v Times Newspapers Ltd,
1679
 one commentator noted that an embracement of the freedom of 
expression by the Courts can be discerned during the time when the HRA was being passed.
1680
 
For example, in the former case, which dealt with prisoners’ freedom of expression, the House of 
Lords deemed this freedom to be ‘as strongly protected in the common law as it is under the 
Convention.’ 1681In the latter case on defamation and libel, Lord Steyn, in citing the 1972 case of 
Broome v Cassell & Co. Ltd,
1682
 noted that there is a ‘constitutional right to freedom of 
expression in England.’1683  
 
So, what position does this freedom hold when it comes to far-right rhetoric? The answer is not a 
simple one. A House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee report has underlined that 
free speech is not absolute, with one of the examples offered in relation to legitimate restriction 
of this right being hate speech. Namely, the Committee held that ‘those who incite racial hatred 
claim the right to free speech, but they misuse that right to preach a doctrine of hate and violence. 
Surely those who persecute others, should themselves be prosecuted by the forces of law and 
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order.’1684 Thus, the Committee refers to preachers of hate and violence, thereby appearing to 
pose violence as a requirement for prohibition. On a judicial level, when considering the scope of 
free expression, Courts usually embrace the position of Sedley LJ in Redmond Bate v DPP,
1685
 
which echoed the judgement of the ECHR in Handyside v The United Kingdom.
1686
 Namely, he 
held that ‘free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the 
eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does not tend to provoke 
violence. Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having.’1687 This approach therefore 
accepts all types of speech insofar as they do not constitute calls for violence.  Further, in its 
2010 submission to the CERD, the UK, in explaining why the reservation to Article 4 had not 
been lifted, referred to a ‘a long tradition of freedom of speech which allows individuals to hold 
and express views which may well be contrary to those of the majority of the population…’1688 
This position was reiterated in the country’s 2015 report to the CERD. This freedom has also 
habitually been referred to when racial hatred provisions were to be incorporated into national 
legislation and any discussion about new relevant legislation usually comes with strong  
resistance in the name of free expression.
1689
 In fact, this could be the reason for which this 
country has not proceeded to the incorporation of offences such as group insult as have other 
countries
1690
 and, by extension, has not incorporated any provision clearly banning hate speech. 
However, any strictness in relation to the significance of free speech seems to crumble in the 
sphere of preserving public order given that harmful expression is prohibited in this country if it 
negatively affects public order. In fact, the significance of public order in the realm of hate 
speech (and also acts) within the sphere of the extreme-right, can be illustrated by looking at the 
factors leading up to the incorporation of relevant legislation, namely the Public Order Act 1936. 
This was predominantly a response to the Battle of Cable Street which commenced from a march 
of the British Union of Fascists and resulted in public disarray on the streets of London. It is also 
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noteworthy that the Race Relations Act 1965 was a response to race riots taking place in London 
and Bristol, namely the 1958 Notting Hill Riots and the 1963 Bristol Bus Boycott riots.
1691
 In 
fact, when it comes to preserving public order, the country is ready and willing to limit free 
expression
1692
 demonstrating that public order comes higher up the hierarchy than free speech. 
 
In more recent times, anti-terror measures have been developed with expression that, amongst 
others, supports or glorifies terrorism, constituting prohibited speech. So, when dealing with the 
serious offence of terrorism, relevant expression can also be prohibited although, once again, 
because of the damage it can result in on a societal level. However, by placing the relevant 
offences within the public order framework (and also anti-terrorism), what is missing is 
legislation against harmful expression simply because of the harm it can do to the victim, 
regardless of the effects on, for example, public order. The Public Order Act 1986, discussed 
below, prohibits racially hateful expression which is threatening, abusive or insulting and 
religiously hateful expression which is threatening or abusive. However, nowhere do we find 
provisions analogous to the purposes of the aforementioned CoE Additional Protocol (which the 
UK has not yet ratified) which aims at prohibiting, inter alia, forms of online expression which 
promote or incite discrimination against an individual or group of individuals. Thus, it appears to 
be the case that discrimination is not sufficient to amount to a public order offence and personal 
harm is not sufficient to excuse the curtailment of free expression and, as such, there is currently 
no space for a hate speech ban in this country. Moreover, the importance attached to the freedom 
of expression and the significance of preserving public order, which essentially overrides the 
former, could possibly be the reasons for which the UK has not taken supranational steps in the 
form of ratifying the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the 
Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer 
Systems. More particularly, given that the State adopts the position that expression can only 
legitimately be curtailed insofar as it poses a danger to the public, the aforementioned Additional 
Protocol, which is not placed within the realm of maintaining public order does not fit within the 
national approach. The extent to which this approach can be justified is open to discussion 
according to how harm is conceptualised. More particularly, if a restrictive approach to harm is 
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adopted, then curtailing expression is legitimate insofar as destructive effects result from such 
expression. If one views harm in a broader manner, then abstract effects, such as the moral 
damage of expression, can also constitute legitimate grounds for curtailing expression which, in 
such a case, does not need to cause public disorder but may lead to harm such as personal and 
group denigration.  
 
For purposes of the subsequent analysis, it is also necessary to note one more important 
characteristic of England and Wales in the realm of free expression. Notwithstanding that the 
judiciary has made several attempts to make an analysis of the freedom of expression and has put 
forth certain reasons in relation to the limitations of speech and, even though there exist 
comments such as those made by the Select Committee discussed above, it must be 
acknowledged that the freedom of expression in England and Wales ‘remain[s] heavily under-
theorised’1693 with Lord Steyn being the central figure who attempted, on numerous occasions, to 
provide an overview of the normative framework underlying this freedom.
1694
 Thus, the analysis 
of hate speech uttered by far-right groups, parties and movements will be effectuated against a 
lacking normative backdrop accompanied by a statutory setting which has only recently seen the 
codification of the freedom of expression. 
 
4.1.2 Freedoms of Assembly and Association 
As with expression, the freedoms of assembly and association became part of the statute 
following the enforcement of the HRA which, inter alia, incorporated Article 11 of the ECHR 
into national law.   
 
4.1.2(i) Freedom of Association: General Overview  
Although not part of statute until 2000, freedom of association was put forth by the UK as a 
reason to reject the endorsement of Article 4 of the ICERD. During the drafting process and 
discussions on Article 4, the UK representative held that her country ‘defended the right of all 
organisations, even fascist and communist ones, to exist and to make their views known, even 
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though those organisations held views which the majority of the people utterly repudiated. No 
matter how odious the ideas of any group or organisation were, her country could not agree to 
the banning of it.’1695 This paragraph reflects two significant issues, firstly that, although the 
HRA had not been part of national law at that point, the UK did recognise the freedom of 
association and, secondly, that the representative’s argument is no longer valid since, following 
the 2000 Terrorism Act, several associations are, in fact, proscribed. More particularly, the 
freedom of association is limited through Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which provides 
that the Secretary of State can proscribe an association which is involved in terrorism. Although 
groups affiliated predominantly with Irish republicanism, communism and Islamic extremists 
have been proscribed under this Act, no far-right associations, as understood and conceputalised 
in this dissertation, have yet been proscribed.
1696
 More particularly, in relation to political parties 
contesting elections in the UK, the only one ever to have been proscribed was a far-right one, 
namely the British Union of Fascists.
1697
 This however, occurred under the Defence Regulation 
18b (AA) of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939, drawn up for purposes of restricting Nazi 
activities, and are no longer in use. Following that, and notwithstanding some restrictions placed 
on the access to the media by parties such as Sinn Féin
1698
 up until 1994 when the Irish 
Republican Army
1699
 declared a ceasefire, no other restrictions have been placed on the right of 
political parties functioning in the UK to associate.
1700
 It has been held that ‘the extreme rarity of 
placing limitations upon or banning political parties illustrates how freedom of association for 
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political parties is well-protected in Britain, provided they do not advocate violence.’1701 This, in 
itself, is not in contravention of the ECtHR which, in Vona v Hungary,  held that ‘unless the 
impugned association can reasonably be regarded as a hotbed for violence or incarnating a 
negation of democratic principles, restrictions to the freedom of association are incompatible 
with the Convention.’1702 Interestingly the ECtHR’s position (and also the national position) 
deviates from Article 4 of the CERD. In fact, the CERD held that, by not prohibiting the BNP 
and other groups and organisations of a racist nature and by allowing them to pursue their 
activities, the UK was failing to implement Article 4, which calls for a condemnation of all 
organisations attempting to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination.
1703
  Activities of 
associations have been tackled through the public order framework. More particularly, the Public 
Order Act 1936
1704
 was the first statutory tool created to tackle activities of groups and 
associations that could bring disarray to public order. This document was created to address 
public order issues arising from racist assemblies of the British Union of Fascists
1705
 and their 
opposition.
1706
 Although no direct proscription of racist assemblies and marches was contained 
therein, nor did it contain any hate speech regulation, this Act sought to ensure public order by 
granting the police powers to preserve the public order on the occasion of assemblies, 
processions and meetings 
1707
 and to prohibit uniforms in connection with political objects
1708
 
and quasi-military organisations.
1709
  This was the basis of today’s Public Order Act 1986. 
 
4.1.2(ii) Freedom of Association and Employment: Issues of Non-Discrimination  
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Although, the country has only once proscribed a political party, the judiciary has come before 
cases in which the issue of restricting the association rights of members of far-right parties and 
particularly the BNP has arisen.  
 
(a) H M Prison Service v Mr. C Potter 
In the case of HM Prison Service v Mr. C Potter,
1710
 the Prison Service had introduced a policy 
which precluded from employment any individuals who are members of racist organisations.
1711
 
The Prison Service held that this policy was adopted so as to ensure compliance with Section 71 
of the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended by Section 2 of the Race Relations Amendment Act 
2000. Section 71 required that every authority or person specified in Schedule 1A (including the 
Prison Service) must, in carrying out its functions, have due regard to the need to eliminate 
unlawful racial discrimination. The prison’s policy held that certain organisations, including the 
BNP, were considered to be racist.
1712
 The claimant, an active BNP member, twice applied and 
was rejected for employment in the Prison Service.
1713
 As a result of these rejections, he brought 
the case to the Employment Tribunal arguing that ‘as a white Anglo-Saxon I have been racially 
discriminated against by HM Prison Service.’1714 He based this argument on the fact that the 
Prison Service’s policy was, in fact, applied only against white organisations.1715  In this case, a 
pre-hearing review was conducted as per the Employment Tribunal’s (Constitution and Rules 
etc.) Regulations 2004, with the Tribunal having to consider, as per paragraph 18(7) (b) thereof, 
whether the case should be struck out or not. More particularly, under Section 18 of the 
regulations, pre-hearing reviews are conducted by the chairman unless certain conditions, not 
applicable in this case, are met. Subject to Section 18(7) (b), a chairman can strike out or amend 
a claim on the grounds that it has, inter alia, no reasonable prospect of success. In considering 
the case, the Employment Tribunal found the freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR and 
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the freedom of association under Article 11 ECHR to be directly relevant to the case. More 
particularly, it noted that ‘it may be, and I put it no higher than this, that a blanket rule that 
precludes someone from being a member of a racist organisation, even where for example they 
keep their membership a secret or do not bring their views into the working environment at all, 
might not necessarily be justified at least simply on the basis that they belong to a racist 
group.’1716 The Employment Tribunal held that the prospects of the claimant winning the trial 
would be limited, but, bearing in mind the relatively serious nature of the allegation and the need 
for some evidence to be examined, including evidence in relation to the equal or unequal 
application of the policy, the case should be heard by a tribunal.
1717
  The Prison Service appealed 
this decision, with the Employment Appeal Tribunal rejecting it but noting the ‘considerable 
irony in the Claimant alleging a breach in the Race Discrimination Act, which is an anathema to 
racists in any event, on the basis that some racists are treated in a racially discriminatory way and 
less favourably treated than other racists.’1718 The Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the 
prospect of success was very limited but based its decision, in part, on a dictum of Lord Steyn in 
a previous case in which he held that ‘discrimination cases are generally fact sensitive and their 
proper determination is always vital in our pluralistic society.’1719 In addition, the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal underlined the relatively serious nature of the allegations. The only difference 
with the Employment Tribunal was that the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that this was a 
possible case of direct discrimination rather than indirect as held by the previous Court.
1720
 The 
important points to be retained from this case were that both tribunals underlined the limited 
prospects of success of this case but either way granted Potter a chance to proceed if he wished, 
with the Employment Appeal Tribunal noting the grounds of seriousness and variability of 
discrimination cases. No records of a subsequent trial exist, thereby, preventing an in-depth 
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analysis of what a tribunal would finally have decided based on the actual content of the case and 
the relevant points of law.  
 
In the case of Serco Limited v Arthur Redfearn,
1721
 the Court of Appeal was confronted with a 
decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal regarding a claim for race discrimination contrary 
to the Race Relations Act 1986. More particularly, Redfearn, a (white) member of the BNP and, 
at the material time of his dismissal, a candidate for the BNP in forthcoming local elections, was 
employed by Serco which supplies transport services to public authorities, including the 
Bradford City Council. Its buses are used to transport adults and children with physical or mental 
disabilities who are mostly of Asian origin. Serco received notifications from unions and 
employees about Redfearn’s employment at Serco being ‘a significant cause for concern, bearing 
in mind the BNP’s overt and racist/fascist agenda.’1722 As a result of these concerns, Serco 
summarily dismissed Redfearn who subsequently sued on the basis of racial discrimination. 
Redfearn argued that Serco had treated him less favourably under Section 1(1)(a) of the 1976 
Act by dismissing him on the grounds of the Asian race and ethnic origin of the people the 
Applicant transported.
1723
 The Employment Tribunal rejected the claim for direct discrimination, 
holding that Serco’s dismissal of Redfearn did not occur on racial grounds. 1724  It must be 
underlined that Redfearn could not bring a claim against Serco under the HRA 1998 for 
infringements of his rights under Articles 9, 10 and 11 since Serco is not a public authority. 
1725
 
The Court of Appeal noted that the key question to be tackled was whether it had been 
established that Serco had directly or indirectly discriminated against him on racial grounds.
1726
 
It found that the Employment Appeals Tribunal was correct in deciding that Redfearn was not 
dismissed on racial grounds since ‘they did not become racial grounds because Serco dismissed 
him in circumstances in which it wished to avoid the perceived detrimental effects of Redfearn’s 
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membership of and election to office representing the BNP, which propagated racially 
discriminatory policies concerning non-white races who formed part of Serco’s workforce and 
customer base.’1727 Thus, Redfearn was not treated less favourably because he was white but 
because of his membership of the BNP.
1728
 In a nutshell, ‘Serco was not adopting a policy which 
discriminated on the basis of a dividing line of colour or race. Serco would apply the same 
approach to a member of a similar political party, which confined its membership to black 
people.’1729 In fact, the Court reminded the parties that it was the BNP who was adopting a 
racially exclusionary membership policy against persons who were not white.
1730
 As such, the 
Court noted that Redfearn’s complaint was one of discrimination on political grounds, with 
political belief not constituting a protected characteristic under anti-discrimination law. 
1731
 
Although the Court of Appeal found in favour of Serco and, notwithstanding that Redfearn was 
refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords, thereby prohibiting Redfearn’s right to associate 
with the BNP while an employee of Serco, the ECtHR found that his freedom of association had, 
in fact, been violated by Serco’s decision to dismiss him based on his affiliation to the BNP. This 
case, at the Strasbourg level, will be discussed further in chapter four. As such, in this case, the 
national judiciary interpreted the freedom of association in a more restrictive manner than 
Strasbourg, when faced with a far-right member.  
 
In the case of Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen v Lee,
1732
 the Associated 
Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen (ASLEF) excluded Lee who was an activist for the 
BNP and had stood as a candidate in the general elections.
1733
 Furthermore, there were 
allegations that he had harassed Anti-Nazi League leafleteers by taking pictures of them, taking 
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their car numbers, making cut throat gestures at them and following a woman in his car to her 
home, noting down her house number.
1734
 The Employment Tribunal found that, by dismissing 
Lee, ASLEF had acted in a way contrary to Section 174 of the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (consolidation Act) which entails the right not to be excluded or expelled from a union. 
More particularly Section 174(1) provides that an individual shall not be excluded or expelled 
from a trade union unless the exclusion or expulsion is permitted by this section. Section 174 (2) 
(d) provides that ‘the exclusion or expulsion is entirely attributable to conduct of his (other than 
excluded conduct) and the conduct to which it is wholly or mainly attributable is not protected 
conduct.’ Part 4 notes that protected conduct is conduct ‘which consists in the individual’s being 
or ceasing to be, or having been or ceased to be, a member of a political party.’ ASLEF appealed 
to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which interpreted Section 174 of the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act to mean that a Union can rely on a member’s conduct to expel him or her 
and cannot rely on such conduct if this constitutes membership of a political party, while the 
Union must demonstrate that the expulsion is entirely justified by impermissible conduct.
1735
 The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the Employment Tribunal erred in law and ruled that 
the case be remitted to a different Tribunal to respond to the questions of firstly, who and/or what 
body on the Union’s behalf expelled the applicant? Secondly, was the expulsion entirely 
attributable to his conduct, regardless of his being a member of the BNP?
1736
 The second tribunal 
upheld Lee’s complaint, rejecting the defence that his expulsion was based on his conduct, 
holding that the expulsion occurred ‘primarily because of his membership of the BNP’ and was, 
thus, a violation of the aforementioned Section 174.
1737
 Therefore, in this case, which involved 
trade union rather than employment rights, the national Court found in favour of a far-right 
member in the realm of association. ASLEF subsequently took the UK to the ECtHR and won, 
on the basis that a violation of its Article 11 had occurred since a trade union is, within the ambit 
of this freedom, allowed to select its members. This case is discussed in more detail in chapter 
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four. Thus, in Potter’s case, the tribunals recognised that the prospects of his winning the case 
were limited but allowed him a voice, given, amongst others, the severity granted to the freedom 
of expression and association. However, from their judgements and predictions one can conclude 
that, had a hearing occurred, Potter would not have won in the name of freedom of association 
(and/or expression). In Redfearn’s case, the Court of Appeal directly restricted his freedom of 
racist association in the employment setting. Finally, in Lee’s case, the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal granted him the freedom of association, that being the freedom to participate in the 
trade union concerned, regardless of his BNP membership. It seems that with a trade union, the 
threshold of limiting association is higher for national Courts. Thus from Redfearn’s case, the 
national Courts sent out a clear message to members of the far-right, namely that this sort of 
association may readily and legitimately affect other rights such as that of employment. This 
contributes to the overall process of challenging the far-right, directly or indirectly, as the 
judiciary has an extra tool to challenge its members, even in the sphere of employment, insofar 
as their association may affect those receiving his services.  
 
4.1.2 (iii) Freedom of Assembly  
The birth of the freedom of assembly had been interlinked during the time leading up to the 
enactment of the HRA.
1738
 For example, in a 1997 case, Lord Denning underlined ‘the right to 
demonstrate and the right to protest on matters of public concern.’1739 The central issue that has 
been clear from the onset is that only peaceful assembly is accepted, as is the position on a 
European and international level, with ‘provocative disorderly behaviour which is likely to have 
the natural consequences of causing violence…is likely to cause a breach of the peace’1740 
deemed illegal under domestic law. Part 2 of the 1986 Public Order Act regulates processions 
and assemblies and incorporates a range of conditions and duties that must be met if such 
activities are to occur. For example, Article 11 holds that written notice shall be given to the 
Police for a public procession that aims to, inter alia, support or oppose the view or activities of 
a person or body of persons. Article 12 holds that such processions may be prohibited if the 
Police consider there to exist a possibility of public disorder. Article 14 allows the Police to 
                                                          
1738
 Equality and Human Rights Commission: Human Rights Review 2012: Article 11 Freedom of Assembly and 
Association, 412 
1739
 Hubbard v Pitt [1975] 3 All ER 1 
1740
 Morpeth Ward Justices, ex parte Ward [1992] 95 Cr App R 215 
353 
 
restrict assemblies insofar as issues of public disorder may arise. The Serious Organised Crime 
and Police Act 2005
1741
 requires those organising a demonstration, within one kilometer of 
Parliament Square or in any other area designated by the Secretary of State for purposes of this 
Act, previously to request a permit to do so.
1742
 In granting such a permit, the Commissioner may 
impose conditions to, amongst other things, prevent disorder and protect property.
1743
 This has 
happened on several occasions in relation to EDL marches. In fact, in some cases, the Secretary 
of State for the Home Department ordered a blanket ban on all marches due to fear that EDL 
marches would result in violence and public disorder.
1744
 Further, EDL marches which have been 
allowed to take place have often been marked with arrests on the grounds of persons breaching 
the peace or to prevent an imminent breach of the peace.
1745
 In the case of Chief Constable of the 
Bedfordshire Police v Paul Golding and Jayda Fransen,
1746
 the High Court addressed the 
Police’s request for interim injunctions under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 
2014
1747
 against the leader and deputy leader of Britain First. Under Section 1 of the 
aforementioned Act, a Court may grant an injunction insofar that, on the balance of probabilities, 
the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage in anti-social behaviour and, that the Court 
considers it just and convenient to grant the injunction for the purposes of preventing the 
respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour. The injunctions were sought for a one-year 
period, but the immediate reason for the injunctions was Britain First’s march which was to take 
place on the 27 June 2015.
1748
 The injunctions were requested given the anti-Islam and anti-
immigrant rhetoric and activity of the two defendants, with the subsequent concern being that the 
27 June march would possibly result in public disorder.
1749
 The High Court refused the first 
injunction which would forbid the respondents from entering Luton and the surrounding area. 
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1750
The reasons put forth by the Court for rejecting this injunction included one that directly 
correlated to the significance of political expression, assembly and association. More particularly, 
the Court held that ‘to ban the leaders of a registered political party altogether from a town is a 
very considerable thing. The evidence and the submissions on behalf of the Chief Constable did 
not address the consequences for legitimate political activity by that party in a town. Nor did 
they address the potential for an injunction in one town to lead to calls for injunctions in other 
towns and cities with a Muslim population of appreciable size, and, in turn, how legitimate 
political activity might be conducted if those calls were heeded.’1751 
 
However, it granted the rest of the injunctions, preventing the respondents from:   
(a) Entering any Mosque or Islamic Cultural Centre or its private grounds within England 
and Wales without prior written invitation. 
(b) Publishing, distributing or displaying, or causing to be published, distributed or 
displayed, any words or images, whether electronically or otherwise, which having regard 
to all the circumstances are likely to stir up religious and/or racial hatred. 
(c) Using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour thereby causing 
harassment, alarm or distress to any person. 
(d) Carrying or displaying in Luton on Saturday 27 June 2015 at or in connection with the 
march by "Britain First" any banner or sign with the words "No More Mosques" or 
similar words or words to like effect.
1752
 
 
Thus, the Court embraced the position that it is particularly important that the freedom of 
assembly is exercised within the framework of a political party, even a far-right one with 
particular emphasis being added by the Court to the defendants’ roles as leaders of a political 
party. It instead sought to limit their behaviour in order to maintain the peace. Once again, 
challenging the far-right occurred within the spectrum of ensuring public order.  
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As such, England and Wales have historically prohibited far-right assemblies, the prohibition of 
which constitutes a practical and usable tool to limit the activities and rhetoric of far-right groups 
such as the EDL, preventing them from taking to the streets. The restrictions to relevant rights, 
such as that of assembly, are curtailed in the framework of public order and anti-social behaviour. 
On the other hand, the ECtHR permits the prohibition of assemblies insofar as they are violent 
but also, if they ‘otherwise deny the foundations of a democratic society.’1753 The latter element 
is not upheld by England and Wales which will ban an assembly because of its nature, namely 
that this may lead to violence and/or public disarray but has not, to date, banned one because of 
its undemocratic content. The handling of such occurrences reflects, once again, the great 
significance placed by the country on public order rather than, for example, on the detrimental 
effects the content of an assembly may have on its target group.  
 
5. The Far-Right Movement and Criminal Law  
This section will provide an overview of the relevant legislative provisions in the ambit of 
criminal law, and particularly the public order and anti-terrorism frameworks, which can be used 
for purposes of challenging the rhetoric and/or activity of the far-right. Following a commentary 
on the provisions, there will be a jurisprudential analysis demonstrating how these are interpreted 
and applied by the judiciary when faced with the challenge of the far-right. It should be noted 
that the English legal system does not have statutes which directly and explicitly deal with 
extreme right-wing movements and/or their expression, activities or symbolism. However, this 
State has other legislative tools that can be used to challenge the far-right movement,
1754
 with 
public order constituting the predominant realm through which relevant cases have traditionally 
been pursued. More recently, in relation to criminal law, the far-right has also been challenged 
through anti-terror laws. 
 
5.1 Maintaining Public Order as a Sphere through which to Challenge the Far-Right   
Sections 18-23 of Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986, as amended, deal with racial hatred and, 
specifically, acts intended or likely to stir up racial hatred and make it an offence to possess 
racially inflammatory material. Acts intended or likely to stir up racial hatred include the use of 
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words or behaviour or display of written material, the public performance of a play, the 
distribution, showing or playing of a recording and the broadcasting or inclusion of a programme 
in cable programme service. Section 17 defines what is meant by racial hatred, while Section 23 
prohibits the possession of racially inflammatory material. Section 27(1) restricts the 
enforcement of the above provisions by holding that the consent of the Attorney-General must be 
acquired before the commencement of proceedings for any of the said offences. This provision 
was originally incorporated into the Race Relations Act 1965 and then the Public Order Act 1986 
in order to safeguard ‘against proceedings being taken in circumstances which would penalize or 
inhibit legitimate controversy, and will ensure that their use is confined to the ringleaders and 
organizers of incitement to racial hatred.’1755 Section 27(2) holds that, for purposes of respecting 
the rules against charging more than one offence in the same count or information, Sections 18 to 
23 create one offence. Section 27(3) holds that the penalty imposed for a conviction on 
indictment
1756
 for any of the offences under consideration results in imprisonment of no more 
than seven years and/or a fine, whilst a summary conviction
1757
 results in imprisonment for a 
term of up to six months and/or a fine.  
 
5.1.2 Acts Intending to Stir up Racial/Religious Hatred and Possession of Inflammatory Material 
Incitement to racial hatred has routes in seditious libel, public mischief and breach of the peace. 
Seditious libel was defined in the case of R v Burns
1758
 as ‘an intention…to raise discontent or 
disaffection amongst Her Majesty’s subjects or to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility 
between different classes of such subjects.’1759 By the late 1960s, it was noted that sedition could 
only be invoked where there was incitement to violence or public disorder. The courts defined 
public mischief even more widely to include ‘all offences of a public nature, that is all such acts 
or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the community.’1760 Although some prosecutions were 
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brought forth under these offences for cases dealing with incitement to racial hate
1761, ‘such 
offences were hardly an effective deterrent since their inherent vagueness discouraged 
prosecutions.’1762 The Race Relations Act 1965 was the first statutory document to incorporate 
the offence of incitement to racial hatred. In fact, it was the State’s fear for, inter alia, the 
increase of support for neo-Nazi and other racist groups and associations during the 1960s that 
led to the incorporation of the offence of stirring up racial hatred in the Race Relations Act 1965. 
Section 6, therein, prohibited incitement to racial hatred by making it an offence for a person 
intentionally to stir up racial hatred through the publication or distribution of written matter 
which was threatening, abusive or insulting or through the use of such words in a public place. 
Consent of the Attorney-General was required for a prosecution under section 6 to occur. Section 
6 of the 1965 Act was received with much criticism with, for example, Judge Leslie Scarman 
noting that it was ‘hedged about with restrictions (proof of intent, requirement of the Attorney 
General’s consent), it is useless to a policeman on the street….’ 1763 Section 70 of the Race 
Relations Act 1976
1764
 moved the offence of stirring up racial hatred to Section 5 of the Public 
Order Act 1936 and amended it in such a way as to remove the requirement that the offender 
intended to stir up racial hatred and added behaviour which could lead to racial hatred to the 
existing package of speech and material.
1765
 This rendered prosecution of practices falling within 
the provision’s ambit more realistic and allowed a greater number of occurrences to fall within 
its scope. Moreover, the government had noted that it considered a criminal public order statute 
rather than a civil anti-discrimination statute to constitute a more appropriate framework through 
which such incitement could be dealt with.
1766
 Since the insertion of this provision into the 
Public Order Act 1936, stirring up racial hatred as expressed through speech or actions has been 
habitually dealt with within the framework of public order regulation. Section 5 of the Public 
Order Act 1936 created the offence of conduct which was conducive to a breach of the peace, 
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holding that ‘a person who in any public place or at any public meeting: - (a) uses threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour or (b) distributes or displays any writing, sign or visible 
representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting with intent to provoke breach of the 
peace of where the breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence.’ 
As will be reflected in the jurisprudential analysis, this section has been the one most often used 
to curtail far-right expression and activities which may lead to public disorder.  
 
The provisions on incitement to racial hatred, as incorporated in the 1936 Act were, as noted by 
Lord Stoneham, ‘designed to operate selectively against the leaders and organizers of race hatred, 
and not be capable of becoming a weapon used against the ordinary man in the street engaged in 
ordinary conversation or discussion of the issues or events of the day.’1767 While there have been 
some convictions for the use of racist words or racist conduct under Section 5 of the Public 
Order Act 1936, it has been suggested that ‘the punishments were often derisory, and police 
interpretation of the law was often incontinent.’ 1768  However, some successful examples of 
convictions, thereunder, do exist. In Jordan v Burgoyne,
1769
 the defendant and several other 
speakers, all members of the National Socialist Movement, addressed an assembly of 
approximately five thousand people at Trafalgar Square in London, some of whom were counter-
demonstrators. During his speech, the defendant stated that ‘more and more people every 
day…are opening their eyes and coming to say that Hitler was right. They are coming to say that 
our real enemies…were not Hitler and the National Socialists of Germany but world Jewry and 
its associates in this country.’1770  Although ‘there was disorder throughout the whole of the 
meeting,’ 1771  this statement led to complete disorder as the counter-demonstrators moved 
towards the stage which resulted in approximately twenty arrests for breaching the peace.
1772
 
Jordan was convicted under Section 5 and, during his appeal, which was unsuccessful, Lord 
Chief Justice Parker
1773
 noted that the words the defendant used were threatening, abusive or 
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insulting, thereby resulting in a breach of the peace.
1774
 Furthermore, it has been argued that the 
1936 provision on incitement to racial hatred was one of the elements which led to the decline of 
the National Front while, at the same time, improving behaviour during assemblies of far-right 
groups.
1775
 During parliamentary debates, the Home Secretary noted that the new law sought ‘to 
deal with more dangerous, persistent and insidious forms of propaganda campaigns – the 
campaign which, over a period of time, engenders hate which begets violence.’1776 As a result, 
legitimate parties had to ‘publicly disassociate themselves from the violent activity even if they 
continued to hold covert links.’ 1777 
 
As noted, the Public Order Act 1986 incorporates provisions that tackle an array of words or acts 
that are threatening or abusive, likely or intended to stir up racial hatred and renders the 
possession of racially inflammatory material an offence. As underlined by the CPS, 
demonstrating incitement to racial hatred (and logically by extension religious hatred) is 
problematic given that there are ‘high legal hurdles to clear in order to bring a successful 
prosecution.’1778 Also significant to this is the meaning of hatred as discussed, which does not 
‘necessarily encompass material that stirs up ridicule, prejudice, or which causes offence.’1779 
Finally, the CPS holds that another issue relevant to the legal obstacles is the complex balancing 
test that is to be enforced in the realm of freedom of expression on the one hand and the 
damaging effects of incitement on the other. 
1780
 Moving to more recent statutes, the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006, which was created at ‘a time when polarization of communities in 
the UK was feared,’1781 incorporated the offence of stirring up religious hatred into the Public 
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Order Act 1986
1782
 and rendered the possession of religiously inflammatory material an offence. 
However, vital differences exist between the statutory approach and handling of racial hate, on 
the one hand and religious hate on the other, with the latter encompassing only threatening acts 
or words, leaving out abusive and insulting acts or words, whilst, at the same time, being 
accompanied by a ‘broad ranging freedom of expression defence incorporated at the House of 
Lords.’1783 As a result, the efficacy of the religious hatred provisions was, from the onset of their 
incorporation, drastically limited.  
 
Section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986 deals with the use of words or behaviour or display of 
written material and provides that:  
 
(1) A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays 
any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting is guilty of an offence if: 
(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or 
(b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby. 
(2) An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, except 
that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the written 
material is displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and are not heard or seen except by 
other persons in that or another dwelling. 
 
Thus, this section curtails the free use of certain speech, execution of certain acts and display of 
written material which stir up racial hatred, replacing incitement, which had been referred to as 
stirring up in the Race Relations Act 1965. This reflects the removal of the necessity of intent on 
the part of the offender, which had, at any rate been ensured by the 1936 Act. So, ever since 
1936, intention has no longer been a prerequisite for prosecution, with it sufficing that an offence 
is committed if the offender intends to stir up racial hared or having regard to all the 
circumstances, racial hatred is likely to be stirred up. However, Article 18 provides that a person 
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who is not shown to have intended to stir up racial hatred is not guilty of an offence under this 
section if he did not intend his words or behaviour, or the written material, to be, and was not 
aware that it might be, threatening, abusive or insulting. As such, the only defence to this offence 
is for the person who has allegedly committed the offence of stirring up racial hatred to 
demonstrate that he neither intended nor was aware that the words, acts or written material may 
be threatening, abusive or insulting. It can reasonably be assumed that a certain abstraction is 
accompanied with proving such intention and/or absence of knowledge, as contained within the 
aforementioned section.  
 
In relation to free opinion, Section 18 incorporates certain safeguards as to opinion. Namely, as 
with Article 19(1) of the ICCPR, Section 18 places no restrictions on opinions or beliefs, in this 
case, racist ones. Instead, Section 18 only deals with the actual voicing of opinion in the form of 
expression or acts.  Further, the type of words used in Section 18 must be considered. More 
particularly, an offence exists if the words, acts or material are threatening or abusive. So, any 
racist acts, material or expression disseminated or voiced by, inter alia, far-right groups which 
do not meet this threshold but, rather, are simply prejudicial or contemptuous, cannot be deemed 
an offence. In Brutus v Cozens, the House of Lords noted that determining whether or not 
conduct is abusive or insulting rather than simply annoying is a question of fact to be determined 
by the trial court. 
1784
 
 
Further, Section 19 deals with publishing or distributing written material, Section 20 with the 
public performance of a play, Section 21 with the distribution, showing or playing of a recording 
and Section 22 with the broadcasting or inclusion of a programme in a cable programme service. 
The key issue of relevance for this discussion is that the offences take the same pattern as 
Section 18, namely that the aforementioned activities amount to offences if the person intended 
to stir up racial hatred or, having regard to all the circumstances, racial hatred is likely to be 
stirred up. The same defences apply for all sections, namely, that the person did not intend to stir 
up racial hatred or was not aware of the content of the material/play/recording or programme and 
did not suspect, and had no reason to suspect, that it was threatening, abusive or insulting. 
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Lastly, Section 23 prohibits the possession of material or a recording of visual images which are 
threatening, abusive or insulting in the event that the person possessing such material intends to 
use it for purposes of stirring up racial hatred or, having regard to all the circumstances, racial 
hatred is likely to be stirred up. The classic defence, as seen with the other articles, exists, 
namely, that the person had no intention of stirring up racial hatred or that he/she was not aware 
of the content of the material or had no reason to suspect it to be threatening, abusive or insulting.  
 
5.1.3 Prohibiting Religious Hatred within the Public Order Framework: The Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006  
The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which entered into force in October 2007, was 
created to tackle offences involving stirring up hatred against persons on religious grounds. More 
particularly, it amends the Public Order Act 1986 for England and Wales, incorporating Part 3A 
therein, which makes an offence out of threatening speech, acts and material which seek to stir 
up religious hatred.
1785
 Prior to that, religion was not included in any relevant laws since it was 
considered ‘as something inherently different from race - connected to certain convictions and 
teachings and thus more open to criticism ...’1786 One of the reasons for which the decision was 
taken to incorporate religious hatred into the Public Order Act 1986 was the increased 
vulnerability of the Muslim community post September 11
th
.
1787
 To investigate whether 
incitement to religious hatred should be criminalised, the government set up the Select 
Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales.
1788
 In 2003, the Committee presented 
its report on the issue,
1789
 finding that it could not reach a final decision as to whether incitement 
to religious hatred should, in fact, be made an offence.
1790
 Either way, the government presented 
the reasons for which it believed that such an offence should, in fact, exist by holding that 
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‘although the Government does not believe that incitement to religious hatred is commonplace, it 
does exist and where it exists it has a disproportionate and corrosive effect on communities, 
creating barriers between different groups and encouraging mistrust and suspicion. At an 
individual level this can lead to fear and intimidation and a sense of isolation. It can also 
indirectly lead to discrimination, abuse, harassment and ultimately crimes of violence against 
members of our communities. It is legitimate for the criminal law to protect citizens from such 
behaviours.’1791 Interestingly, in this extrapolation, the government recognised the effects such 
offences may have on a personal and/or community level rather than focusing solely on the issue 
of public order.  
 
This Act has ‘a frantic history’ 1792  with six attempts having been made in Parliament to 
incorporate an offence of stirring up religious hatred over a period of twelve years.
1793
 The 
central concern voiced time and again was that the new provisions pertaining to the stirring up of 
religious hatred may lead to a violation of the freedom of expression. 
1794
 The first version of the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Bill was a mirror image of Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 on 
racial hatred. The House of Lords considered this to be too broad, with commentators, such as 
Lord Lester, noting that the provisions were ‘using a steamroller to crack a nut.’1795 So, a long 
negotiation process started between the House of Lords and the House of Commons with the 
former finally convincing the latter to accept certain significant amendments to the government’s 
initial proposals. These amendments sought to protect the freedom of expression but, as will be 
demonstrated below, would directly affect the scope and enforcement of the Act as it stands 
today. The first was that acts intending to stir up religious hatred would be dealt with by separate 
legislative provisions rather than being incorporated into the existing framework on racial 
hatred.
1796
 This was simply because the template of Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 was not 
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considered suitable for curtailing religious hatred, due to its alleged broadness if it were to be 
used in the ambit of religious hatred. Secondly, words or acts would have to be threatening, not 
simply abusive or insulting as in the case of the racial hatred provisions discussed above. The 
House of Lords sought this amendment so as to protect those simply making a joke about a 
religion or partaking in a theological debate.
1797
 Thirdly, it would not be enough that religious 
hatred would be likely to be stirred up as a result of the words or acts, but, instead, the persons 
would have to have intended the speech or acts to result in religious hatred. Lastly, the Lords 
requested the incorporation of a provision that explicitly protects the freedom of expression so as 
to ensure, once again, the protection of theological debates, jokes and proselytism.
1798
  
 
As a result of the accepted amendments, the provision on hatred against persons on religious 
grounds, as inserted into Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 by Section 29B of the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act, provides that a person who uses threatening words or behaviour or 
displays any written material which is threatening is guilty of an offence if he intends to stir up 
religious hatred. The rest of the provisions in the framework of acts intended to stir up religious 
hatred follow the pattern of their racial hatred counterpart in relation to the private/public 
distinction and the non-application of the provision for purposes of the material, words or 
behaviour being included in a programme service. Further, the only defence available is that the 
person proves that he/she was in a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words, acts or 
material would be heard or seen by someone outside that dwelling. This provision existed in the 
framework of racial hatred and particularly in Section 18(3) of the Act under consideration but 
was repealed by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. 
1799
 Section 29C makes an 
offence out of the publication or distribution of threatening written material in the event that the 
person publishing or distributing this material intends to stir up religious hatred. Section 29D 
deals with the public performance of a play which involves the use of threatening words or 
behaviour and whose presenter or director intends, thereby, to stir up religious hatred. Section 
29E holds that the distribution, showing or playing of a threatening recording in the event that 
the person intends to stir up religious hatred is an offence while Section 29F deals with the 
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broadcasting or inclusion in a programme service. Section 29G underlines that it is an offence to 
possess inflammatory material, which is threatening if the person possessing it seeks to use it in a 
way to stir up religious hatred. Significantly, the legislation incorporates a broad protective net 
for religious jokes, discussions and debates, thereby, seeking to limit the possibility of the 
provisions curtailing the freedom to express ones humorous, theological or academic ideas. More 
particularly, Section 29J holds that ‘nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way 
which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, 
insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other 
belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a 
different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system.’ No such 
provision was incorporated in the ambit of racial hatred, with the conclusion being that it was 
considered necessary by the House of Lords that more leeway for expression, behaviour and 
material pertaining to religion should be granted, even if these are essentially insulting or abusive.  
Lastly, as is the case with its racial hatred counterpart, Section 29L requires the consent of the 
Attorney-General for any procedures to be instigated. In relation to this, one commentator has 
argued that the broadness of this power and the unlikeliness of its being adequately reviewed 
could mean that certain ‘haters,’ such as extreme religious clerics, are brought forth for 
prosecution more often than other, less usual suspects
1800
 Also, notwithstanding the indisputable 
inequalities vis-à-vis the scope between the provisions dealing with racial hatred and those 
dealing with religious hatred, the punishments for offenders are the same.  
 
Thus, it can be discerned that ensuring a conviction under Part 3A is more difficult than doing so 
under Part 3 since only threatening words, behaviour, acts, material, plays, recordings and 
programmes are considered an offence insofar as the person responsible has intended to stir up 
religious hatred, with the likeliness of an offence occurring regardless of intention not sufficing. 
In fact, it has been argued that the decision to prohibit only threatening speech/acts/material has 
‘probably narrowed the new offence to the point of non-existence.’1801 The scope is further 
narrowed by the incorporation of Section 29J which seeks to protect acts and expression ranging 
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from proselytism to humour. Also, opposed to the sections on racial hatred, demonstrating lack 
of intention is unavailable for potential offenders.  Either way, it cannot be doubted that 
rendering the stirring up of religious hatred an offence, and ensuring prosecution within this 
ambit, occurs in a much more restricted sphere than in relation to racial hatred. The point to 
which this has depleted any possibility of practical success can be demonstrated by a lack of 
prosecutions and convictions in this realm. The limited prosecutions and convictions under Part 3 
and 3A is reflected in CPS statistics. In its 2013-2014 report on hate crime, no reference was 
made to any cases brought forth on religious hatred grounds and only one on the grounds of 
racial hatred.
1802
 As a point of comparison, for the years 2013-2014, five-hundred and fifty 
religiously aggravated cases and 11,818 racially aggravated cases were prosecuted with a 77.3% 
and 75.9% conviction rate respectively.
1803
 In the same report, the CPS underlined that the 
freedom of expression considerations that have to be taken into account in relation to 
prosecutions under Part 3 and Part 3A mean that the number of cases brought forth is much 
lower than for the general hate crime offences
1804
 in the form of Section 5 offences made racially 
or religiously aggravated by the Crime and Disorder Act.  This reflects the fact that, even if the 
freedom of expression is not integrated into Part 3 as it is in Part 3A, the CPS takes it into 
consideration in the realm of the relevant sections on racial hatred. In fact, in its All-
Parliamentary Inquiry into Anti-Semitism, the CPS found that ‘there are high legal hurdles to 
clear in order to bring a successful prosecution for an offence to incitement to racial hatred. 
Hatred is a strong term and the offence does not necessarily encompass material that stirs up 
ridicule, prejudice or which causes offence.’1805 This, by extension, and to an even greater extent 
can be applied to the situation vis-à-vis religious hatred offences under the Public Order Act 
1986. Maybe, the aim of Part 3A was not to have a tool that would be readily and practically 
enforceable, but rather a symbolic mechanism to ensure respect for the diverse religions present 
in the country. In fact, the symbolic effect of this Act was underlined time and again by the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the issue. The panel ‘accepted that it was unlikely the law 
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would attract a great number of prosecutions’1806 but nevertheless underlined that ‘there are 
many devout people living in our country who take their religion very seriously and have a 
legitimate interest in seeking to preserve [it].’1807 
 
As a result, and although the aforementioned sections in Parts 3 and 3A deal directly with racial 
and religious hatred, Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 which deals generally with 
harassment, alarm and distress has, as will be reflected further down, been used to challenge the 
speech and activities of far-right groups. This section provides that a person is guilty of an 
offence if he uses threatening or abusive words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour, or displays 
any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening or abusive within the 
hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. As opposed 
to Parts 3 and 3A, no consent from the Attorney-General is needed for a prosecution to be made 
in this section and, thus, it is easier to use for relevant cases. Section 5 as Section 6(4), dealing 
with the mental element of an offence, underwent an amendment under Section 57 of the Crime 
and Courts Act 2013
1808
 which removed the word ‘insulting’ from the words or behaviour 
considered to amount to an offence under Section 5(1) and removed the word ‘insulting’ from 
the intentions of the person uttering the words or behaving in a particular manner so as to 
broaden the spectrum of free speech. The amendments came into force on 1 February 2014. No 
such amendments were made to sections contained in Parts 3 and 3A of the Act which deal 
exclusively with racial and religious hatred. Further, it is noteworthy that, before the enforcement 
of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005,
1809
 police officers had extensive powers 
both in the framework of Section 5 and Section 18. More particularly, a police officer could 
arrest a person without warning if he or she engaged in offensive conduct which a constable 
warned him to stop and he engaged in offensive conduct immediately or shortly after the 
warning with offensive conduct meaning conduct which the police officer reasonably suspects to 
constitute an offence under the particular section.
1810
 Thus, previously, the police could arrest a 
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person if it was suspected that he or she was committing a Section 5 or Section 18 offence so 
long as there was reasonable suspicion, with the legislation not elucidating the circumstances in 
which such arrest could occur, thereby, granting complete discretion to the Police and entrusting 
them with the ability and will to think and act reasonably. As a result of the aforementioned 
amendments, Police powers and discretion to act within the ambit of the above sections have 
been restricted.  
 
5.2 Aggravation and Sentencing 
In relation to arrest and sentencing, both the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, as amended by the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,
1811
 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003
1812
 contain 
provisions that can be used by the judiciary to allow for sentence enhancements for racially and 
religiously aggravated offences. These will be looked at in detail below. Nevertheless, it must be 
noted that, even before the incorporation of racially aggravated crimes, judicial discretion vis-à-
vis considering racial motivation as an element during sentencing ‘has been an effective weapon 
in dealing with racially motivated crime.’1813 As was underlined by Lord Chief Justice Taylor ‘it 
is perfectly possible for the Court to deal with any offence of violence which has a proven racial 
element in it, in a way which makes clear that that aspect invests the offence with added gravity 
and therefore must be regarded as an aggravating feature.’1814 
 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and particularly Part 2 therein, creates certain racially and 
religiously aggravated offences. The introduction of racially aggravated offences came before the 
incorporation of its religious counterpart. The former has been deemed to represent ‘a major shift 
in the State response to violence and harassment of minorities in the UK’1815 with cases such as 
the brutal murder of Stephen Lawrence and the Stephen Lawrence enquiry denoting the urgency 
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of dealing with racial violence in a more effective manner.
1816
 It was only in 2001 with the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act, and specifically Section 39, therein, that religious aggravation 
was incorporated into the Crime and Disorder Act, on an equal footing with racial aggravation. 
Once again, the gradually developing concern for religious hostility is demonstrated by the 
integration of religious aggravation into the Act under consideration. This Act provides the 
judiciary with a tool to enhance the sentencing of, inter alia, persons committing offences within 
the framework of the far-right. 
 
Section 28 of Part 2 of the Crime and Disorder Act provides that an offence is racially or 
religiously aggravated if: 
 
(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the 
offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s 
membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group or 
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or 
religious group based on their membership of that group. 
 
Part 2 of this section underlines that membership in relation to a racial or religious group 
includes association with members of that group while Part  3 notes that it is immaterial for the 
purposes of the above paragraphs, whether or not the offender’s hostility is also based on any 
other factor.  
 
Section 29 holds that a person is guilty of a racially or religiously aggravated assault if he 
commits: 
 
(a) an offence under Section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (malicious 
wounding or grievous bodily harm); 
(b) an offence under Section 47 of that Act (actual bodily harm); or 
(c) common assault 
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In the event that a person is found guilty of an offence under part (a) or (b) above, he or she will 
be liable to punishments which mirror those incorporated in Part 3 and 3A of the Public Order 
Act, these being: 
 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a 
fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or 
to a fine, or to both. 
 
In the event that the person is found guilty of common assault which is racially or religiously 
aggravated for purposes of this Act, he or she will be liable: 
 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a 
fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to 
a fine, or to both. 
  
Furthermore, Section 30 deals with racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage, Section 
31 with racially or religiously aggravated public order offences and Section 32 with racially or 
religiously aggravated harassment with the penalties varying according to the crime committed. 
 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is particularly important since the limitations of enforceability 
of Part 3 and, even more so, Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 on stirring up and possession 
of inflammatory material in the ambit of racial hate and religious hate, respectively, may hamper 
the efforts of England and Wales to challenge the far-right. Thus, the tools that are granted by the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 must not be undermined as they essentially allow the invocation of 
other provisions, such as Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, which do not require the strict 
tests or high thresholds incorporated in relation to racial or religious hatred, thereby, facilitating 
successful prosecutions and allowing for the enhancement of sentencing.  However, this is only 
within the framework of offences directly stipulated by the Crime and Disorder Act, namely 
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assault, criminal damage, public order offences, namely, violence, alarm, distress and 
harassment.
1817
 Section 145 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which came into force in 2005, 
increases the sentences for racial or religious aggravation and for offences other than those 
provided for by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, thereby, broadly extending the scope of 
offences for which a Court may enhance a sentence for racial or religious aggravation.  
 
Thus, racial or religious aggravation as a reason for enhanced sentencing is a tool for challenging 
far-right groups which are criminally active, harassing and assaulting their victims by ensuring 
convictions under the more general offence of Section 5 and subsequently enhancing sentencing. 
Interestingly, in R v Rogers, the House of Lords underlined that ‘the mischiefs attacked by the 
aggravated version of these offences are racism and xenophobia. Their essence is the denial of 
equal respect and dignity to people who are seen as ‘other.’ This is more deeply hurtful, 
damaging and disrespectful to the victims than the simple versions of these offences. It is also 
more damaging to the community as a whole, by denying acceptance to members of certain 
groups not for their own sake but for the sake of something they can do nothing about…’1818 
This statement is interesting as it moves away from the designated lens through which hate 
crimes have been habitually perceived in this country, namely that of public order, and 
demonstrates that the judiciary conceptualise the harm done by prejudice on an individual and 
community level. As with the comments on the government’s position on religious hatred and its 
effects on the community, this statement does not reflect the stance adopted by the country in the 
realm of challenging hate. 
  
5.3 Jurisprudential Analysis 
5.3.1 Utilising the Public Order Act and/or the Crime and Disorder Act to Deal with the 
Activities of the Far-Right 
In 1986, the judiciary dealt with the expression of two persons acting within the framework of a 
far-right party as disseminated, inter alia, by publications of that party, namely the BNP. More 
particularly, the Crown Court found John Morse and John Tyndall guilty of conspiring to 
contravene Section 5A of the Public Order Act 1936 due to their role in the publication of a 
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newspaper ‘British Nationalist’ which was the newspaper of the BNP and which the Court 
considered to have stirred up racial hatred against black people, Asians and Jews in the UK.
1819
 
Morse, the editor of the newspaper and Tyndall, the leader of the BNP at the time, worked 
together for the production of the newspaper. In addition, Tyndall was found guilty of a violation 
of Section 5A of the Act which dealt with, amongst others, threatening, abusive or insulting 
expression and material and for his role in the publication of three leaflets and three issues of a 
magazine entitled ‘Spearhead,’ all which resulted in the same consequences vis-à-vis racial 
hatred as did the newspaper. 
1820
 In 1998, Griffin, the leader of the BNP and editor of the 
magazine ‘The Rune’ was found guilty of violating Section 19 of the Public Order Act 1986, 
namely for the publishing or distribution of threatening, abusive or insulting material which 
intends to or is likely to stir up racial hatred. Issue 12 in the aforementioned magazine contained 
claims that the Holocaust had not occurred, depicted some cartoons which were alleged by the 
Crown Court to be anti-Semitic and referred to certain statistics and facts which were supposed 
to demonstrate the great power Jews have in institutions such as the media.
1821
 Ballard, the 
magazine’s distributor and a BNP member, was also prosecuted but pleaded guilty and was, 
therefore, not tried by the Court. The judge instructed the jury that the material was not 
threatening but that they would have to decide whether the magazine was insulting or abusive or 
both.
1822
 It must be noted that the reference to this case has only been based on secondary 
sources since no transcript of the hearing was made and only the CPS holds records of the case. 
In fact, in 2010, the CPS blocked attempts to disclose further details about this case, claiming 
that this would breach data protection rights.
1823
 
 
The following two cases are also relevant to the rhetoric and activities of the BNP but deal 
particularly with posters depicting messages for which their displayers were tried by the Courts 
and found guilty. These are the cases of Mark Anthony Norwood v Director of Public 
Prosecutions
1824
 and Kendall v Director of Public Prosecutions.
1825
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5.3.1 (i) Norwood v Director of Public Prosecutions 
Norwood involved the display of a poster on the accused’s window containing words in very 
large print ‘Islam out of Britain - Protect the British people.’ The poster had a photograph of one 
of the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in flames on 11
th
 September 2001 and a Crescent 
and Star surrounded by a prohibition sign. The poster had been supplied by and bore the initials 
of the BNP, of which Norwood was the regional organiser for his area.
1826
 Norwood was 
convicted by the Magistrates Court of an offence under Section 5(1)(b) of the Public Order Act 
1986, aggravated in the manner provided for by Sections 28 and 31 of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998. He appealed his conviction by way of case stated
1827
 at the Supreme Court of 
Judicature, Queen’s Bench Division.  
  
Section 5 Analysis 
Section 5(1) (b), which was relied on by the Court in this case provided that a person is guilty of 
an offence if he displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm 
or distress thereby. 
 
In relation to Section 5, the Court held that its structure required the display of a visible 
representation, a value-judgement that the representation in question was in fact threatening, 
abusive or insulting and a demonstration of intention or awareness on the part of the defendant 
that the representation may be threatening, abusive or insulting as well as a demonstration that 
the display was within the sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress as a 
result of the poster.
1828
 Interestingly, the Court found that the wording of Section 5.1 means that 
‘the prosecution do not have to prove that the display of the poster in fact caused anyone 
harassment, alarm or distress.’1829 In his judgement, Lord Justice Auld rejected the appeal against 
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conviction and held that ‘ the appellant's conduct was unreasonable, having regard to the clear 
legitimate aim, of which the section was itself a necessary vehicle, to protect the rights of others 
and/or to prevent crime and disorder. There are also… considerations under Articles 9 and 17, 
weighing against permitting the appellant to rely on his right under Article 10.1 in the 
circumstances of this case.’1830 Thus, in reaching his conclusion, the judge took into account the 
limitation grounds of the freedom of expression and conducted a balancing act between the 
appellant’s right to access this freedom and the right of others to enjoy, without interference, 
their freedom of religion or belief. Moreover, by referring to the prohibition of abuse of rights 
clause, as enshrined in Article 17 of the ECHR, the judge demonstrated the severity which he 
attached to the potential consequences of Norwood’s expression. Interestingly, the ECtHR, 
followed the Article 17 approach in this case.  
 
Consideration of the Freedom of Expression 
The Court noted that a prosecution under Section 5 does not necessarily entail a restriction on 
Article 10.
1831
 However, it held that if Article 10 is engaged in any such case then the key issue 
to be examined is ‘whether the accused’s conduct went beyond legitimate protest and whether 
the behaviour had not formed part of an open expression of opinion on a matter of public interest, 
but had become disproportionate and unreasonable.’1832 In this way, the Court set the boundaries 
for free expression, using them as a framework for the subsequent analysis. In establishing the 
outer boundaries of speech, the Court referred to Handyside v The United Kingdom
1833
 noting 
that restrictions to Article 10 of the ECHR are to be ‘narrowly construed.’1834 Furthermore, the 
Court underlined the obligations arising from the HRA and recognised that the Court must take 
into account Strasbourg jurisprudence when making judgements on issues such as the freedom of 
expression. More particularly, it cited Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers Ltd: 
1835
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‘Under Section 12 of the HRA 1998….the Court is required, in relevant cases, to have particular 
regard to the importance of the right to freedom of expression. The common law is to be 
developed and applied in a manner consistent with article 10…and the Court must take into 
account the relevant decision of the ECtHR…To be justified, any curtailment of freedom of 
expression must be convincingly established by a compelling countervailing consideration, and 
the means employed must be proportionate to the end sought to be achieved.’ 1836 
 
Norwood: Final Comments 
After looking at the structure of Section 5 and the obligations arising from Article 10 of the 
ECHR, the Court held that the appellant had displayed a poster which he intended or knew 
would be insulting given that it was ‘a public expression of attack on all Muslims in this 
country…’1837 and, thus, could ‘not be dismissed as merely an intemperate criticism or protest 
against the tenets of the Muslim religion…’1838 This is similar to the statement made by the 
ECtHR on the poster, namely that it was a ‘general vehement attack against a religious group.’ 
1839
Furthermore, in relation to the prosecution having to prove that the poster was within the 
hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress, the Court found 
that this poster, its imagery and words were capable of distressing, alarming or harassing ‘any 
right-thinking member of society concerned with the preservation of peace and tolerance... as 
well as to any follower of the Islamic religion…’1840  
 
5.3.1 (ii) Kendall v Director of Public Prosecutions  
Kendall involved several posters that had been put up by the accused on an advertising pillar 
along a road. One wrote ‘Illegal Immigrant Murder Scum,’ the other consisted of photographs of 
three black men and the third gave the contact telephone number for BNP. Three men seen in the 
photographs were undocumented migrants who had been convicted for the manslaughter of a 
woman holding her baby.
1841
  In 2007, Kendall was convicted of the offence created by Section 5 
of the Public Order Act 1986, racially aggravated as provided for by Section 31 of the Crime and 
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Disorder Act 1988. He had pleaded not guilty and appealed to the High Court of Justice by way 
of case stated. 
 
The magistrates put forth three questions for the opinion of the High Court, namely: 
 
(1) Whether on the facts of the case, the visual display can be regarded as 'threatening 
and abusive'. 
(2) Whether on the facts of the case it can be said that the [appellant] intended or was 
aware that the poster was 'threatening, abusive or insulting'. 
(3) Whether on the facts of the case it can be said that an act of putting the poster up was 
motivated by hostility towards a particular racial or religious group.
1842
 
 
In relation to all the above, the Court replied in the positive. To the first question, the Court held 
that the response was ‘very much a value judgement’1843 as was previously noted in Norwood v 
DPP. The Court proceeded to underline that ‘the value judgement which the magistrates would 
unquestionably have been entitled to make was that the posters were conveying the message that 
black people are scum because they are the sort of people who come to this country illegally, and 
who either commit, or are capable of committing, crimes like murder.’1844 In relation to the 
second question, the Court held that ‘all that had to be proved was that the appellant had been 
aware that they might be threatening, abusive or insulting.’1845 Regarding the last question, the 
racial group which was allegedly targetted by these posters was the immigrant community and, 
to this end, the Court held that it was open to the magistrates to treat as significant the fact that 
the appellant chose to illustrate the prevalence of crimes committed by irregular immigrants by a 
case involving black men, and by putting up photographs of them so that everyone could see that 
they were black.
1846
 Moreover, the Court found that ‘the appellant's conduct amounted to a 
manifestation of his hostility to immigrants because their non-Britishness was perceived by him 
to derive from their race or colour.’1847 Further, the Court noted that, even though he may have 
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sought to recruit members to the BNP, ‘that did not mean that he was not at the same time 
motivated by such hostility.’1848 Kendall’s appeal was rejected but no reference to Article 17, as 
in the case of Norwood, was made.  
 
Thus, in all the aforementioned cases, the persons prosecuted who were allegedly stirring up 
racial hatred, all members of the BNP, were convicted of an offence under the Public Order Act. 
This reflects an homogeny in the judiciary’s approach to such cases and also the dependence on 
the public order preservation framework as one which has habitually been relied on in the realm 
of challenging the far-right. In the case against Tyndall and Morse, the 1936 Public Order Act 
was the only route available for the Court. In Griffin’s case, the approach of the Court was clear 
as it relied on the special provisions on racial hatred, with Jews, which were the targets of some 
of the impugned material in the magazine, falling within the sphere of a race. In light of the 
above, two conclusions can be drawn from the judicial approaches in Norwood and Kendall. The 
first conclusion is two-fold and is drawn from the fact that, in both cases, the display of racist 
materials was dealt with by the general offence of causing harassment, alarm or distress through 
words or behaviour, as provided for by Article 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, rendered racially 
aggravated through the Crime and Disorder Act. In Norwood, there existed no option to adopt 
the tailor-made Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 that deals with religious hatred since the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act had not yet been passed. However, the racial aggravation clause 
was utilised notwithstanding the fact that Section 28 (4) of the Crime and Disorder Act holds that 
a racial group means a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality 
(including citizenship) or ethnic or national origin. This is interesting given that the Courts, to 
date, have found that Muslims fall outside the framework of the racial group definition. However, 
in Norwood, the Court had no trouble in finding this crime to be racially aggravated even if the 
hated group in the posters was Muslim. As noted by the Court, ‘the District Judge, on the 
evidence before him, was entitled to find the first limb of Section 5 in its aggravated form proved, 
namely that the display of the poster was racially insulting to Muslims.’1849 This sentence is in 
stark contrast to previous discussion of the understanding of a racial group by the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary and as extrapolated on above. The Court made a departure from the 
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norm, thereby, rejecting the appeal but did not offer any explanation for the reasons of its choice 
and position therein, which would have been of great normative and judicial value. The second 
part of this conclusion is that, in Kendall, the Court proceeded to convict the accused of the 
racially aggravated form of the offence created by Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 even 
though Part 3A had entered into force by the time of the hearing. This creates some kind of 
confusion since it is not clear why the former avenue was chosen by the CPS rather than the 
religious hatred provisions of the Act. Lastly, it must be noted that, in both cases, the Courts 
clearly demonstrated that the types of material used, therein, are in fact racist and unacceptable, 
regardless of the alleged political intent to put forth a message and/or to recruit members to the 
BNP.  As underlined by one commentator ‘the defendants chose to make the obvious racialist 
content with the veneer of political debate.’1850 However, the Courts readily saw through this, 
giving no excuse due to their alleged political mission regardless of the fact that political speech 
is particularly protected within the framework of free speech.
1851
 What remains from these cases 
is a precedent in which material which is hateful, such as ‘Islam out of Britain – protect the 
British people’ is not permitted, even if it does not call people to violence. Such cases are a 
strong tool that can be referred to by the judiciary when tackling hateful expression uttered or 
disseminated by the far-right.  
 
Notwithstanding the above cases, which were significant in demonstrating the judiciary’s 
approach to the far-right and reflecting its interpretation and use of the Public Order Act and the 
Crime and Disorder Act as tools to challenge speech and material which stir up hate, a more 
recent case, one bought against BNP members, falls outside the aforementioned homogeny of the 
Courts. More particularly, in 2006, Griffin, leader of the BNP and Mark Collett, the party’s head 
of publicity, were accused of using words or behaviour intended or likely to stir up racial hatred 
as provided for by Section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986
1852
 after an undercover BBC 
documentary
1853
 presented speeches they made at a gathering in 2004. Amongst other comments 
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were references to Islam as a ‘wicked, vicious faith,’ holding that Muslims were turning the UK 
into a ‘multi-racial hell hole,’ that ‘these 18, 19, and 25-year-old Asian Muslims are seducing 
and raping white girls in this town right now’1854  while asylum seekers were compared to 
cockroaches.
1855
 The pair argued that their speech fell within the boundaries of the freedom of 
expression, that they did not demonstrate hatred towards Muslims, ethnic minorities or asylum 
seekers but, instead, that they opposed multiculturalism. Also, in relation to Griffin’s statements 
about Islam, he argued that this constituted an attack against a religion rather than a race and, 
thus, at the time, they did not fall within the framework of the Public Order Act as the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act had not yet come into force.
1856
 
 
At their trial at the Crown Court, Griffin and Collett were cleared of half the charges against 
them but the jury remained divided on the other charges, and a retrial was ordered
1857
 during 
which they were cleared of all charges.
1858
 Following the end of this trial, a number of Cabinet 
Ministers voiced concerns over the legal framework holding that it was not sufficient to tackle 
such incidents.
1859
 For example, Lord Falconer stated that ‘I think we should look at them [the 
current laws] in the light of what‘s happened here, because what is being said to young Muslim 
people in this country is that we as a country are anti-Islam, and we have got to demonstrate 
without compromising freedom that we are not.’1860 On one level, it could be argued that the 
reason for their acquittal was indeed the lacking legal framework at the time which did not 
protect religions such as Islam and its followers from hatred. On a second level though, Norwood 
also dealt with hateful expression against Islam at a time when the judiciary did not have access 
to prosecuting religiously hateful offences and yet a guilty verdict was still delivered, making the 
first argument less convincing. This point is further accentuated by the fact that the accused were 
found innocent in relation to all speeches made, regardless of some directly falling within the 
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established definitional framework of a racial group. Either way, this case has moved away from 
the precedent set from the previously discussed cases which deal with such hatred, with the 
government quick to note and discuss the possible loopholes in the legal framework.  
 
5.4 Using Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 to Challenge Religious Hatred 
There is one case relevant to prohibiting religious hatred in the sphere of the far-right which was 
also the first time that the newly acquired religious hatred provisions had been set in motion. 
This was a 2010 case against Anthony Bamber,
1861
 a BNP activist and candidate for the local 
elections at the material time. Bamber distributed leaflets in which Muslims were accused of 
being responsible for heroin trade from Afghanistan and Pakistan and stating that it was time for 
the Muslims to apologise and pay compensation for this ‘crime against humanity.’1862 He was 
charged with seven counts of distributing threatening written material intended to stir up 
religious hatred and was cleared by a jury on all counts.
1863
 His acquittal is indicatory of the high 
threshold that needs to be met if religious hatred is to be proved in the framework of Part 3A of 
the Public Order Act 1986. 
 
There is another case which involves an interesting incorporation of Part 3A of the Public Order 
Act 1986 into the framework of non-admission of a far-right representative from the Netherlands 
to the UK. In the case of GW v An Immigration Officer, Heathrow,
1864
 the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal dealt with the refusal of admission of a far-right politician who sought to 
visit the country for purposes of expressing his views on Islam. More particularly, in 2009, Geert 
Wilders, a member of the Dutch Parliament, brought forth an appeal against the decision to 
prevent him from entering the UK to show his film ‘Fitna.’1865 Wilders was to be the guest of 
two members of the House of Lords and show his film to the House of Lords, the House of 
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Commons and to the press and general public, a presentation which was to be followed by a 
question and answer session.
1866
 The applicant received a notification from the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department (SSHD) which held that his presence in the country would ‘pose a 
genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society. The 
SSHD is satisfied that your statements about Muslims and their beliefs, as expressed in your film 
‘Fitna’ and elsewhere, would threaten community harmony, and, therefore, public security in the 
UK. If, in accordance with Regulation 21 of the Immigration European Economic Area 
Regulations 2006, the immigration officer is satisfied that your exclusion is justified on grounds 
of public policy and/or public security, you will be refused admission to the UK under 
Regulation 19…’1867 Regulation 21(1) holds that a relevant decision to reject the admission of an 
EEA national may be taken on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 
Despite the contents of that letter, Wilders travelled to the UK but was refused entry. He 
subsequently appealed against this decision, based on his right of free movement and right of 
freedom of expression.
1868
 The prosecution based its case on Part 3A of the Public Order Act 
1986 which prohibits hatred against persons on religious grounds.  The Court found that the 
freedom of expression clause, as provided for in Section 29J, ‘prevents the conduct which it 
described from being an offence under Part 3A. It does not permit conduct that would amount to 
an offence under the sections of the Public Order Act 1986 that are not within Part 3A. In the 
paragraph that followed, the Court immediately turned to other parts of the Act, holding that any 
prospect of success would arise from the reliance on other sections therein, with a particular 
emphasis on Section 5,
1869
 underlining  the interrelations between the regulation in Section 21(1) 
and the potential of a breach of the peace or potential breach of the peace. However, no further 
extrapolation between Section 29J and its decision to rely on other sections of the clause was 
made, thereby, implicitly denoting that the Court concluded Wilders’ speech to fall within the 
ambit of Section 29J, albeit lacking explanation on the reasons for this apparent conclusion. No 
other reference was made to the Public Order Act 1986 in the Court’s analysis.  
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In reaching its conclusion as to whether the applicant was legitimately denied entrance to the UK, 
the Court found that there was no evidence that an issue of public disorder would arise due to his 
presence and activity there. More particularly, the Court held that there was no public disorder 
evident from his stay in the Netherlands, his visits to other European countries and his previous 
visit to the UK. Moreover, his views and film are readily available on the internet, in 
publications and in the news. Further, the Court noted that the planned meeting and showing of 
the film in 2009 occurred without Wilders’ presence and occurred without any issue of public 
disorder.
1870
 Thus, it held that any evidence put forth for public disorder was ‘not only entirely 
speculative’1871 but also ‘contrary to the available evidence.’1872 As a result, the Court found that 
the Home Department’s decision was illegitimate and disproportionate to the aim pursued.  
 
For comparative purposes, and although Part 3A of the Public Order Act was not used (which is 
a finding in itself), a reference will be made to R (on the application of) Geller and Spencer v 
The Secretary of State for the Home Department,
1873
in which the applicants,  Islamophobes who 
address the public and write on the subject of Islam and the West in an Islamophobic manner,
1874
  
intended to address a rally planned by the EDL in Greenwich on Saturday 29 June 2013, soon 
after the brutal murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby on 22 May 2013.
1875
 The Metropolitan Police 
advised the Home Secretary that their participation in the EDL rally would likely ‘undermine 
community cohesion and may provoke serious violence.’ 1876 The Secretary of State found that 
their behaviour fell within the framework of unacceptable behaviour which forms the basis for 
excluding and deporting individuals from the UK. It must be noted that this is a non-statutory 
power and potentially very broad.
1877
 Geller and Spencer applied for judicial review of this 
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decision but the House of Lords rejected it following a discussion on the freedom of expression 
and of peaceful assembly, set against the backdrop of public order. The Court found that ‘this 
was a public order case where the police had advised that significant public disorder and serious 
violence might ensue from the proposed visit.’1878 The Court also looked at the fact that the 
applicants would partake in an EDL rally, at a time where community ties were tense due to the 
brutal murder of Rigby.
1879
 Relying on the significance of public order, the Court limited the 
activities of EDL, in relation to allowing it to host international speakers and, thus, limited far-
right extremists themselves from entering the country for this purpose. What was conspicuously 
missing from the discussion, in antithesis with Wilders’ case was any extrapolation or 
justification on the grounds of Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986.  
 
So, in the sphere of non-admission to the UK, the Courts accepted Wilders’ appeal against the 
decision of the immigration officer and, thus, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
but a few years later rejected Geller and Spencer’s request for judicial review.  Both of the above 
cases were considered in the sphere of maintaining public order but, even so, their outcomes 
differ and it might be concluded that this variation may be reflective of the type of activity the 
persons were to become involved with in the UK, namely a presentation at institutions such as 
the House of Lords conference room, on the one hand, and an EDL demonstration on the other, 
with the latter being notorious for the possibility of resulting in public disorder.  
 
6. The Far-Right Movement and Anti-Terror Legislation  
In addition to the above tools, domestic Courts have access to anti-terror legislation, which can 
be of use when it comes to challenging the activities of extreme right-wing groups engaged in 
serious violence, as such violence is understood by the anti-terror legislation. The relevant pieces 
of legislation are the 2000 and 2006 Terrorism Acts. For purposes of this analysis, an evaluation 
of the definition of terrorism, a consideration of the proscribed organisations, the grounds upon 
which an organisation can be proscribed and the legal effect of being a member of and/or 
supporting a proscribed organisation will all be looked at as well as the offences of the 
encouragement of terrorism and the dissemination of terrorist publications.  
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Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as the use or threat of action that seeks to 
influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the 
public, or a section of the public, where the use of threat is made to advance a political, religious, 
racial or ideological cause. Such actions include, amongst others, serious violence against a 
person and serious damage to property.  Such actions further entail those taken for the benefit of 
a proscribed organisation while section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes it an offence to make 
a statement which is ‘likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to 
whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement for them to the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.’ Schedule 2 
of the Terrorism Act 2000 includes a list of proscribed organisations with Section 3 empowering 
the Secretary of State to add or remove organisations from the list.  Although no far-right 
association is currently included on the list, such an association could, theoretically, be included 
in Schedule 2 if there were sufficient grounds for proscription, as incorporated by Section 21 of 
the Terrorism Act 2006. More particularly, this section holds that such proscription occurs in the 
event that an organisation promotes or encourages terrorism, as defined in Section 1 of the 2000 
Act. Furthermore, Section 11 of the 2000 Act provides that a person commits an offence if he 
belongs to or professes belonging to a proscribed organisation. Section 12 holds that a person 
commits an offence if he supports such an organisation while wearing uniform of a proscribed 
organisation in public which is rendered an offence by Section 13 therein.  
 
Anti-terror legislation has been utilised in the ambit of non-party groups and, particularly in 
relation to violent groups such as the Aryan Strike Force. This is because the political parties and 
other more rigidly formed groups of the far-right in the UK may incite racism, promote racist 
ideas and beliefs but do not function within the realm of terrorism as this is understood and 
incorporated in anti-terror legislation. More particularly, they do not carry out actions such as 
serious violence to persons or properties which are incorporated in the 2000 definition. In May 
2010, Ian Davison, a founding member of the Aryan Strike Force, and his son, Nicky Davison, a 
member of the group, were convicted of terrorism-related offences.
1880
 The arrests came after the 
Police became aware of the ideas expressed through the Aryan Strike Force’s website and 
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searched Davison’s home. This search resulted in the discovery of the chemical ‘ricin’ made by 
Ian Davison which was capable of resulting in about ten deaths. The CPS held that terrorism-
related charges resulted from the finding of the chemical, Ian Davison’s internet posts which 
encouraged far-right violence
1881
 and the fact that the pair collected and distributed terror 
manuals such as the Anarchist’s Cookbook1882 and The Poor Man’s James Bond. 1883 As a result 
of the above, Ian Davison was charged and pleaded guilty to six offences, namely preparing for 
acts of terrorism contrary to Section 5(1) of the Terrorism Act 2005, one act of producing a 
chemical weapon contrary to Section 2(1)(b) of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996, three charges 
of possessing a record or information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an 
act of terrorism contrary to Section 58(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000 and one of possessing a 
prohibited weapon contrary to Section 5 (1)(b) of the Firearms Act 1968. Nick Davison faced the 
charges of possessing a record or information likely to be useful to a person committing or 
preparing an act of terrorism contrary to Section 58 (1) (b) of the Terrorism Act 2000 and was 
found guilty of these charges.
1884
 A month after the Davisons’ convictions, Michael Heaton and 
Trevor Hannington,
1885
 also members of the Aryan Strike Force, were charged for their speech 
and activities.
1886
 The pair uploaded internet posts on the group’s website calling for Jews to be 
destroyed, referring to them as ‘scum.’1887 The Court heard that Heaton, who admitted to being a 
founding member of the Aryan Strike Force, had posted three thousand messages on the Aryan 
Strike Force website between January and June 2008. The judge characterised his words as being 
of the most ‘insulting and extreme nature’ marked by ‘violent racism.’1888 Hannington admitted 
to being the website’s administrator with one of his posts reading ‘kill the Jew, kill the Jew, burn 
down a synagogue today! Burn the scum.’1889 Furthermore, in a police raid on their houses, a 
variety of weapons were found and Hannington admitted owning books such as the Anarchist's 
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Cookbook and the Terrorist Encyclopedia,
1890
 all of which are considered useful tools to 
someone preparing or committing an act of terrorism.
1891
 Due to the above speech and activity, 
Heaton faced the charge of soliciting murder, an offence contrary to Section 4 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861
1892
 with four charges of using threatening, abusive or insulting 
words likely to stir up racial hatred, contrary to Section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
Hannington faced one charge of soliciting murder contrary to Section 4 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861, one charge of disseminating terrorist publications contrary to Section 2 of 
the Terrorism Act 2006, three charges of possessing a record containing information likely to be 
useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, contrary to Section 58(1) (b) of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 and two charges of using threatening, abusive or insulting words likely 
to stir up racial hatred contrary to Section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986.
1893
 Both were cleared 
of soliciting murder but, before the trial, Hannington pleaded guilty to the remaining six charges 
under the Terrorism Act 2006 and the Public Order Act 1986. Heaton was found guilty on all 
four racial hatred charges that he faced under the Public Order Act. The trial judge ordered the 
weapons to be destroyed, along with the defendants' home computers.
1894
 It must be noted that 
when the CPS considers whether to prosecute offences pertaining to terrorism in the realm of 
speech, it takes into account that the freedom of expression incorporates the right to offend and 
that ‘behaviour that is merely annoying, rude or offensive does not necessarily constitute a 
criminal offence’ but notes that, in relation to radicalisation such speech comes with the ‘desire 
to kill, maim or cause a person or group of people immense fear for their personal safety through 
the threat of (often) extreme violence based on their colour or religion…’1895 
 
Notwithstanding the above use of anti-terror legislation in the sphere of challenging far-right 
extremism, it must be noted that this framework is habitually used in relation to those associated 
with groups such as ISIS or Al’ Qaida rather than with right-wing terrorism because, as noted by 
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the government in 2011, making particular reference to Al’Qaida related terrorism due to the 
particular time of drafting, the far-right was less widespread, systematic or organised than the 
extremism of religious extremism.
1896
 In fact, the government has received some criticism for 
alleged use of this ambit solely for tackling extremism by those who allege to be functioning in 
the name of Islam. Further, the government noted that extreme-right wing terror activities are 
habitually carried out by lone wolves or a small group rather than an organised network. 
1897
 This 
is not to say that the anti-terror framework is never used. For example, the CPS noted that ‘the 
recent conviction of neo-Nazi extremists Michael Heaton and Trevor Hannington serves yet 
again to dispel the myth that terrorism prosecutions are focused on the Muslim community.’1898 
Moreover, it was not only legislation and its enforcement that came under fire but, also, the 
policy framework in relation to combatting violent extremism. More particularly, the Prevent 
Strategy was developed in 2006 and aimed to counter attraction towards extreme ideologies. The 
government has received criticism for using this framework to focus almost solely on Islamist 
extremism.  As a result, the 2011 ‘Prevent’ review responded by broadening the strategy’s focus 
better to incorporate far-right threats. 
 
7. Constitutional Law: Treatment of Political Parties by National Law 
7.1 Registration of Political Parties 
Given that this dissertation is examining the far-right movement in England and Wales as 
manifested in the form of, inter alia, political parties, the following section will provide an 
overview of the laws and regulations that exist for the registration and functioning of political 
parties and groups in the electoral process. Also, it will explain the first-past-the post system 
which is particularly important given that the latest general elections saw UKIP receiving only 
one seat in Parliament notwithstanding that it received the third largest number of votes. 
Understanding the laws, regulations and systems that affect political parties is significant for 
purposes of conceptualising the effects they may have on the development of far-right parties.  
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The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000
1899
 is the governing legislation for the 
registration and functioning of minor and major political parties in the UK. The difference 
between a major and a minor political party is that the latter can only take part in parish council 
elections in England and community council elections in Wales.
1900
 The Electoral Commission is 
the competent authority for the assessment of applications for the registration of new parties and 
the monitoring of the functioning of a political party.
1901
 If a group is not registered with the 
Commission, its candidates can only stand as independent candidates without the use of names 
or emblems.
1902
 Important for this dissertation is the Act’s reference to the prohibition of names 
and descriptions which accompany the party name and emblems of a political party for reasons 
of being offensive or that they include words the publication which would be likely to amount to 
the commission of an offence.
1903
 Thus, this law would allow the Electoral Commission to 
prohibit emblems, such as Nazi swastikas or discriminatory images in relation to Islamic 
symbols, if it considered such emblems to fall within the realm of offensiveness. It would also 
allow the prohibition of words which could, inter alia, constitute a call to violence against a 
particular ethnic or religious group. So, on one level this may be considered positive as it allows 
the country to keep out parties with obnoxious and offensive emblems, but this, in itself, does not 
do much to prohibit far-right parties who wish to contest elections who can easily hide behind 
neutral emblems. It must also be noted that far-right parties have realised that, for purposes of 
gaining support on the electoral front, a toned-down image is a central prerequisite as hardliner 
ideologies have been unsuccessful in gaining support in this country so, discriminatory emblems 
or words would come with a certain stigma and would, regardless of the aforementioned 
legislative provision, attach a certain stigma to a political party and prevent its effective 
advancement. Other administrative rules have also come to limit parties, including far-right 
parties from contesting elections as a party (rather than individual members with no affiliation to 
a party). For example, on the 8
th
 January 2016, the Electoral Commission de-registered the BNP 
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for failure to conform to the annual confirmation of registration details with the Commission and 
pay the annual fee of £25. However, the BNP re-registered.  
 
In relation to a party’s constitution, although a party must submit its constitution to the Electoral 
Commission, there is no provision in the law which stipulates that the Electoral Commission can 
reject a party which seeks to promote values and principles which, for example, go against 
human rights and equality. Instead, it is the Equality and Human Rights Commission which is 
the competent authority to deal with issues pertaining to a party’s constitution. The Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (hereinafter the Commission) has been mandated by the UK 
Parliament to challenge discrimination and to protect and promote Human Rights, functioning in 
all of the UK apart from Northern Ireland.
1904
 More specifically, the Commission was created by 
the Equality Act 2006,
1905
 which merged the Commission for Racial Equality, the Equal 
Opportunities Commission and the Disability Rights Commission.
1906
 Under Section 8 of the 
2006 Act, the Commission has a statutory duty to, amongst others, work towards the elimination 
of unlawful discrimination and the elimination of unlawful harassment. Under the 2006 Act, the 
Commission can apply to a County Court for an injunction to restrain the commissioning of acts 
that constitute unlawful discrimination.
1907
 The current anti-discrimination legislation is found in 
the form of the Equality Act 2010, which was passed to amalgamate over one hundred and 
sixteen pieces of legislation into one Act, the most relevant of these for purposes of the present 
discussion being the Race Relations Act 1976, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003 and Part 2 of the Equality Act 2006 which provided for, amongst others, the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief.  The Act seeks, inter alia, to 
‘reform and harmonise equality law and restate the greater part of the enactments relating to 
discrimination and harassment related to certain personal characteristics.’1908 Thus, the Act has a 
wide scope, setting out the protected characteristics that fall within its ambit, including, amongst 
others, race and religion
1909
 and prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination occurring on these 
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grounds or due to the victim’s association with a person with a protected characteristic.1910 
Further, 
 
the Act prohibits harassment
1911
 and victimisation
1912
 on the grounds of such 
characteristics. It must also be noted that Section 153 enables the Welsh ministers to impose 
specific duties on a public authority through regulations, something which was finalised by the 
Welsh Assembly and entered into force on 6 April 2011. 
 
In its guidelines to political parties, the Commission notes that a party’s constitution must not 
exclude members on grounds of a protected characteristic such as race or religion or charge him 
or her higher membership fees on grounds of their protected characteristic.
1913
 Further, it must 
not impose a condition which is hard to comply with due to such a characteristic.
1914
 
Interestingly, in its guidelines to political parties, the only requirements it sets out in the 
framework of non-discrimination pertain to membership. There is nothing referred to therein in 
the realm of, for example, prohibiting a party from discrimination against particular groups in 
society. In the case against the BNP, the Commission instigated proceedings against the BNP in 
relation to its Constitution which it alleged was racially discriminatory.
1915
 There were three 
separate cases brought before the national Courts, one that dealt directly with the provision of 
BNP’s constitution that only allowed membership of white persons, one that dealt with the scope 
of the order issued in the first case, with the Commission arguing that the BNP did not fulfill the 
obligations included therein and one arising from a dispute regarding the costs of the second case. 
The last case will not be further assessed as it is not directly relevant to the legal analysis of this 
section as it dealt with issues of cost.  
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7.1 (i) Case 1: BNP’s Membership Policy Amounting to Unlawful Discrimination  
In 2009, the Commission sent a letter to the BNP
1916
 noting that, since the prevention of 
discrimination by political parties falls within its statutory duties, it was concerned regarding the 
party’s failure to comply with the Race Relations Act 1976 as a result of its Constitution and 
membership criteria, its recruitment and employment policies and the provision of services to the 
public. In relation to the first concern, the Commission noted that it considered the BNP 
Constitution and membership criteria to discriminate on racial grounds since it restricts 
membership to white persons. On this point, the Commission underlined that the party violated 
Section 25 of the Race Relations Act 1976 which outlawed discrimination by association. In 
relation to employment policies, the Commission noted that only members can apply for 
employment with the BNP, thereby extending the discrimination on the grounds of race within 
that field as well. Lastly, the Commission referred to one of Griffin’s speeches in which he stated 
that one ‘would expect ethnic minorities to continue to go to the Labour party.’ As a result, the 
Commission voiced its concerns over the BNP’s provision of services to all members of the 
public regardless of race.  The Commission requested amendments and undertakings for 
purposes of rectifying the above alleged discrimination against racial groups as exercised 
through the practices, policies and procedures of the BNP. Since the BNP took no steps or 
measures adequately to redress the issue put forth by the Commission, the latter instigated 
proceedings against the three defendants, each board members of the BNP, seeking orders to 
restrain the BNP from applying certain provisions related to membership which it considered to 
be directly discriminatory on the grounds of race, contrary to Sections 1(1)(b) and 25(2)(a) of the 
Race Relations Act 1976. In Court, the Commission focused only on membership and, thus, 
indirectly on employment policy but not, directly or indirectly, on the provision of services to the 
general public.
1917
 
 
More particularly, Section 1(1(b) provides that a person discriminates against another if: 
he applies to that other a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to 
persons not of the same racial group as that other but: 
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(i) which is such that the proportion of persons of the same racial group as that other who 
can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that racial 
group who can comply with it; and 
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the colour, race, nationality or 
ethnic or national origins of the person to whom it is applied; and 
(iii) which is to the detriment of that other because he cannot comply with it. 
 
Further, Section 25(2)(a) provides that: 
It is unlawful for an association to which this section applies, in the case of a person who is not a 
member of the association, to discriminate against him: 
 
(a) in the terms on which it is prepared to admit him to membership; or 
(b) by refusing or deliberately omitting to accept his application for membership. 
 
The County Court judge held that ‘the BNP are likely to commit unlawful acts of discrimination 
within section 1 (b) of the Race Relations Act 1976 in terms on which they are prepared to admit 
persons to membership under the 12
th
 Constitution.’ 1918  As such, the BNP provided an 
undertaking that the party would take all the necessary measures to revise the constitution to 
ensure that it did not directly or indirectly discriminate against any potential member. The Court 
was adjourned twice before the BNP finally submitted the revised version of its Constitution.  
Although this version removed the requirement that members must be white persons, it 
incorporated a new provision, namely, that new members must adhere to, inter alia, the 
‘continued creation, fostering, maintenance and existence of a unity and of the integrity of the 
Indigenous British’1919 and to ‘stemming and reversing the immigration and migration of peoples 
into our British Homeland that has, without the express consent of the Indigenous British, taken 
place since 1948, and to restoring and maintaining, by legal changes, negotiation and consent, 
the Indigenous British as the overwhelming majority in the make up of the population of and 
expression of culture in each part of our British Homeland.’1920 As a result of the aforementioned 
developments, the judge held that there no longer existed a case of direct discrimination against a 
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particular racial group but underlined that the requirement for new members to adhere to the 
aforementioned principles rendered the Constitution indirectly discriminatory and unlawful.
1921
 
As such, he ordered the defendants to cancel the requirement for adherence to the 
aforementioned principles as conditions for membership and to revise the Constitution for the 
purposes of the requested amendments.
1922
 Finally, the judge held that the BNP should pause the 
recruitment of new members until its Constitution was duly amended. 
1923
All this was ordered to 
be effectuated within a set time-frame. 
1924
 
 
7.1 (ii) Case 2: Non-Adherence by the BNP to the Court Order? 
Shortly after, the Commission brought a new case, arguing that the BNP had not adequately 
fulfilled the conditions of the Court Order and requested an order for the defendants to be 
committed for contempt and for the sequestration of the BNP’s assets.1925 More particularly, the 
Commission decided to commence proceedings since, notwithstanding that membership was no 
longer intertwined with an adherence to the party’s principles and objectives,1926 the right to 
attend or vote at any official meeting could only be ensured if a person adhered to the 
aforementioned principles and objectives. So, the Commission’s second case against the BNP 
dealt with the scope of the Order made by Judge Collins and not the general question regarding 
the BNP’s Constitution. As noted by the Court, the crux of the dispute was whether the Court 
Order, described above, was directed only in relation to becoming a member of the BNP or 
whether it could continue to be applied once admitted as a member of the party.
1927
 To this end, 
the Court found that the party had, indeed, been adequately restructured in response to the Order 
which was directed on the terms under which a person is admitted as a member and no violation 
of this Order emanated from the party having adherence conditions for subsequent activity 
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within the party.
1928
  A couple of issues can be determined from the role of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission in relation to political parties. Firstly, that the powers set out in its 
guidelines are not extensive so as to incorporate powers to prohibit objectives which are 
discriminatory against a particular group. This is illustrated by the fact that in its above case 
against Griffin, it called for an end to the restrictive and discriminatory membership and, 
subsequently, candidate policy, but did not focus on the actual content of the policy, namely that 
the opposition to any form of integration or assimilation of…the indigenous British could be 
regarded as an exclusionary and discriminatory view of the nation and a foundation for 
subsequent discriminatory and racist activity and rhetoric. The second point that can be discerned 
is that imposing rules regarding membership restrictions on grounds such as race, does not 
seriously hamper the activities of a far-right party. In Griffin’s case, to put it briefly, the BNP got 
away with it on technical terms and is, thus, able to impose indirectly discriminatory 
requirements on those who want to proceed in the party.  
 
The Court’s decision in this realm can be deemed as rather problematic since, essentially, the 
Court requested that the principle of non-discrimination is applied for purposes of ensuring 
membership of the BNP, but makes no equivalent requirement for this principle to continue in 
subsequent activities within the party. By carrying out a literal reading of the Court Order, the 
judgement resulted in limiting the principles of non-discrimination and equality to membership 
conditions only. Another point that must be noted is the actual efficacy of the Commission’s 
guidelines in relation to the general framework through which the far-right is challenged. To 
illustrate this point, one may consider UKIP’s Constitution which stipulates that the party will 
conduct itself in a way so as not to discriminate positively or negatively against any person on 
grounds of, amongst others, their race or religion.
1929
 This is a broad clause that refers to the 
general conduct of the party and not just within the sphere of membership thereto. However, 
even if this party’s Constitution meets the objectives of the Commission’s guidelines in relation 
to membership adopting a general non-discriminatory character, this does not stop it from being 
a party that promotes discriminatory rhetoric. Important to this discussion is the argument put 
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forth above in relation to offensive emblems. The new far-right and parties who seek to be 
successful in the electoral process are aware of the risks of being linked, by the public, to 
doctrines such as that of racism or fascism. As such, a party may partly circumvent such 
attachment by depositing a neutral constitution which makes no reference to potentially offensive 
words or themes. To illustrate this point one may consider UKIP’s Constitution which notes that 
its objectives are to ensure national sovereignty, cease the UK’s membership of the EU and 
refrain from making any treaty or join any international organisation which would weaken its 
national sovereignty. It makes no reference to other issues that it takes up in its rhetoric such as 
anti-immigration and anti-Islam stances. Even more striking is the provision in the BNP’s 
Constitution which notes that they are ‘implacably opposed to… National Socialism in all its 
forms (including Fascism and Nazism).’1930 Taking into account the foundations and history of 
this party and the rhetoric and activity it has developed in the field of, for example, anti-
immigration and anti-Islam, this provision may appear rather bizarre. However, one may well 
assume that it was incorporated in the BNP’s general effort to neutralise its image to the 
electorate and, more importantly, disassociate itself from the principles it refers to in the above 
article. This, in itself, demonstrates that, not only do limitations on  a party’s formal documents 
and emblems have little effect on tackling extremist elements but formal documents themselves 
can be used and abused by political parties as a tool to ploy and even manipulate the electorate.   
  
In sum, parties are under legislative scrutiny to put forth a non-offensive emblem but, bizarrely, 
the same legislation does not incorporate any provisions regarding the prohibition of offensive 
provisions in parties’ constitutions. Further, the Commission has guidelines for political parties 
which are restricted to prohibiting discrimination in relation to party membership and, as such, 
constitutions which promote general discriminatory rhetoric avoid scrutiny once again. However, 
regardless of legislative control, it appears that parties who are serious about gaining electoral 
success will avoid having a discriminatory constitution for reasons of summoning more support. 
What is significant for this discussion is that any form of legislative scrutiny on a party’s formal 
documents, which is rather limited in England and Wales, does not contribute to making it less 
racist or xenophobic but merely prompts it to hide certain realities which it needs to do anyhow 
to gain mainstream support. The only achievement the above-discussed provisions and 
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guidelines could achieve would be to oust obnoxious right-wing symbols and, to some extent 
maintain some form of fairness vis-à-vis membership conditions but, as per the case of Griffin, 
such fairness does not extend to general participation in the party.  
 
7.2 Post-Registration Phase 
7.2.1 The Electoral Process 
The first-past-the-post system is the electoral system for gaining seats in the British Parliament 
and for local elections in England and Wales. Proportional representation is used only for the 
election of the devolved governments of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales,
1931
 and for 
European Parliament elections.
1932
 Under first-past-the-post, voters of each constituency can only 
vote for one candidate and it is the candidate getting the most votes that gets elected to 
Parliament. Bluntly put, the remaining votes are of no use.  There are several advantages and 
disadvantages of this system, with the former including its effectiveness in terms of time and cost 
and the latter including the promotion of tactical voting, undemocratic since many votes are lost 
and, importantly for this dissertation, unfair to smaller parties. It ‘presents a profound challenge 
for insurgents...who have to build or discover concentrated pools of support that are sufficient to 
win locally.’1933 This system leads voters to worry about the possibility of a vote to a small party 
such as UKIP being a wasted one. This was reflected in a 2012 survey which revealed that 24% 
of voters considered a vote to UKIP as a wasted one.
1934
 Furthermore, donors may be ‘more 
reluctant to invest in parties that have little chance of victory.
1935
 At the same time it contributes 
to decreasing the moral of the members of such parties who are almost de facto shut out of 
Westminster.  Thus, this system is a serious obstacle to small parties, whether these are far-right 
parties or not, entering the British Parliament. Although the purpose of this system is not to keep 
out far-right parties from the government, its effect is exactly this and, as such, can be considered 
an effective tool for challenging the far-right. As noted above, this system greatly affected the 
                                                          
1931
 Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie, Dannie Dorling & David Rossiter, ‘From Votes to Seats: The Operation of the UK 
Electoral System since 1945’ (eds. Manchester University Press 2001)  
1932
 Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie, Dannie Dorling & David Rossiter, ‘From Votes to Seats: The Operation of the UK 
Electoral System since 1945’ (eds. Manchester University Press 2001) 
1933
 Robert Ford & Matthew Goodwin, ‘Revolt on the Right – Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain’ 
(eds. Routledge 2014) 221 
1934
 Lord Ashcroft ‘UKIP: They’re Thinking What We’re Thinking Understanding the UKIP Temptation’ Published 
by Lord Ashcroft: <http://lordashcroftpolls.com> [Accessed 20 December 2015]  
1935
 Robert Ford & Matthew Goodwin, ‘Revolt on the Right – Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain’ 
(eds. Routledge 2014) 221 
397 
 
results of the UKIP in the 2015 general elections.  However, on the other hand, it has the 
potential to push major parties in a populist direction
1936
 if they wish to rally the support of 
someone who may be wary of a lost vote but embraces the mandate of parties such as UKIP. 
This, thereby, may result in keeping far-right parties from effectively entering the government 
but, instead, leads to the normalisation of right-wing extremism within the mainstream which is a 
dire effect in itself but may also normalise support for non-party far-right activities which are 
potentially linked to violence. An example to illustrate the latter is the fact that some evidence 
exists to demonstrate that Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech established a fertile setting in which 
parties, such as the violent National Front, could develop.
1937
 
 
Conclusion  
The UK has refrained from incorporating major international documents in the form of the 
ICCPR and the ICERD, with no equivalent of Article 20 of the former or Article 4 of the latter in 
its national law. Notwithstanding requests from the UN Committees to proceed with ratification, 
the country has, over time, remained steady in its position regarding non-ratification of the 
documents. It has imposed reservations to the two articles above which are very telling of its 
general position in relation to limiting rights such as expression for purposes of, for example, 
preventing racial discrimination or advocacy for hatred.  However, insofar as an individual or 
movements, including those belonging to the far-right, pose a risk to public order then the 
relevant freedoms discussed above fall down the hierarchy of importance. In relation to public 
order, the Public Order Act 1986 provides two separate mechanisms that can be used for racially 
and religiously hateful expression, acts or material, namely Parts 3 and 3A, which respectively 
deal particularly and exclusively with speech, material and activities which involve stirring up 
racial and religious hatred. Even though provisions which tackle these phenomena have been 
developed, the use of Section 5 of the same Act which deals with general harassment, alarm and 
distress, in its racially or religiously aggravated form, as established by the Crime and Disorder 
Act, is an option often adopted. This is because it is easier to handle given that, unlike its racial 
and religiously hateful counterparts, no approval is needed by the Attorney-General to proceed. 
In addition to issues that may arise vis-à-vis the tools to be used during a prosecution, issues of 
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coherence in respect of whether or not the CPS actually decides to prosecute a case have also 
come up in the field of the far-right. More particularly, it decided not to proceed with the 
prosecution of a case which involved the distribution of leaflets which, amongst others, 
prompted support for a white power party. The CPS noted that ‘this amounted to no more than 
free political speech, however controversial.’1938 So, following its establishment, the CPS has 
sought to pursue conviction for the relevant cases but, at the same time, has decided not to 
prosecute on a particular case which, taking into account the content of the above seems slightly 
incongrous. In addition to the public order sphere, anti-terrorism legislation has been put into 
force when dealing with violent non-party groups, namely Aryan Strike Force and Volunteer 
Force.  Such legislation is, thus, reserved for the overtly violent groups in the realm of the far-
right movement, with violence being, as provided for in the Terrorism Act 2000, serious violence. 
It is only within the anti-terrorism sphere that associations can be proscribed. What is 
inconspicuously missing from the above processes adopted to tackle expression, acts and 
material of the far-right is a consideration of the effects of these phenomena on groups such as 
the victims themselves and their communities. This is not a point which interests the country, 
instead, it lies faithful to its history, placing great importance on looking at societal damage and 
prevents this predominantly by working through the realm of maintaining public order.  
 
As well as the effects of speech, acts and materials of far-right groups insofar as these lead to 
public harm, in one way or another, this country also has several tools which can be used in the 
sphere of far-right parties contesting elections. The majority of such tools have not been 
purposely designed to tackle the harms of the far-right or any other harmful movement but the 
effects of some tools are significant. First and foremost, the first-past-the post system, although 
not particularly designed to keep far-right political parties far away from government has 
achieved just that. Thus, from the moment a far-right political party that seeks to contest 
elections is created it is faced with this grave obstacle. On the other hand, however, it prompts 
mainstream parties more habitually to adopt populist rhetoric. Further, the laws governing the 
registration of a political party may, to a certain extent, keep the far-right element (as well as 
other elements) out. These include rules such as the prohibition of offensive emblems, names or 
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descriptions (although an offensive constitution is not banned in any law per se).  However, as 
discussed, this is not a concrete method through which far-right parties can be kept out of the 
system as they can readily camouflage their intentions and mandate through a seemingly neutral 
appearance and constitution. What is evidently lacking in the UK (and therefore England and 
Wales) is legislation or regulation which may directly be applied to prohibit, inter alia, a racist 
constitution. The Electoral Commission has no power over this whilst the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission regulations limit its powers to ensuring non-discrimination vis-à-vis party 
membership. Further, practical bureaucratic rules of the competent authority in charge of the 
registration and functioning of political parties, the Electoral Commission, have resulted in 
parties such as the BNP being removed from the electoral roll.
1939
 Thus, as well as the great 
effects brought about by the electoral system itself, we also see small rules here and there which 
appear in different phases of the life cycle of a political party, including a far-right one, that may 
cause major trouble for them.  
 
Further, the use of the non-discrimination framework in the realm of the far-right in England and 
Wales has been interesting. On the one hand, it has been used by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission to challenge the racist membership criteria of the BNP. On the other, however, it 
has predominantly been used by far-right members themselves to challenge what they perceive 
as discrimination against them, in the work place and in relation to trade union membership due 
to their affiliation to the far-right movement. In the work place, domestic Courts have found 
dismissal due to membership of a far-right political party to constitute fair dismissal while the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal underlined the limited prospects of success in a discrimination 
case in the realm of access to employment by a BNP member. As far as is possible, and with the 
limited number of cases available, one can denote a partial pattern vis-à-vis the judiciary’s stance 
regarding the employment of far-right extremists.  However, exclusion from a trade union due to 
membership of the BNP has been found to constitute unfair exclusion.  
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In light of the above, England and Wales embrace the significance of the freedom of expression 
but can readily limit speech if issues of public order, terrorism or anti-social behaviour arise. 
Assemblies are also readily prohibited if public order or anti-social behaviour issues arise. What 
is clear is that England and Wales are not ready and willing to proscribe associations if such 
associations do not amount to terrorist organisations. However, their electoral system directly 
prevents ‘insurgent’ parties from entering the government, no matter what their ideology. It 
could thus be concluded that the doctrinal approach underlying the jurisdiction’s approach to the 
far-right is not militant democracy as can be reflected, amongst others, in its reservation on 
Article 20 of the ICCPR which notes that it is to be interpreted in line with Article 19 and 21. 
Instead, England and Wales places a great emphasis on ensuring public order. Regardless of the 
jurisdiction’s intention in this realm, this approach allows them to purport a libertarian badge of 
non-interference but, in practice, the laws and system do not allow racist or religious hatred 
which affect public order, while small parties (including far-right parties) remain out of the 
government. The current reality in relation to the country’s approach to the far-right will not be 
affected on a legislative or judicial level due to the country’s departure from the EU as the 
former was not developed to conform or incorporate EU legislation whilst the latter is driven by 
national legislation including the HRA which ratifies a CoE not an EU instrument. The only 
directly relevant issue that arises is the ceasing of the applicability of the combined Article 2 and 
Article 7 TEU mechanism upon the departure of the UK from the EU. Nevertheless, as discussed 
previously, this has proved to be a dormant tool with no practical efficacy to-date.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: GREECE 
Introduction  
This chapter will map out the domestic legal framework that can be utilised to challenge right-
wing extremist movements in Greece. Policy consideration is scarce in this chapter as there exist 
very few policy documents relevant to the issues under consideration. The chapter analysis will 
be effectuated against the backdrop of a contextual discussion, which will be composed of three 
spheres. Namely, there will be a brief overview of the country’s legal and political system, as 
established by its constitution, which will facilitate an understanding of the subsequent analysis, 
looking at issues such as primary sources of law and the functioning and powers of the judiciary. 
This will also demonstrate the differentiation between England and Wales as a common law 
system and Greece as a civil law system. Furthermore, given the country’s recent experience of a 
military dictatorship and the ramifications this has had on the development of the far-right, a 
brief insight into this period of history will be provided with emphasis on its interrelationship 
with post-dictatorship right-wing extremism. Lastly, the section will set out a backdrop of the 
far-right in Greece, looking at its development following the post-dictatorship period and its 
composition today. In relation to Minkenberg’s structure composed of political parties, non-party 
movements and the subculture milieu, in Greece today, the far-right scene is dominated by The 
Popular Association - Golden Dawn (Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος -Χρυσή Αυγή) – hereinafter Golden 
Dawn, a registered political party simultaneously acting as a violent subculture movement but 
with a rigid rather than loose structure. As such, rather than displaying a clear placement of 
Minkenberg’s entities as was the case in England and Wales, the Greek case incorporates a 
mélange of entities, which make up one group with two faces. It must be noted from the onset 
that MPs, including the leadership of Golden Dawn and other members, are currently on trial for, 
inter alia, leading or participating in a criminal organisation. The trial commenced following the 
murder of anti-fascist musician Pavlos Fyssas in September 2013 by a Golden Dawn member. 
After the contextual setting has been established, the chapter will provide an overview of the 
definitional framework of key terms including racial discrimination and incitement to racial and 
religious violence as these emanate from the country’s legislation. As is the case for England and 
Wales, relevant definitions discussed in chapter one are repeated here due to the particularities 
which may stem from the legal and policy frameworks of the particular country and the 
relevance of national terminology on the implementation of legal or policy measures in the 
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sphere of challenging the far-right. What becomes immediately obvious is the lacking 
definitional framework of relevant terms in comparison with England and Wales due to the fact 
that, although references to certain terms are incorporated into some legislation, there exist less 
relevant cases in which discussions on key terms can be developed and given that, apart from the 
National Action Plan on Human Rights 2014-2016, there are no policy documents relevant to the 
issues at stake. Against the aforementioned contextual and definitional setting, the chapter will 
consider the interpretation and incorporation of the country’s obligations as these emanate from 
international and European documents. More particularly, the section will consider the status of 
the ICCPR and ICERD in national law with emphasis on Article 20(2) of the former and Article 
4 of the latter. In order to determine the State’s adherence to international obligations, potential 
reservations and/or declarations made on provisions of international conventions shall be 
assessed. On a Council of Europe level, it will look at Law 239/1953 which incorporated the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) into national law. On this level, it must be noted 
that Protocol 12 to the Convention was signed by Greece in 2000 but has not yet been ratified. 
Further, the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime concerning the 
Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature committed through Computer 
Systems, discussed in chapter four has been signed but not ratified by the country. As with the 
chapter on England and Wales, although no further discussion will, thus, arise from this 
document, the fact of non-ratification is a finding in itself in the realm of the tools available for a 
State to challenge hate. However, the National Action Plan on Human Rights 2014-2016 noted 
that one of the State’s priorities is the adoption of the draft law ratifying the additional protocol 
to the Cybercrime Convention.
1940
 It is noteworthy that the Action Plan does not refer to the 
ratification of Protocol 12 to the ECHR as a priority. On an EU level, the analysis of the 
Framework Decision on Combatting Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia 
by means of criminal law,
1941
 which has been transposed by Law 4285/2014,
1942
 will not be 
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discussed in the section on international and European obligations but, rather, in the national 
legal framework as this tool has amended the principal legal instrument that tackles issues 
relevant to challenging the far-right, namely Law 927/1979 on The Punishment of Acts or 
Activities which Pursue Racial Discrimination (Περί Κολασμού Πράξεων ή ενεργειών 
Αποσκοπουσών εις Φυλετικάς Διακρίσεις). This is also the case for Law 3304/2005 on the 
Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment regardless of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 
Religion or other Beliefs, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation (Εφαρµογή της Αρχής της Ίσης 
Μεταχείρισης ανεξαρτήτως Φυλετικής ή Εθνοτικής Καταγωγής, Θρησκευτικών ή άλλων 
Πεποιθήσεων, Αναπηρίας, Ηλικίας ή Γενετήσιου Προσανατολισµού) which transposed EU 
Directives 2000/76/EC and 2000/43/EC. As is the case with the anti-racist law mentioned above, 
Law 3304/2005 will be dealt with in the national legal framework even though it transposes 
European Union law given that it is the only anti-discrimination legislation which exists in 
Greece. After assessing Greece’s adherence to international and European obligations, the 
chapter will look at the country’s domestic legal framework in the realm of challenging far-right 
movements. To this end, it will firstly pinpoint how the key freedoms of expression, assembly, 
association and non-discrimination are established therein. This starting point is based on the 
premise that regulative measures need to be designed following a balance of the aforementioned 
rights and interests on the one hand and the potential harm resulting from right-wing rhetoric and 
activity on the other. After this framework is set out, the chapter will appraise the role of 
criminal law in relation to the far-right, looking particularly at Law 927/1979, as amended by 
Law 4285/2014 mentioned above, and relevant provisions of the Greek Penal Code such as those 
on racial aggravation and criminal and terrorist organisations. Law 3304/2005 will then be 
looked at which, apart from a general provision in the country’s constitution, is the only source 
in Greek law tackling the issue of discrimination. It must be noted that the need to consider anti-
discrimination legislation more extensively in this chapter, in comparison to its English and 
Welsh counterparts stems from its relevance to discriminatory and exclusionary activities 
conducted by Golden Dawn and its members in relation to the provision of goods and services, 
such as the provision of soup kitchens to Greeks only. As will be further assessed below, relevant 
legislation has seldom been relied upon to challenge the far-right in Greece, a reality which has 
led to a state of impunity for the criminal activities of Golden Dawn and an issue that became a 
key concern for national and international human rights institutions and non-governmental 
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organisation such as the ICERD committee, ECRI and the Ombudsperson, with relevant reports 
and positions discussed in this chapter. Although some members of Golden Dawn were 
convicted for their criminal activities and the Court recognised their affiliation with Golden 
Dawn, before the murder of Fyssas, no steps were taken against the organisations. As such, the 
jurisprudential analysis will take place simultaneously with the legislative analysis as 
quantitatively the existence of relevant case-law does not merit a separate section as was the case 
for England and Wales. Furthermore, the chapter will proceed to appraise how national law treats 
political parties before registration and during their functioning. The purpose is to determine 
what tools and sub-tools are available and can be used for challenging far-right parties contesting 
elections. By considering all the above frameworks, this chapter incorporates all means and 
methods directly or indirectly available to Greece for purposes of challenging the far-right. The 
chapter will then conclude on key themes identified throughout this chapter, making reference to 
the compatibility between national law and international and European law and, more generally, 
appraising whether the current system is well-equipped when confronting the far-right.  
 
1. Contextual and Definitional Framework  
1.1 Overview of Greek Political and Legal System  
Greece is a civil law system with a national constitution. It is a parliamentary republic. In 1924, 
following a referendum, the Monarchy was abolished and a new constitution was adopted in 
1927 which, amongst others, established Greece as a parliamentary republic for the first time. 
However, in 1936, this form of government was abolished following the establishment of a 
dictatorship by Ioannis Metaxas.
1943
 The requirement of a new constitution following the socio-
political turmoil created by the invasion and occupation of Greece by Nazi Germany in 1941 and 
the civil war that occurred from 1946-1949 led to the adoption of a new constitution in 1952  
which established a constitutional monarchy. This was in force up until 1975 following the fall 
of the military dictatoriship (μεταπολίτευση). This period planted the seeds of public will and 
democracy, promoted political and individual rights as well as principles such as social solidarity, 
as reflected in the 1975 constitution in force today, amended in 1986 and then in 2001 and 2008. 
                                                          
1943
 Ioannis Metaxas is a controversial figure in Greek history because, on the one hand, he was a dictator but, on the 
other, he is admired for his famous rejection of Mussolini’s Italy request to allow the Italian army passage to occupy 
certain strategic places in Greece. This event continues to be commemorated with national parades in Greece and 
Cyprus  
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The 1986 amendment focused on limiting presidential competences and in 2001 the amendment 
was broad ranging, establishing new institutions and guarantees, which advanced the political 
and administrative system of the country and the ambit of human rights protection. The basic aim 
of the 2001 amendment was to bring the Greek constitution in line with European and 
international realities and obligations which had emerged at the beginning of the century. The 
constitution provides that Greece is a parliamentary republic.
1944
 The legislative powers reside 
with the parliament and the President, the executive powers with the President and the 
government and the judicial powers with the courts.
1945
 The courts are not obliged to comply 
with legal provisions which they deem to be unconstitutional.
1946
 Article 30 provides that the 
President is the regulator of the State, elected by the parliament for a period of five years. The 
constitution is the primary source of law and all other sources must comply with it. Legislation 
may come from the parliament but also from other authorities such as the President in the form 
of decrees and the Ministers in the form of decisions, which are then approved by Parliament.
1947
 
The President promulgates and publishes the statutes and issues the decrees necessary for their 
execution. The President can issue general regulatory decrees which have the force of a 
Statute.
1948
 The Supreme Administrative Court elaborates all decrees of a regulatory nature.
1949
 A 
body which is relevant and significant to the issues under consideration in this chapter is the 
Ombudsperson, an independent authority established under Article 103 of the Constitution, with 
its role set out in Law 2477/1997
1950
 and subsequently enhanced by Law 3094/2003.
1951
 In 
relation to the current study, the Ombudsperson has jurisdiction over public bodies for violations 
of principles of equal treatment
1952
 and conducts research and publishes special reports on the 
implementation and promotion of the principle of equal treatment without discrimination on 
grounds such as racial or ethnic origin or religious or other beliefs.
1953
 One such special report 
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 Article 1(1) Greek Constitution   
1945
 Article 26 Greek Constitution  
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 Article 87 (2) Greek Constitution  
1947
 Article 73 Greek Constitution, European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, Athanasios 
Theodoridis, ‘Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination – Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC – Country 
Report 2013 – State of affairs up to 1st January 2014’ 6 
1948
 Article 43(2) Greek Constitution  
1949
Article 95(1)(d) Greek Constitution  
1950
 Founding Law: Ombudsperson, Public Administration Inspectors  and Auditors Body (Ιδρυτικός Νόμος - 
Συνήγορος του Πολίτη, Σώμα Επιθεωρητών-Ελεγκτών Δημόσιας Διοίκησης) 
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 The Ombudsperson and other Provisions (Συνήγορος του Πολίτη και άλλες Διατάξεις)  
1952
 Article 1, Law 3094/2003 
1953
Article 5(3) Law 3094/2003 
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was a 2013 report on hate crime in Greece discussed in this chapter. The Ombudsperson cannot 
initiate or participate in judicial proceedings with its maximum powers being the referral of a 
case to the prosecutor or competent administrative authority for investigation.  
 
The electoral system of the country is a form of reinforced proportional representation. This 
means that parties take the number of seats in parliament proportional to the number of votes 
received, with the winning party taking a bonus of fifty seats in the three-hundred seat parliament. 
This could potentially affect the representation of smaller parties in parliament.  In addition, for 
an entity/individual candidate to enter parliament it/he/she must receive at least 3% of valid 
votes,
1954
 thereby placing another obstacle in the way of smaller parties. Since 1974, the Greek 
political scene has been dominated by two parties namely the centre left PASOK - Pan-Hellenic 
Socialist Movement (ΠΑΣΟΚ – Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) and New Democracy (Νέα 
Δημοκρατία). However, following their demise due to the dissatisfaction of the electorate in their 
social and financial policies, particularly their alignment with the Memorandums of 
Understanding(s),
1955
 the rise of smaller parties was facilitated.  
 
1.2 Dictatorship – Regime of the Colonels  
On the 21
st
 April 1967, a group of right-wing colonels carried out a coup d'état, which resulted in 
the country being run by a Regime of the Colonels (Καθεστώς των Συνταγματαρχών) also known 
as the Junta (Χούντα). It ended on the 24 July 1974. The interrelation between post-Junta far-
right groups with the Colonel’s Regime had traditionally ‘rendered them illegitimate in the eyes 
of Greek voters.’ 1956  In addition, the country’s experience with the Nazi invasion in 1941 
rendered affiliation with fascist or Nazi ideologies unpopular. As such, the part of the electorate 
with right-wing extremist ideologies was attracted to the centre-right New Democracy as this 
option was considered more legitimate than resorting to supporting extreme-right parties.
1957
 
Notwithstanding the above, by 2012 over 400,000 Greeks had voted for Golden Dawn, a party 
                                                          
1954
 Article 5 Law 3231/2004 Election of Members of Parliament Law (Εκλογή βουλευτών Νόμος) 
1955
 A total of three Memorandum of Understanding have been signed between the European Commission (on behalf 
of the Stability Mechanism), Greece and the Bank of Greece. Financial support is given to Greece but under the 
condition that certain ‘adjustments’ are made (austerity measures)  
1956
 Sofia Vasilopoulou & Daphne Halikiopoulou, ‘The Golden Dawn’s Nationalist Solution – Explaining the Rise of 
the Far-Right in Greece’ (eds. Palgrave 2015)  21 
1957
 Sofia Vasilopoulou & Daphne Halikiopoulou, ‘The Golden Dawn’s Nationalist Solution – Explaining the Rise of 
the Far-Right in Greece’ (eds. Palgrave 2015)  21 
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which embraces the principles enshrined in fascism and Nazism. The relationship between 
Golden Dawn and the Junta is clear since the links are present and obvious both historically and 
on a practical level. In 1973, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the leader of Golden Dawn, joined the 4
th
 
August party (4
η
 Αυγούστου) named after the date of a military coup in 1936. This party was 
founded by Constantinos Plevris, a far-right extremist holocaust denier and LAOS member of 
Parliament who had been brought to trial for his book ‘Jews – the Whole Truth’ (Έβραίοι – Όλη 
η Αλήθεια) in 2007. Michaloliakos was arrested for political violence and convicted in 1978 for 
bombings in Athens. He remained imprisoned for ten months and during his stay met the leader 
of the Junta, George Papadopoulos. In 1984, Papadopoulos founded a new far-right party from 
prison, the National Political Union (Εθνική Πολιτική Ένωσις) and appointed Michaloliakos as 
leader of the party’s youth wing. 1958  In 1985, following a conflict between the two, 
Michaloliakos departed from this party to establish the Golden Dawn magazine which promoted 
ideas pertaining to National Socialism.
1959
 Moreover, on a practical level, leaders of the 
Colonels’ Regime embraced Greek supremacist thinking which is evident in Golden Dawn’s 
belief system.
1960
 Notwithstanding the above and the established links between Golden Dawn 
members and the Junta, the former ‘selectively mentions the Junta in its materials,’1961 aware of 
the general public’s position when it comes to the country’s experiences under the dictatorship.  
 
1.3 The Face of the Far-Right in Greece: General Overview    
This section will provide an overview of the phenomenon of right-wing extremism in Greece 
following the fall of the Junta up until today. After 1974, far-right extremist groups carried out 
violent activities such as bombings and personal attacks.
1962
 It must be noted that, even though 
many of the attacks’ masterminds were arrested, far-right violence of that period was ‘largely 
under-recorded, under-reported and under-studied, in contrast with the violence of far-left 
                                                          
1958
  Human Rights First ‘We’re not Nazis, but…The Rise of Hate Parties in  Hungary and Greece and Why America 
should Care (August 2014) 83 
1959
 Nikos Hasapopoulos, ‘Golden Dawn – History, Personalities and the Truth’ (Χρυσή Αυγή - Η Ιστορία, τα 
Πρόσωπα και η Αλήθεια) (eds. Livani 2013) 17  
1960
Human Rights First ‘We’re not Nazis, but…The Rise of Hate Parties in  Hungary and Greece and Why America 
should Care (August 2014) 82 
1961
 Sofia Vasilopoulou & Daphne Halikiopoulou, ‘The Golden Dawn’s Nationalist Solution – Explaining the Rise of 
the Far-Right in Greece’ (eds. Palgrave 2015)  58 
1962
 Robert McDonald, ‘Pillar and Tinderbox: The Greek Press and the Dictatorship’ (eds. Marion Boyars 1983) 
187-188  
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groups.’ 1963  In relation to political participation, during this period far-right parties had 
traditionally remained on the margins of the political system,
1964
 partly because of the reason 
stated above, namely the rawness of the public’s wounds resulting from their experience with a 
far-right system and the interconnection between the far-right and the Junta. The birth of the 
post-Junta far-right of Greece as a movement was essentially a ‘reaction to leftist 
internationalism rather than… a positive identification with the Greek nation.’1965 Parties of this 
ideology which appeared on the scene include the Hellenic Front (Ελληνικό Μέτωπο), the Front 
Line (Πρώτη Γραμμή), National Democratic Union (Εθνική Δημοκρατική Ένωση), the National 
Alignment (Εθνική Παράταξη), the Progressive Party (Κόμμα Προοδευτικών) and the National 
Political Union (Εθνική Πολιτική Ένωση). The youth wing of the National Political Union 
became a ‘breeding ground for future far-right leaders including Golden Dawn leader Nikos 
Michaloliakos…’1966 In general, the post-Junta extreme right-wing parties sought to ‘protect the 
Helleno-Christian tradition but stayed short of the nationalist overtones that characterize the 
contemporary far-right in Greece.’1967 Examples of some form of political representation of the 
far-right include the 1977 national parliamentary elections in which the National Alignment 
received 6.8% of the vote and five seats, the 1981 European Parliament elections in which the 
Progressive Party received 1.96% of the vote and one seat
1968
 and the 1984 European Elections 
when the National Political Union received 2.3% of the vote and one seat.
1969
  
 
In more recent times, the far-right scene was initially dominated by LAOS. LAOS was established 
in 2000 after its leader George Karatzaferis, a previous parliamentarian of New Democracy, 
came into conflict with that party. Another founding member was the aforementioned 
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Sappho Xenakis, ‘A New Dawn? Change and Continuity in Political Violence in Greece’ (2012) 24 Terrorism 
and Political Violence 3, 441 
1964
 Sofia Vasilopoulou & Daphne Halikiopoulou, ‘The Golden Dawn’s Nationalist Solution – Explaining the Rise of 
the Far-Right in Greece’ (eds. Palgrave 2015)  20 
1965
 Antonis A. Ellinas, ‘The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far-Right in Greece’ (2013) 18 South 
European Society and Politics 4, 545 
1966
 Antonis A. Ellinas, ‘The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far-Right in Greece’ (2013) 18 South 
European Society and Politics 4, 546 
1967
 Antonis A. Ellinas, ‘The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece’ (2013) 18 South 
European Politics and Society 4, 545 
1968
Antonis A. Ellinas, ‘The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece’ (2013) 18 South 
European Politics and Society 4, 546 
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Antonis A. Ellinas, ‘The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece’ (2013) 18 South 
European Politics and Society 4, 546 
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Constantinos Plevris.
1970
 LAOS is ‘explicitly nationalist and xenophobic,’ 1971  calling for the 
‘protection of the nation, the genus, the faith, the history and the cultural identity’1972 of Greece 
and for ‘the expulsion of illegal immigrants.’1973 LAOS has also proved to be anti-Semitic with 
its leader publicly denying the Holocaust, uttering racist speech against Jews and relating Jews 
with the crime and theories regarding their world control through ‘international Zionism.’1974 In 
20002, the party included four Golden Dawn representatives on its local election listing.
1975
 In 
those elections, the party performed well receiving 13.6% of the vote in the Athens-Pireaus 
area.
1976
 LAOS entered the European Parliament in 2004 with 4.12% of the vote and one seat
1977
 
and the national parliament in 2007 with 3.8% of the vote and ten seats
1978
 and again in 2009 
with 5.6% of the vote and fifteen seats.
1979
 By 2012, the party’s support fell after it ‘lost its 
outsider status’ 1980  following its support of the Memorandum of Understanding and its 
participation in the 2011-2012 government which worked on the second bailout. As a result, in 
May 2012, the party’s vote fell to 2.9% and 1.6% in June of the same year, resulting in its losing 
all its seats in parliament.
1981
 Some of this party’s electorate then supported Golden Dawn. This 
contributed to the fact that Golden Dawn is substantially the only entity which has inhabited the 
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European Politics and Society 4, 547 
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Cambridge University Press 2010) 137 
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Cambridge University Press 2010) 137 
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(eds. 2013 Αleksandria) 23 
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 Dimitris Psaras, ‘The Black Bible of Golden Dawn: The Documented History of a Nazi Group’ (‘Η Μαύρη 
Βίβλος της Χρυσής Αυγής, Ντοκουμέντα από την Ιστορία και τη Δράση μιας Ναζιστικής Ομάδας) (eds. 2012 Polis) 
354 
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Greek far-right scene following the fall of LAOS. Given the domination of the scene by this party 
and the central role it plays in this chapter, it will be examined alone in the section below.  
 
1.3.1 Golden Dawn  
1.3.1 (i) Golden Dawn – Historical Development and Ideological Profile  
Golden Dawn is a registered political party whose roots can be traced back to December 1980 
when its current leader, Nicholaos Michaloliakos, along with other right-wing extremists he had 
worked with within the framework of the party 4
th
 August and ENEK (Unified Nationalist 
Movement) (ΕΝΕΚ- Ενιαίο Εθνικιστικό Κίνημα) issued the national socialist magazine Golden 
Dawn. The magazine ‘espoused blatantly Nazi ideology’1982 and often glorified Hitler1983 with its 
first issue in December 1980 noting that the group pursued a revolution for a Golden Dawn 
‘which will lead humanity again to nature and the Greek ideals of civilization’1984 This was the 
beginning of a new life with ‘no place for Zionists, their products and their agents.’1985 In a 1993 
edition on racism, the magazine wrote that: ‘Greeks are eminently racist ... Racism  is not beating 
a negro in the street or burning a Filipina. Racism is the right to difference, the dislike of merger, 
the maintenance of a clean race and when we say clean race we mean the expulsion of foreign 
elements which do not conform with our nature and traditions.’1986 In 1983, the group running 
the publication of this magazine sought to organise itself into a political party and, so, 
Michaloliakos filed a declaration for the establishment of a political party entitled ‘Popular 
Association – Golden Dawn’ (‘Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος – Χρυσή Αυγή’). The party’s statutes hold that 
it is a popular movement with ‘faith in the ideology of nationalism.’1987 It is a party which 
promotes anti-Semitism and which, as far back as the 1990s, was involved in violent activity, 
something which has been a characteristic of its actions as will be extrapolated below. Moreover, 
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 Human Rights First ‘We’re not Nazis, but…The Rise of Hate Parties in  Hungary and Greece and Why America 
should Care (August 2014) 82 
1983
 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights – Report on Greece, CommDH(2013)6,  
1984
 Golden Dawn magazine, Issue 1 (December 1980): ‘μια Χρυσή Αυγή που θα οδηγήσει και πάλι τον Άνθρωπο 
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1985
 Golden Dawn magazine, Issue 1 (December 1980): ‘μια Ζωή στην οποία δεν θα υπάρχει θέση για τους 
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1986
 Golden Dawn magazine (20/3/93) text entitled ‘Greeks and Racism’: Έλληνες και ρατσισμός – ‘Ο Έλληνας 
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παραδόσεις μας.’  
1987
 Statutes of the political party with the name ‘Popular Association  Golden Dawn’ ‘Καταστατικό του Πολιτικού 
Κόμματος με την Επωνυμία «Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος Χρυσή Αυγή», pg.2 
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it endorses populist xenophobic and racist rhetoric with its party statutes holding that it is 
‘against demographic alteration, through the millions of illegal immigrants and the dissolution of 
Greek society, which is systematically pursued by the parties of the establishment of the so-
called Left.’1988 It was founded and continues to be led by the same person who has been part of 
the Greek nationalist movement since the age of sixteen and was imprisoned in the 1970s for 
illegal possession of explosives. The party embraces a biological conceptualisation of race and 
subsequently endorses biological as well as cultural racism with its statute underlying that ‘for 
nationalism, the People is not just an arithmetic total of individuals but the qualitative 
composition of humans with the same biological and cultural heritage.’1989 In relation to how it 
was established, as noted by its leader in a 2012 interview ‘we started in a Leninist way: we 
decided to issue a newspaper, Golden Dawn and build a party around it. Back in the 1980s we 
flirted with all sorts of ideas of the interwar years, including National Socialism and fascism. But 
by the 1990s we had settled the ideological issues and positioned ourselves in favour of popular 
nationalism.’1990 The party remained politically dormant up until 1993 where it capitalised on the 
issue of the name ‘Macedonia’ to be given to a Former Yugoslav state.1991  
 
Essentially, after the 1990s, Golden Dawn sought to avoid identification with National Socialism 
and adopt a Greek Nationalist Party.
1992
 However this move has been deemed ‘superficial’1993 
with National Socialism remaining the ideological backdrop of Golden Dawn.
1994
 Even today, 
the party’s symbol remains a Greek meander which appears very similar to the Nazi swastika 
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and its leader has often been seen using the Nazi salute.
1995
 As noted in the pre-trial report of the 
investigative judges drafted for purposes of requesting parliament to lift the immunity of Golden 
Dawn’s MPs in the sphere of the current trial (hereinafter pre-trial report), although the party 
alleges that their salute is an ancient Greek salute also used by the dictator Ioannis Metaxas, their 
National Socialist belief system is evident in, amongst others, their hidden constitution discussed 
in section 1.3
1996
 and also in pictures depicting one of their MPs and seven other people with the 
Nazi swastika.
1997
 The National Socialist belief system of Golden Dawn was also referred to in 
the Prosecutor’s recommendations to the Appeals Council (Συμβούλιο Εφετών) in the sphere of 
the current trial (hereinafter Prosecutor’s recommendations), through examples such as the Nazi 
salutes and evidence collected for purposes of the trial including Nazi flags and Nazi military 
uniforms. Further, Golden Dawn adopts the Führerprinzip (leader principle) characteristic of the 
regime in Nazi Germany.
1998
 In fact, in the pre-trial report and Prosecutor’s recommendations, 
reference was made to the absolute hierarchy and omnipotence of the leader.
1999
 Golden Dawn 
has strong ties with the German neo-Nazi group named Free South Network, inviting it to visit 
the Greek Parliament.
2000
 As is the case with other neo-Nazi groups in Europe, Golden Dawn 
commemorates Adolf Hitler’s birthday on the 20th April each year.2001 In more recent years, the 
leadership has attempted to avoid the reference to National Socialism in public speeches so as to 
sanitise its image and attract a wider range of voters. In the 2014 election campaign for example, 
Golden Dawn candidates disassociated themselves from violence, stopped uttering anti-Semitic 
speech and kept away from references to National Socialism, all with the hope of broadening the 
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range of its electorate.
2002
 It can be said that, notwithstanding efforts to disassociate itself from 
National Socialism, this ideology not only continues to lie at the foundation of Golden Dawn but 
it is the issue that sets it apart from the other post-Junta far-right entities
2003
 and from other far-
right parties in the European Union. It has also made statements glorying the ‘enlightened 
leadership of Adolf Hitler.’2004 Interesting in relation to the nature of the party are the secret 
statutes deposited at the Supreme Court by journalist Dimitris Psaras,
2005
 for purposes of the 
ongoing trial. It must be noted that Golden Dawn denies that this document belongs to its 
party,
2006
 notwithstanding that references had been made to another such document from the first 
editions of the Golden Dawn magazine issued over twenty years ago. However, it has been 
referred to and relied upon in the pre-trial report and also in the Prosecutor’s 
recommendations.
2007
 The statutes reveal, amongst others, that the party is founded on principles 
of National Socialism and biological racism, it inherently believes in the supremacy of the Greek 
race, endorses the leader principle and ensures a rigid hierarchy and strict discipline. More 
particularly, amongst others, the statutes hold that the candidate members of Golden Dawn are 
‘only Aryans by blood, Greek by descent...’2008 whilst a candidate may only be someone who 
‘accepts the…principles of National Socialism and is determined to fight without reservation for 
their effectuation.’2009 They believe blood to be ‘the supreme carrier of the biological virtue of 
our race.’2010 The statutes also underline the importance of the leader’s principle holding that ‘for 
us, the Greek national socialists there was never any dilemma, the democratic model of 
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governance…has no place in our movement…we believe in the principle of the leader as 
fundamental for State legitimacy.’2011 It also notes that ‘discipline which emanates from the 
hierarchy of Golden Down is necessary for the effectuation of the objectives of the 
movements.’2012  Interestingly, the Prosecutor’s Recommendations highlighted that the belief 
system of the members and MPs was ‘criminally indifferent.’ 2013 However, this document 
contains no assessment of when such opinion becomes expression and when such expression 
may become destructive.  Further, there is also a paramilitary element to this group, with the pre-
trial report referring to evidence that depicts members of Golden Dawn carrying out military 
training including gun use, targetting, combat, self-defence and provision of first aid. Further, the 
self-sacrifice of members for purposes of ensuring the objectives of the party are noted in Article 
10 of its secret constitution. The Prosecutor’s Recommendations refer to the militant and 
hierarchal structure of this group.
2014
 As noted, this party is ‘no ordinary ultra nationalist party. 
No other extreme-right party in Europe is as stridently racist, nativist and violent, none is so 
unapologetically anti-Semitic and none so openly calls for the overthrow of the State.’2015 
 
In addition to the National Socialist foundation of Golden Dawn, it is ‘against parliamentary 
democracy and treats it with contempt,’2016 with Michaloliakos stating directly that ‘we reject 
democracy.’ 2017The party does not try to hide this characteristic with an example being the party 
spokesman’s statement in 2012 in which he said ‘we do not like the petty MP posts, we do not 
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want them at all. Of course we take advantage of some privileges of this membership, we now 
have a permit for a firearm, there is no possibility for an immediate arrest upon the commission 
of a criminal offence and it is a bit easier for us to move around.’2018 Further, in one of its 
magazine’s issues, it held, amongst others that, ‘we say yes to everyone, we become the good 
guys of the system, we bless, with every way…the guilty political system…but we have a goal to 
use our actions as the Trojan Horse and destroy the system…’ 2019 As such, the MPs of this party 
‘consciously try to devaluate the Parliament, the institutions and principles of the State.’ 2020 
 
Further, this party is ‘staunchly and indiscriminately anti-immigrant.’2021 The party’s statute, as 
deposited in the Supreme Court in 2012, which the party alleges to be the first and only true 
version, provides that it is ‘against the demographic alteration, through the millions of illegal 
immigrants and the dissolution of Greek society, which is systematically pursued by the parties 
of the establishment of the so-called left.’2022 Parliamentarians of this party have been quick and 
consistent in demonstrating their racist belief-system with ample examples existing to illustrate 
this point. In 2012, a Golden Dawn MP Eleni Zaroulia referred to migrants in Greece as ‘sub-
humans who have invaded our country, with all kinds of diseases.’2023 It is noteworthy that there 
was no reaction and no measures were taken against her by parliament. This is unlike the 
European Parliament where, in 2016, Martin Schulz expelled Golden Dawn MP Eleftherios 
Synadinos following his remarks that Turks are ‘barbarians,’ ‘dirty,’ and ‘dogs.’2024 The hateful 
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stance of Golden Dawn has not been restricted to words only but is evident in their exclusionary 
activities and violence. More particularly, over the last few years Golden Dawn has and 
continues to provide welfare services such as health services, soup kitchens, blood donation and 
job centres for Greeks only.
2025
 Through this method, Golden Dawn seeks to appear to be 
supporting the people, making up for the lacking social infrastructure in times of financial crisis. 
The party also alleges to fund these activities through the salaries of the MPs thus ‘alluding to 
the ultimate ideals of sacrifice, selflessness and popular supremacy.’2026 Further, Golden Dawn is 
anti-Semitic, accusing Jews or Zionists of attempting to eradicate Greece through 
globalisation.
2027
 Examples of such a belief can be reflected in the recital of a passage from the 
Elders of Zion by member of parliament Elias Kasidiaris. They are anti-Roma, with examples of 
their actions including supporting a demonstration against the registration of thirty Roma pupils 
in a school in Lamia in 2012.
2028
 They also disseminate hate against the Muslim minority of 
Turkish origin who live in Thrace with members of this community having reported hate speech 
and threats and violence carried out by Golden Dawn.
2029
 Although outside the sphere of this 
dissertation, it must be highlighted that they are also homophobic and transphobic.
2030
 Moreover, 
it has been noted that hate speech has risen substantially since 2009, a point which is directly 
interrelated with the rise of Golden Dawn.
2031
 In light of the above, Golden Dawn has been 
described as belonging to the ‘extreme right category of the broader far-right label’2032 due to the 
embracement of Nazi ideals, its dangerous approach to democracy and its anti-immigrant, anti-
minority rhetoric.  
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1.3.1 (ii) Golden Dawn and Violence 
Golden Dawn uses violence to instill fear amongst its political opponents and those groups it 
considers to be sub-humans (using the words of its MP Zaroulia as referred to above). These 
predominantly include migrants, but also Roma, with incidences of violence against Muslim 
minorities in Thrace having been recorded. Golden Dawn has also carried out violence against 
persons belonging to the LGBTI community. Golden Dawn has hit squads (τάγματα εφόδου) 
composed of members with particular physical features, knowledge of martial arts and use of 
weapons, especially trained in hard conditions. They wear black clothes or clothes with military 
colours, with the logo of Golden Dawn, military boots and helmets with short or no hair. They 
possess weapons such as knives, iron bars and bats.
2033
 A particularly significant description of 
the violence carried out by Golden Dawn was put forth by the president of the National 
Commission on Human Rights
2034
 for purposes of the pre-trial report. More particularly, he held 
that the violence conducted by Golden Dawn, which is a centrifugal element of the party’s public 
appearance, works on two levels. Firstly, there is the public violence in which members of 
Golden Dawn carry out violent acts, such as those carried out against market stalls of immigrants 
and often record and upload them on the internet as a form of the party’s identity and success. 
There is also the secret type of violence which occurs at night and is directed at more vulnerable 
groups such as refugees.
2035
 Unlike its electoral development which was slow and fractured, 
Golden Dawn’s use of violence became apparent more quickly, commencing in 1987 and 
becoming more systematic by 1992.
2036
 Essentially, up until the early 2000s, this party worked as 
a violent subculture working on the streets, remaining electorally marginalised. The backdrop 
which facilitated this was the fact that 1992 was the year during which a ‘nationalist and 
xenophobic wave erupted.’2037 This occurred due to the fall of the regime in Albania and the 
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influx of immigrants to Greece. Racism and xenophobia were starkly promoted by the media 
which placed a great emphasis on the alleged criminality of foreigners. To add to the rising 
feelings of insecurity was the dispute about the name of Macedonia.
2038
 As such, the xenophobic 
stance adopted by the media as well as the mainstream political parties created fertile ground 
upon which Golden Dawn could (violently) disseminate its own message and agenda. Targets of 
Golden Dawn were initially political opponents such as leftists but, in the years that followed, 
other groups such as refugees and migrants were incorporated therein,
2039
 with multiple attacks 
being recorded over the next years, with such violence remaining unpunished.
2040
 One of the 
most serious attacks took place in 1998 when the second in charge, Antonis Androutspolous, 
nearly killed a student and seriously wounded two others, all members of a leftist group. After 
being on the run for several years, he decided to hand himself in and, in 2006, was convicted and 
sentenced to twelve years in prison,
2041
 but remained imprisoned for only four and a half years. 
The case is further discussed in section 5. This occurrence resulted in the party suspending its 
activities for a while.
2042
 Unfortunately, the number of violent activities carried out by Golden 
Dawn, even the known attacks, are so many that it is impossible to make reference to all of them 
in this chapter. However, some of the most serious known examples of Golden Dawn violence 
include the killing of a Pakistani immigrant cycling to work, the murder of anti-fascist musician 
Pavlos Fyssa and a serious attack against an Egyptian fisherman, all discussed in this chapter. In 
addition, members of this party are infamous for destroying the market stalls of immigrant 
vendors and raiding places which migrants inhabit.
2043
 It must be noted that, although Pavlos 
Fyssas’ murder was the murder of a person who Golden Dawn considered a political opponent 
and this does not, therefore, fall within the examination grounds of this dissertation, it will 
nevertheless be considered firstly due to the severity of the act but, secondly, due to the 
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ramifications of this murder on the prosecution of Golden Dawn’s leadership and membership.  
In fact, the connection between Golden Dawn and the racist crime that has marked Greek reality 
over the past few years is a central theme of the current trial. Although the violence carried out 
by this party has fallen following the arrests in 2013 and the trial, it continues to be a reality in 
Greece. Further, as well as individual attacks, there have been attacks on religious and cultural 
centres, migrant organisations and homes in which migrants live.
2044
  
 
Given the dramatic rise of such violence and given that there exist no systematic recordings of 
such crimes by the State, the National Human Rights Commission, the UNHCR in Greece and a 
number of NGOs set up the Racist Violence Recording Network. However, this is not present 
throughout Greece and is completely dependent on the will of victims to report such crimes to 
the network. As such, any findings are not reflective of the full extent of the situation vis-à-vis 
racist crime in Greece.
2045
 Further, given the rise in such violence, the Ombudsperson drew up a 
special report on hate crime in Greece which included research carried out for sixteen months 
from the 1
st
 January 2012 – 30th April 2013. This found that two hundred and eight one cases2046 
of such violence took place in the particular timeframe.
2047
  In seventy one cases, the perpetrators 
were involved or appeared to be involved with Golden Dawn. Importantly, from January – April 
2012, three reports of Golden Dawn violence were made but from the period from May until the 
end of 2012, fifty four such reports were made. Further, in the first four months of 2013, whilst 
the number of reports for racist incidents fell, the involvement of Golden Dawn rose to 46.50% 
of the incidents.
2048
 The report’s findings have been described in the report as the ‘tip of the 
iceberg’2049 given that the majority of attacks are not reported or are reported and not recorded or 
recorded without the racist motive.
2050
 Indicative of this reality is the 2013 statement made by 
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staff members of Doctors of the World in Greece who held that they received one to six victims 
of racist violence who need medical attention each week.
2051
 
 
In light of the above, we are not confronted with the case of a political party with a violent past 
which, following electoral success opted to rid itself of its violent identity. Rather, we are 
confronted with an organisation with two faces, one of a political party, notwithstanding that this 
political party directly and openly rejects principles of a liberal democracy, and, two, of a violent 
subculture movement with a rigid, rather than loose structure.  
 
1.3.1 (iii) Golden Dawn’s Electoral Development 
From 1994 up until 2010 Golden Dawn remained a marginalised political party with limited 
electoral success, receiving, for example, 0.11 and 0.07 % of the vote in national and European 
elections respectively
2052
 After suspending its activities for a short while following 
Androutspoulos’ conviction, in its 2007 general assembly it decided to contest the next local, 
national and European elections.
2053
In the 2009 national and European elections it received 0.29 
and 0.46% of the vote respectively and no seats in either one.
2054
 However, in 2010 it saw a rise 
in its electoral support at a local level, with its leader receiving 5.29 % of the Athens vote. 
2055
 As 
Michaloliakos noted, ‘in 2010 we said we should take over Athens in order to spread the 
message to the rest of Greece as well. We strategically participated in this election for this reason. 
We knew we would succeed.’2056 It is important to note that he received particular support in the 
sixth district of Athens which houses the area of Agios Panteleimonas. As noted, ‘the high 
concentration of immigrants…and the seeming abandonment of the area by the State highlighted 
the electoral potential…’ 2057  In fact, the party resorted to anti-immigrant violence in the 
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particular area to gain such support. The great leap forward, however, was taken in the national 
elections of May 2012 in which the party’s performance rose to 6.97%, gaining twenty-one seats 
out of the three-hundred in parliament.
2058
 In the national elections of June 2012 it received 
6.92% of the vote and eighteen seats in parliament.
2059
 Over 400,000 Greeks voted for this party 
during this period, an occurrence which has been described as a ‘double electoral 
earthquake.’2060 Since then, notwithstanding the extremist and violent nature of this party, it has 
managed to gather sizeable electoral support and continued to maintain such support even 
following the arrest of its leadership and members of parliament in 2013. Even after the party’s 
MPs and some members were arrested and detained for their role in leading and/or participating 
in a criminal organisation, contrary to Article 187 of the Criminal Code, the party managed to 
maintain its electoral support, gaining 9.8 % of the vote in the 2014 European elections, sending 
three members to the European Parliament and coming in third place.
2061
 In the 2015 national 
elections of January, their support fell slightly in comparison to the previous national elections, 
gaining 6.28% of the vote and 17 members of parliament. However, due to the results of other 
parties it moved to third place. The slight fall of January 2015 was quickly rectified by 
September of the same year in which Golden Dawn received 6.99% of the vote and eighteen 
members of parliament. 
 
In light of the above, it becomes evident that once Golden Dawn began succeeding electorally, 
the path it chose to follow was two-sided. On the one hand, it sought to establish an external 
image of a mainstream political party free of links to, amongst others, National Socialism whilst 
simultaneously continuing to carry out violent street activities that fall within the framework of a 
violent subculture movement rather than a political party.
2062
 Following its electoral success, it 
decided to demonstrate its legitimacy as a political party rather than as a violent movement by 
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depositing a set of Statutes at the Supreme Court, even though it had no obligation to do so.
2063
 
The last but one article of these Statutes holds that this document constitutes the first such 
document, notwithstanding that references had been made to another such document from the 
first editions of the Golden Dawn magazine issued over twenty years ago. With this move it 
sought to appear a legitimate party, with a legitimate constitution, removing any possibility of 
being attached to the secret constitution which had been deposited at the Supreme Court by 
Dimitris Psaras. 
 
1.3.1 (iv) Reasons for Golden Dawn’s Rise 
Golden Dawn saw a dramatic rise in a country which had experienced a Nazi invasion in 1941 
and military dictatorship from 1967-1974. How was it possible for a nation who had lived 
through the dire effects of fascism and Nazism to vote Golden Dawn into third place? On one 
level, this question could be answered by quoting the financial crisis. The first Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed in 2010 and two followed in 2012 and then in 2015. This led to major 
austerity measures such as spending cuts, tax increases and reforms, moving the country into a 
great economic depression. As noted in the 2014 country report submitted by Greece to the 
Human Rights Committee, ‘in times of economic crisis, extremist organisations or individuals 
attempt to exploit the anger or the discontent of some segment of the population to advance their 
social and political agenda.’2064  Whilst the exploitation of people’s insecurities and discontent in 
such a financially dire period is a reality, the financial crisis itself is not a sufficient reason to 
explain the rise of this violent far-right party. As argued, other European countries which were 
also affected by the crisis such as Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and Italy did not witness such 
a rise of the far-right.
2065
 Instead, as will be demonstrated below, the case of Greece saw the 
translation of the economic crisis into a simultaneous socio-political crisis, set against the 
backdrop of a rise in immigration.  
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The reality is that, apart from the consequences of the financial crisis, the rise of Golden Dawn 
was facilitated by the interrelated political crisis. Society became frustrated with and lost 
confidence in the effectiveness of the traditionally dominant political parties, namely PASOK 
and New Democracy, blaming them for their situation and no longer having confidence in these 
parties of the State. For example, good governance indicators between 2003 and 2013 
demonstrate that the trust of the people in the political system declined with perceptions of 
government stability falling from 61.5% in 2003 to 39.3% in 2013, government effectiveness 
falling from 75.1% to 67% and people’s confidence in judicial impartiality and effectiveness 
falling from 73.7% to 63.5%.
2066
 As well as these figures, practical examples exist which 
demonstrate the people’s dismay with the leading parties, such as an ‘increase in incidents of 
public insults against politicians and the disruption of high symbolic public events.’2067 What 
became apparent is that the financial crisis came hand in hand with a political crisis, with society 
losing confidence in the political system, resulting in the demise of the two main parties. For 
example, in 2012, PASOK and New Democracy which were the political parties habitually voted 
for by the Greek people, averaging 83.8% of the vote in ten elections between 1981-2009 fell to 
32% of the vote in the May 2012 election.
2068
 As such, the fall of the two traditionally dominant 
parties, subsequently making way for the rise of smaller parties.  
 
In addition to the above, the rhetoric of Golden Dawn was  facilitated  due to the normalisation 
of racism occurring on a political and institutional level. In Greece, nationalism is evident in the 
rhetoric of all parties ‘regardless of ideology or other social cleavages.’2069 This foundational 
setting enables adoption of racist and xenophobic rhetoric as mainstream rhetoric on a political 
level. As noted by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Greek politicians 
stigmatise groups such as migrants and the Roma whilst immigrant control measures further 
stigmatise migrants.
2070
 He argued that this ‘reinforces the influence of racist parties such as 
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Golden Dawn, triggers further intolerance and leads to the trivialisation of racism in society.’2071 
Examples of such political speech include the reference in 2012 by the Prime Minister of the 
time that irregular migrants had ‘occupied’ certain areas, carrying out ‘illegal activities.’2072 In 
the same year, the Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection held that because of irregular 
migration the ‘country perishes. Ever since the Dorians’ invasion 4000 years ago, never before 
has the country been subjected to an invasion of these dimensions…this is a bomb on the 
foundations of the society and the state.’2073 Soon after, on its website, Golden Dawn held that 
this statement was a ‘vindication of the positions of the party.’2074 The above statements were 
made within the framework of the infamous Xenios-Zeus
2075
 operation which commenced in 
July 2012 in which 4,500 police officers, using racial profiling as their key tool, entered the 
centre of Athens, making thousands of arrests as a means of cracking down on irregular 
migration. It must be noted that Golden Dawn acted simultaneously with this mission, with 
violent attacks happening all over the country. 
2076
 
 
Thus, racist rhetoric is not confined to the political discourse of the far-right and racist activities 
are institutionalised, as illustrated in the Xenios-Zeus operation. This normalisation of racism 
allows for the speech and activities of Golden Dawn to appear more acceptable both by society 
and its institutions. In addition to this, on a societal level, rising sentiments of racism and 
xenophobia facilitated the rise of Golden Dawn with such sentiments already having commenced 
in the 1990s. More particularly, from the beginning of the 1990s, the Eurobarometer 
demonstrated a drastic change in the sentiments of Greek society towards foreigners and 
especially migrants. Within four years, from 1991 – 1994, Greece moved from the last place to 
the first place in relation to anti-immigrant sentiments. At the same time, Golden Dawn’s 
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systematic attacks against political opponents and, in turn, against migrants commenced. In fact 
the Human Rights Committee placed its discussion on the rise of extremism in Greece against 
the backdrop of the unprecedented rise in irregular migration.
2077
 In sum, the racist and 
xenophobic character of Golden Dawn was facilitated by the racism and xenophobia that existed 
on both an institutional and societal level which at first tolerated and, in terms of the electorate, 
endorsed it in relatively large numbers.  
 
1.3.1 (v) Golden Dawn’s Impunity: A Facilitating Factor of its Rise 
The above section sought to extrapolate on the conditions which created a fertile ground upon 
which the far-right Golden Dawn managed to gain electoral support. However, when considering 
this group’s development, it is also significant to take into account how and why it was able to 
carry out violent activities amounting to hate crime without the interference of the State. There 
are several serious allegations that Golden Dawn infiltrated the police force and, in this way, 
managed to ensure impunity for their violent activities.
2078
 For example, in Athens polling 
stations, where members of the Greek police along with other Greek citizens voted during the 
2012 national elections, Golden Dawn percentages were far above the national average, ranging 
from 17.2% to 23.04%. It is estimated that ‘more than 50% of the police officials in these polling 
stations voted for Golden Dawn.’2079 As well as voting for this party, video footage has emerged 
which shows police officers standing by as Golden Dawn members threw stones at opposition 
groups.
2080
 In light of these realities, the Ombudsperson spoke of the ‘passive stance’ taken by 
the police towards hate crime incidents.
2081
 In fact, following the arrests of Golden Dawn MPs 
and members, the Minister of Public Order instructed the Chief of Police and the Director of 
Internal Affairs to investigate the allegation of police involvement and/or facilitation of Golden 
Dawn’s violent activities. Although eight senior officials were suspended pending the 
investigation, in 2014 the Director held that fifteen police officers had been arrested, ten of 
whom were found to be ‘directly or indirectly linked to the criminal activities of Golden 
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Dawn.’2082 He concluded, however, that, following the investigation and although ‘extremist 
behaviour’2083 had been identified in two hundred and three policemen/women, ‘there was no 
evidence of cells or factions of para-constitutional forces in the Greek police.’2084 Τhis has been 
deemed not to be reflective of the real situation with the link between the police and Golden 
Dawn being reiterated by several national and international organisations such as Amnesty 
International.
2085
 The link between Golden Dawn and the general inertia of the police to act in 
cases involving groups such as migrants or Roma, deeply hampers the victims’ access to justice 
as they do not immediately carry out investigatory activities such as going to the crime scene, 
finding and examining witnesses and collecting material, a reality which has contributed to the 
impunity of Golden Dawn.
2086
 As well as the police, other institutions have been deemed to have 
facilitated the implementation of Golden Dawn’s objectives with there existing an ‘outrageous 
cover-up of Golden Dawn’s actions by the Greek Police, State mechanism and the 
ministries.’2087  In this ambit, it must be noted that only an estimate of1-2% of Golden Dawn 
attacks over the past twenty years have reached the courts,
2088
 demonstrating a failure of the 
State to crack down on the violent and even fatal actions of this party. In relation to the judiciary, 
for the cases that do eventually reach the courts, the circumstances are no better. As noted by one 
lawyer ‘the impunity of the organisation has to do not only with the police but also with the 
judiciary.’2089 The impunity could be based on lack of knowledge on relevant legal provisions, as 
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noted by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights,
2090
 but could also stem from 
bias. According to a research study conducted in 2008 and considering records of the Criminal 
Appeals Court in Athens, the criminal treatment of persons differentiates according to racial 
criteria, with the key finding of the research being that migrants, especially migrant men aged 
thirty-five to fifty who are labourers, receive unequal treatment when it comes to sentencing in 
comparison to Greeks.
2091
 Although this finding considered the position of foreigners when 
defendants in criminal trials, it nevertheless demonstrates a tendency of racism and xenophobia 
within the judiciary, which has the potential to taint significantly the outcome of trials that 
involve potential racist motives. Such a stance could partly contribute to the fact that racist 
motives have seldom been found in cases involving Golden Dawn, as discussed in section 5. A 
prejudicial and/or indifferent stance to foreigners was also reflected on an executive level in 
2012. More particularly, in receiving a report by the National Human Rights Committee, which 
highlighted the issue of racist violence, a former Cabinet Secretary stated that ‘we are not 
interested in the human rights of foreigners.’2092 
 
As such, Golden Dawn enjoyed a large degree of impunity due to the stances adopted by the 
different organs of the State, either due to their indifference to the issue and/or due to their own 
prejudicial approaches to some of the groups which Golden Dawn targetted but also due to the 
direct link between Golden Dawn’s activities and the police. This state of impunity allowed 
Golden Dawn to reap its violent seeds sown in the Greek community and develop itself into a 
criminal organisation, a status for which it is being prosecuted today.  
 
The Greek State proved to be unwilling to take an active stance against the rhetoric and violence 
of Golden Dawn up until the moment that Pavlos Fyssas, an ethnic Greek, was murdered by a 
Golden Dawn member after a hit squad appeared at the café where he was sitting with his friends 
and subsequently chased him in the streets. This is notwithstanding that the Greek judiciary had 
been faced with several cases before that of Fyssas in which courts became aware of Golden 
Dawn and its activities. One of the most significant demonstrations of the judiciary’s knowledge 
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of the intentions and means of the functioning of Golden Dawn was the case of Antonis 
Androustopoulos.
2093
 Androutsopolos was found guilty of attacks that took place in 1998 against 
three persons who belonged to a leftist group called the Socialist Revolution Organisation (ΟΣΕ 
- Οργάνωσης Σοσιαλιστική Επανάσταση). In its judgement, the Court underlined that he had 
acted along with other people who were all members of Golden Dawn and that they had decided 
to kill Dimitris Kousouris. Androutsopoulos and his accomplices had managed ‘with great 
savagery and barbarianism to cause multiple wounds to his head and body.’ 2094  As well as 
acknowledging the affiliation with Golden Dawn, the Court described the relationship between 
the party and the hit squads and confirmed that the violent activities occurred within the 
framework of the party rather than on an individual basis.
2095
 Further, the Court held that the 
group had the capacity of attempting to kill those it considers enemies of its ideology, as was the 
case with Kousouris.
2096
 Even though the defendant sought to challenge this point at the Supreme 
Court by holding that he had been convicted because he was a member of a group which differed 
ideologically to that of the victim, the Court rejected this argument and found homicidal 
intent.
2097
 The Court passed judgement in 2009, sentencing him to twenty one years in prison 
whilst the Appellant Court lowered his sentence in 2010 to twelve years.  
 
There are other cases, both before and after Androutsopoulos where courts have also made 
reference to perpetrators’ links with Golden Dawn. For example, in case 30841A/2011,2098 the 
Court held that the two people who were charged with attempted homicide against two others 
claimed to be members of Golden Dawn.
2099
According to case 4020/2006,
2100
 the Court held that 
in 2001, the perpetrator participated in a public assembly whose participants carried out violent 
activities against persons and properties. ‘Particularly, he participated in the group Golden Dawn 
which was concentrated outside the main entrance of the courthouse and attacked police forces 
and members of the Socialist Labour Party, throwing yogurts and sharp objects and causing 
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damages to parked cars.’2101 It must be noted that the systematic reaction of Golden Dawn’s 
leadership to any reference of the party’s involvement in crimes was to argue that their members 
had not been part of the particular occurrence and to attribute the reference to the party to a plot 
of their political opponents, trying to appear as victims of the system.
2102
 
 
Moreover, the parliament was also confronted with the party’s violence and the issue of lifting 
the immunity of some of the MPs for cases that took place in 2007 and 2012. More particularly, 
the parliament lifted the parliamentary immunity of the party spokesperson, Ilias Kasidiaris, 
charged with taking part in a robbery and causing bodily harm in 2007.
2103
 In 2012, the 
Parliament lifted the parliamentary immunity of three Golden Dawn MPs so that the Court could 
proceed with the charges of falsification of authority and destruction of foreign property after 
they participated in destroying the stalls owned by migrant street vendors and carried out 
identification/documentation checks on such persons.
2104
 
 
In light of the above, it becomes clear that the police and the judiciary were aware of the violent 
actions of Golden Dawn, its hit squad tactics, its homicidal intent in certain cases and the link 
between such intent and its ideology and, importantly, conceptualised all the above crimes within 
the sphere of the organisation, rather than considering them as individual acts with no affiliation 
to any organisation. Further, the parliament was confronted with the involvement of some of the 
party’s MPs in violent activities against persons and property. Notwithstanding this, there were 
no ramifications for the party itself and the State never considered the prohibition of Golden 
Dawn, never took a sincere and effective stance on cracking down on its leadership but, rather, 
let Golden Dawn flourish and extend its violence and, at times, homicidal intent towards political 
opponents and other groups such as migrants. All this changed when Pavlos Fyssas was 
murdered. 
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1.3.1 (vi) The Murder of Pavlos Fyssas – The Turning Point 
For several years, Golden Dawn acted violently against migrants, political opponents and other 
groups they considered not to belong to their world theories and belief system, without fear of 
any serious repercussions from the State and its institutions. This reality altered almost 
immediately following the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, an ethnic Greek anti-fascist musician, on the 
evening of the 17
th
 (towards 18
th
) September 2013 by Georgios Roumpakias, a member of the 
party’s council in the area of Nikea, with the aid of a hit squad who had chased Fyssas from a 
café he was in through the streets.
2105
 It was only after the murder of an ethnic Greek that Greece 
witnessed ‘an unprecedented mobilization of law enforcement mechanisms’2106 which resulted in 
the arrest and prosecution of the leadership and some members of the party for, inter alia, 
leading and participating in a criminal organisation in contravention of Article 187 of the Greek 
Criminal Code. As underlined by ECRI, the ‘fact that hundreds of attacks against foreigners, 
including several killings, had not resulted in any steps against this organisation but that this 
required the death of a Greek is, in itself, worrying.’2107 It must be noted that just a few months 
earlier, the murder of Pakistani immigrant, Shehzad Luqman, by Golden Dawn members had not 
led to an equivalent response by the authorities.  
 
A noteworthy consequence of Golden Dawn’s trial has been underlined by the Racist Violence 
Recording Network which has found a significant drop in hate crime following the mass arrests 
of Golden Dawn members and leaders. More particularly, it recorded eighteen incidents for the 
period between October and December 2013 whilst the average number of the previous three-
month period came to fifty incidents.
2108
 Whilst a positive consequence of the arrest of Golden 
Dawn members, the above finding also demonstrates the damaging consequences of the fact that 
the Greek State was much too slow to take measures against the party.
2109
 Moreover, the 
Network concluded that the above finding demonstrates that such crime was perpetuated by the 
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infamous hit squads of the party.
2110
 However, although these crimes have decreased, they still 
continue albeit less numerously. The Head of Doctors of the World in Greece noted that, due to 
the fact that the hit squads no longer have the safety net of impunity, there is a tendency to resort 
to other measures such as threatening and humiliating their target groups.
2111
 Furthermore, whilst 
the arrests of Golden Dawn members and the ongoing trial have led to the decrease in its violent 
activities, the current reality has not affected their electoral support as the figures in section 1.3 
demonstrate.  
 
Fyssas’ murder has also affected the way in which one particularly serious racist crime has been 
dealt with, namely, that against Egyptian fishermen in Pireaus. In 2012, a Golden Dawn hit 
squad, made up of at least twenty persons, attempted to enter the house resided in by the 
fishermen. They did not manage to break the door which was a metal door and so they went to 
the roof where the victim Embarak Abouzid was sleeping. They attacked him with metal rods 
and wooden bats and seriously injured him on his head and face as well as on his chest.
2112
 The 
Prosecutor of Pireaus Magistrates Court chose to prosecute the defendants for grievous bodily 
harm with intent and, although the defendants had been recognised by the brothers of the victim, 
had been let free with some restrictions whilst, importantly, no examination of the 
destructiveness of Golden Dawn was incorporated in the investigation or subsequent prosecution. 
It was only following the murder of Fyssas and the submittal of this case to the investigators (as 
well as others), for purposes of demonstrating the criminal activities of Golden Dawn, that there 
was a supplementary prosecution, incorporating the crime of attempted homicide. 
2113
 
 
Thus, the key pointers to underline considering the murder of Pavlos Fyssas in relation to right-
wing extremism are three. Firstly, the Greek State was idle and apathetic to the group’s violent 
activities up until the point that they murdered an ethnic Greek, even if there was a plethora of 
evidence of hate crimes carried out predominantly against migrants before that, including the 
murder of Pakistani immigrant, Shehzad Luqman, just a few months before Fyssas’ murder. 
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Secondly, that by finally deciding to take action against Golden Dawn, the activities of the 
infamous hit squads decreased but were not eliminated completely and, thirdly, that although the 
criminal procedure taken against Golden Dawn may have decreased the violent streak of the 
party, it did not affect its electoral performance.  
 
1.3.1 (vii) Golden Dawn’s Trial 
On 28 September 2013, eleven days after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, the police arrested MPs 
and members of Golden Dawn on charges including the participation in or leadership of a 
criminal organisation. The Minister of Public Order and Protection of Citizens sent a document 
from the Greek police to the Supreme Court’s Prosecutor regarding the activities of Golden 
Dawn’s MPs. In this document, it was noted that their activities ‘are not isolated incidents…they 
undermine the rule of law, offend human rights and human dignity, endanger public order and 
the internal security of the country, go against the democratic tradition and legal culture of the 
country as well as its obligations as they emanate from international and European human rights 
law.’2114 Based on this, and following the instructions of the Supreme Court’s Prosecutor, a 
preliminary investigation was conducted by the Supreme Court for purposes of determining 
whether crimes had been conducted by supporters and members of the political party, 
particularly those related to leading or participating in a criminal organisation.
2115
 This 
investigation found that there were sufficient indications to justify the prosecution of the 
members/MPs of this organisation, particularly in relation to Article 187 of the Criminal 
Code.
2116
 Although this article will be discussed further in section 5.4, for purposes of clarity, 
reference will be made here to the key points found therein. Article 187(1) of the Criminal Code 
punishes, with imprisonment of up to ten years whoever establishes or participates in a criminal 
organisation. Whoever leads such an organisation receives a prison sentence of at least ten 
years.
2117
 The article holds that a criminal organisation is an entity which includes three or more 
members that aims to commit an array of offences including, inter alia, homicide with intent, 
grievous bodily harm, arson and kidnapping.
2118
 Following the preliminary investigation of the 
Supreme Court, two investigative judges were appointed to conduct a pre-trial investigation for 
                                                          
2114
 Case  4003/173/315661/19-902913 
2115
 Case 413 a/28-9-2013 
2116
 Case 413 a/28-9-2013 
2117
 Article 187 (3) Criminal Code 
2118
 Article 187 Criminal Code 
433 
 
purposes of requesting the Parliament to lift the immunity of Golden Dawn MPs, as set out by 
Article 62 of the constitution.
2119
 At the same time as the above procedure for lifting the 
immunity of the MPs, an investigative officer was appointed the task of investigating the crimes 
committed by members of the party including Pavlos Fyssas’ murder,2120 the attacks against 
PAME (All-Workers Militant Front) -  (ΠΑΜΕ - Πανεργατικό Αγωνιστικό Μέτωπο, ΠΑΜΕ) 2121 
and the attacks against the Egyptian fishermen.
2122
  Subsequently, a competent Prosecutor made 
a recommendation to the Appeals Council (Συμβούλιο Εφετών)2123 based on which the Council 
prosecuted all parliamentary members and other members of the party for offences such as those 
related to a criminal organisation and/or homicide. In the Prosecutor’s Recommendation, all the 
known criminal activities conducted by Golden Dawn since 2008 are described. In total, this case 
has seventy-six defendants who are MPs and members of Golden Dawn. It must be noted that 
Greek law provides that pre-trial detention can occur for a time period of up to eighteen months 
and, since this time frame has been surpassed, all the defendants in the trial have now been 
released, with different forms of restrictions. For example, Roumpakias, the murderer of Pavlos 
Fyssas, is under house arrest whereas the leader of Golden Dawn must appear at a police station 
three times per month.
2124
 
 
The trial against Golden Dawn commenced on the 20
th
 April 2015 and stopped for a period of 
five months from the 12
th
 January 2016 due to strikes of the Athens Bar Association. The 
Association gave special leave for the continuation five months after the onset of the strikes, 
more particularly on the 20
th
 May 2016.
2125
 In the case against Golden Dawn, the prosecution is 
seeking to demonstrate that Golden Dawn is a criminal organisation and that its leadership and 
members are guilty of leading and/or participating in a criminal organisation, as prohibited by 
Article 187 of the Criminal Code. The State is viewing the criminal acts of its members and MPs 
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as indicative and reflective of the criminality of Golden Dawn itself.
2126
 As noted in the 
Prosecutor’s Recommendation, none of the party’s MPs can argue ‘convincingly that he/she was 
unaware of the party’s criminal activities, which systematically and for a long period of time 
were being committed by and for the party.’2127 It is through this approach that it seeks to 
prosecute its members and MPs and dismantle Golden Dawn which is looked at through the lens 
of a criminal organisation rather than a political party. The victims of Golden Dawn’s crimes 
and/or their relatives are part of the proceedings as a civil party in three cases, namely, the 
murder of Pavlos Fyssas, the attempted murder and attacks on Egyptian Fishermen and the 
attempted murder against PAME unionists. The prosecution will seek to prove that Golden Dawn 
consisted of about one thousand central cadres and about three to four hundred junior members, 
divided into cells of four or five members in all parts of Greece. 
 
As such, following Fyssas’ murder, the State mobilised itself, for the first time, against Golden 
Dawn, seeking to dismantle this group by looking at it through the lens of a criminal organisation, 
thereby attaching criminal responsibility to its leadership and members whilst simultaneously 
dismantling the organisation itself. It also prompted the police to conduct an investigation into its 
own members and their links to Golden Dawn, albeit with questionable results. An array of 
issues arise in relation to the trial, namely the temporal delay of instigating any form of 
proceedings against Golden Dawn as a violent and criminal entity, notwithsanding the role of the 
State as an indifferent bystander in allowing this party and its hit squad to spread terror on the 
streets, and the worrying connotation of the fact that the push factor for action emanated only 
following the murder of an ethnic Greek.  
 
1.3.2 The Far-Right in Greece: Concluding Comments 
The far-right in Greece is dominated by one extremist and violent group, Golden Dawn, who 
bears the characteristics of a violent subculture movement (albeit strictly organised and 
disciplined) and has the legal status of a registered political party, contesting elections and 
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participating in the national and European parliaments. Although other parties came and went, 
with some demonstrating more extended success than others, for example LAOS, such successes 
were short-lived. Golden Dawn, on the other hand, has remained on the subculture/street scene 
from the time of its inception and on the political scene with success since 2012. Along with 
parliamentary seats which have contributed to the rise in hate speech and xenophobic and racist 
polices and rhetoric on a political level, this party has dramatically deteriorated the daily 
existence, predominantly of migrants, but also of other groups such as ethnic minorities, through 
hate speech and hate crimes against them.  This party’s rhetoric and activities went unfettered for 
a long period of time, up until the point one of its members murdered an ethnic Greek. Only at 
that point did the tables turn and did the State and its institutions decide, rather than ignoring 
and/or facilitating the activities of this party, to use the law against it. The outcome of the 
unprecedented trial against Golden Dawn is awaited. Also, in the event of the imprisonment of 
MPs and members and the dismantling of this party, it remains to be seen what the next day will 
bring for the far-right in Greece and, importantly for the State’s attitude and stance towards the 
far-right, considering the criminal activities of Golden Dawn on the one hand and the ultra-
protection provided to the role of a political party in the national constitutional order on the other. 
 
1.4 Definitional Framework 
1.4.1 Racial and Religious Groups  
Race is not defined in national legislation or case-law, as is the case with, amongst others, 
international documents. There is no definition of religion but an understanding of what is 
deemed to fall in the framework of religion is facilitated in comparison to race, given that 
religion is partly described, although not defined, in Article 13 of the constitution. This article 
holds that ‘all known religions shall be free.’2128 However, there is no further discussion in 
relevant case-law or policy regarding the religions which are considered to be known. It has been 
argued that the constitution ‘protects publicly known religions but not mystical and secret 
practices or dogmas.’2129 This could denote that the State will accept what it considers to be 
mainstream religions and probably be hostile to sects. The only clear indication is that the 
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Christian Eastern Orthodox Church does not fall within the ambit of ‘known religions’ but, 
rather is referred to as the ‘dominant religion’ in Article 3 of the constitution. Further in Article 
198(2) of the Criminal Code on blasphemy, reference is made to the prohibition of blasphemy 
insofar as this is directed either to the dominant religion or ‘another religion tolerated in Greece.’ 
However, there is no extrapolation in the legislation, case-law or policy providing an 
understanding of which religions are considered tolerated and not tolerated in Greece. There 
exist no definitions of the terms racial groups and religious groups in national legislation, case-
law or policy. 
 
1.4.2 Public Incitement of Violence and Hatred and Prohibition of Revisionism– A Substitute for 
Hate Speech? 
As is the case with England and Wales, Greek legislation offers no definition of hate speech but, 
instead, the provision relating to inciting violence, hatred and discrimination must be relied upon 
when seeking to tackle this phenomenon. Greece also provides for a prohibition of publicly 
condoning, trivialising or maliciously denying the existence or severity of certain international 
crimes. The first element, namely inciting violence, hatred and discrimination, is defined by 
Article 1 of Law 972/1979 as amended by Law 4285/2014. It punishes any person who ‘intends, 
publicly or orally or through the press, through the internet or in any other way or manner, to 
incite, promote, arouse or promote actions which may cause discrimination, hatred or violence 
against a person or group of persons due to their race, religion, genealogical origins, ethnic or 
racial origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability, in a way which poses a danger to 
public order or constitutes a threat to the life, liberty or physical integrity of the above persons.’ 
However, no definition of the majority of terms contained in the above articles are provided for 
either in legislation, case-law or policy. In fact, the only terms relevant to the above section 
which are given some definition, albeit not in the law under consideration, are those of 
discrimination and racial discrimination, discussed further on. Part two of the same article refers 
to speech which seeks to result in property damage insofar as such property is utilised by the 
above mentioned groups, only if such actions cause damage to public order. As such, this article 
can be seen, to an extent, as a substitute for a definition of hate speech but the effects of the 
speech must either result in public harm or serious individual harm. Therefore, Greece opted to 
take the restrictive approach offered by the Framework Decision which holds, amongst others, 
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that for offences concerning racism and xenophobia, States may choose to punish conduct which 
is likely to disturb public order. In the event of property damage as harm, there must be a 
necessary correlation to the infliction of public disorder. Further, Greece chose to incorporate the 
requirement of ‘threatening,’ an option provided for by Article 12 of the Framework Decision, 
but did not include the other optional provisions, namely that of conduct which is abusive or 
insulting, which depicts a less severe case in comparison to the situation of threatening conduct. 
This demonstrates Greece’s desire to adopt a restrictive approach when it comes to 
conceptualising and subsequently prosecuting conduct which may, amongst others, result in 
racial hate.  As per the Framework Decision but also the old law, the perpetrators must intend for 
such harm to be the result of his/her/their speech and/actions. It must be noted that the 
requirements regarding public order or serious individual harm were not a necessity in the old 
law and, as such, the 2014 amendments rendered the conceptualisation of hateful expression 
more restrictive. Further, the old law incorporated offensive speech as prohibited speech in 
Article 2, something which is not incorporated in the amended law. In addition, following the 
incorporation of the Framework Decision, Greek law also contains another form of hate speech 
in Article 2. More particularly, this article punishes whoever publically, orally or through the 
press or the internet or through any other means condones, trivialises or maliciously denies the 
existence or the severity of crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, the 
Holocaust and Nazi crimes which have been recognised by international courts or the Greek 
parliament and this behaviour is directed against a group of persons determined by their race, 
colour, religion, descent, racial or ethnic group, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability, 
insofar as such behaviour is manifested in a way which can incite violence  or hatred or is of a 
threatening or abusive character against such a group or a member of such a group. In relation to 
the parliament’s role in recognising such crimes, this has been deemed unconstitutional in the 
case against historian Heinz Richter discussed in section 4.1.1.  Thus, unlike England and Wales, 
condoning, trivialising or denying the severity or existence of international crimes, such as the 
Holocaust, is punishable. However such punishment is dependent on certain factors constituting 
safety nets for freedom of expression such as the necessity of intention on the part of the 
perpetrator and the establishment of a link between the speech and the incitement to violence or 
hatred. In relation to religion, it must be noted that, unlike England and Wales, the Greek 
Criminal Code provides for the offence of blasphemy. The relevant provision is Article 198(2), 
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therein, which holds that anyone who publicly and maliciously reviles the Eastern Orthodox 
Church of Jesus Christ or another religion tolerated in Greece is punished with imprisonment of 
up to two years. This provision has not been used to prosecute any religiously hateful/offensive 
speech uttered by the far-right movement. 
 
1.4.3 Racial and Religious Aggravation and Hate Crime: Two in one 
Before amendments brought about by Law 4285/2014, the Greek Penal Code contained Article 
79(3) which held, amongst others, that committing an act out of hate based on ethnic, racial, 
religious hate or hate due to the descent of the victim constitutes an aggravating circumstance. 
However, Law 4285/2014 abolished the part of Article 79(3) on such aggravation and introduced 
Article 81A to the Code and entitled it ‘Racist Crime.’  This article provides that if an act is 
committed due to the perpetrators’ hatred based on certain grounds, his/her sentence is increased. 
The new law adds colour, sexual orientation, gender identity and disability to the grounds of 
hatred existing in the previous article and enhances the sentences for hate crimes. Interestingly, 
the new provision of the Criminal Code is entitled ‘Racist Crime’ but does not, in fact, deal with 
racist crime only but with a variety of other crimes such as homophobic crimes. This discrepancy 
in the title of the article is reflective of the general limited definitional framework of the 
particular country. Moreover, although entitled racist crime, it essentially deals with aggravation 
and sentencing rather than a legal definition and conceptualisation of racist or hate crime.  
 
1.4.4 Discrimination and Harassment 
Law 474/1990, which ratified the ICERD adopts the latter’s definition of racial discrimination 
and, thereby, provides a definitional framework of this phenomenon for Greece. More 
particularly, Article 1(1) of the Law holds that: ‘racial discrimination means any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin 
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life.’2130 There is no definition of religious discrimination in 
any national legislation, case-law or policy document.  
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Further, Law 3304/2005, which harmonises national law with the EU Equality Directives 
2000/78/EC and 2000/43/EC, conceptualises discrimination with regards to the application of the 
principle of equal treatment and particularly direct and indirect discrimination in the manner set 
out in the directives with the former referring to less favourable treatment than another would 
have been given in a comparable situation
2131
 and the latter referring to an apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice that would put a person belonging to a particular group at a 
disadvantage compared to others.
2132
 The particular piece of legislation incorporates harassment 
or any other offensive conduct, which creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment and which has the purpose or effect of, inter alia, creating a hostile, 
humiliating or aggressive environment, to fall within the definitional framework of 
discrimination.
2133
  
 
1.4.5 Public Order 
This section will consider how public order is defined by national law. Unlike with England and 
Wales, in which far-right extremism is criminally challenged predominantly within the 
framework of public order legislation, Greece’s criminal order theoretically challenges the far-
right through the anti-racist Law 927/1979, adding the element of public order as one of the 
requirements in finding an offence, such as incitement to racial hatred, as described in section 5.1. 
Public order within the anti-racist law is a significant issue and, as such, analysis of the meaning 
of public order within the Greek legal order is necessary so as to facilitate a subsequent 
understanding of the applicable laws. In the pre-trial report and the Prosecutor’s 
Recommendation, public order was briefly defined. These documents note that public order is 
the ‘serenity, tranquility and peace and orderliness in the society of a State’2134 in which there 
exists ‘a regulated legal order, which threatens and imposes penalties against the offenders of 
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legal rules, with the purposes of ensuring the exercise of individual, social or collective and state 
legal interests.’2135 
 
In light of the above, it is clear that the definitional framework of Greece in relation to terms 
relevant to the legislation that can be used to challenge the far-right is relatively lacking, 
especially in comparison with England and Wales. This is firstly because, as opposed to England 
and Wales, Greece does not contain many definitions within its legislation whilst the limited 
case-law and policy on the matter prevents the existence of extensive interpretation of such terms. 
Either way some minimal extrapolation on terms facilitates an improved understanding of the 
legal framework. 
 
3. International and European Framework  
This section shall consider whether and, if so, how Greece has applied and interpreted its 
obligations in the realm of challenging right-wing extremism as these emanate from international 
and European conventions. Article 28 (1) of the constitution holds that recognised rules of 
international law, as well as international conventions which have come into force through 
ratification on a national level, constitute an integral part of Greek Law and override any 
conflicting law. All international rules and conventions involving foreigners are applied upon the 
condition of reciprocity.  In addition, following Greece’s accession to the EU, EU law takes 
supremacy over any national laws that may conflict with it.
2136
   
 
Greece signed the ICERD in 1966 and ratified it in 1970 through Legislative Decree 494/1970. It 
was the anti-racist Law 927/1979 (subsequently amended in 2014) which sought to give effect to 
the ICERD. This country carried out the ratification, making no reservation to the articles therein. 
However, it did not make a declaration under Article  14 of the ICERD and, as such, victims of a 
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violation cannot seek recourse to the competent Committee through the individual complaints 
procedure. This, therefore, directly restricts the efficacy of the document in the realm of 
challenging the far-right as victims cannot find justice on a supranational level. This would have 
been particularly important for Greece given that, on a national level, the competent authorities 
were unwilling to use this tool as one of prevention, protection or punishment in the realm of far-
right rhetoric and activities. As discussed in chapter three, Article 4 is a particularly useful tool, 
and in order to ensure that it is effectively implemented, States Parties ‘have not only to enact 
appropriate legislation but also to ensure that it is effectively enforced.’ 2137  However, this 
Convention has not been relied upon at all for challenging the far-right in Greece as illustrated by 
the fact that the State never considered Article 4 as a tool for challenging Golden Dawn. 
Although an extensive analysis of Law 927/1979 will take place in section 5, a few points must 
be put forth in relation to its conformity with the ICERD and particularly Article 4 therein, which 
is the most relevant to tackling the far-right as manifested in organised or semi-organised 
movements. More particularly, Article 1(4) of Law 927/1979 as amended by Law 4285/2014 
holds that the establishment or participation in an organisation or league of persons of any form, 
which systematically seeks the perpetration of acts such as the incitement to, inter alia, 
discrimination which pose a danger to public order or constitute a threat to the life, liberty or 
physical integrity of the persons concerned, are to be prohibited. However, this is far from 
Article 4 of the ICERD which places no further requirement, other than the resulting individual 
or group harm against the victim or victims, without the prerequisite of other consequences such 
as public disorder. The reason for this discrepancy is that the same instrument, namely the anti-
racist Law 927/1979, has been used to give effect both to the ICERD and the Framework 
Decision 2008/913/JHA. In relation to the prohibition of racist organisations, the former imposes 
no obligation as to, for example, the existence of an interlink between the organisation’s actions 
and public disorder whilst the latter does not tackle the prohibition of organisations per se, 
although it does refer to the responsibility of legal as well as natural entities. Thus, the national 
anti-racist law takes the necessity to prohibit hateful organisations, as this emanates from the 
ICERD, and intertwines the optional link established by the Framework Decision insofar as 
particular conduct may result in, for example, public disorder. It must be noted that, before the 
                                                          
2137
 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendations No. 07 (1985) and No. 
15 (1993) 
442 
 
2014 amendments to the anti-racist law, Article 1(2) of Law 927/1979 prohibited the leading of 
or participation in an organisation which pursues organised propaganda or activities of any kind 
pertaining to racial discrimination. As such, pre-2014 there were no restrictions of thresholds, 
making no requests for public disorder for example but, at the same time, offering a wider range 
of grounds upon which the law can be used.  
 
Further, Greece ratified the ICCPR in 1997 with Law 2462/1997 with no reservations. Although 
individual complaints can be communicated to the treaty body of this Convention given that 
Greece ratified the Optional Protocol in 1997, recognising the competence of the Human Rights 
Committee to receive individual complaints, there is no jurisprudence relevant to the far-right or 
to Articles 19 and 20 which are directly applicable when it comes to challenging the far-right. 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights was signed by Greece on 19 September 1974 and 
ratified on 20 September 1974 by Law 239/1953. This law was repealed following the departure 
of Greece from the Council of Europe. After the fall of the Junta, Greece became a member of 
the Council of Europe again and the Convention became part of national law for a second time in 
1974 by Law 53/1974. It may appear slightly bizarre, given that although the dictatorship 
decided to cease Greece’s membership of the Council of Europe it nevertheless ratified the 
ICERD in 1970, as mentioned above. Protocol 12 of the Convention on the general prohibition 
of discrimination was signed by Greece on the 4 November 2000 but has not yet been ratified. 
Further, on a Council of Europe level, in 2003, Greece signed the Additional Protocol 
concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature committed through 
Computer Systems although it has not yet ratified this document. In the National Action Plan on 
Human Rights for the period 2014-2016, it was stated that the ratification of this Additional 
Protocol is a central objective for purposes of improving the current legislative framework.
2138
 
No mention is made in the Action Plan of the ratification of Protocol 12 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
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 Ministry of Justice - General Secretariat of Transparency and Human Rights: ‘Human Rights  National Action 
Plan 2014-2016’ (Δικαιώματα του Ανθρώπου – Εθνικό Σχέδιο Δράσης 2014-2016) (2014)  
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In light of the above, the major instruments and particularly the ICERD and the ICCPR which 
directly prohibit certain types of hateful rhetoric and activity and the ECHR which limits 
freedoms such as that of expression, assembly and association are part of national law. So, such 
ratifications allowed for the infiltration of militant democracy into the national legal system of 
this country. Moreover, the relevant provisions were part of the legal system  before the onset of 
the systematic criminality and dissemination of hateful rhetoric carried out and conducted by 
Golden Dawn. As such, it cannot be alleged that the country lacked in terms of legislation when 
it came to imposing criminal or other restrictive measures to the rhetoric and activities of groups 
such as Golden Dawn. Also, during this time, the country had the legislative capacity to prohibit 
Golden Dawn from further conducting its activities if it sought to interpret ‘organisations’ as 
contained in the ICERD and in the national legislation ratifying it, in a manner which also 
encompasses political organisations and namely political parties, especially those using the guise 
of a political party to perpetrate crime and violence and spread fear amongst the community. 
What becomes immediately apparent when considering public discussion on Golden Dawn and 
its criminal activities and, as noted by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the issue, is that such discussion appears to ‘ignore or not to take duly into account a number 
of relevant international and European human rights standards which legally bind Greece’2139 
and can be used or could have been used all these years in which Golden Dawn has been 
carrying out its criminal activities and recited its hateful rhetoric with impunity. The above 
documents and articles were not taken into account or implemented by competent authorities, up 
until the point where this organisation became empowered through impunity and facilitated 
through socio-economic circumstances, discussed above, to become a criminal organisation. 
What must be reiterated is that it was never an option for Greece whether or not it was to 
implement relevant provisions which emanate from its international and European commitments 
but, rather, a constitutional commitment. The fact remains that for years Golden Dawn was 
acting and speaking relentlessly in direct contravention to the letter and spirit of the 
supranational documents referred to above but Greece, in turning a blind eye to its obligations as 
these arise from the documents, allowed it to continue to do so unfettered.  
 
                                                          
2139
 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights – Report on Greece, CommDH(2013)6, 6 
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4. National Legal Framework 
This section shall provide an analysis of the domestic legal framework of Greece that can be 
relied upon when challenging far-right extremism. For purposes of this analysis, the section will 
look at the relevant legislation in the sphere of speech, material and activities of far-right entities 
and consider how, in practice, the judiciary has interpreted and applied such legislation when 
confronted with the far-right movement. Appraising the judicial analysis and interpretation of 
relevant legislation is not a straightforward task given the fact that relevant jurisprudence is 
minimal. Before proceeding with an insight into the legislation and jurisprudence (where 
available) and, given that the problem questions within this dissertation are assessed through a 
human rights lens, the section will firstly establish the foundational framework that will facilitate 
any subsequent discussion by providing an overview of how relevant human rights are 
understood and provided for in the Greek legal order. To this end, it will set out how the 
freedoms of expression, association and assembly are conceptualised and incorporated into 
domestic law. After the human rights framework is established, the chapter will consider the 
criminal laws that can be used to tackle the far-right, looking at anti-racist laws as well as 
provision from the Criminal Code on aggravation and sentencing but, due to Golden Dawn’s trial, 
will also look at criminal organisations and their prohibition as so established by the Criminal 
Code. Also, there will be an analysis of the relevant provision of the Criminal Code on terrorist 
organisations. It will then proceed to assess the limited amount of existing case-law that exists 
that interprets and applies the legislative framework. Furthermore, in relation to jurisprudence, 
an overview of the case against Golden Dawn, which is still ongoing, will be effectuated given 
the severity of this case in the framework of challenging the far-right. After considering the 
criminal law framework, the section will assess non-discrimination law as a tool for challenging 
the far-right in Greece. The section will then consider the law regulating the registration and 
functioning of political parties as procedures emanating from the law may, in themselves or in 
conjunction with each other, affect the development of the far-right, regardless of whether such 
laws, regulation and systems have the purpose of countering such movements. This approach is 
necessary since it will enable an understanding of the handling of all the entities which make up 
the far-right and the manner in which they are tackled by the country.  
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4.1 Human Rights: Conceptual Backdrop  
Article 2(1) of the Greek constitution holds that ‘respect and protection of the value of the human 
being constitute the primary obligations of the State.’2140 Personal freedom is established by 
Article 5(1), but this is not absolute given that this is permissible ‘insofar as they do not infringe 
the rights of others or violate the constitution οr morals.’2141 The constitution contains a non-
destruction clause in the form of Article 25 (3) which holds that ‘the abusive exercise of rights is 
not permitted.’2142 As such, militant democracy and the need to protect society and others from 
destructive forces emanating from abusive use of rights and freedoms is codified on a national 
level in the country’s constitution.The constitution provides for the freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly and freedom of association, which are all tools habitually used and abused 
by the far-right with Greece constituting a primordial example of such abuse with Golden Dawn 
having acted with a state of impunity for several years, advancing itself, its rhetoric and acts and 
calling upon the freedoms above as the means to do so. In relation to the freedom of association, 
it must be underlined that political parties hold a particularly significant place in the Greek Legal 
Order and a certain overprotection thereof may be deemed to exist.  The almost absolutist 
approach adopted by the non-prohibition of political parties has had a significant effect on the 
handling of Golden Dawn.  
 
4.1.1 Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression is provided for in Article 14 of the constitution which is entitled 
‘Dreedom of the Press.’ Part 1 of this Article holds that ‘every person may express and propagate 
his thoughts orally, in writing and through the press in compliance with the laws of the State.’2143 
Parts 2 – 9 of the article focus solely on the press. Thus, the constitution essentially provides for 
free expression with the sole restriction being that such expression must comply with national 
laws. Rather than separating freedom of opinion and expression,, the constitution refers to the 
freedom of expression and the freedom to propagate such expression. However, it could hardly 
                                                          
2140
 ‘Ο σεβασμός και η προστασία της αξίας του ανθρώπου αποτελούν την πρωταρχική υποχρέωση της Πολιτείας.’ 
2141
 ‘Ο καθένας έχει δικαίωμα να αναπτύσσει ελεύθερα την προσωπικότητά του και να συμμετέχει στην κοινωνική, 
οικονομική και πολιτική ζωή της Xώρας, εφόσον δεν προσβάλλει τα δικαιώματα των άλλων και δεν παραβιάζει το 
Σύνταγμα ή τα χρηστά ήθη.’  
2142
 ‘H καταχρηστική άσκηση δικαιώματος δεν επιτρέπεται.’ 
2143
 ‘Kαθένας μπορεί να εκφράζει και να διαδίδει προφορικά, γραπτά και δια του τύπου τους στοχασμούς του 
τηρώντας τους νόμους του Kράτους.’ 
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be argued that the constitution does not provide for opinion, it is simply the case that it 
incorporates free expression as if it were opinion, separating the right to propagate such 
expression. Further, Article 16(1) of the constitution, on education, art and sciences, holds that 
‘art and science, research and teaching shall be free and their development and promotion shall 
be an obligation of the State. Academic freedom and freedom of teaching shall not exempt 
anyone from his duty of allegiance to the constitution.
2144 ’ This provision is relevant to 
expression which is propagated through, for example, artistic means, but also in relation to 
academic freedom and the issues that have arisen in the framework of academia under the 
amended anti-racist law and the handling of genocides and other international crimes.
2145
 It is 
noteworthy that the freedom of expression constituted the basic reasoning put forth by those 
opposed to the 2014 amendments to the anti-racist law.
2146
 A case relevant to this aspect of free 
expression and the anti-racist law is the case of Heinz Richter, an historian, who was prosecuted 
under the anti-racist law and particularly Article 2 therein for his book in which, in relation to the 
Battle of Crete (with the Nazis), he argued, amongst others, that ‘ruthless and barbaric practices 
were not only used by the invading troops but also by the Cretans who rebelled against them.’ 
The Court found Richter not guilty for three reasons, one of which was that Article 2 violated the 
freedom of  expression and academic freedoms taking into account that laws which recognise or 
establish historical facts, even if they express the opinion of the majority, cannot (in a democratic 
and pluralist society) constitute the foundation of binding regulations which equate to legal 
prohibitions.
2147
 
 
In addition to free expression having been cited several times as a reason for rejecting the 2014 
amendments to the anti-racist law, this freedom has heavily marked the Supreme Court’s 
discussion of one of the few cases which occurred within the framework of the anti-racist law 
927/1979, namely that against Constantinos Plevris
2148
 for the publishing of his book ‘Jews –The 
Whole Truth’ (Εβραίοι – Όλη η Αλήθεια’). In its judgement, the Court noted that Law 927/1979 
                                                          
2144
 ‘1. H τέχνη και η επιστήμη, η έρευνα και η διδασκαλία είναι ελεύθερες η ανάπτυξη και η προαγωγή τους 
αποτελεί υποχρέωση του Kράτους. H ακαδημαϊκή ελευθερία και η ελευθερία της διδασκαλίας δεν απαλλάσσουν 
από το καθήκον της υπακοής στο Σύνταγμα.’ 
2145
 For example Heinz Richter’s case discussed in section 4.1.1 
2146
 Explanatory Report for amendments to Law 927/1979 
2147
 Statement made by the Court regarding Heinz Richter’s Case (full judgement not yet available)  
2148
 Case 3/2010 
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must be interpreted restrictively and in light of the provisions of Article 14(1) and 16(1) of the 
constitution and Article 10 (1) of the ECHR, through which the freedom of expression is 
established as well as the freedom of art, science, research and teaching. The Court placed a tight 
restriction on the implementation of the anti-racist law, citing free expression as justification for 
such restrictions given the particular significance it attached to such freedoms. However, it did 
note that free expression must be exercised in light of the obligations which arise from, amongst 
others, Article 2 of the constitution on the obligation of the State to protect human value, a 
provision which also incorporates the need to respect the racial and ethnic origin of a person. 
However, the Court found Plevris not guilty, not due to the significance of free speech but, rather, 
that his book was directed against Zionists and not Jews and, so did not constitute a racial 
group.
2149
 Further on this point will be discussed in section 5.1. 
 
4.1.2 Freedom of Association and Assembly 
4.1.2 (i) Freedom of Association 
Article 12 of the Greek constitution provides that ‘Greeks shall have the right to form non-profit 
associations and unions, in compliance with the law, which, however, may never subject the 
exercise of this right to prior permission.’2150 Article 12 further holds, in part 2 thereof, that an 
association may only be dissolved by a court judgement and, in part 3 holds that this also applies 
to unions of persons which do not constitute an association. Although this article refers to non-
profit associations and unions, there is no further extrapolation on what is meant by these terms 
apart from the reference to agricultural and urban co-operatives as a type of association and/or 
union. What becomes clear is that this article does not aim to cover political parties as an entity 
given that these are covered by a separate article dedicated exclusively to political parties, 
demonstrating the significance which the Greek legal order places on such entities. More 
particularly, Article 29 of the constitution provides that Greek citizens with the right to vote may 
establish and join political parties ‘the organization and activity of which must serve the free 
functioning of democratic government.’2151 Thus, the Greek constitution provides for the right to 
                                                          
2149
 Case 913/2009  
2150
 Oι Έλληνες έχουν το δικαίωμα να συνιστούν ενώσεις και μη κερδοσκοπικά σωματεία, τηρώντας τους νόμους, 
που ποτέ όμως δεν μπορούν να εξαρτήσουν την άσκηση του δικαιώματος αυτού από προηγούμενη άδεια.  
2151
 Έλληνες πολίτες που έχουν το εκλογικό δικαίωμα μπορούν ελεύθερα να ιδρύουν και να συμμετέχουν σε 
πολιτικά κόμματα, που η οργάνωση και η δράση τους οφείλει να εξυπηρετεί την ελεύθερη λειτουργία του 
δημοκρατικού πολιτεύματος.  
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form and join political parties without making any direct reference to limitation grounds of this 
right. However, it does incorporate a qualification to this right, namely that political parties must 
serve the free functioning of a democratic State The result of this approach is that the 
constitutional possibility of dismantling a political party is one of the controversial issues of 
Greek constitutional law, given that arguments can be put forth for either side. The Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights argues that this qualification could be ‘interpreted 
according to the principle of effet utile in a way that would give a practical meaning to the above 
constitutional meanings.’2152 More particularly, the Commissioner recommended the adoption of 
relevant legislation or development of jurisprudence which would give effect to the 
aforementioned qualification and ‘restrict or prohibit, if necessary, a party for which ample 
evidence demonstrates that it does not serve the free functioning of democratic governance.’2153 
In making this recommendation, the Commissioner reiterated that such measures would be in 
conformity with Greece’s obligations under Article 4 of the ICERD and Article 11 and Article 
17 of the ECHR.
2154
 Further, in its latest Concluding Observations to Greece, the ICERD 
committee recommended that the State Party ‘concretely ban neo-nazi groups from its 
territory.’2155 When confronted with the issue of Golden Dawn, the State habitually reiterated the 
absolutist position that the Greek constitutional order does not provide for the prohibition of 
political parties. This was notwithstanding the constitutional qualification of Article 29(1) and 
Greece’s international obligations. In adopting this approach, the country ignored its obligation 
to prohibit such an organisation (under the ICERD). It also ignored the fact that the freedom of 
association, as provided for by the ECHR, is not absolute and can be restricted, if such 
association, amongst others, damages the rights and freedoms of others. This is clear from, inter 
alia, the case-law of the ECtHR discussed in chapter four. In brief, by retaining Article 29 and 
particularly part 1 therein without the necessary judicial interpretation and/or legislative 
developments vis-à-vis possibilities of dismantling a political party under certain circumstances, 
using provisions of supranational documents, the national legal order of this country is directly 
violating its obligations under the ICERD and goes against the meaning of Article 11 of the 
ECHR. Moreover, and as noted in the pre-trial report, the requirement of Article 29 that political 
                                                          
2152
 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights – Report on Greece, CommDH(2013)6,8 
2153
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights – Report on Greece, CommDH(2013)6,8 
2154
 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights – Report on Greece, CommDH(2013)6,9 
2155
 ICERD Concluding Observations – Greece, CERD/C/GRC/CO/19  (2009) 11   
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parties serve the free functioning of a democratic state means that an organisation such as 
Golden Dawn is not protected under Article 29.
2156
 This is because, under the guise of a political 
party, it has demonstrated its real objectives with the use of, amongst others, physical and armed 
violence and threats against life. The report further noted that the use of Article 29 for such 
purposes constitutes a violation of 25(3) of the constitution on the non-abuse of rights.
2157
 In 
light of this position, the pre-trial report found that it was legally possible to find members and 
leaders of a criminal organisation which posed as a political party guilty of offences under 
Article 187 of the Criminal Code.  However, this should not imply that a political party can act 
unfettered and cause the destruction of democracy and the rights of others in a violent manner up 
until the point that it becomes a criminal organisation. Instead, based on ECtHR case-law, 
discussed in chapter four, measures should be taken before it reaches this point. 
 
The above approach adopted by the Greek State towards the prohibition of political parties, 
resulted in a considerable weakness as it was unable to tackle effectively and dismantle, amongst 
others, far-right elements which organise themselves in the form of a political party. A few 
weeks after the June 2012 elections, the Council of Europe Commissioner of Human Rights held 
that, although Greek legislation does not clearly provide for the prohibition of political parties, 
Article 29(1) refers to the requirement that such parties must serve the free function of 
democratic government. He then posed a rhetorical question as to whether Golden Dawn serves 
the free functioning of democratic government.
2158
 However, it is imperative to ensure 
compatibility with international and European obligations and acknowledge the destructiveness 
of political parties such as Golden Dawn. The issue of banning Golden Dawn has been coming 
and going for several years now. The viewpoint adopted almost unequivocally by the Greek 
political system was that it was impossible to ban the party in its entirety given that the Greek 
                                                          
2156
 Special Investigation Department: Athens Court of Appeal: Report to the President of the Greek Parliament 
regarding lifting the immunity of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament, Document Number 305. 19 February 2014,  
20 
2157
 Special Investigation Department: Athens Court of Appeal: Report to the President of the Greek Parliament 
regarding lifting the immunity of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament, Document Number 305. 19 February 2014,  
11  
2158
 Dimitris Psaras, ‘The Black Bible of Golden Dawn: The Documented History of a Nazi Group’ (‘Η Μαύρη 
Βίβλος της Χρυσής Αυγής, Ντοκουμέντα από την Ιστορία και τη Δράση μιας Ναζιστικής Ομάδας) (eds. 2012 Polis) 
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constitutional order does not provide for the prohibition of political parties. 
2159
 As a result of this 
certainty, each time a member of Golden Dawn was involved in the perpetration of a violent 
activity, the competent authorities avoided the investigation of the perpetrators’ link to Golden 
Dawn and,
2160
 subsequently, the ramifications of this interrelationship on the status of Golden 
Dawn as a political party. Moreover, on some occasions, relevant incidents carried out by 
Golden Dawn reached the parliament with the Ministry of Justice habitually condemning Nazism 
whilst systematically noting that an ideology cannot be persecuted but only actions.
2161
 The 
direct consequences of the State’s stance was that, in the name of an absolute freedom to 
establish and participate in political parties, Golden Dawn was not dismantled which contributed 
to its violent actions remaining unfettered. One of the few times the issue of banning Golden 
Dawn reached the parliament was in 1998. The Minister of Justice held that Golden Dawn is 
‘clear fascism. And as fascism it is a murderous act, a murderous ideology against the State.’2162 
However, he continued to note that care must be taken so that others do not say that ‘in Greece 
ideas are persecuted.’2163 Although an examination and discussion of the situation was instructed, 
this never took place. So, even in 1998, the State recognised the dangers posed by this party but 
never took constructive steps to move against it. Steps have also been taken by civil society in 
the realm of the party’s prohibition but, to no avail. Namely, in 2011, the Greek Helsinki 
Monitor filed a court claim requesting the District Attorney to commence procedures for banning 
Golden Dawn given that it violates Article 37.5 of Presidential Decree 96/5.6.2007 in 
combination with Article 29 (1) of the constitution. In the application, reference was made to the 
Nazi salutes of party members and references and photographs of the Nazi activity of Golden 
Dawn, but to no avail.  
 
The reluctance of the Greek legal order directly to incorporate provisions, which would allow for 
the prohibition of political parties could potentially emanate from the country’s experience with 
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Dimitris Psaras, ‘Golden Dawn before Justice’ (‘Η Χρυσή Αυγή Μπροστά στη Δικαιοσύνη’) (eds. Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation 2014), 10  
2160
Dimitris Psaras, ‘Golden Dawn before Justice’ (‘Η Χρυσή Αυγή Μπροστά στη Δικαιοσύνη’) (eds. Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation 2014), 10  
2161
Dimitris Psaras, ‘Golden Dawn before Justice’ (‘Η Χρυσή Αυγή Μπροστά στη Δικαιοσύνη’) (eds. Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation 2014), 10  
2162
 Greek Parliament Official Minutes – deliberation 18/2/1998: ‘Είναι καθαρός φασισμός. Και ως φασισμός είναι 
δολοφονική πράξη, δολοφονική ιδεολογία εναντίον του πολιτεύματος.’  
2163
 Greek Parliament Official Minutes – deliberation 18/2/1998: ‘πρέπει να εξετάσουμε το θέμα. Μην περιπέσουμε 
σε καμία άκρη και λένε ότι στην Ελλάδα διώκονται οι ιδέες.’ 
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hostility held against certain political parties. More particularly, Greece has demonstrated a long-
standing hostility to political parties with its peak being the prohibition of the ‘KKE - Communist 
Party of Greece’ (‘ΚΚΕ- Κουμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας’). 2164  In fact, during ECRI’s most 
recent visit to Greece, many civil society organisations held that they would consider the banning 
of a political party ‘with suspicion’2165 During the drafting period of the 1975 constitution, there 
were deliberations as to the possibility of including a direct limitation to Article 29, prohibiting 
political parties which seek to overthrow the democratic order or endanger the territorial integrity 
of the country. However, this possibility was not accepted.
2166
 The temporal framework of this 
decision is significant given the particular sensitivity of the parties of the centre and the left to 
issues of prohibition given that the KKE had only recently been legalised.
2167
  
 
It can, thus, be concluded that the temporal setting in which the 1975 constitution was drafted, 
which is in force today, with amendments, played a great role in relation to the way in which the 
freedom to found and join political parties was comprehended and designed. However, the 
necessity for parties to serve the free functioning of democratic government is a clear 
qualification of this right, establishing, at least indirectly, a limitation to its exercise. In fact, it 
could be argued that Golden Dawn is in contravention of the non-abuse clause found in Article 
25(3) of the constitution as it has exploited the provision on political parties to establish and run 
a violent organisation which carries out crimes relentlessly. The fact remains that had political 
will existed, this provision would be interpreted as above and Greece would have conformed to 
its international and European obligations which stipulate the necessity to prohibit racist parties 
and underline the limitation grounds of free association respectively. As noted by ECRI, ‘timely 
action’2168 should have been taken against such parties so as to ‘avoid an escalation of criminal 
                                                          
2164
 Nikolaos Mavrikas, ‘The Legal Personality of Political Parties as an Element of their Activities, Theory and 
Practice of Administrative Law’ (Η Νομική Προσωπικότητα των Πολιτικών Κομμάτων ως στοιχείο Άσκησης της 
Δράσης τους.’) (eds. Τεύχος 2011) 
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 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance: Report on Greece (24 February 2015) para. 26  
2166
 Dimitris Psaras, ‘Golden Dawn before Justice’ (‘Η Χρυσή Αυγή Μπροστά στη Δικαιοσύνη’) (eds. Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation 2014), 12 
2167
 Dimitris Psaras, ‘Golden Dawn before Justice’ (‘Η Χρυσή Αυγή Μπροστά στη Δικαιοσύνη’) (eds. Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation 2014), 12  
2168
 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance: Report on Greece (24 February 2015) para. 26 
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activities.’2169 However, this was not done and, instead, Golden Dawn remained untouched for 
several years.  
 
4.1.2 (ii) Freedom of Assembly 
Article 11 of the constitution provides that ‘Greeks shall have the right to assemble peaceably 
and unarmed.’ 2170Article 1(2) of Law 794/1971 on Public Assemblies defines, for purposes of 
that law, a public assembly as a pre-organised event regarding the ideology or opinion of the 
participants or to the participation in lectures or in the manifestation of common requests.  
Article 1(3) holds that religious, commercial, entertainment or athletic assemblies do not fall 
within the framework of this law. Presidential Decree 141/1911 on the competences of the police 
force defines an assembly as a pre-arranged concentration of many people for the same reason 
for purposes of decision-making and common action. Article 11(2) of the constitution holds that 
the police may be present only at outdoor public assemblies and that such assemblies may be 
prohibited ‘by a reasoned police authority decision, in general if a serious threat to public 
security is imminent, and in a specific area, if a serious disturbance of social and economic life is 
threatened, as specified by law.’ 2171Law 794/1971 on Public Assemblies provides for peaceful 
and unarmed assembly.
2172
 This statute was passed during the years of the Junta but remains in 
force today. It has several unconstitutional provisions which are no longer valid. Article 1 (4) 
provides that this law is applicable only to pre-organised assemblies whilst the prohibition of 
instantanenous assemblies is incumbent on the free judgement of the police.  The organiser of the 
assembly is also considered its president and this person must inform the police of the time and 
place of the assembly.
2173
Article 6(1), therein, reiterates what is held in part 2 of Article 11 of the 
constitution, namely that the police may prohibit a public outdoor assembly if it is determined 
that there is an issue of endangering public order and security, insofar as preventing this cannot 
be achieved through softer police measures. Softer measures may include those provided in part 
4 of the article and include a change of time or place of the assembly. Any restrictions to an 
                                                          
2169
 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance: Report on Greece (24 February 2015) para. 26 
2170
 Oι Έλληνες έχουν το δικαίωμα να συνέρχονται ήσυχα και χωρίς όπλα.  
2171
 Mόνο στις δημόσιες υπαίθριες συναθροίσεις μπορεί να παρίσταται η αστυνομία. Oι υπαίθριες συναθροίσεις 
μπορούν να απαγορευτούν με αιτιολογημένη απόφαση της αστυνομικής αρχής, γενικά, αν εξαιτίας τους επίκειται 
σοβαρός κίνδυνος για τη δημόσια ασφάλεια, σε ορισμένη δε περιοχή, αν απειλείται σοβαρή διατάραξη της 
κοινωνικοοικονομικής ζωής, όπως νόμος ορίζει. 
2172
 Article 1.1 and Article 11 of Law 749/1971 
2173
Article 3(4) Law 794/1971 
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assembly must be communicated to the president of the assembly at least eight hours before the 
assembly is to take place.
2174
 Further requirements that need to be met in order to hold an 
assembly are included in this article, such as certain prohibited areas where no assembly may 
take place, the maximum amount of persons that can take place in an assembly and the fact that 
assemblies may be made up only of persons on foot. Article 9 of this law provides for 
punishment in the form of imprisonment and a monetary fine if, amongst others, the organisers 
and/or members of the assembly do not inform the police of the assembly or they carry out an 
assembly which has been deemed prohibited or if they continue to carry out the assembly which 
the police has dismantled. Further, Article 171 of the Penal Code provides that whoever takes 
part in a prohibited public assembly is punished with imprisonment of up to six months or a 
monetary fine. Further, if the competent military or civil authority calls for the assembly to be 
dismantled and a participant of such an assembly does not follow such instructions after the third 
request, he or she is punished with imprisonment or a monetary fine. Article 189 of the Penal 
Code provides for the punishment of persons participating in violent assembly/ carrying out 
and/or inciting violent activities. In addition to the above, Presidential Decree 141/1911 deals 
with the competences of the police in relation to dealing with assemblies, providing for issues 
such as the use of force and the distinction of public and private assembles.  
  
In light of the above, Greece permits peaceful assemblies, limits the powers of the State to 
interfere in private assemblies and outlines the precise temporal and contextual frameworks in 
which the police may interfere with violent assemblies. However, despite the legislative 
efficiency of this country in seeking to ensure the right to peaceful assemblies whilst seeking 
legitimacy and measure in relation to State interference, in the latest Concluding Observations of 
the ICERD the Committee noted its concern regarding human rights violations committed by the 
police towards demonstrators and the lack of investigations into perpetrators. In addition, it noted 
that during demonstrations, groups of persons such as journalists and peaceful demonstrators 
were ‘threatened, intimidated and harassed by members of extremist groups such as Golden 
Dawn.’ 2175 
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Article 5(5) Law 794/1971 
2175
 Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations – Greece, CCPR/C/GRC/CO/2  (3 December 2015) 8   
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4.1.3 Non-Discrimination 
The Greek constitution contains a general non-discrimination clause in Article 5(2). This holds 
that ‘all persons living within the Greek territory shall enjoy full protection of their life, honour 
and liberty irrespective of nationality, race or language and of religious or political beliefs. 
Exceptions shall be permitted only in cases provided by international law.’2176 However, before 
the transposition of Directives 2000/78/EC and 2000/43/EC into the national legal system 
through Law 3304/2005 ‘on the application of the principle of equal treatment regardless of 
racial or ethnic origin, religious or other beliefs, disability, age or status,’ the anti-discrimination 
framework of this country was generalised and abstract, with the general non-discrimination 
provision of the constitution constituting the only source of law on the issue.  As such, law 
3304/2005 ‘fills a conspicuous lacuna in the Greek Legal System.’2177  More particularly, non-
discrimination is incorporated as a general principle in the Greek constitution but it was only 
following the passing of the 2005 law that this abstract depiction of the principle has been put 
into effect, always in the areas and vis-à-vis the target groups set out by Directives 2000/43/EC 
and 2000/78/EC. An equivalent of the non-discrimination framework analysis was not 
effectuated in the chapter on England and Wales given that this was not necessary due to the 
contextual framework. More particularly, in Greece, Golden Dawn carries out activities such as 
soup-kitchens and blood donations for Greeks only. This, as well as other practices conducted by 
this party’s members, has led to the enforcement and/or relevance of the non-discrimination 
framework. Such practices have not been carried out by the far-right in England and Wales and, 
as such, the analysis of the parts of the Equality Act dealing with, for example, access to goods 
and services is not necessary.  
 
Article 1 of the Greek non-discrimination law holds that its purpose is the establishment of a 
general anti-discrimination framework in relation to racial or ethnic origin as well as an anti-
discrimination framework in relation to other grounds such as religion, disability, age or status in 
relation to employment. Article 4 prohibits discrimination in relation to the ‘access to and supply 
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of goods and services which are available to the public, including housing’ but only in respect of 
race and ethnic origin, a minimum standard set out by the racial equality directive. Further, 
Article 16.1 provides for criminal sanctions in the event of discrimination in the realm of 
accessing goods and services. This provision holds that ‘whoever violates the prohibition of 
discriminatory treatment on the grounds of ethnic or racial origin or religious or other beliefs, 
disability, age or sexual orientation, with respect to the supply of goods or the offer of services to 
the public is punished with six months’ imprisonment and a fine of 1000 – 1500 Euros.’ Article 
4.2 holds that the law is applicable to differences based on nationality or to the regulation of the 
entrance and of third country nationals or stateless persons or the treatment linked to their legal 
status as third country nationals or stateless persons.  This is reiterated in Article 8.2. This law is 
applicable to the public and private spheres.
2178
 The law mandates three institutions for the 
promotion of the principle of equal treatment, one of which is the Ombudsperson, who is 
entrusted with the promotion of equal treatment regardless of racial or ethnic origin, religious or 
other beliefs, age, disability or sexual orientation in the public sector. 
 
Thus, taking into account the provisions of Article 4(1) and 16(1) in relation to non-
discrimination in relation to accessing goods and services, insofar as this discrimination is based 
on racial or ethnic origin, two issues pertaining to Golden Dawn may arise. Firstly, that there 
exists a national non-discrimination framework which may be used to punish the  discriminatory 
activities of Golden Dawn, such as the soup kitchen and blood donations for Greeks only. 
Secondly, that, notwithstanding the countless number of such activities that have taken place 
even after the enforcement of the non-discrimination law, this law has never been used for the 
collective activities of Golden Dawn. Instead prosecution of such discrimination has occurred in 
two cases, only one of which could rely on the non-discrimination law, for reasons discussed 
below. Firstly, in 2013, a bus driver of a transport company of the city of Thessaloniki forced 
two passengers of African descent to get off the bus for no apparent reason. When the other 
passengers criticised this behaviour, the driver provocatively declared that he was a Golden 
Dawn supporter. An association, the Nazi-Free Thessaloniki Assembly, filed a complaint to the 
Organisation of Public Transportation of Thessaloniki. The case resulted in the intervention of 
the Misdemeanours Prosecutor of Thessaloniki who ordered a preliminary inquiry into the case. 
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The court found the perpetrator guilty of denying access to services on racial grounds, holding 
that the bus driver’s conduct offended the victims’ dignity and created an intimidating, 
humiliating or offensive environment, without however referring to the term ‘harassment.’2179 It 
ordered his ten-month imprisonment suspended for three years and a fine of 1000 Euros.
2180
 This 
was the first time that Article 16, which provides for criminal penalties for discriminatory 
behaviour in the supply of goods and services, was enforced, reflecting a nine year delay from 
the law’s creation.2181 Secondly, in 2014, a Greek doctor and member of Golden Dawn posted a 
‘Jews not Welcome’ sign outside his office and was subsequently arrested for inciting racial 
discrimination, in violation of anti-racist Law 972/1979.
2182
 This incident falls within the 
framework of Law 3004/2005 as the doctor, through his sign, ousted an entire ethnic and/or 
religious group from the provision of his services. However, the Prosecutor had to pursue this 
case in the realm of Law 972/1979 which can be instigated ex officio, due to the fact that there 
was no identified victim of the aforementioned conduct. Therefore, since a case cannot be 
brought before judicial bodies without a designated victim under the anti-discrimination law, the 
only path available in the realm of ethnic and racial discrimination is the anti-racist law. Thus, 
whilst there exists another option in the framework of supply of goods and services for persons 
discriminated against due to their race or ethnicity, even if no consenting victim is identified for 
purposes of a trial, no such alternative is available for the other groups protected by equal 
treatment legislation. So, the necessity of a consenting victim is a direct result of the provisions 
of the directives and not a deviation by the State from its European obligations. Either way, such 
characteristics of the law are considered by institutions, such as ECRI, to constitute shortcomings 
that directly affect the practical applicability and scope of the equal treatment framework of 
Member States which choose to apply the directives’ provisions as minimally as possible. 
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5. The Far-Right Movement and Criminal Law  
This section will consider how criminal law can be used for purposes of challenging the rhetoric 
and/or activities of the far-right.  To this end, there will firstly be an analysis of the anti-racist 
legislation Law 927/1989 On Punishing Acts or Activities Aiming at Racial Discrimination as 
amended by Law 4285/2014, for purposes of harmonising the national system with Framework 
Decision 2008/913/JHA. Within this framework there will an assessment of aggravation and 
sentencing, as provided for in the Criminal Code but amended by Law 4285/2014. Following this 
analysis there will be an assessment of the offence of leading or participating in a criminal 
organisation, as prohibited by Article 187 of the Criminal Code, which is the provision upon 
which the State is currently relying for purposes of dismantling Golden Dawn and prosecuting its 
members and leadership. After assessing the relevant provision on criminal organisations, the 
section will consider the anti-terror provisions available. This is significant with a view to 
ascertaining whether the anti-terror sphere can be relevant or useful for purposes of challenging 
the far-right and raising the issue that the State has chosen to steer away from anti-terror 
provisions in prosecuting Golden Dawn.  
 
5.1 Law 927/1979 – Anti-Racist Legislation 
Law 927/1979 is the central piece of legislation which seeks to combat racism as manifested 
through speech and activities. It was amended in 2014 through Law 4285/2014
2183
 for purposes 
of harmonising national law with Framework Decision 2008/913 on combatting certain forms 
and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. The Greek legal system has 
had a piece of legislation tackling hateful speech and activities directed at racial and ethnic 
groups since 1979 and religious groups since 1984. This law was amended in 2014, with some of 
the amendments restricting the offences and creating higher thresholds. 
 
Although the law is ‘on punishing acts or activities aiming at racial discrimination,’ following 
the 2014 amendments, it incorporated grounds such as disability as a protected characteristic and 
therefore, deals with a broader range of issues, falling outside the framework of racial 
discrimination. The report on the law’s evaluation stated that the law was rarely implemented 
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and deemed insufficient due to the serious challenges faced by the country in the particular 
temporal framework in which the amendments were being discussed. The report refers to issues 
such as the transition into a multicultural society and the equal protection of all persons 
regardless of characteristics such as physical or cultural ones. For these reasons, it was 
considered necessary to adopt a new and improved piece of legislation to tackle, in a more 
effective manner, manifestations of racist and xenophobic behaviour.
2184
 The explanatory report 
refers to the risk of violating the freedom of expression when seeking to criminalise racist and 
xenophobic manifestations and referred to provisions that should be followed including, inter 
alia, Articles 10, 14 and 17 of the ECHR.
2185
 The passing of the law came with ‘intense political 
controversy’2186 with different political parties putting forth different draft laws before agreeing 
upon the final version. The law has been condemned before and after its passing, mainly due to 
concerns over free expression, with a particular focus on Article 12. For example, Greek 
academics, in a written statement signed by one hundred and thirty nine academics, expressed 
their reservation to Article 2 at the stage of its deliberation.
2187
 In fact, during the deliberations 
on the bill, one of the arguments against its passing was that its provisions violate free speech, as 
reflected in the public deliberation on the law.
2188
 The way in which the State tackles the issue of 
free expression within the realm of the law under consideration becomes clear in its report 
following the public deliberation at the time when the amending law was a bill. It was noted that 
the protection of free expression is of utmost importance and gave an example of the type of 
behaviour punishable under the new law, namely the incitement to violence of a mob armed with 
bats and chains looking for victims which do not conform with their racial, religious or cultural 
standards. However, this reflects the intention of the State to attach rather high thresholds to 
what is considered prohibited conduct under the law, underlining violence as a potential 
requirement. This goes against the supranational position adopted, for example, by the ECtHR.  
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Law 927/1979 includes provisions on the criminalisation of, inter alia, hate speech, including the 
denial of international war crimes such as genocide. Article 1 deals with the public incitement to 
violence, hatred or discrimination against a person or group of persons due to their race, colour, 
religion, status, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability if this poses a 
danger to public order or constitutes a threat to the life, liberty or physical integrity of the person 
or persons. Article 1 does not refer to the grounds of language and citizenship. This is not a 
requirement of the Framework Decision but had been recommended by ECRI.
2189
A person guilty 
of such an offence is punished with a prison sentence ranging from three months to three years 
and with a monetary fine of five thousand to twenty thousand euros. Part 2 of this article deals 
with damage to the property of persons on grounds of their protected characteristics insofar as 
this may cause harm to public order. A person found guilty under Article 1(2) receives the same 
punishment as that provided for in Article 1(1). If the incitement results in a criminal act, the 
punishment increases to imprisonment of at least six months and a monetary fine of fifteen to 
thirty thousand euros.
2190
 This is below what is provided for in the Framework Decision which 
holds, in Article 3(2), therein, that the aforementioned conduct should be punishable by criminal 
penalties of a maximum of between one and three years’ imprisonment. In sum, the above 
provisions punish hate speech insofar as it incites, inter alia, violence against a person or damage 
to property. However, there is no definition in the national law of, for example, what is to 
constitute hatred, nor any qualification made as to whether definitions offered in the Framework 
Decision are adopted. As well as the above, Article 1(f) criminalises hateful organisations. More 
particularly, this provision holds that whoever creates or participates in an organisation or league 
of persons in any form, which pursues the systematic perpetuation of criminal activities as 
described in parts 1 and 2 of the same article (harm against persons and harm against property 
insofar as, inter alia, public order is disrupted) is punished with imprisonment of three months to 
three years and with a monetary fine of between five and twenty thousand Euros, insofar that this 
is not punished more severely through another provision. Although the article on prohibited 
organisations incorporates the possibility of a higher punishment if one is available, the fact 
remains that the law gives the same punishment for an individual act which may incite hate as it 
does for an organised movement of persons who seek to incite hate, with the element of a group 
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denoting an organised movement, systematic activities and, potentially, more serious 
consequences. Nevertheless, Article 1(4) on prohibited organisations is a significant tool to 
combat organised and semi-organised far-right movements. Article 1(2) of the old law prohibited 
the establishment and participation in organisations which promote propaganda or actions 
pertaining to racial discrimination. With the 2014 amendments, the relevant provision extends 
the range of target groups which are to be protected from prohibited organisations, clarifies that 
an organisation can take any form and, as such, one could assume it could take the form of a 
political party. The new provision holds that prohibited organisations are ones which 
systematically carry out the activities of parts 1 and 2 of the Article, with all the restrictions and 
qualifications that come with them, thereby narrowing the scope of this Article in that sense. 
Even though the prohibition of organisations promoting racial discrimination existed in the old 
law, this was never used to dismantle Golden Dawn and, given that the 2014 amendments 
entered into force following the State’s crackdown on the party which commenced in 2013, the 
utility of this provision in the face of Golden Dawn is non-existent. Article 2 of the law deals 
with publicly condoning, trivialising or maliciously denying the existence or severity of 
international crimes such as genocide. The construction of this article became the issue of the 
2016 court case against German historian Heinz Richter mentioned above, regarding his writings 
on the Nazi invasion of Crete. The Court found that the new Article 2’s provision that the crimes 
must have been recognised by, amongst other institutions, the Greek Parliament is 
unconstitutional. More particularly, it found that, by incorporating the provision that such crimes 
must have been recognised by the Greek Parliament (and not the Greek judiciary), the legislature 
has taken the role of the judiciary by ascertaining the legal existence of crimes. Moreover, the 
Court noted that the provision was purposely left out of the Framework Decision referring to the 
recognition of such crimes by decisions of international and/or national courts only. As such, the 
legislators exceeded the constitutional limits of the legislature, violated the constitutional 
principle of the legality of crimes and attempted to intervene unacceptably in judicial powers. 
Either way, the punishment for crimes that fall within this article are the same as those for 
Article 1 (1). Furthermore, Article 3 deals with jurisdiction when the forum used for 
communication is the internet and Article 4 provides for the responsibility of legal persons or a 
league of persons, two points which are new additions to the law following the 2014 
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amendments. Article 4 allows for the ex officio prosecution of crimes provided for in this law.
2191
 
This is not a new provision as prosecution for racist crimes (not general hate crimes on the 
grounds provided for in the amended law) could be prosecuted ex officio since 2005.
2192
 
However, as noted by the Ombudsperson, the power of ex officio prosecution has not been 
exercised by authorities.
2193
 What is conspicuously missing from this law is the provision on 
aiding and abetting the crimes described in Articles 1 and 2, as so required by the Framework 
Decision. Instead there are some general provisions in the Penal Code that could be relied on for 
such purposes. In light of the above, the 2014 amendments have brought both positive and 
negative aspects to the current anti-racist legal framework of the country. In some respects it 
offers more restrictive tools to the State to challenge the far-right as is the case, for example, 
with the necessity for there to be an issue of public order attached to expression which incites, 
inter alia, violence as it includes a wider array of protected characteristics, even though such 
characteristics would not habitually have been foreseen to fall within an anti-racist framework. 
 
Since its inception in 1979, this law has seldom been relied upon to combat the offences found 
therein,
2194
 with biased conduct rarely being acknowledged as such by the police and/or the 
Courts. In fact in 2012, the Minister of Justice recognised that ‘few prosecutions for crimes 
regulated by Law 927/1979 have been initiated in recent years.’2195 This is particularly the case 
regarding the law as it stood before the 2014 amendments with the post-amendment period being 
too short to conclude upon its application, although some positive steps can be discerned, as 
discussed in section 5.1. However, assessing the implementation of the anti-racist law is a 
complex task given the lack of relevant statistics and the absence of a central hate crime 
database.
2196
 Around sixty law suits have been filed under the anti-racist law and almost all of 
these have come from the Greek Helsinki monitor but very few have resulted in a conviction. 
The law was relied upon again in the 2010 case against Constantinos Plevris, founder of the 
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party 4
th 
August and Front Line and member of LAOS and the newspaper ‘Eleftheros Kosmos’ 
for Plevris’ book ‘Jews – The Whole Truth.’ (Εβραίοι – ‘’Όλη η Αλήθεια’). Notwithstanding that 
Plevris had been prosecuted ex officio and was convicted at first instance on the basis of Law 
927/1979, receiving a fourteen month suspended prison sentence, he was subsequently acquitted 
by the Athens Appeal Court in 2009. 
2197
A motion for cassation was dismissed.
2198
The Athens 
Appeal Court held that the writings were not directed at Jews ‘solely because of their racial and 
ethnic origin; but mainly because of their aspirations to world power, the methods they use to 
achieve these aims and their conspiracy activities.’2199 This is notwithstanding the fact that the 
book included extracts such as: 
Adolf Hitler: The tragic leader of the German Third Reich is certainly the most impressive 
leadership figure of the modern age… Human history will blame Adolf Hitler for the following: 
1. He could have rid Europe of the Jews, but did not; 2. He did not use the special chemical 
weapons, which only Germany possessed, to gain a victory... Because of the defeat of Germany 
then, the White Race and Europe are at risk now… The day will come when Europeans will 
either dominate or be destroyed. Either way they will acknowledge that Hitler was right...’2200 
 
Such an extract, the few of many equivalent extracts, demonstrates the weakness in the Supreme 
Court’s argument that the book was not directed to Jews because of their racial and ethnic origin.  
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for cassation in the interests of law, placing great 
importance on free speech.
2201
 The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights noted 
that the judiciary did ‘not manage to effectively apply Law 927/1979’2202 in this case.  
 
However, there are other examples, one of which is ongoing, which demonstrates the use of this 
law to combat the rhetoric of Golden Dawn. More particularly, in Case 65738/2014,
2203
 the 
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Court found a member and parliamentary candidate of Golden Dawn guilty of inciting racial 
violence against migrants in the area of Agios Panteleimonas in front of a camera. He said that 
‘we are ready to open the ovens... To make soaps. Not for the people…since we may fall ill…we 
will take their hair and will sell it at Monastiraki.’ These were some of the phrases he used to talk 
about migrants in the area. The Court recognised that these statements were exaggerations but 
held that they demonstrated his conviction publicly to provoke people to cause harm to 
immigrants. His racist motive was recognised and he was sentenced to one year of imprisonment 
under the anti-racist law. Further, on the 16
th
 February 2016, the Supreme Court requested 
Parliament to lift the immunity of three MPs of Golden Dawn so that they can be charged under 
the anti-racist law in relation to leaflets they disseminated which included phrases such as 
‘Illegal Immigrants Out’ and ‘Greece belongs to Greece.’ Also in its newspaper and in other 
sources, it referred to an assembly it carried out entitled ‘a protest against illegal immigrants. No 
to racism against Greeks.’ It must be noted that these particular statements of Golden Dawn are 
much lower on the hierarchy of hate when taking into account the rhetoric and activities of this 
group that have been evident over the past years, as discussed in this chapter. However, no 
efforts were effectively made to tackle these through the anti-racist legislation. In fact, it is 
debatable whether the 2016 case and the statements of the party do, in fact, fall within the realm 
of Article 1 of the law. Either way this case potentially demonstrates a shift in the State’s 
approach.  
 
Thus, although there has been a legislative framework that could have been used against acts of 
the far-right since 1979, this has rarely been used to tackle far-right hate, with the Council of 
Europe Commissioner of Human Rights noting ‘the serious gap in training and awareness 
concerning anti-racism legislation and practice for police, prosecutors and judges.’ 2204  The 
investigation of bias at the stage in which a complaint is filed is of utmost importance since time 
and again it has been noted that bias motivation is not recorded by the police, even if they are 
confronted with a hate crime victim.
2205
 In relation to this, the Police Circular 7100/4/3 of 2006 
is a useful tool for the adequate and effective investigation of such bias. The circular requires 
that the police investigate the motivation of a crime, collect relevant information and report hate 
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crime incidents and record, amongst others, the racial, ethnic and religious groups of the victim 
where relevant. However, this Circular was not accompanied by training and other methods to 
ensure its implementation and, as noted by the Ombudsperson, it has remained unused.
2206
 So, as 
is the case with the anti-racist legislation, significant tools available to the State to challenge the 
far-right have remained unused.
2207
 In addition to the limitations that emanate from lack of 
awareness and expertise lies the lack of trust in law enforcement agencies, particularly amongst 
victims of hate crime which is a result of the incidents of ill treatment of migrants and Roma 
especially by law enforcement officials and, at the same time, the lack of adequate investigations 
into hate crime.
2208
 The lack of trust in the police also emanates from the ‘persistent and 
continuing allegations, some of which were officially investigated, of collusion between police 
officers and Golden Dawn.’2209 The link between the police and Golden Dawn is a serious issue 
that also arose during the onset of the party’s trial. In addition, there have been several reports of 
the police requesting alleged victims of hate crimes to pay the amount of one hundred Euros for 
purposes of lodging their complaint. This practice went against the law given that Article 46 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure requests that such a fee is to be paid for cases which are not 
prosecuted ex officio.  Article 5 of the 2014 amending law incorporated a provision which 
directly excluded the payment of such fees for filing a hate crime complaint. Furthermore, up 
until 2014, national law placed undocumented migrants who were victims of hate crime at risk of 
detention and deportation. As a result, such migrants were reluctant to report the crime to the 
police or even to visit public health care services.
2210
 However, Ministerial Decision 30651 of 
2014 allows for the issuance of a residence permit on humanitarian grounds to migrants who are 
victims of or key witnesses to hate crime and are valid until the case is closed or the final court 
judgement is passed.
2211
 For a permit to be issued, criminal proceedings must have been initiated. 
Although this is a positive step which develops the law in a manner in which it can provide 
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enhanced protection to victims of hate crime and subsequently challenge the far-right, as argued 
by ECRI, it would have been more effective for there to be an ‘automatic suspension of the 
deportation orders rather than leaving it to ministerial discretion.’2212 The victim of the attempted 
homicide in Pireaus by members of Golden Dawn (the Egyptian fishermen case), was the first 
person to receive a humanitarian permit under this provision.
2213
 
 
In light of the above, Greece has had anti-racist legislation since 1979 which renders criminally 
punishable rhetoric and activities which fall within the sphere of the far-right. This piece of 
legislation has undergone certain amendments since that time, bringing changes such as the 
incorporation of a religion protected characteristic and in 2014 underwent major changes for 
purposes of harmonising national law with the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA. 
These amendments brought about several changes to the current law, broadening its scope in 
some respects, such as by incorporating a larger number of protected characteristics but also 
limiting it as is manifested in the necessary interrelation between hateful speech and public 
disorder.  In addition, Greece recognised the need to crack down on hate crime, albeit not 
directly recognising the correlation between such crimes and Golden Dawn. Such recognition is 
manifested in, for example, the 2006 Police Circular on bias motivation and in the establishment 
of regional departments in Athens and Thessaloniki and special units to tackle racist violence 
who have the duty to conduct investigations into racist crime, carry out an ex officio investigation 
and receive complaints in person or through a hotline.
2214
 However, there ‘is little evidence so far 
of their effectiveness.’2215  Moreover, the anti-racist legislation remains essentially used with 
some sporadic reliance on the law whilst other measures, such as the anti-racist units and the 
Police Circular on bias motivation, have not brought about a significant change or results. 
Moreover, there are real and practical obstacles, such as the link between the police and Golden 
Dawn, especially and more evidently before the latter’s trial, which prevented victims from filing 
complaints. Following the assessment of the anti-racist law which, inter alia,  prohibits certain 
types of rhetoric and actions against particular groups as well as the establishment and 
participation of groups which seek to incite certain actions through their rhetoric, it is now 
                                                          
2212
 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance: Report on Greece (24 February 2015) para. 84 
2213
 Civil Action (Case files ΑΒΜ Φ2013/3990, ΑΒΜ Φ2012/979 and 979Α) 15 
2214
 Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Racism, Discrimination, Intolerance and Extremism: learning from experiences in 
Greece and Hungary’ (2013) 14 
2215
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance: Report on Greece (24 February 2015) para. 77 
466 
 
necessary to consider further provisions of Greek criminal law that can be used to challenge the 
far-right, namely those pertaining to aggravation and sentencing.  
 
5.2 Aggravating, Sentencing and Hate Crimes 
Since 2008, the aggravating circumstance of a crime has been incorporated into Article 79 (3) of 
the criminal law which provided (since 2008)
2216
 that carrying out an act of ethnic, racial, 
religious hatred or hatred based on the victim’s status constitutes an aggravating circumstance. 
Since 2013,
2217
 the grounds of aggravation were extended to cover the colour, sexual orientation 
and gender identity of the victim. In addition it provided that a sentence in such a situation 
cannot be suspended. Article 79 provided courts with the opportunity to take into consideration 
the aforementioned circumstances at the time of sentencing. This provision acknowledged the 
particular weight of such a circumstance and allowed courts to take it into account so as to hand 
down the maximum sentence possible without the possibility of its suspension. However, it did 
not provide the Court with the opportunity to give a higher sentence than it could hand down for 
the equivalent crime which had no bias motive. The non-use of this provision can be 
demonstrated in some cases. A case
2218
 that demonstrates this point occurred in 2014 when a 
member of Golden Dawn participated in the fascist attack of a hit squad against a hair salon run 
by a Pakistani immigrant. He, along with eight others entered the salon and attacked the two 
Pakistani employees and one Greek client. They then exited the salon and threw a self-made 
Molotov bomb into the property. This case did not result in the investigation of racist motives by 
the police. It must be noted that similar attacks continued to occur over the following weeks in 
the same area. The case involves Kontomos, who acted along with eight other people. He was 
sentenced to fourteen years and three months imprisonment as an accomplice in an attempted 
homicide, dangerous bodily harm, robbery and possession of explosives. However, as with the 
police, the court did not use the provision of aggravation due to a racist motive, as contained in 
Article 79(3) applicable at the material time.
2219
 Further, in 2012, the Magistrates Court only 
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imposed a suspended sentence of eight months and a pecuniary fine of two-hundred Euros on a 
Golden Dawn member who had violently attacked a member of the Muslim minority in 
Thrace.
2220
 However, there are some exceptions to the non-use of the legal framework but also to 
the habitual inaction of the authorities. In the 2014 case of Sachzat Lukman, a migrant from 
Pakistan, who was stabbed to death by two members of Golden Dawn when he was on his 
bicycle going to work, authorities found Golden Dawn material and weapons at the perpetrators’ 
houses. The Court recognised Article 79(3) and the ‘racist fury’ of the perpetrators and found 
them guilty of, amongst other, homicide with intent, illegal possession carrying and use of 
weapons. The Court did not recognise any mitigating factors and handed down the highest 
sentences possible, more particularly life sentences for both for the intentional homicide plus 
thirty-two months for the other offences.
2221
 Although the Court placed the sentencing of the 
perpetrators within the framework of a racist motive, in their words, racist fury, an interesting 
point to make was their reference to Golden Dawn. More particularly, the Court held that their 
membership of this party was not relevant to criminal responsibility. This is a weak point of the 
judgement and reflective of the general stance of the judiciary towards Golden Dawn’s actions, 
since they were not willing to recognise the link between the perpetration of criminal acts and 
Golden Dawn as a violent entity. Following Lukman’s murder, Amnesty International 
announced that this crime was not an isolated incident and that urgent measures need to be 
taken.
2222
 This case has been included in the case-file against Golden Dawn as presented to the 
Supreme Court.
2223
 In case 1079/2014, the Court found four members of Golden Dawn guilty of 
attacking Pakistani immigrants working at an olive factory. According to the decision they ‘acted 
with xenophobic and racist feelings.’ 2224 In case 60084/2013,2225 two members of Golden Dawn 
had been found guilty of the arson of a bar owned by a Cameroonian national. The Court found 
that their actions were ‘prompted by hate due to the racial and ethnic origin of the civil plaintiff’ 
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and sentenced them to forty-one months’ imprisonment. However, notwisthanding some positive 
steps and use of the aggravation provision, the fact remains that Article 79(3) has rarely been 
used.
2226
 
 
Part 3 of Article 79 was replaced by Article 10 of Law 4285/2014 which brought about further 
changes to the Criminal Code in relation to hate crimes. More particularly, Article 10 
incorporates Article 81A, an article entitled ‘racist crime’ and provides that: 
 
If the act is carried out of hate due to the victim’s race, colour, religion, descent, ethnic 
origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability, sentencing increases as follows: 
a) in the event of a misdemeanour, for which the foreseen sentence is between ten days 
and one year’ imprisonment, the lowest sentence is increased by six months and by one 
year in the rest of the cases of a misdemeanour.  
b) in the event of a felony, for which the foreseen sentence is between five and ten years’ 
imprisonment, the lowest sentence is increased by two years and by three years for the 
rest of the cases of a felony; and 
c) fines are doubled 
The lowest sentence is not suspendable  
 
Thus, although this article is entitled ‘Racist Crimes,’ it is actually a provision on hate crime. As 
such, this article is significant as it embeds hate crime as a provision in itself within the Greek 
Criminal Code and not simply within the ambit of aggravating circumstances and sentencing, as 
previously set out. Also, this provision provides for higher sentences for hate crimes as opposed 
to the old law which simply enabled the courts to provide the highest sentence possible without 
suspension. Further, Article 10 amends Article 61 of the Criminal Code, incorporating the 
situation described in Article 81A above as a reason for depriving the perpetrator of his/her civil 
rights for one to five years. On the one hand this is a positive amendment, on the other however, 
the issue of hate crime continues directly to link the issue of hatred to sentencing and does not set 
out, for example, the consideration of a racist backdrop of a crime to be considered throughout 
judicial proceedings. No amendments were made, for example, to the Code of Criminal 
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Procedure in relation to, for example, the consideration of a racist backdrop of a crime at the 
investigation stage. Although the 2006 Police Circular exists on the consideration of hateful 
motivations, as discussed in section 5.1, an amendment to the aforementioned codes and an 
adoption of the approach that the elements of a hate crime are to be considered throughout the 
entire procedure and not just in relation to sentencing would have ensured a more effective legal 
framework in relation to such crimes. Moreover, time will tell if Courts decide systematically 
and effectively to use the 2014 amendments in relation to hate crime sentencing. As noted by 
ECRI, authorities must closely monitor the way in which Article 81A will be used by the Courts 
and whether it will overcome the problems caused by Article 79(3)
2227
 
 
5.3 Advances, Amendments and Alterations in the Sphere of Criminal Law 
The Greek legal order has undergone several developments over the past few years such as the 
2014 amendments which included, amongst others, an enhanced recognition of hate crimes. It 
has also undergone other significant amendments which should, theoretically, facilitate the 
access to justice of victims of hate crime. For example, since 2001 and with Law 2910/2001, 
crimes incorporated in the anti-racist law can be prosecuted ex officio, even though, as reflected 
in the examination of available jurisprudence, this is not relied on by authorities. Further, a 
Special Prosecutor
2228
 has been appointed for the investigation of racist crimes in the region of 
Athens. Before the establishment of this body, legal practitioners had indicated to the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights that such a development would allow for the 
consideration of a racist motive from the onset of proceedings, rather than merely considering 
such a motive at the end of the trial in terms of sentencing.
2229
 However, this post only exists for 
the region of Athens with the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
recommending its extension into other areas to ensure adequate and geographical fairness in 
relation to the effective implementation of the anti-racist law,
2230
 insofar as the Special 
Prosecutor can bring about such results. Further, Presidential Decree 132.2012 established 
several departments and bureaus for combatting violence based on racial, ethnic or religious 
hatred. More particularly, two anti-racist departments were established, one in the region of 
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Attiki and one in Thessaloniki whilst sixty-eight bureaus were established in different police 
departments throughout the country.
2231
 They can carry out investigations into racist attacks, 
carry out an ex officio investigation and receive complaints through a hotline.
2232
 Although this is 
a positive development on a theoretical level, in 2015, ECRI noted that there was little evidence 
of their effective functioning.
2233
 In addition, the barriers to reporting a hate crime have been 
partly tackled through Article 44(1) of Law 3386/2004 as amended. This article allows the 
Ministry of Interior to grant a residence permit on humanitarian grounds to migrants (third 
country nationals) who are victims of crimes provided for in Articles 1 and 2 of Law 927/1979 
and Article 16.1 of Law 3304/2005
2234
 in the event that a criminal prosecution has commenced 
and up until the moment that a final judgement has been delivered.
2235
 
 
As such, within the realm of anti-racist legislation, it can be said that Greece, albeit with certain 
limitations, has an adequate framework of criminal law that should be relied upon to tackle the 
activities and rhetoric of the far-right. It cannot be doubted that over the past few years this 
country has taken significant steps in improving this particular aspect of its legal order, 
incorporating the 2008 EU Framework Decision, albeit restrictively in some areas, establishing a 
Special Prosecutor for racist crimes and seeking to overcome certain reporting obstacles by 
allowing for the granting of residence permits on humanitarian grounds for victims of hate crime. 
However, as noted by the ICERD Committee in its latest Concluding Observations, and as 
continues to be the case today, notwithstanding some positive changes brought about following 
the crackdown on Golden Dawn, such as the fall in hate crime and increased recognition of bias 
in some court cases, this country is ‘not effectively implementing legal provisions aimed at 
eliminating racial discrimination and in particular those relating to the prosecution and 
punishment of racially motivated crimes.’2236 The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights shares this view, arguing that there is an ‘ineffective application or non-application of the 
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existing anti-racism legislation’2237 and refers to the lack of training of competent authorities as 
the key reason for this reality.
2238
  In addition to the lapses between theory and practice when it 
comes to Greek legislation and the non-application of the law when it comes to challenging the 
far-right, there is one more issue that is of a more general nature that also comes into play when 
considering the efficacy of the current legal framework for purposes of tackling the far-right. 
That is the issue of access to justice. The first element of this is the fact that Greece has slow 
judicial proceedings. A fact that illustrates this point is that out of the six hundred and sixty two 
judgements delivered against Greece by the ECtHR up until the end of 2012, over half, and 
particularly four hundred and thirty eight, concerned the excessive length of judicial 
proceedings.
2239
 The second element relates to the issue of legal aid as regulated by Law 
3226/2002, which provides legal aid, to migrants and also certain groups such as victims of 
trafficking. However, this does not extend to victims of hate crime. For purposes of ensuring that 
such victims are considered on an equal footing in the national legal system, this point should be 
rectified. As such, along with the particular issues above which prevent the effective legal 
challenging of the far-right, its actors and elements, the issue of effectively accessing justice is of 
utmost importance as only with an improvement in this situation will victims of the far-right be 
able to find justice through the prosecution of the perpetrators.  
 
5.4. Criminal Organisation – Prohibition of Establishment, Leadership and Participation  
Article 187 of the Criminal Code on criminal organisations is particularly significant for this 
dissertation given that it is the provision through which the State is attempting to tackle and 
potentially dismantle Golden Dawn and punish its leadership and members. Article 187(1) of the 
Criminal Code punishes with imprisonment of up to ten years whosoever establishes or becomes 
a member of a criminal organisation. Whoever leads such an organisation receives a prison 
sentence of at least ten years.
2240
 The article holds that a criminal organisation is an entity which 
includes three or more members that aims at committing an array of offences including, inter 
alia, homicide with intent, grievous bodily harm, arson and kidnapping.
2241
 The establishment of 
a criminal organisation is the provision of guidance and help with the steps necessary for the 
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recruitment of members for the creation of the organisation.
2242
 In relation to the establishment 
of a criminal organisation which comes with a lower sentence than running such an organisation, 
the Prosecutor’s Recommendation refers to it as a ‘momentary crime.’2243 Throughout the trial 
documents, Michaloliakos is referred to as the founder and leader of Golden Dawn. Yet in the 
Prosecutor’s Recommendation, in relation to Michaloliakos, no reference is made to the aspect 
of establishing a criminal organisation but rather his participation and leadership of a criminal 
organisation. The type, details or object of such crimes do not have to be pre-determined, all that 
is necessary is that pursuing the perpetration of such crimes is directly linked to the 
establishment or functioning of such a group, even if it is not required that the perpetration of 
such a crime reflects the will of all those who established and participate in the organisation and 
is not necessarily known by all members.
2244
 In brief, there are three elements necessary for the 
existence of a criminal organisation under the Criminal Code. Firstly, a qualitative element in 
that the group must be structured, a quantative element in that the group must be made up of 
three or more persons and a temporal element, in that there is requirement for ongoing action.
2245
 
The trial documents hold that the prohibitions arising from Article 187 occur for purposes of 
protecting public order and personal freedoms.
2246
 Moreover, the organisation must have an 
objective, common to the members/leaders. This can be financial, ideological or anything else. 
2247
 Further, the Prosecutor’s Recommendation noted that criminal organisations are extremely 
                                                          
2242
 Special Investigation Department: Athens Court of Appeal: Report to the President of the Greek Parliament 
regarding lifting the immunity of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament, Document Number 305 (19 February 2014)  
8 
2243
 Special Investigation Department: Athens Court of Appeal: Report to the President of the Greek Parliament 
regarding lifting the immunity of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament, Document Number 305( 19 February 2014)  
13 
2244
 Special Investigation Department: Athens Court of Appeal: Report to the President of the Greek Parliament 
regarding lifting the immunity of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament, Document Number 305( 19 February 2014)  
19 
2245
  Special Investigation Department: Athens Court of Appeal: Report to the President of the Greek Parliament 
regarding lifting the immunity of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament, Document Number 305(19 February 2014)  
7 
2246
 Special Investigation Department: Athens Court of Appeal: Report to the President of the Greek Parliament 
regarding lifting the immunity of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament, Document Number 305 (19 February 
2014),  11, 26 & Special Investigation Department: Athens Court of Appeal: Report to the President of the Greek 
Parliament regarding lifting the immunity of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament, Document Number 305 (19 
February 2014)  8 
2247
 Special Investigation Department: Athens Court of Appeal: Report to the President of the Greek Parliament 
regarding lifting the immunity of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament, Document Number 305(19 February 2014)  
10 prosecutor 11 
473 
 
dangerous due to their particular dynamic but also their internal objective of committing 
particularly serious crimes. 
2248
 
A most significant issue is the determination of who is to be considered a member of a criminal 
organisation since a conceptualisation of this term is important so as to understand under the 
criminal responsibility of Golden Dawn members. This point is elucidated in documents from the 
party’s trial, namely the pre-trial report and the Prosecutor’s Recommendation. They hold that a 
member of the organisation is anyone who subordinates his or her will to the will of the 
organisation, without his or her personal involvement in the operations of the organisation being 
necessary. His or her participation in the organisation is manifested by the participation in 
military training activities, festivities and talks, the commission of punishable acts, the 
propaganda of the organisation, funding of its activities, attracting new members to the 
organisation or any other forms of support.  It is of no relevance if the decisions are taken by the 
majority of members or, due to the embedded principle of obedience, if they are taken by the 
leader, as long as any decision is considered the decision of the organisation. Mere support of the 
organisation’s objectives extranesouly does not make him or her a member. In a criminal 
organisation, the desire of the group for the implementation of its objectives binds all members, 
regardless of their involvement in the design of the criminal acts, as long as each member is 
aware that he or she is contributing to the implementation of the organisation’s objectives 
through the duties granted to him/her.
2249
 For the above to be applicable, the element of malice is 
required with the members/leaders of the groups wanting to be part of the 
membership/management of the group. Such malice is demonstrated in the participation in all 
types of activities and particularly having knowledge of events in which force was used and 
crimes were committed, the acceptance of these as desirable objectives and non-repudiation of 
such acts and non-departure from the group.
2250
 As such, the definition of ‘member’ in the realm 
of a criminal organisation seems to denote that criminal responsibility extends to the active 
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members of the party even if that member does not take part in the commission of a particular 
crime, but, as is reasonable, does not extend to those who merely support the objectives of the 
party (and may even vote for this party).  
 
It must be noted that the Criminal Organisation provision was used to imprison members of the 
Revolutionary Organisation 17
th
 November in 2003. This organisation was a violent far-left 
organisation which carried out its crimes for twenty-seven years as an untraceable ghost 
organisation, carrying out over ninety attacks against Greek, American and European targets 
such as government officials. The important difference was that during the trial of 17
th
 
November, which ended on the 17
th
 December 2003,
2251
 the provision on terrorist organisations 
was not part of the Criminal Code since Article 187B became part of the Greek Criminal Code in 
2005 following amendments brought about by Law 3251/2004
2252
 adopted in July 2004. Unlike 
Golden Dawn, this organisation was habitually referred to as a terrorist organisation by 
competent authorities,
2253
 the media
2254
 and the public, something which is not the case  with 
Golden Dawn. One will never know whether the anti-terror provision of the Criminal Code 
would have been used for 17
th
 November had it existed at the time of its trial.  
 
It must be noted that, in connection with the absolutist approach adopted by the Greek legal 
order towards political parties and their non-prohibition, such an approach is not applicable when 
confronted with a criminal organisation. The guise of a political party cannot stand in the way of 
prosecuting the leadership and members of a criminal organisation, just because this entity is 
registered as a political party.
2255
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5.5. Terrorist Organisations: Core Difference 
In relation to a terrorist organisation, it must be noted that right-wing extremism has not been 
considered within this framework by the State as is the case with England and Wales. Either way, 
Article 187B of the Criminal Code holds that ‘a terrorist act is the commission of a criminal 
activity including, inter alia, homicide with intent, grievous bodily harm, arson or kidnapping in 
a manner or to an extent or under circumstances which may seriously harm a country or an 
international organisation and has the aim seriously to intimidate a population or illegally force a 
public authority or international organisation to carry out any act or omit to do so or to seriously 
harm or ruin the fundamental constitutional, political or financial infrastructure of a country or of 
an international organisation. No definition in any legislative, jurisprudential or policy document 
exists regarding issues of threshold in relation to the above definition, such as what the severity 
of harm may be and what could constitute an intimidating circumstance for a population. This 
could potentially retract from the clarity of the definition and does not facilitate its suitable use. 
In brief, the difference between a criminal organisation and a terrorist organisation is that the 
latter seeks to carry out the criminal acts noted in the relevant section with the aim of achieving 
results such as population intimidation or serious harm to a country’s infrastructure. On the other 
hand, a criminal organisation is lower on the hierarchy of harm given that it is simply termed as 
such as it entails three or more persons who conduct criminal activities with no overarching 
objective to cause collective harm as is the case with a terrorist organisation. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that the trial documents recognised the damage caused by Golden Dawn 
to, amongst others, the rule of law and the rights of others.  
 
It could be argued, that by relying on Article 187 of the Criminal Code rather than Article 187B, 
the authorities did not consider the activities of Golden Dawn to meet the threshold of seriously 
intimidating a population and/or seriously harming or ruining the fundamental constitutional or 
political infrastructure 
2256
 of Greece regardless of its rain of terror on the streets of Greece 
(predominantly Athens) and even though the trial documents recognise that the group’s activities 
were destructive to, amongst others, the rule of law.  
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6. Constitutional Law: Treatment of Political Parties by National Law 
6.1.1 Registration of Political Parties  
Given that this dissertation is examining the far-right movement in Greece as manifested in the 
form of, inter alia, political parties, the following section will provide an overview of the laws 
and regulations that exist in Greece for the registration and functioning of political parties and 
groups in the electoral process. Understanding the laws, regulations and systems that affect 
political parties is significant for purposes of conceptualising the effects they may have on the 
development of far-right parties.  
 
Article 29 of Law 3023/2002 deals with the establishment, legal personality and emblem of a 
political party. Part 1, therein, holds that, before a political party commences its activities, it files 
a founding statement at the Supreme Court in which it refers to the fact that the organisation and 
its activities serve the free functioning of a democratic State. Part 2, therein, holds that the party 
must inform the Supreme Court of its name, emblem and seat and submit, thereto, the party’s 
constitution or the founding statement signed by at least two hundred citizens who hold the right 
to vote.  Part 3 of the same article provides that the use of symbols, referred to in Article 37(5) of 
Presidential Decree 55/1999 as names and symbols of a political party, are forbidden. Relevant 
to this dissertation is that this law prohibited the use of names, symbols or emblems the symbols 
of the Junta or photographs of persons involved with the regime. Examples of the prohibition of 
a name can be found in a 2012 case before the Court of Cassation regarding a political party 
entitled Tyrannicides (Τυραννοκτόνοι) that was prohibited from taking part in the May 2012 
elections given that the Court considered that this name demonstrated the intention to ‘commit a 
criminal act’2257 and that this went against Article 29 (1) of the constitution and Article 37(5) of 
the relevant presidential decree.  However, all the party had to do was change its name so as to 
be able to take part in the elections. Thus, this approach demonstrates a certain level of 
superficiality in the judiciary’s approach to potentially dangerous political parties as it merely 
requested a change of name, making no inquest and assessment and taking no measures in 
relation to the party’s objectives.  In 2007, the Supreme Court had decided that the name ‘New 
Fascism’ (Νέος Φασισμός), to which the candidate affiliated himself, was not allowed and that 
he would have to put forward his candidature without any affiliation to such a title as such a title 
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goes against Article 37(5) of the Presidential Decree 96/5.6.2007 in combination with Article 
29(1) of the constitution.
2258
 Two issues can be concluded here. Firstly, that the judiciary is 
willing to take a broad approach to the meaning of Junta affiliated symbols and emblems as it 
considered the title ‘New Fascism’ as well as ‘Tyrannicides’ to fall within the framework of 
prohibited titles as provided for in Article 37(5) of the aforementioned decree. Secondly, that 
rather than investigating the aims and objectives of the particular candidate/party and considering 
whether his/her/its ideology sought to do harm to a democratic State, the Court simply removed 
the problematic title attached to his candidature in one case and requested the political party to 
change its name in the other, providing for a superficial result. Article 29(6) of Law 3023/2002 
holds that, from the date of its inception, a political party gains a legal personality for the 
effectuation of its constitutional mission. Thus, a political party does not have to submit its 
constitution but can merely submit its founding statement that includes its adherence to serving 
the free functioning of a democratic State. So, a political party can have a constitution which 
contains an array of fascist and/or racist statements and objectives but does not need to submit 
this to the State. At the same time, by simply pledging allegiance to the principles of Article 29 
of the constitution on the necessity of a political party to serve a free functioning democracy, this 
does not necessarily mean that it sincerely aims to do so. Moreover, the Greek legal order has no 
tools which can be used for checking the sincerity of the required declaration.
2259
 As noted by the 
prosecutor of the Court of Cassation to the Council of Europe Commissioner of Human Rights, 
this procedure is not used to ‘verify the lawfulness of the party concerned but acts in effect as a 
protocol book registering the applicant party.’2260  In fact, once there is an approval of the 
founding statement of the party, there seems to be no possibility for subsequently dismantling 
that party whilst there is no review process of the party’s ongoing objectives and activities.2261 It 
must be highlighted that, even if there existed an obligation in Greek law for political parties to 
submit their constitution before the inception of their activities, this does not necessarily 
correlate with the ousting of, inter alia, far-right parties from existence. This is because 
camouflaging its real intentions and objectives within a constitution is not a complex task. 
However, the fact that a State needs to incorporate its dedication to this principle when seeking 
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to be established demonstrates the weight that is attached to this requirement given that a 
political party can function legitimately only insofar as it accepts this principle, an issue that 
seems to have been ignored by the Greek State, as demonstrated in relation to its stance on 
Golden Dawn. Furthermore, banning a particular emblem or name does not necessarily correlate 
to ousting far-right elements from the political scene of the country. Either way, in the relevant 
law, only those related to the Junta are banned and thus others, such as the Nazi swastika are 
permissible, unless a broad understanding of emblems and symbols related to the Junta is 
adopted and, in the cases discussed above, such a broad approach was, in fact, adopted.  
 
In relation to the above, a comparison with the treatment of associations by the Civil Code of the 
Country is important. More particularly, Article 79, therein, provides that for purposes of 
registering an association, the founders or its management must submit an application to the 
competent court which includes its instrument of establishment, the names of the members of its 
administration and the association’s statutes with the signatures of the members and with the date. 
In fact, Article 80 of the Civil Code highlights the elements that need to be incorporated in the 
Constitution which include, amongst others, the association’s objectives, membership and 
funding. As such, unlike a political party, an association must deposit its statutes which, as 
demonstrated in two cases which reached the ECtHR, are up for examination and scrutiny by the 
Courts. More particularly in Sidiropoulos and others v Greece
2262
and L’affaire Maison de la 
Civilisation macédonienne et autres c. Grèce, Greece was found in violation of Article 11 for 
refusing to register an association entitled the ‘Home of Macedonian Civilisation’  
(Στέγη Μακεδονικού Πολιτισμού. The second case arose following Greece’s unwillingness to 
conform to the Sidiropoulos judgement. In both cases the national judiciary had rejected the 
application for the association’s formation on grounds pertaining to the dispute regarding the use 
of the name ‘Macedonia.’ As such, in relation to associations, the State and particularly the 
judiciary has the power to reject the formation of associations on grounds which they deem fit as 
these are not incorporated in the Civil Code. No equivalent of restriction is available for political 
parties with the strange result being that in Greece whilst parties such as Golden Dawn were 
allowed to register and subsequently enter the parliament, an association seeking to involve itself 
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with a matter which is historically disputed has been prevented from registering as an association, 
regardless of an ECtHR in its favour. 
 
6.1.2 The Post-Registration Phase 
The Greek legal system also provides for enhanced protection for the activities of MPs, limiting, 
to the extent possible, any censorship or restriction from the State. The principle of parliamentary 
immunity is protected by Article 62 of the constitution which holds that ‘during the 
parliamentary term the Members of Parliament shall not be prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned or 
otherwise confined without prior leave granted by Parliament.’2263 However, this article provides 
that ‘no leave is required when Members of Parliament are caught in the act of committing a 
felony.’ On the last point regarding felonies, in 2012 and following the increase in violence 
perpetrated against groups such as migrants and arbitrary identification checks by groups of 
citizens which also included MPs, a new circular was prepared regarding the issue of impunity. 
This circular allows for the arrest of MPs if they are committing a felony even if parliamentary 
immunity has not been lifted.
2264
 The principle of immunity granted to parliamentarians renders 
members of parliament almost untouchable with Golden Dawn conducting violent activities with 
little or no fear of prosecution. Following Fyssas’ murder, the parliament voted to lift this 
immunity so that they could be tried.   
 
In addition, following the arrests of the Golden Dawn leadership in 2013, the Greek Parliament 
amended Law 3023/2002 on the financing of political parties
2265
 and, in this way, decided that 
public funding may be ceased if a party’s leader or head of the parliamentary group or one fifth 
of its MPs are charged with involvement in a criminal or terrorist organisation.  However, if the 
defendants are found not guilty then the suspended funds must be returned to the party. Either 
way, as well as the practical effect of this amendment to the functioning of a far-right party, this 
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also reflects the possibility that a criminal organisation may, in fact, be acting under the guise of 
a political party.  
 
6.1.3 Political Parties – Concluding Comments 
It appears to be a relatively easy task to register a political party in Greece, so long as you have 
no emblems or symbols related to the Junta, your registration is supported by two hundred 
signatures and you pledge allegiance to the free functioning of a democratic State. In addition to 
this, the State’s ongoing approach has been that the Greek legal order does not allow for the 
prohibition of political parties. Thus, it is not only easy to register as a political party and hide 
your true intentions but also to continue functioning as one without the fear of prohibition unless, 
as with the case of Golden Dawn, your activities move into the realm of a criminal organisation. 
In fact, the only constructive measure the State may take against a party is the suspension of 
public funding in cases of serious criminal offences committed by its members and/or leadership 
and the prosecution of its MPs and, according to the situation as described above, this can take 
place with or without lifting their immunity. As such, unless the activities or rhetoric of a 
political party meet the high thresholds of a criminal organisation, it can seemingly act and speak 
freely in Greece, notwithstanding existing anti-racist legislation that prohibits, inter alia, 
organisations that incite racial or religious hatred or violence. This has been the case up until the 
arrest of Golden Dawn’s leadership and members. It may be the case that, following the end of 
the trial, the State adopts a different and more cautious approach to political parties. 
Unfortunately, the reality is that between political parties and criminal organisations there exists 
a lot of space in which a group can harm the daily existence of several groups of persons and 
actively work against doctrines such as the rule of law and democracy.  
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, Greece has experienced a far-right entity, registered as a political party but 
simultaneously acting in the manner one would expect from a violent subculture movement, with 
the only difference being that instead of a loose structure, Golden Dawn is characterised by a 
tight structure with a strict hierarchy. The elements of the Greek legal order relevant to 
challenging the far-right include the anti-racist law, the provisions of the Criminal Code on 
aggravation and sentencing and the anti-discrimination law. With the 2014 amendments to the 
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anti-racist law, the relevant tools became more restrictive, probably with the aim of or under the 
guise of protecting freedom of expression. Relevant conditions incorporated following the 2014 
amendments include the need for prohibited conduct that affects public order or causes a threat 
to the life, liberty or physical integrity of a person or persons. Although the far-right or 
comparable movements and groups are not predominantly tackled through public order 
legislation, as is the case for England and Wales, the issue of public order and the importance 
attached, thereto, when considering tackling the far-right is evident in the anti-racist law and the 
trial documents referred to above, in which the authors refer to the damage which criminal 
organisations cause to public order. Notwithstanding the above, the fact remains that the 
legislative tools available to the State to tackle the rhetoric and activities of Golden Dawn 
remained unused and, instead, this group carried out crimes with a high level of impunity. As 
reflected in, inter alia, parliamentary discussions on the banning of Golden Dawn, the strict 
approach taken to non-interference to freedoms, such as those of expression and association, 
systematically stood in the way of steps been taken against the party. Therefore, although a non-
abuse of rights clause is incorporated in the Greek constitution which essentially embodies 
militant democracy, the State’s stance towards the activities of Golden Dawn was far from this. 
The almost libertarian approach taken to the aforementioned freedoms and the dismissal of the 
need for protecting democracy had, in the case of Greece, harmful effects on individual and 
societal levels. Further, even in cases pertaining to the activities of Golden Dawn’s that were 
brought to justice, the judiciary often steered away from looking at racist motives, whilst never 
taking any serious steps to examining the relationship between Golden Dawn and the array of 
violent activities occurring in Greece although acknowledging affiliation of perpetrators to 
Golden Dawn. At the same time, Golden Dawn disseminated hateful ideas through speech both 
in and out of parliament, again with no fear of repercussions. This state of affairs continued up 
until 2013 and up until the point that the State’s inactivity and non-use of the legal tools had 
allowed Golden Dawn to develop extensively to the point where it could be prosecuted as a 
criminal organisation. The effects of this trial on today’s situation include the fall of hate crime 
in Greece and a slight increase in the use of the above-discussed tools in some cases. This 
statement is made with reservation to the fact that no such systematic approach can be discerned 
whilst not enough case-law yet exists to make concrete conclusions on this point. As well as 
criminal law, Greece has an anti-discrimination framework through which the activities of a 
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Golden Dawn member has, on one occasion been tackled. This is minimal in comparison to the 
number of times the party as an organised entity has, for example, provided goods and services 
such as blood donations or soup kitchens to Greeks only. In addition to the non-reliance on 
legislative tools, it is the absolutist stance adopted by the State towards political parties, which 
has facilitated Golden Dawn’s untouchability. This emanates from the reality that, in Greece, 
political parties, even ones with dangerous and undemocratic intentions, can register and 
function without any limitations with the only point of State intervention being when such 
entities cross into the threshold of a criminal organisation. Evidently the registration and (non) 
regulation of political parties constituted a key weakness in tackling Golden Dawn. It seems to 
be the case that the State had omitted to pay any consideration to the qualification of Article 
29(1) insofar as political parties must serve a free functioning democracy as well as its 
international obligations when it comes to prohibiting racist parties. As such, two issues must be 
noted. Firstly, that the outcome of the Golden Dawn trial is still pending and, therefore, its effect 
on the State’s future approach to the far-right remains unknown. What one may hope for is that 
the State will realise the damage of its previous inaction in relation to the far-right as well as its 
international and European human rights obligations. Secondly, even if the defendants on trial 
are found guilty and Golden Dawn is deemed a criminal organisation and thus dismantled, this 
will not offer a long-term solution vis-a-vis challenging the far-right. In this realm, the issues of 
its large electoral support, which continued even following the prosecution of its leadership and 
members, will need to be addressed. In sum, Greece has legislative tools that can be used to 
tackle the far-right. Acknowledging the non-absolute nature of political parties will be a good 
starting point for subsequent measures.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
483 
 
CONCLUSION 
Right-wing extremism in Europe is on the rise. The financial crisis, the arrival of large numbers 
of migrants and refugees, combined with the lack of coherent migration and asylum policies on 
national and regional scales, as well as the terrorist attacks carried out by the Islamic State, as 
single phenomena or in combination with each other, have created a fertile soil upon which far-
right political parties, non-party groups and the subculture milieu have mobilised support. The 
UK’s far-right political spectrum is led by UKIP, a political party endorsing far-right rhetoric, 
notwithstanding its attempts to appear as a mainstream party. In 2015, this country witnessed far-
right non-party groups and the subculture milieu becoming smaller but more violent. 
Furthermore, the vote of the British people to leave the EU is worrying for a multitude of reasons, 
including the possibility that part of the UK’s population may possess racist sentiments. It must 
not be ingored that anti-immigrant rhetoric was strongly utilised by the ‘Yes’ campaign. 
Moreover, the rise in hate speech and hate crime following the Brexit vote reflects that the issue 
of hate, racism and far-right extremism do exist in this country. Greece’s far-right is essentially 
concentrated into one entity, namely Golden Dawn, a political party which simultaneously acts 
as a violent subculture milieu albeit with a rigid structure. The differences between the 
contextual framework of the two countries has allowed for a broad conceptualisation of the types 
of entities that can inhabit the far-right, the means and methods of manifestations of far-right 
hate and the content of such manifestations. This dissertation defends the thesis that Conventions 
such as the ICERD, the ICCPR and/or the ECHR and/or membership of the EU impose a 
supranational obligation on countries to restrict the freedoms of expression and/or assembly 
and/or association in the ambit of the rhetoric and/or activities of extremist right-wing entities, 
which target, amongst others, ethnic or religious groups. As well as the obligations imposed on a 
supranational level, the dissertation’s position is also based on the premise that the far-right as 
organised in any form, be it a political party, a non-party group or the subculture milieu, poses a 
threat to doctrines such as the rule of law and is destructive to the rights and freedoms of its 
victims on a micro (individual), meso (community) and macro (societal) level.  
 
International and European Level 
On a UN level, it was demonstrated that the doctrine of militant democracy underlies the 
approach taken by this institution to possible dangers to democracy. Article 4 of the ICERD lays 
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down a positive obligation on States to prohibit racist expression, racist violence and 
organisations and propaganda which promote and incite racial discrimination.  Article 20 of the 
ICCPR prohibits any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence. Article 5 of the ICCPR is the non-destruction clause. In 
its jurisprudence and Concluding Observations, the HRC has underlined the non-permissibility 
of hateful expression, association and assembly whilst the CERD has underlined, inter alia, that 
prohibiting racist associations is of utmost importance. On a CoE level, although the ECHR does 
not incorporate a provision similar to, for example, Article 20 of the ICCPR, it nevertheless 
restricts the tools that can be used by destructive movements such as the far-right and/or those 
belonging thereto,  namely the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly and the freedom 
of association on the grounds of, amongst others, protecting the rights and freedoms of others. 
This Convention also incorporates a non-destruction clause in the form of Article 17. The 
analysis of Strasbourg jurisprudence demonstrates that speech and association that falls within 
the realm of far-right rhetoric is not permissible, without the necessity of such speech or 
association amounting to and/or inciting, for example, violence. On a CoE level, there also exists 
the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime concerning the Criminalisation of Acts 
of a Racist and Xenophobia Nature Committed through Computer Systems. This criminalises, 
inter alia, the dissemination of racist and xenophobic material through computer systems as well 
as racist and xenophobic insults and threats disseminated through such systems. The drafters of 
this document acknowledged the significant role played by the Internet as a platform for the 
dissemination of racist and xenophobic expression. However, neither country considered in this 
dissertation has ratified the Additional Protocol.  On an EU level, the analysis concluded that 
Article 7 of the TEU is the strongest EU tool for tackling the far-right due to its primacy and its 
innovative nature. However, these positive elements are hampered on a practical level given that 
this article has not yet been applied by the EU, as demonstrated in its approach to Fidesz’s 
Hungary. Furthermore, there exists the Council Framework Decision on Combatting Certain 
Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law which 
criminalises activities and speech conducted by racist and xenophobic entities, a tool that can be 
directly used to combat the rhetoric and activities of the far-right. Thus, there are three central 
conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of the instruments available at a UN, CoE and 
EU level. Firstly, overall speech and activities that fall within the realm of the far-right are to be 
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prohibited. However, the thresholds attached to the prohibition of hate speech differ. For 
example, the ICERD provides that all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to racial discrimination or incitement to violence against any race or group of persons 
of another colour or ethnic origin are to be prohibited. On the other hand, the ICCPR prohibits 
any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence. Thus, the two UN documents are not in conformity with one another when 
it comes to thresholds given that the ICCPR necessitates that the particular expression must 
constitute incitement whereas the ICERD allows for prohibited expression to include the 
dissemination of particular ideas without the need for it to amount to incitement. Not only does 
this limit coherence between instruments of the same institution but also offers a lower level of 
protection to religious groups which are not incorporated into the ICERD. Secondly, the EU 
Framework Decision, referred to above, prohibits the public incitement to violence or hatred, but 
not discrimination, directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by 
reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. Member States may 
choose to criminalise such conduct insofar as it affects public order or if it is threatening, abusive 
or insulting. Thus, by leaving out the issue of discrimination and incorporating the possibility to 
criminalise if certain grounds are met, such as a threat to public order, the threshold of prohibited 
speech is raised significantly in comparison to relevant UN provisions, and renders punishment 
more difficult to attain. Lastly, the result of the above is that a country which is a Member State 
of the European Union and a party to the aforementioned international documents has differing 
obligations in the realm of speech and conduct of the far-right. The UK has not incorporated the 
ICERD or the ICCPR into national law and, as such, Article 4 of the former and Article 20 of the 
latter, which are central tools for States to challenge the rhetoric, activities and thus effects of the 
far-right, are not part of national law. The competent UN committees have reiterated that the 
United Kingdom must ratify these Conventions for purposes of complying with the obligations 
therein, but, to date, no such action has been taken. Further, the country has imposed reservations 
on the articles discussed above, citing the freedoms of expression and of association as the key 
grounds for doing so. Greece, on the other hand, has ratified both the above Conventions with no 
reservation, incorporating them into national law. However, their practical efficacy has been no 
more forethcoming than in the case of the UK given that, notwithstanding their ratification, 
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Greece has almost completely ignored its obligations arising therefrom, rendering them futile in 
challenging the far-right.  
 
Criminal Law as a Tool to Tackle the Far-Right: 
The Role played by the Conceptualisation of Harm 
The United Kingdom has developed a public order framework through which the rhetoric and 
activities of the far-right can be tackled. Although this country appears to place particular 
significance on the freedom of expression but also assembly and association (directly or by 
extension), this significance deteriorates when there is a threat to public order. The Public Order 
Act 1986 provides two mechanisms to tackle the type of hate looked at in this dissertation. Part 3 
of the Act prohibits acts intended or likely to stir up racial hatred with such acts falling within the 
realm of expression such as use of words or behaviour, written material or the public 
performance of a play. Such acts must be threatening, abusive or insulting. It also makes the 
possession of racially inflammatory material an offence. Part 3A of the Act deals with hatred 
against persons on religious grounds and follows the structure of Part 3 but limits the genre of 
acts to those of a threatening nature, removing insulting and abusive as incorporated in the 
section on racial hatred. Under Part 3A, intention is necessary, unlike its racial hatred counterpart. 
The threshold for prosecution of religious hatred is further heightened through the inclusion of a 
freedom of expression provision, which seeks to avoid punishment of, inter alia, discussion, 
criticism or expression of antipathy. This provision was considered necessary by the House of 
Lords who held that freedom of expression had to be enhanced in the realm of religion, even if 
such expression is considered insulting or abusive (but not hateful). As a result of these safety 
nets, in the name of expression, it is very difficult to enforce Part 3A. 
 
The public order framework was the central one which the CPS relied upon when confronted 
with the rhetoric and acts of the far-right in England and Wales. This is reflected in cases such as 
Mark Anthony Norwood v Director of Public Prosecutions
2266
 and Kendall v Director of Public 
Prosecutions
2267
 which both dealt with the conduct of BNP members. What became apparent 
from the jurisprudential analysis of public order cases in the realm of the far-right was the 
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reliance by the CPS on Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 which prohibits general 
harassment, alarm and distress, rather than the provisions tailored to tackling religious or racial 
hatred. The CPS has opted for this route as it is an easier one, not requiring approval by the 
Attorney-General. Notwithstanding that there is no equivalent of the British public order 
framework in Greece, this doctrine does, to a certain extent, come into play in relation to 
challenging the far-right therein. More particularly, following the 2014 amendments made to the 
anti-racist Law 927/1979 for purposes of harmonising national law with the EU Framework 
Decision on Racism and Xenophobia, Greece incorporated the requirement that such conduct is, 
inter alia, likely to affect public order. Thus, in relation to Greece, the incorporation of the public 
order ground in the anti-racist legislation essentially restricted its applicability by heightening the 
threshold of harm within the anti-racist legislation. Further, the trial documents for the current 
proceedings against Golden Dawn refer to the fact that the activities of Golden Dawn constitute a 
threat to public order and so put forth this premise as a justification for finding that this party 
essentially constitutes a criminal organisation.  
 
The central piece of criminal legislation through which speech and activities of the far-right in 
Greece are theoretically tackled is the anti-racist law. Although the statute is ‘on punishing acts 
or activities aiming at racial discrimination,’ following the 2014 amendments, it incorporated 
grounds, such as disability, as a protected characteristic. Law 927/1979 directly criminalises 
conduct defined in the Framework Decision including the public incitement to violence, hatred 
or discrimination against a person or group of persons due to characteristics such as race if 
certain grounds, such as public order are threatened. For the most part, this Law directly 
transposes the wording and meaning of the Framework Decision. There is no such equivalent in 
England and Wales which instead tackles issues, such as hate speech, through the Public Order 
Act 1986. The anti-racist legislation has existed in Greece since 1979 but has seldom been relied 
on to tackle the far-right, unlike England and Wales, which, although it has no anti-hate and/or 
anti-racist legislation, per se, has incorporated relevant issues and concepts within other 
frameworks. When considering the frameworks through which the two countries theoretically or 
practically tackle the far-right, it is significant to look at the conceptualisation of harm. More 
particularly, England and Wales criminalises harm resulting from, for example, racial hatred, 
within a public order sphere, thereby establishing a necessary link between the racially hateful 
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conduct, on the one hand, and the effects this has on public order on the other. Post-2014, Greece 
conceptualised the issue of harm by incorporating the necessity for prohibited conduct to affect 
public order. The central conclusion that can be drawn from this is that both countries consider 
societal damage, rather than individual or group harm, as the key driver for criminally 
challenging the far-right. In the case of Greece, it could simply be that the country saw an 
opportunity, in the form of the Framework Decision, to restrict the scope and applicability of the 
anti-racist law.  
 
Aggravation and Sentencing 
In addition to the provisions which tackle, for example, racially hateful conduct, both countries 
provide for aggravating circumstances, such as racial hate, to be taken into account when 
sentencing a perpetrator. In relation to England and Wales, Part 2 of The Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 creates certain racially and religiously aggravated offences. This provision is particularly 
significant in the realm of combatting far-right conduct given that it can be used in combination 
with Article 5 of the Public Order Act to punish relevant conduct without the obstacles that can 
be found in Section 3 and, even more so, Section 3A of the same Act, if such conduct falls within 
the sphere of the Crime and Disorder Act. In Greece, Article 81A of the Criminal Code holds 
that if an act occurs due to the perpetrator’s hate towards characteristics such as the victim’s race, 
colour or religion, the Court hands down an enhanced sentence to the perpetrator, one which is 
not suspendable and/or a higher fine. In Greece, however, as well as the habitual disregard of the 
Police to the potentially hateful motives of a perpetrator, a reality which affects the examination 
of a case at the investigative phase, a central problem in relation to aggravation and sentencing is 
that the judiciary has also proved unwilling to acknowledge such aggravation when handing 
down sentences, even in the most blatantly racist cases. The non-consideration of hateful motives 
by the Greek judiciary contributed to the impunity of Golden Dawn members allowing them to 
carry out their criminal acts. What must be underlined is that the consideration of aggravation 
due to, inter alia, racial grounds, if adequately upheld, is a strong tool to tackle the far-right since, 
by enhancing this mechanism, far-right crimes are placed higher on the hierarchy of severity in 
relation to crimes without such motives. Therefore, any disregard of the sphere of aggravation 
directly affects the efficacy of tackling the far-right, as reflected in the case of Greece.  
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Anti-Terror Legislation as a Tool to Challenge the Far-Right 
In England and Wales, anti-terror legislation has been relied upon when dealing with violent 
non-party groups such as Aryan Strike Force and Radical Volunteer Force. This legislation is 
thus, reserved for overtly violent groups. Important to note is that the proscription of an 
association is only permitted insofar as such as an association is of a terrorist nature, as per the 
2000 Terrorism Act. However, no far-right groups have yet been proscribed within this sphere. 
In relation to Greece, Article 187B of the Criminal Code incorporates a provision on terrorist 
acts and organisations and defines such acts as the commission of a criminal activity which may 
seriously harm a country or an international organisation and has the aim, inter alia, seriously to 
intimidate a population or seriously to harm or ruin the fundamental constitutional, political or 
financial infrastructure of a country or of an international organisation. The definition of acts 
which fall in the sphere of terrorism differs from those falling within a criminal organisation 
since, in relation to the latter, there is no requirement of such acts affecting, amongst others, the 
infrastructure of the country.  Three issues must be underlined when considering the provision on 
terrorist organisations as incorporated into the Criminal Code. Firstly, that although a higher 
threshold of harm is associated with a terrorist organisation, the penalty is the same as that of a 
participation or leadership in a criminal organisation. Secondly, that in the case of Golden Dawn, 
the State opted to utilise the criminal organisation provision, appearing to disassociate the 
increased severity of harm, as set out in the Criminal Code within the sphere of terrorist 
organisations. Thirdly, that even if the State opted to consider Golden Dawn as a terrorist 
organisation, the practical results of this choice would be irrelevant given that the penalties are 
the same as those relating to the prohibition of participating or leading a criminal organisation. 
This demonstrates an oddity in the legislation which, on the one hand recognises the enhanced 
severity of the harm that results from the formation of and participation in a terrorist organisation, 
yet does not attach equivalently enhanced sentences on the other.    
 
Non-Discrimination Framework 
Comparing the use of the non-discrimination framework in England and Wales and Greece in the 
sphere of the far-right is interesting. In England and Wales, although the Equality Act 2010 was 
relied upon by the Equality and Human Rights Commission to challenge the racist membership 
criteria set out by the BNP, this framework has been predominately utilised by members of the 
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far-right, namely the BNP, to argue that they had been discriminated against in their employment 
due, directly or indirectly, to their membership of the BNP. The competent tribunals have 
essentially found non-recruitment or dismissal of BNP members to be legitimate, a legitimacy 
which was not, however, extended to the dismissal of a BNP member from a trade union.  In 
relation to Greece, the Law on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment regardless 
of Racial or Ethnic Origin, Religion or other Beliefs, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation 2005 
has been used against a bus driver, a self-professed member of Golden Dawn, who prohibited 
two persons of African descent from entering the bus. In another case, which involved the 
prohibition of accessing medical services of a doctor to Jews in general, the anti-racist law had to 
be invoked since there was no identifiable victim. What is of utmost importance is the fact that 
Golden Dawn has systematically discriminated against persons due to their ethnicity by 
providing goods and services, such as soup kitchens and medical services, to Greeks only. Even 
though the State could not use the anti-discrimination framework unless a victim of such 
practices could be identified, it could have enforced the anti-racist legislation for purposes of 
criminalising this conduct. It chose not to, thereby, allowing this entity to continue, unchallenged, 
to discriminate and hate.  
 
Registration and Functioning of Political Parties 
The extent to which the laws and regulations governing political parties could affect the 
participation and development of far-right political parties was considered. What became 
apparent, following the inspection of the laws in each country, was that the frameworks which 
regulate political parties are not a serious obstacle for the far-right. In England and Wales, The 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 prohibits the registration of political 
parties with offensive emblems, names or descriptions, although no equivalent regulation exists 
to prohibit offensive constitutions. Moreover, the term ‘offensive’ is not defined in the relevant 
law. The Electoral Commission has no power to prohibit the registration and/or functioning of a 
political party with a hateful constitution whilst the Equality and Human Rights Commission can 
only commence action for purposes of ensuring non-discrimination vis-à-vis party membership. 
Article 29 of the Greek Constitution provides that Greek citizens with the right to vote may 
establish and join political parties ‘the organization and activity of which must serve the free 
functioning of democratic government.’ However, the only step that needs to be taken by its 
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leadership for purposes of demonstrating their allegiance to this requirement is to file a founding 
statement at the Supreme Court referring thereto. No subsequent check can be made as to the 
validity and/or sincerity of this declaration by the Greek State and no monitoring of the activities 
of political parties can subsequently occur. As such, political parties hold a particularly sacred 
and almost untouchable position in the Greek legal order, something which directly contributed 
to the non-implication of the State in Golden Dawn’s rhetoric and activities as these occurred 
under the guise of a political party. Thus, neither of the countries under consideration possesses 
militant democratic tools which can be relied upon to monitor and/or regulate and/or prohibit a 
political party. However, in England and Wales, action has been taken by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission against BNP, due to its racist membership, and the State has relied 
on the Public Order framework to tackle the conduct of BNP members. On the other hand, in 
Greece, apart from on two occasions (not including for purposes of the current trial) where 
parliament lifted the immunity of Golden Dawn MPs for purposes of investigating criminal acts, 
the Greek State took no measures to monitor and/or restrict and/or punish the activities which 
were occurring within the sphere of Golden Dawn as a political party, due to the almost absolute 
nature such an entity enjoys in Greek Law and the resulting lack of regulatory or other measures 
in the realm of political parties.  
 
Final Comments  
In light of the above, the far-right is a phenomenon we are witnessing in Europe on a national 
and regional level with countries, such as Greece, demonstrating the tragic effects of the rhetoric 
and activities of the far-right. Far-right rhetoric and acts are prohibited on an international, 
European and national level, albeit with varying thresholds of harm associated with the different 
levels and, also, within particular frameworks. What becomes clear is that militant democracy is 
more emphatic as a doctrine underlying provisions and jurisprudence on a supranational level 
rather than on a national level, despite the infiltration of this doctrine to the framework of the 
latter as a result of harmonisation procedures between countries and international documents. 
The shortcomings of taking an opposite approach to that enshrined in militant democracy can 
best be illustrated in the case of Greece and the systematic denial of the State to prohibit a neo-
Nazi party, in the name of free expression and association. Moreover, one of the most striking 
facts on a supranational level is the inactivity of the EU. More particularly, Article 7 of the TEU 
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which is available to EU institutions to tackle the threat of the far-right in Member States, lays 
dormant, even though the EU is witnessing a rise of this phenomenon in the form of governing 
parties, such as in Hungary, but also as facilitated by an inactive State, as was the case in Greece 
(up until Golden Dawn’s trial). On national levels, Greece has a theoretically well-rounded 
legislative sphere to tackle the rhetoric and acts of the far-right but has not used the tools 
available. The result has been the development of Golden Dawn into a criminal organisation 
spreading fear and violence on the streets, a consequence which it is currently on trial for. In 
Greece, although there has been an anti-racist law since 1979, it has seldom been used and in 
England and Wales, although there is no anti-racist law, per se, the public order framework 
incorporates provisions on, for example, racist and religious hatred. However, England and 
Wales, unlike Greece, has sought to criminalise behaviour falling within this sphere whilst its 
Equality and Human Rights Commission commenced proceedings against the BNP for its 
discriminatory Constitution. Unfortunately, no such equivalent actions and measures can be seen 
in Greece. The reason for this has not been the lack of a legislative framework but the limited 
will of the State to mobilise against Golden Dawn in combination with the particularly sacred 
position attached to political parties, all effectuated in contravention with the country’s 
supranational obligations. In relation to England and Wales, the legislation relevant to 
challenging the far-right in England and Wales will not be directly affected by the UK’s exit 
from the EU as the relevant statutes were not created for purposes of harmonisation with EU law. 
However, its departure from the European family will render inapplicable the Article 7 of the 
TEU mechanism which, either way has never been used but, more importantly, shall prevent the 
country from European cooperation for purposes of tackling the far-right. In relation to political 
parties in England and Wales, the relative simplicity of registering political parties, the lack of 
control of political parties once they are registered and the absence of any legislative provision 
on the prohibition of political parties (unless they are an entity falling within the anti-terror 
framework) demonstrates the significance attached to such entities. The only issue that directly 
affects the development of political parties in this country is the electoral system itself, as 
demonstrated in UKIP’s case.  In addition to the public order sphere and the Greek anti-racism 
legislation, both countries have a non-discrimination framework as well as anti-terror provisions 
which may be used in regard to certain far-right acts and rhetoric. In relation to England and 
Wales, the non-discrimination framework has been used only in relation to the BNP’s 
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discriminatory Constitution whilst the anti-terror legislation has been reserved for the violent 
subculture milieu. In Greece, although the non-discrimination framework was directly relevant to 
the exclusionary practices of Golden Dawn in relation to accessing goods and services, the 
legislation was only relied upon in one case involving a self-professed Golden Dawn member 
and not vis-à-vis the organised activities of the party, such as the soup kitchens for Greeks only. 
In light of the above, in Greece, the far-right, in the form of Golden Dawn, was left to operate 
freely for years without any restriction whilst all the suspects for the crimes that fall within the 
realm of a criminal organisation have been set free given that the detention period has passed 
without the case being finalised.  Of utmost interest and significance to the far-right spectrum in 
Greece is, not only, the judgement of the Court in the case against Golden Dawn but, also, the 
effects, if any, of this judgement on the future stance of the State towards the far-right, even if 
this is embodied in a far-right political party. In light of the above, doctrines and elements such 
as public order, anti-terror and non-discrimination are all part of the legislative frameworks of 
the chosen case-studies, albeit being developed and incorporated in different manners. What is 
emphatically different in the two jurisdictions and, subsequently, what we learn from the 
combination of the two, is the stark variation in the approach of the State. Although Greece had 
the legislative tools to tackle the rhetoric and activity of Golden Dawn, it never did, leaving it 
instead to systematically spread fear and hate. On the other hand, small and structured steps such 
as the action of the Equality and Human Rights Commission against the discriminatory 
constitution of the BNP, bans on the activity of representatives of far-right groups such as Britain 
First and the prohibition of entry of Geert Wilders on grounds of public order have all constituted 
pieces of the puzzle of challenging the far-right in England and Wales.  As such, what can be 
discerned from the analysis of the two jurisdictions is the need for a systematic approach to be 
taken by the State to challenge the far-right, through criminal and non-criminal procedures.  
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